The transformation of war is a major problem in the study of Early Modern military history. This history dissertation addresses the pace and nature of military transformation in a war between Sweden and Denmark in 1643–1645. The focus of this investigation is on insurgency and small war between regular soldiers, armed peasants, and hybrid contingents of both in Scania, Norway, Jutland, and Holstein during the final years of the Thirty Years War.
SNAPPHANAR AND POWER STATES

INSURGENCY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR
IN SWEDEN AND DENMARK 1643–1645
Olli Bäckström

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ABSTRACT

The thesis argues that Torstensson’s War between Sweden and Denmark in 1643–1645 indicates a transformation of war in the field of insurgency and irregular warfare. This argument emerges from content analysis applied to primary source evidence. The thesis aims for a qualified and nuanced appraisal of the nature and limits of the proposed transformation of war. The thesis is based on archive sources as well as contemporaneous printed literature. Before discussing Torstensson’s War, the thesis illustrates the institutions and structures of warfare in early modern Scandinavia. The origins of the war did not emerge from irregular warfare or any endemic conflict in the Danish-Swedish borderlands. Sweden made some preparations to muster and arm peasant levies in the coming war.

The Swedish government allowed its generals to treat enemy peasants as hostile combatants if they saw reason to do so. Both the Swedes and the Danes used ploys or stratagems to overcome fortified places. Many of these stratagems involved the infiltration of regular soldiers disguised as peasants. The Danish government was materially ill-prepared for war, and it had great difficulties in arming the peasant levies. Both Sweden and Denmark used propaganda and misinformation to affect the opposing nation’s commonality, although much of the propaganda and information warfare were directed to international audiences. The small war in Holstein and Bremen was conducted mainly by regular Danish forces that were often joined by local militiamen and insurgents. The main Swedish tools for fighting the insurgency and small war in Holstein and Bremen were the mobile armies led by Helmut Wrangel and Hans Königsmarck. The Swedish government made some preparations for counterinsurgency in Scania. The initial Swedish advance into Scania was not effectively hindered by the peasant levies or the insurgents. Later the Scanian insurgents presented a notable threat to Swedish lines of communication and managed to launch raids into Swedish territory.

During Torstensson’s War, both sides employed peasants as spies and informants. Devastation caused by war was considerable in Scania and Holstein alike, but its scale cannot be sufficiently quantified from the existing sources. The snaphance or firelock musket in the hands of peasant irregulars was a catalyst for a transformation of war, as it had many features that made it suitable for guerrilla warfare. This transformation signified movement towards the modern concept of ‘people’s war’, as articulated by Carl von Clausewitz. The empowerment of insurgent peasants forced the Swedes to employ specific measures to counter the insurgency. The Danish
government largely devolved the management and command of insurgency to the local elites and institutions. The insurgencies in Holstein and Bremen were at least partly based on peasant communalism. Peasant collaboration with the enemy and unsanctioned engagement in localized truces occurred at all theatres of war. The Swedish counterinsurgency efforts involved opportunity costs, which made them additional burdens to the Swedish power state.

War in the Norwegian front was fought as hybrid warfare by combined forces of regular soldiers and levied peasants. The effectiveness of the Norwegian hybrid forces was hindered by material shortcomings and some peasants’ reluctance to participate in the war. The Swedish power state failed to put its material resources to their best potential use in the conduct of hybrid warfare. The most functional Swedish institution in hybrid warfare was the semi-standing force of the miners’ militia or bergsknektar, which provided the foundation for the later standing army of the Carolean era. Norwegian hybrid warfare was managed and controlled by the statholder Hannibal Sehested. Swedish control of hybrid warfare had to be partially devolved to the provincial governors or landshövdingar. The treatment of captured peasant combatants in Torstensson’s War was not consistent, but moderation was generally preferred over brutality. Swedish plans for the pacification of occupied Jämtland and Härjedalen involved the banishment of potentially troublesome groups yet also offered the general population a vested interest in the new rule. The transformation of war as evidenced by insurgency and irregular warfare in Torstensson’s War generally lends support for the Military Revolution theory, but this transformation needs to be qualified with notions of evolution and devolution in early modern warfare.

Keywords: Insurgency, Military Revolution, Thirty Years War, Torstensson’s War
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TIIVISTELMÄ


Talonpoikien yhteistoimintaa vihollisen kanssa sekä epävirallisia paikallisrauhoja esiintyi sodan kaikilla rintamilla. Ruotsin käymä vastakumouksellinen sota sisälsi vaihtoehtoisiskustannuksia, jotka muodostuivat ylimääräisiksi taakoiksi ruotsalaiselle mahtivaltiolle.


**Avainsanat:** Kumouksellinen sota, sodankäynnin vallankumous, kolmikymmenvuotinen sota, Torstenssonin sota.
ABBREVIATIONS

ADFT  Aktstykker til Oplysning især af Danmarks indre Forhold i ældre Tid
AORSH  Akstykker og Oplysninger til Rigsraadets og Stændermødernes Historie
APW  Acta Pacis Westphalicae
BHG  Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius
DBB  Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale Illustrantia
DBL  Dansk Biografisk Lexikon
DGA  De la Gardiska archivet
DRA  Rigsarkivet Copenhagen
HH  Historiska Handlingar
HSH  Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens historia
KBB  Kancelliets brevbøger vedrørende Danmarks indre forhold i uddrag
KCFEB  Kong Christian den fjerdes egenhændige breve
KD  Kjøbenhavns Diplomatarium
KrA  Krigsarkivet Stockholm
NRA  Riksarkivet Oslo
NRR  Norske Rigs-Registranter tildeels i uddrag
NSM  Neues staatsbürgerliches Magazin
NSNA  Nordalbingische Studien, neues Archiv
PCB  Prins Christian (V.)s breve
RAOSB  Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefvexling
RR  Riksregistratur
SBH  Svenskt biografiskt handlexikon
SHGV  Sammlung der hamburgischen Gesetze und Verfassungen
SNFSH  Samlinger til Det Norske Folks Sprog og Historie
SRA  Riksarkivet Stockholm
SRRP  Svenska riksrådets protokoll
SSNE  Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database
UUB  Uppsala Universitetsbibliotek
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I dedicate this book to the memory of my father Jarmo Bäckström (1943–2003).

Olli Bäckström
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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 FOREWORD

On 6 May 2007 something was afoot in the southern Swedish meadows of Borstbäcken. A group of archaeologists scanned the soil with metal detectors, while a crime scene investigation unit of the Malmö police department searched for scents with the help of a four-legged detective named Baui. This was not the first time the meadows had been subjected to intense scrutiny. In the previous year three archaeologists had made initial surveys with metal detectors and found evidence that spoke of violent events: horse shoes too small for today’s robust equines, rusty knives, lead balls, and a piece of a pistol’s firing mechanism. The forensic investigation sought to shed light on an alleged massacre that had taken place in Borstbäcken 363 years earlier. On 25 March 1644, the local tradition insisted, 500 peasants from the parish of Färs fought a battle there against a Swedish cavalry contingent under the command of General Major Hans Wachtmeister. The battle ended disastrously for the peasants, most of whom were killed where they stood. The archaeologists and the police hoped to uncover a mass grave, which local folk tradition placed in a ravine near the supposed site of the battle. The crime site investigators were confident that Baui and his canine colleagues would uncover any existing human remains, even ones that were 363 years old. “If there are any bone remains here, I would be very surprised if the dogs did not find them”, one of the forensic technicians told a local news reporter.1 After a week of intense searching the investigators had found only a small horse shoe and a knife. There were no human remains or any indication of a mass grave. Nevertheless, the archaeologists expressed satisfaction with the findings. The fact that musket balls and other military residue were discovered at the alleged site of the battle was not without significance. “We can here vindicate an oral tradition that tells of a battle taking place in this very location”, Bo Knarrström, the supervisor of the excavation, told the newspaper Ystads Allehanda.2

The subject of this monograph is the larger historical context behind the alleged massacre at Borstbäcken – that is, the transformation of war manifested in irregular warfare between Sweden and Denmark during Torstensson’s War in 1643–1645 (officially the war ended in 1645 but hostilities resumed briefly in Bremervörde in early 1646). Traditional historiography has dealt with Torstensson’s War in connection with the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), and has also employed a view that looks at the war from the perspectives of interstate politics and conventional warfare, first and foremost from that of naval combat. Irregular warfare by peasant insurgents, the so-called snapphanar, has been typically addressed only in the context of the later Scanian War in 1675–1679. Furthermore, Torstensson’s War has not yet been discussed in the context of recent military theory.

This book attempts to offer new insight into Torstensson’s War by looking at it from the perspective of the transformation of war. This latter concept is often associated

1 Ystads Allehanda 7/May/2007.
2 Ystads Allehanda 10/May/2007.
with Martin van Creveld’s 1991 book of the same name, in which Creveld provocingly argued that future wars will not be fought by nation-states but by terrorists, guerrillas, and criminal gangs. Modern military theorists, particularly those in continental Europe, tend to apply the concept of a transformation of war more broadly. The military theorists prefer to discuss about the “transformation in the outlook of war.” By this they mean a shared perception of the aims and methods of warfare among the international state system. War, or the perception of it, is sometimes understood to transform through a revolution. The latest perceived revolution of war is the RMA or the Revolution in Military Affairs. The RMA refers to the technological changes of the late twentieth century, particularly to the emergence of stealth fighters and precision-guided munitions, which allegedly brought about a revolutionary transformation of war around the time of the Gulf War in 1990–1991. Broadly speaking, this Revolution in Military Affairs has manifested itself in the rise of quality over quantity, the specialization of military hardware, and growing centrality of commercial military technology.

Some military theorists trace back the debate about the RMA to the theoretical concept of the early modern Military Revolution. The theory was originally formulated by Michael Roberts, who suggested in 1955 that the period 1560–1660 witnessed a revolutionary change in European warfare. Tactical and technological innovations in regular land warfare, best evident in the reforms of Prince Maurice of Nassau and King Gustaf Adolf of Sweden, increased the scale and demands of warfare, led to increased military professionalism, gave birth to new administrative institutions, and paved the way for the monopoly of violence exercised by modern territorial states. Some later historians have found support for Roberts’s theory in other forms of early modern warfare, namely sieges and naval warfare. Others have refuted the theory in part or in its entirety. So far historians have paid little attention to the Military Revolution in the context of irregular warfare, which itself remains an under-researched topic in the wider field of early modern military history.

This book proceeds to investigate the transformation of war from the dual perspectives of irregular warfare and the Military Revolution. This will be done by focusing the investigation on one specific case study, the war between Sweden and Denmark in 1643–1645, often referred to as Torstensson’s War. The foremost reason for this is the availability of relevant primary sources. Early modern Denmark and Sweden produced copious amounts of administrative documents relating to military matters. These sources allow one to produce an in-depth look at irregular warfare, which perspective is crucial if one wants to discuss the Military Revolution in a nuanced and qualified way.

The necessity for nuances and qualifications comes from irregular warfare, which as a complex research topic rejects all generalization and oversimplification. Irregular warfare is an under-researched subject in the field of early modern military history, even though much of the fighting in the early modern era took place outside field armies and sieges. Irregular warfare is also a very topical issue thanks to the numerous asymmetric and endemic conflicts that are currently going on in the Middle East,

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3 Creveld 1991.
Africa, and Central Asia. A study of irregular warfare and the Military Revolution does not only allow insights into early modern military history but to the historical roots and precedents of modern warfare as well.

1.2 METHOD AND FRAMING OF THE RESEARCH

Irregular warfare in seventeenth-century Europe is a large subject that requires clear framing before it can be represented in a monograph format. This book investigates the generic form of irregular warfare in seventeenth-century Scandinavia: that of conflict between soldiers and armed peasants. It is important to begin this framing by emphasizing that the subject of the book is not peasant resistance in the larger historical meaning of the term. Peasant/soldier conflict is understood in this book as something that only occurs during times of war, perhaps best explained as a war within a war. This definition disqualifies most peasant rebellions as social protests against established authorities. Sporadic assaults against tax-collectors or landlords do not constitute a peasant/soldier conflict; widespread and consistently violent peasant response towards military intrusion (such as fire-ransoming, billeting, or outright pillage) into a peasant society does.

Neither does this book further explore reconnaissance, foraging, and other manifestations of ‘small war’ if they occur between regular armies alone. Such forms of warfare were not irregular in the modern sense of the word, as they dominated the daily activities of all early modern armies and were carried out by assigned military formations, namely light cavalry, dragoons, and sharpshooters. The phenomenon of inter-military small war would be best dealt in the context of operational art and its development during the Thirty Years War. Operational art is usually understood as an intermediate level between tactical and strategic levels of warfare, often defined as the ability to plan, prepare, and execute a series of tactical battles.\(^7\) Military entrepreneurship is another form of warfare that the modern age views as being irregular.\(^8\) Yet privatized warfare too was part and parcel of the military mainstream in the early modern era. Every European nation in the seventeenth century resorted to outsourcing and subcontracting in the recruitment, supply, and maintenance of military forces and installations. Even independent-minded condottiere captains were still an established part of warfare during the age of the Thirty Years War. Military entrepreneurship and mercenary employment reached the very highest level of the social order, where they were represented by the Imperialist Generalissimo Albrecht von Wallenstein, the Protestant mercenary prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, and Charles IV, the Duke of Lorraine. This ‘business of war’, very much a regular feature of early modern warfare, has been discussed by David Parrott in 2012.\(^9\)

The book also excludes such conflicts between soldiers and urban populations that would fall within the field of judicial history. Urban communities bore a collective responsibility for their own defence, which resulted in a different dynamic between soldiers and burghers than between soldiers and peasants. As most towns housed at least a small garrison, soldiers would be a ubiquitous part of the urban landscape. In

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\(^7\) Hennessy and McKercher 1996, 1–2.

\(^8\) Mohlin 2012, 1–10; Sipilä 2008, 163-188.

\(^9\) Parrott 2012.
those European towns and cities where urban militias and garrisons were financed through internal tax revenue, military presence was an unwelcome burden that had to be tolerated. In the Dutch Republic, where recruits were paid through external sources of credit, the stream of revenue was reversed from the soldiers to the urban communities, and military presence could even be seen as a beneficial boost to the local economy. Soldiers for their part may have regarded townspeople with disdain and at times even treated them high-handedly, but they were nevertheless drawn to cities because of the many opportunities they offered for consumption, revelry, and enlistment.

Urban environments become more pertinent to present inquiry in the contexts of sedition, terrorism, espionage, and the so-called ‘stratagems’ or ruses. Insurgency did not necessarily stop at the city gates, as insurgents occasionally infiltrated informers, disseminators of propaganda, and outright saboteurs into urban communities. In some occasions entire towns were captured by ruses or stratagems, in which insurgents or soldiers disguised as peasants seized control of key defensive installations such as the city gates.

The book includes discussion on propaganda and information warfare. While some of the propaganda and disinformation was clearly aimed for larger international audiences, at its core much of the propaganda of both Denmark and Sweden sought to affect the enemy population at large, essentially those peasants who lived in the immediate vicinity of the war zones. Thus issues of propaganda, opinion-moulding, and outright disinformation become relevant to the larger theme of irregular warfare and insurgency.

The method of this inquiry is content analysis, which means contextualized interpretations of documents that aim at the production of conclusive inferences. Content analysis requires clear delineation and framing of the research topic, separation of relevant sources from less topical material, and the classification and thematization of sources. Essentially one has to choose a clearly-defined and narrow topic, but one has to discuss the topic in a comprehensive and thorough manner. Content analysis is typically categorized into source-based, theory-driven, and theory-based analyses. This book relies on theory-based analysis, which is the traditional approach in natural sciences. Theory-based analysis relies on the thinking and concepts presented in specific and established theories. The content analysis is therefore guided by a framework created by earlier scholarship, in this case those of the Military Revolution and the military theory of irregular warfare.

The justification for this method is the nature of the existing primary sources, which do not directly address issues of irregular warfare and the Military Revolution but rather provide historical context for discussion about military and historiographical theory. Because the discussion emerges from content and context instead of discourses, the book aims to construct a detailed and chronological narrative of military events in Torstensson’s War. This narrative will provide the primary source evidence, on which the discussion and conclusions are based. The book also aims to produce nuanced and qualified arguments, and for this reason too a detailed account of military events is a justified form of presentation. A comprehensive narrative of

10 Israel 1995, 613.
11 Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2009, 92.
12 Ibid., 97.
military actions should reveal the extensive scale of irregular warfare and adjacent violence in Torstensson’s War. Lastly, a narrative of the wider land war between Sweden and Denmark helps us place irregular warfare in its proper proportion and context. Not every operation and combat action in Torstensson’s War involved insurgents or guerrilla fighters.

The purpose of this book is to look at irregular warfare in this period within the context of the debates surrounding the Military Revolution and the rise of the fiscal-military state. The book will examine how Sweden conducted irregular warfare in 1643–1645 at different military-institutional levels and how irregular warfare affected (or failed to affect) such institutions. What makes irregular warfare an illuminating approach to military-institutional history is the fact that the response to irregular warfare, today known as counterinsurgency warfare, adopted and utilized the enemy’s own institutions in its efforts to master and defeat insurgency. The theme of irregular warfare thus extends the institutional investigation to include Denmark as well and allows us to pose questions about differences and similarities between the two Scandinavian realms and their respective military institutions. The chronological limits tie the book even more deeply into the era of the Military Revolution. The year 1660, separated only by fifteen years from the end of Torstensson’s War, was the end date of the original Military Revolutionary period originally proposed by Roberts. After 1660, Roberts argued, the Military Revolution was over, and the modern, centrally-governed fiscal-military state and its institutions had matured to the extent that they could effectively lay claim to the monopoly of violence. The modern art of war had by then come to life.

1.3 MILITARY THEORY OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

This book is situated within two theoretical frameworks, those of irregular warfare and the Military Revolution. The former theory, that of irregular warfare, is hard to encapsulate under any universal definition. The central problem regarding such a form of warfare is that there exists no single, all-encompassing theory to cover it. Instead irregular warfare is dispersed under a variety of theoretical labels, namely those of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare, special operations tactics, terrorist/anti-terrorist operations, guerrilla warfare, hybrid warfare, and asymmetrical warfare. For the benefit of coherent research questions and a consistent line of inquiry it would be purposeful to select the kind of definition for irregular warfare that would resonate with the other theory, that of the Military Revolution. Therefore the book investigates Torstensson’s War within the framework of hybrid warfare, guerrilla warfare, and counterinsurgency warfare. By looking at the war through these perspectives, the book hopes to introduce new qualifications for the Military Revolution theory as well.

The perspective of modern military theory into a research topic dealing with seventeenth-century warfare presents the danger of anachronism. Let us be clear here: seventeenth-century soldiers possessed no theoretical or succinctly articulated concept of irregular warfare; neither had they any understanding of an early modern Military Revolution. Most military theory, and indeed all historiographical theory, postdates the seventeenth century. This, however, does not mean that seventeenth-century soldiers had no understanding of irregular warfare. The French news chronicle Mercure françois described the raiding warfare and foraging operations between the
French and the Spaniards in late 1635 as “petites guerres” or small wars. Ambuscades and other covert attacks were part and parcel of seventeenth-century warfare, just like they are today. For the want of a better word the seventeenth-century English military thinker Edward Cooke placed all such unconventional actions under the blanket title of stratagems. Cooke’s layman-like handbook and its anecdotes concerning ambushes, reconnaissance, espionage, and covert retreats show that in place of a concise theory there was an established practice of irregular warfare, an art of war of its own kind. Cooke’s book is also a welcome exception among the corpus of seventeenth-century military literature, which concerned itself almost wholly with issues of siege warfare and such tactical controversies as the feasibility of lance over pistol in cavalry combat. By leafing through the works of Giorgio Basta and Johann Jacobi Wallhausen, the two most celebrated military authors of the early seventeenth century, we are presented with an image of warfare that mainly consists of sieges and set-piece battles. This was what the early seventeenth-century soldiers viewed as regular warfare; everything outside it was not proper warfare and of little interest to those military writers who regarded themselves as scholars in the art of war. Discussing the findings of this book in the light of modern military theory helps to identify and rediscover historical practices and events and to articulate their significance. For this purpose modern military theory possesses the vocabulary and analytical tools that the seventeenth-century art of war did not yet have.

Historically the concept of irregular warfare goes all the way back to The History of the Peloponnesian War, in which Thucydides described how planned polemos (war) turned into prolonged stasis (warfare). The Chinese Sun Tzu, who advocated the use of deception in war, is often quoted as another early theorist of asymmetrical warfare. Among the first modern contributors to the canon of irregular and guerrilla warfare have been the Hessian Jäger commander Johann von Erwald, who in the late eighteenth century wrote a manual on light infantry tactics, Sir Charles Caldwell, whose Small Wars (originally published in 1896) analyzed Western experiences of colonial ‘bush wars’, and T. E. Lawrence, who described the guerrilla warfare of the anti-Ottoman Arab insurgents in Seven Pillars of Wisdom.

Only few of the first modern theorists of irregular or guerrilla warfare paid much attention to the Thirty Years War. A. von Bogislawski, writing in 1881, followed closely Carl von Clausewitz’s lead, when he described the “kleinen Krieg” of the Thirty Years War taking place only in the intervals between battles or when the troops had settled into winter quarters. Very few commanders of the Thirty Years War could be regarded as wagers of irregular warfare, Bogislawski argued. “Mannsfeld [sic], Christian of Brunswick, incidentally, were not major partisans. Only Johann von Werth raised his name as such to significant military glory.” [Werth served in Spanish, Imperial, and Bavarian armies as a cavalry commander from 1622 to 1648.] Bogislawski’s views were more or less repeated by the successive theorists of guerrilla warfare.

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13 Mercure 1638, 9.
14 Cooke 1628.
15 Basta 1617; Wallhausen 1615 and 1616.
16 Caldwell 1996; Erwald 1991; Lawrence 1997; Thucydides 1972.
17 Bogislawski 1881, 10.
18 Bedürftig 2006, 184.
The Bavarian military theorist Ludwig Schraudenbach regarded the Peninsular Wars as the first true example of guerrilla warfare. The most well-known contemporary theorist of guerrilla warfare, Walter Laqueur, has stated that the systematic doctrine of the small war first appeared only in the eighteenth century, and that the likes of Gustaf Adolf had little interest in irregular warfare. Theodor Fuchs, who wrote the history of irregular warfare in Germany, skipped the entire seventeenth century in his narrative.

The obvious starting point for the modern theory of guerrilla warfare is On War (1832–1834) by Carl von Clausewitz. In his book Clausewitz discussed “people’s war”, which essentially meant guerrilla warfare. Clausewitz identified certain characteristics and circumstances in the effective conduct of people’s war. The theatre of war would have to be geographically extensive and broken, and warfare itself should be intermittent and driven by suitable “national character.” While the observations of Clausewitz about people’s war have by now become partially obsolete, On War is the best theoretical reference for Torstensson’s War because many of the conditions and methods of guerrilla warfare had remained essentially unchanged from the mid-seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century.

Guerrilla warfare, however, cannot be sensibly discussed without some recourse to its modern vocabulary and concepts. The most influential works on the theory and practice of modern guerrilla warfare originate from the revolutionary movements of the mid-twentieth century. Mao Tse Tung has become the most oft-quoted articulator of guerrilla theory by formulating such key concepts of guerrilla warfare as ‘base areas’ and ‘main forces’. The second most influential authority on revolutionary warfare was Ernesto Che Guevara, who introduced the concept of foco or centers of gravity in guerrilla warfare. Mao and Guevara were both Communist revolutionaries, whose political missions were reflected in their military thinking. To them guerrilla warfare had one supreme goal: the overthrow of established governments and their replacement by the rule of a single Communist party. Despite their twentieth-century political framework, the writings of Mao and Guevara still offer certain useful concepts for the analysis of guerrilla warfare in Torstensson’s War.

Guerrilla warfare has been historically a common method of insurgency. The meaning and etymology of insurgency is convoluted and by default open to many interpretations. The root word comes from the Latin infinitive verb insurgere, “to rise up.” The supine insurrectus appears in bastardized Latin as insurrectio in medieval Hungary, where it was used to designate the feudal nobility’s response to the Crown’s summons for military service. This meaning of ‘rising up to fulfil military obligations’ is present in uppbåda and opbud, the Swedish and Danish terms for peasants levies, which literally mean “called up.” Sometime in the sixteenth century insurgere began to adopt socio-political connotations and synonymity with rebellion. This is the

19 Schraudenbach 1926.
20 Laqueur 1977.
21 Fuchs 1982.
25 Kereszturi 1790.
predominant meaning in which insurgency is understood today.

Literature on counterinsurgency predates that of guerrilla warfare. The first European military treatise to deal explicitly with the repression of rebellions was Álvaro Navia Ossorio Santa Cruz de Marcenado’s *Reflexiones Militares* (1724). In his book Marcenado cites examples of seventeenth-century insurgencies, namely the English rebellion against Charles I, the Khmelnytsky rebellion in Poland-Lithuania in 1648, the Catalan Revolt in 1640–1659, and the Neapolitan uprising against the Spanish viceroy in 1646. Marcenado saw insurgencies as specific problems that required specific responses, ranging from tactical to constitutional.

Modern counterinsurgency theory follows the paradigms established during the Cold War. The American field manual *FM 3-24* defines counterinsurgency as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”

26 The manual denotes much space to intelligence-gathering, which perhaps reflects the US government’s current emphasis on counter-terrorist operations. The most intricate schematic of insurgency and counterinsurgency has been provided by David Kilcullen. He sees insurgencies as social and organic systems that are complex and adaptive. In this model insurgencies comprise of seven elements. Nodes are the physical components of the insurgency, that is, individual fighters, units, and sympathizers. Links define patterns of interaction in the insurgency. Boundaries define the limits between the insurgent movement and its environment. Subsystems exist within the insurgency and usually comprise of logistics, intelligence, and propaganda. Boundary events are the day-to-day events of the insurgency, for instance attacks, population support, and intelligence-gathering. Input is the energy and matter that the insurgency takes up from its environment. Outputs are waste products of the insurgency, usually casualties, physical destruction, and displacement.


28 Ibid., 208.

29 Mansoor 2012, 2.

Counterinsurgency, therefore, consists of following actions: attacking nodes, interdicting links, disrupting boundaries, suppressing boundary events, choking off inputs, denying outputs, or a combination of these actions. Attacks that target a combination of elements are likely to be more effective, Kilcullen argues, since they give fewer opportunities for insurgents to adapt in response.

Hybrid warfare is a military-theoretical concept that has recently acquired a variety of meanings and definitions. This book limits itself to the narrow historical definition offered by Williamson Murray and Peter Mansoor, who define hybrid warfare “as a conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose.”

Therefore the book investigates hybrid warfare as military activity carried out by a combination of regular troops and armed peasants. Modern military thought also includes cyber warfare in the spectrum of hybrid methods, but cyber warfare of course cannot be applied to seventeenth-century military history. Hybrid wars exist in the middle ground between conventional and irregular warfare, and hybrid opponents form a difficult and powerful combination. The conventional element in hybrid warfare needs to be countered by a massed military force, whose own lines of communication and logistics

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28 Ibid., 208.
29 Mansoor 2012, 2.
in their turn become exposed to the irregular element of insurgents and guerrillas. Seventeenth-century warfare exhibited such hybrid characteristics. Wayne E. Lee has shown in his article how the rebellious Irish employed a combination of Irish-Spanish conventional troops and local irregular militias against the English during the Tyrone’s Rebellion in 1594–1603. The English were forced to fight two different wars simultaneously: a conventional one against Tyrone’s battlefield formations and an irregular war against the Irish guerrillas.

1.4 THE MILITARY REVOLUTION DEBATE

Hybrid warfare, guerilla war, and counterinsurgency, despite their prevalence, have been largely ignored in traditional works on military history and theory. This also applies to the Military Revolution debate. The concept of the Military Revolution is already deeply entrenched in the scholarship of early modern military history, and it would be safe to say that no argument relating to early modern military history can be made without referring to the Military Revolution in one way or another. The theory of an early modern Military Revolution was first formulated by Michael Roberts, the eminent historian of seventeenth-century Sweden, in his 1955 inaugural lecture at the Queen’s University, Belfast. Roberts argued that tactical and technological innovations between 1560 and 1660 increased the scale and costs of warfare and thus laid the foundations for the centralized and territorial state, which alone could respond to the increased material and human demands of the new kind of warfare. Geoffrey Parker further developed Roberts’s original thesis by arguing that it was in particular the developments in positional warfare and not battlefield tactics (as Roberts had originally argued) that brought about the great change in military affairs. Robert I. Frost has reassessed the Military Revolution as a series of profound transformations that occurred at different times in different parts of Europe and resulted in a variety of different political outcomes.

From the 1980s onward scholarly literature on the Military Revolution has multiplied. The key text for understanding the historiographical debate surrounding the Military Revolution is the essay collection edited by Clifford J. Rogers. The publication of The Military Revolution Debate in 1995 brought together all the central paradigms and doubts surrounding the Military Revolution theory. What is common with all the debates touching the Military Revolution is that they all concern themselves with conventional battles, fortifications and sieges, naval warfare, and matters of military organization and finance – often presented as modernizing reforms or as structures of considerable continuity.

Some historians argue over the exact period and particular catalysts of revolutionary change, while others deny the entire concept altogether. One critic of the theory is John Childs, who has written off the Military Revolution as a historiographical misconception.

30 Mansoor 2012, 4.
31 Lee 2012, 45–46.
34 Frost 2000.
and argued that warfare changes through a process of evolution alone.\textsuperscript{35} This same view has been recently reasserted by Frank Jacob and Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo, who argue that the military changes in early modern Europe were “part of an endless evolutionary process of research and development.”\textsuperscript{36} Azar Gat maintains that there was no actual Military Revolution but simply a process of general “modernization” that occurred over centuries.\textsuperscript{37} Jeremy Black has questioned the suitability of the term ‘revolution’ and proposed that, to the extent there ever was any Military Revolution, the periods it applies to occurred outside Roberts’s timeframe of 1560–1660.\textsuperscript{38} Other critics of the theory have been more qualified in their responses. Clifford J. Rogers has suggested that instead of one great Military Revolution there were several minor ones that fitted in with the biological model of change called the ‘punctuated equilibrium’.\textsuperscript{39} Max Boot has pursued a similar line of argument and replaced the Military Revolution with the shorthand term of a Gunpowder Revolution, which in its turn breaks down into several technological mini-revolutions in the arts of gunnery and fortification-construction.\textsuperscript{40}

David Parrott has done much work to discover the limits and qualifications of change in seventeenth-century European warfare and has questioned the concepts of dramatic rise in army sizes and state authority, the two key arguments behind Roberts’s original theory.\textsuperscript{41} Jürgen Luh, on the other hand, has concluded that seventeenth-century change led to eighteenth-century military stagnation.\textsuperscript{42} For Jan Glete the key transformations brought about by the Military Revolution occurred in the spheres of society and politics, thus resulting in the emergence of the fiscal-military state (for more on the fiscal-military state, see chapter 3.3).\textsuperscript{43} Nils Erik Villstrand does not question the evidence behind the Military Revolution theory but rather qualifies it as historiographical colligation, in which historians group together a number of interrelated phenomena under a single concept. Colligation serves to inspire discussion, in which the term Military Revolution is questioned and given some degree of new content. This is perhaps the most useful way of understanding the concept of the Military Revolution as it does not get bogged down in any specific qualification or articulation of military change (or non-change) in the early modern era.\textsuperscript{44} Bernhard R. Kroener has given a detailed synopsis of these convoluted debates surrounding the Military Revolution.\textsuperscript{45}

This scholarship has provided the Military Revolution with its analytical framework, which comprises of \textit{dimensions} and \textit{characteristics}.\textsuperscript{46} The core chronological dimension

\begin{enumerate}
\item Childs 2004.
\item Jacob and Visoni-Alonzo 2016, 1.
\item Gat 2010, 48.
\item Black 1995, 95–114.
\item Rogers 1995, 55–93.
\item Boot 2006, 13, 74.
\item Parrott 2001 and 2012.
\item Luh 2000, 1–6.
\item Glete 2002, 1–9.
\item Villstrand 2011, 58.
\item Kroener 2013, 62–74.
\item Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2009, 113.
\end{enumerate}
of the Military Revolution was the period 1560–1660, while its area of influence was
presented by Michael Roberts to have been limited to Europe alone. Geoffrey Parker
extended both these dimensions by widening the chronology to run from 1500 to 1800
and by expanding the spatial dimension to cover the entire globe. Parker also increased
the thematic dimension of the Military Revolution by including positional and naval
warfare in its sphere of discussion. 47 The characteristics of the Military Revolution
generally include the increased professionalization of warfare, strengthening of the
state monopoly of organized violence, growth in the scale and demands of warfare,
and the emergence of executive and centralized military-administrative institutions.
What connects all these characteristics is the underlying idea of definite and even
dramatic transformation of war in the early modern period.

So far irregular warfare has not been clearly included in the dimensions of the
Military Revolution. While Michael Roberts, Geoffrey Parker, and Jan Glete among
others have presented persuasive evidence of the way in which tactical and technological
innovations in field armies, sieges, and naval warfare increased the scale and demands
of warfare and thus contributed to the Military Revolution, no similar arguments have
been presented for irregular or guerrilla warfare. Most early modern military historians
do not discuss small war, insurgency, or counterinsurgency, although there are some
exceptions. Simon Pepper has viewed small war as an early modern operational
art that aimed at tying down large numbers of enemy troops. 48 Benjamin Deruelle
has traced the origins of “special operations” warfare to the chivalric traditions that
still persisted in the sixteenth century. 49 Bertrand Fonck and George Satterfield have
argued that Franco-Dutch warfare in 1672–1697 was dominated by petite guerre that
was a particular solution to the problem posed by war “at a time when the resources
of states were comparatively limited.” 50 Gregory Hanlon has shown the prominent
role of militias in the Italian campaigns of the 1630s. For instance, in the run-up to
the devastating battle of Tornavento in 1636, the Spaniards employed local Milanese
militiamen in garrison duties and as tactical reserves. 51 Brian Sandberg has discussed
“raiding warfare” that took place in the frontiers and “tribal zones” of the wider world
beyond Europe. 52 None of the aforementioned historians, however, has examined
irregular warfare in the context of the Military Revolution theory in particular. Yet,
as Fonck, Satterfield, and other historians have argued, such small war, often taking
the form of foraging operations and peasant insurgencies, was a ubiquitous part of
seventeenth-century warfare in Europe. There still remains much historiographical
room to debate whether tactical and technological changes transformed early modern
guerrilla warfare, and whether the need to wage counterinsurgency warfare against
irregular enemies increased the demands of war and imposed new burdens on the
emerging fiscal-military states.

47 Parker 1996.
49 Deruelle 2014, 754–766.
50 Fonck and Satterfield 2014, 767–783.
51 Hanlon 2016, 63–66.
1.5 FORMULATING THE RESEARCH QUESTION

This book attempts to condense seventeenth-century irregular warfare into a consistent and unified inquiry by using the method of content analysis, in which the content, Torstensson’s War in 1643–1645, is analysed against the theoretical framework of irregular warfare and the Military Revolution. The aim of this method is to create discussion not only between the theoretical framework and the research topic but also inside the theoretical framework itself.

Separate from the theories that are used to explore the subject matter are the historiographical theories that guide the entire process of historical research. The subject matter of this book, to begin with, would be categorized as military history. What, then, is military history? According to one broad definition proposed by Michael Howard, military history is the study of war, its causes, conduct, and consequences. Stephen Morillo’s and Michael F. Pavkovic’s textbook What is Military History? offers a slightly more nuanced definition of military history. Morillo and Pavkovic expand the definition beyond wars and instead propose that military history “includes any historical study in which military personnel of all sorts, warfare (the way in which conflicts are actually fought on land, at sea, and in the air), military institutions, and their various intersections with politics, economics, society, nature, and culture form the focus or topic of the work.” A decidedly more complex definition for military history was offered by The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1979). According to Marxist-Leninist thought, military history was

[The] science studying the wars and armed forces of the past and discovering the regularities of their development, a part of the discipline of history because it examines one aspect of the history of human society. At the same time, military history is a part of the science of war, as it studies and generalizes the experience of preparing for and conducting past wars.

The Great Soviet Encyclopedia then went on to differentiate between several fields of military history in an even more exhaustive manner:

The major branches of military history are the history of wars, which reveals the purposes, causes, and character of actual wars and their course, results, and significance in the historical process; the history of the building up of armed forces, which studies the process of the creation, organization, training, and technical equipment in various armed services and combat arms; the history of the art of war, which does research on the development of and changes in form and instruments in the conduct of military actions; and the history of military thought, which investigates the development of military-theoretical views on the nature and character of war, the preparation and conduct of wars, and problems of military development and the art of war. Special

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54 Morillo and Pavkovic 2013, 3.
The above examples show how military history can be understood both broadly and narrowly. For present purposes it would be feasible to strive for some kind of a middle ground between the broad and the narrow and to adopt the moderate yet nuanced interpretation offered by Morillo and Pavkovic. The conservative definition of military history does not quite articulate the crucial engagement between war and society, while the Marxist-Leninist interpretation ties military history too close to pure military science.

The military history of early modern Europe, in which field this book is firmly placed, is today theoretically dominated by the concept of the Military Revolution. As a result early modern military history has acquired a very distinct approach that focuses on the issue of change more than anything else. Rather than preoccupying itself with narratives, early modern military history investigates revolutions, paradigm shifts, developments, continuities, regressions, and dead-ends. In historiography the preoccupation with progress and revolution usually involves two particular traditions of historical explanation, Liberal (or Whig) teleology and Marxism.

The former school of historiography is primarily interested in the development of political institutions and ideologies, which are traced back from the perceivably fully-matured end-results to their earlier origins. The key words for this nineteenth-century historiographical tradition are ‘progress’ and ‘modernization’, which imply a steady march of history towards the modern-day perfection of institutions and ideologies. This vision of history’s inevitable advance is what makes Liberal historiography teleological. The teleology or modernization-narrative is indeed a central problem at the heart of the Military Revolution debate and hence in early modern military history in general. Whether one embraces Liberal interpretation of relentless progress or not, the connection between early modern warfare and the rise of modern institutions cannot be ignored.

If Liberal teleology sees history in terms of steady progress towards modernity, Marxist teleology envisions history as a series of revolutions rising from the dialectical and materialist struggle between the haves and the have-nots. These were not only political and social revolutions, such as the English Civil War and the French Revolution repeatedly referred to by Karl Marx, but also economic and technological revolutions, such as the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution and the much more distant Neolithic Revolution envisioned by the Marxist archaeologist Vere Gordon Childe. By definition the Marxist notion of historical revolutions is therefore already built into the concept of an early modern Military Revolution as well. The proposition that the military history of the early modern era is defined by a single Military Revolution has both attained support and provoked resistance. For decades now the military history of early modern Europe has been dominated by the debate whether the changes of the era deserve to be labelled a ‘revolution’ or not, or whether there even was a significant change in the first place. Marxist thought appears also in connection with peasant/
soldier conflict, which can be understood as a class struggle over property, if not quite the means of production.

While Liberal history, which is interested in the development of institutions and political bodies, and Marxist historiography, which focuses on revolutionary changes and social struggles, are useful theories for the investigation of early modern military history, their major problem is their teleological vision of the past (and indeed future). One way of looking at change in history outside the constraints of teleology is to employ postmodern thought, namely the theory of genealogy. This is a philosophical concept first introduced by Friedrich Nietzsche, and then further articulated for modern historians' benefit by Michel Foucault. According to Foucault, genealogy is inherently anti-teleological. It denies the existence of Ursprung, or one primordial origin. Instead it supports the investigation of Herkunft, descent, and Entstehung, appearance. The former can be understood as something that takes place gradually, as a result of several contributing events. The latter is an origin that emerges from the conflict between opposing views. Appearance is always a unique event in history, and one which is not directed by any predetermined goal or fulfilment. Foucault was chiefly concerned with the problem of origins behind change and transformation, while Nietzsche was equally interested in their differences and distances from one another. In the present inquiry genealogy can be understood to refer to the concepts of military evolution and Military Revolution. The former process can be related to ‘descent’, in which military change, whether of technological or institutional nature, adapts and evolves in clearly identifiable stages. In essence, an innovation begets another innovation. The latter process might be linked with the Military Revolution, which can be understood to erupt dialectically from the conflict between war and society.

The invocation of Foucault and Nietzsche in the context of early modern warfare should not be viewed as some kind of forced name-dropping. Genealogy is a rudimentary philosophy of history that deals with the problems of origins, change, and discontinuity in the past. All historians would benefit from at least a superficial appreciation of genealogy and its possible implications for their own historical inquiries. After all, to paraphrase Foucault, nothing ever stays the same indefinitely and that is why all things have their own histories. Genealogy is a philosophy of history that deals with the problems of origins, change, and discontinuity in the past. All historians would benefit from at least a superficial appreciation of genealogy and its possible implications for their own historical inquiries. After all, to paraphrase Foucault, nothing ever stays the same indefinitely and that is why all things have their own histories.

In the field of history, genealogy can be used to produce counter-narratives. Unlike Liberal and Marxist history-interpretations, which are explicitly linear and implicitly teleological, counter-narratives expose conflicts, discontinuities, and disruptions within historical processes. The usefulness of such a Foucaultian counter-narrative has been promoted by Alex Verschoor-Kirss in his article ‘Foucault and Fourth Generation Warfare: Towards a Genealogy of War and Conflict’. Verschoor-Kirss criticizes the trans-historical nature of most military history, which sees its subject matter in terms of evolution and progress and is institutionally blind to the discontinuities in warfare and conflict. “Advocating for the application of Foucaultian theories to military history has the potential to correct the oversights of existing ideological models, along with the attendant benefit of increasing creativity and innovation across a wide

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59 Foucault 1998; Seinälä 2015, 238–269.

60 Seinälä 2015, 260, 264.

61 Anttila and Myllykangas 2015, 382.
spectrum of military thinking,” Verschoor-Kirss writes. Presenting war as a trans-historical universal is essentially a defensive reaction towards the uncertainties of contemporaneous warfare. “It appears to remove much of the chaos and unpredictably from the waging of war. The outcome of each war could have been predicted had an individual only fully subsumed and understood the lessons of the past”, he goes on to argue. According to Verschoor-Kirss, Foucaultian theory allows us to see beyond trans-historical metanarratives. Instead of offering us universal truths, it shows that warfare functions in different ways for different cultures and time periods. Foucaultian critique of accepted metanarratives does not necessarily mean that the continuities and universalities in military history are all wrong; it merely provides us a way to falsify those claims: “If a unity does possess some validity, a genealogical critique will uphold its validity.”

Verschoor-Kirss brings up valid points about the usefulness of Foucaultian genealogy, but in some ways his acceptance of Foucault’s position is excessively uncritical. Describing most military history as being blind to discontinuities comes close to being a strawman argument, given the fact that Verschoor-Kirss fails to provide examples of such blindness in military historiography. Using Foucault’s argumentation to “correct existing ideological models” is another dangerous claim: why should we assume that Foucault’s theories were not influenced by ideology, and, if we indeed accept that they were (Foucault was at one time a member of the French Communist Party PCF), why would Foucault’s own ideologies be more ‘correct’ than those of traditional military historians? While Liberal and Marxist historiography is haunted by the ghost of teleology, Foucaultian genealogy appears to drift towards excessive (and indeed quite subjective) political correctness.

This book does not subscribe slavishly to any one historiographical theory. Rather it sees historiographical theory as a tool box with different implements for different tasks. Liberal teleology traces the origins of modern institutions, which concern is a central part of any assessment of the Military Revolution theory. Similarly Marxist historiography and its critique must address the pace and nature of military innovation and development in the early modern era. Marxist materialism also highlights the social struggles between competing social strata, which approach is germane to any discussion of peasant/soldier conflict. The teleological premises of these two theories can be counterbalanced by the Foucaultian genealogy that brings forth latent discourses and submerged counter-narratives. Foucaultian thought, however, may fall into the trap of anachronism if it is used to view the past in the light of modern-day political correctness.

Appreciating the complexities of continuity, discontinuity, progress, and genealogy in military history helps us to formulate research questions that do not explicitly embrace any single notion of evolutionary or revolutionary change in early modern warfare. However, a monograph must still have a hypothesis and some premise for investigation. The obvious starting-point for the present inquiry has to be the notion of military change in the period under investigation. The hypothesis behind the book is that irregular warfare (whether counterinsurgency, guerrilla, or hybrid warfare) was a transforming agent of the Military Revolution in the sense that it increased the
demands of warfare and instigated new tactical and operational responses. The main research question can be thus formulated:

**Does irregular warfare in Torstensson’s War indicate a transformation of war?**

From this inquiry emerge the following subordinate research questions:

- Does the phenomenon of irregular warfare in Torstensson’s War support the theory of an early modern Military Revolution?
- How effective were the different forms of irregular warfare in Torstensson’s War?
- If there was a transformation in guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency, or hybrid warfare, what were the qualifications and limits of that transformation?

### 1.6 PRIMARY SOURCES

This book uses unprinted archive sources that are deposited in the Swedish Riksarkivet (SRA) in Stockholm and the Danish Rigsarkivet in Copenhagen. The one archived collection directly related to Torstensson’s War is the collection Strödda handlingar (miscellaneous relations) in the series Militaria. Strödda handlingar is true to its name a mixed bag of letters, memoranda, and military documents. Some of the more significant documents in this collection reveal troop strengths and compositions, and narrate military events that involved irregular or hybrid contingents. Another useful collection is the Oxenstierna samlingen. Much of its contents have been placed online as part of the Oxenstiernaregistret. While the most relevant parts of Axel Oxenstierna’s correspondence (namely the *extractskrifvelse*) have already been published in the printed series *RAOSB*, some of the unpublished letters are still very useful for the research. Of particular interest are the reports from borderlands by local magistrates, such as the *länsmann* Brodde Jakobsson, which describe circumstances in peasant communities on both sides of the frontier. Other useful letters are those addressed to Axel Oxenstierna’s son Johan, who was the head of the Swedish embassy at Osnabrück at the time of Torstensson’s War. Oxenstierna’s letters to his son refer to many military events that were taking place in Scania and Jämtland. The third and the largest single corpus of documents is the Riksregistratur (RR). This is a copybook of out-going correspondence from the Swedish *riksråd* or council of state. The letters and instructions written down in the Riksregistratur express the collective will of the *riksråd*, while the addressees are typically military commanders and civilian administrators. The fourth relevant collection of unprinted documents is the letter book of the *krigskollegium*, now deposited in the Stockholm Krigsarkivet (KrA). Gustaf Horn and other Swedish commanders of Torstensson’s War wrote to the *krigskollegium* many letters that deal mostly with the purely material side of early modern warfare. This book also uses miscellaneous sources in the Skoklostersamlingen, Henrik Flemings arkiv and the collections of the University of Uppsala.

The Danish archive sources are somewhat different by nature as they were produced by institutions that did not exist in Sweden. The most useful archive collection is the correspondence of the so-called Tysk Kancelli or German Chancellery. This was an institution that handled correspondence pertaining to those Oldenburg territories that were situated within the Holy Roman Empire – namely Schleswig, Holstein, and the Archbishopric of Bremen and Verden. This collection includes correspondence from Prince-Bishop Frederick of Bremen, Glückstadt’s commander Count Penz,
Chancellor and _Amtmann_ Ditlev Reventlow, Danish envoys in Hamburg, Duke Philip of Glücksborg, and the cathedral chapter of Bremen. The surviving archive material in Copenhagen sheds light on warfare in Holstein and Bremen but tends to overlook events taking place in Scania and Norway. The sources in the Tysk Kancelli are complemented by the archive material in the collection Krigsrådet i Glückstadt, which provides further insight into the military events in Holstein and sheds some light on the composition and quantity of the Danish forces in Glückstadt and Krempe.

A historian working within the time period of Torstensson's War is privileged in the sense that many of the central documents exist today in printed form. The most well-known collection of documents is the _Rikskanslern Axels Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefvoxling_ (RAOSB) or the correspondence of Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna. The more relevant sources in this collection are the _extractskrifvelse_ that relate the events of Gustaf Horn's Scanian war in detail. Thirteen such reports have been published in the volume II:8 of the series. The _extractskrifvelse_ describe different scenarios of peasant/soldier conflict and the ways in which the Swedish military authorities responded to insurgent operations. No other source provides such an in-depth view of irregular warfare during Torstensson's War. While reading them, however, it is good to keep in mind their subjective nature. Military reports are rarely unbalanced and objective accounts, even though it is the fog of war that undermines the reliability of the _extractskrifvelse_ more than passions or biases. The _extractskrifvelse_ were also printed documents, and they were meant to be read by a wider audience. As such they straddle a muddled line between military reporting and official state propaganda. Whereas the Riksregistratur and RAOSB contain formal missives and instructions from the _riksråd_ and its executive leader, the published protocols of the _riksråd_ (SRRP) reveal something about the way in which those decisions were discussed and agreed upon.

The Danish archive sources are particularly well-represented in the published format. The copybook of the Danish Chancellery (KBB) lists every official missive sent out by this office. On the surface the copybook resembles the Swedish Riksregistratur, but there are certain profound differences between the two sources that need to be addressed. The Danish Chancellery occupied itself only with domestic matters, whereas issues of Imperial and foreign policy were handled through the German Chancellery. Unlike Queen Christina, who was still a minor during most of Torstensson’s War, Christian IV exercised a strong personal rule within the constitutional limits of the elective monarchy, and no decision could be passed through the Danish Chancellery without the King’s explicit approval. The missives in the Danish Chancellery’s copybook therefore express a much stronger monarchical influence than those in the Riksregistratur, which were sanctioned by Christina in name only. The copybook partially overlaps with the personal correspondence of Christian IV that has been published as _Kong Christian den fjerdes egenhændige breve_ (KCFEB). Christian IV’s copybook deals largely with issues of foreign policy and naval matters, but it nevertheless provides some useful insights into matters surrounding irregular warfare and peasant levies. Another peculiarity of the Danish body politic was the ill-defined yet central role of the Crown Prince Christian in the executive decision-making. Prince Christian kept his own copybook (PCB), which becomes a very useful source during Prince Christian’s personal command over the city of Malmö in the spring of 1644.

The best sources dealing with the Norwegian part of the realm are the _Norske Rigs-Registranter_ (NRR) and the _statholder_ Hannibal Sehested’s copybook. Norway was ruled by the _statholder_ in capacity of the King’s deputy. For this reason the missives in the NRR are either from Christian IV or Hannibal Sehested. The latter’s copybook
(SNFSH), which only survives from 1645, offers a very detailed overview of Norwegian military actions during that year.

The perspectives of the above sources are limited by their nature. The Riksregistratur, the copybook of the Danish Chancellery, the official documents, and the central governments’ correspondence may reveal a great deal about the plans and anticipations of the central governments in Stockholm and Copenhagen, but they tell little about the actual execution of those plans or the conduct of military operations on the ground. As narrative and qualitative sources, therefore, they have their limits. When they do address events, their view is distorted both by their political bias and their distance from the scene of warfare. The usefulness of letters and reports is further diminished by their very limited ability to communicate the wider context behind their subject matters. This essentially means that the useful information in them usually arrives as individual morsels of isolated facts and subjective insights.

Being largely narratives of events, the printed primary sources provide some of the most useful materials for qualitative research. The printed primary sources can include news pamphlets and chronicles, contemporaneous histories, memoirs, and edited collections of letters and other documents. Many of these works are available online at sites such as Eurodocs, Europeana, Gallica, Google Books, EEO, and Universitätshibliothek Augsburg. Hardcopies in the National Library of Finland, the National Library of Denmark, the National Library of Sweden, and the Finnish National Defence University Library have also been consulted in connection with the present inquiry.

The most valuable contemporaneous news letter is the French Gazette. Being one of the first genuine newspapers in Europe, the Gazette employed correspondents in Hamburg, Bremen, Stade, Lubeck, and Copenhagen, which were all in the immediate vicinity of Holstein and Jutland. The Gazette was therefore the first European newspaper to receive fresh news from these particular theatres of war. The major source-critical problem with this news, however, was its heavy Danish bias. The Gazette generally related the Danish version of the events, as the Danes were the first to disseminate the news in Bremen, Holstein, and the Hanseatic towns. This does not mean that the Gazette was institutionally opposed to Sweden, on the contrary: in its coverage of the continental military affairs, the Gazette consistently favoured the Swedish interpretation of events over the Imperialist one. The Gazette’s other problem related to its lack of attention to details. For instance, in its brief overview of the military events along the River Göta in the summer of 1644, the Gazette referred to the River Göta as the Elbe and Gothenburg as Rottenburg. This error most likely originated from sloppy news editing rather than any chronic ignorance regarding northern-European geography.

Contemporaries wrote a number of histories that covered Torstensson’s War partly or in its entirety. Johann Heinrich Boeckler’s Historia Belli Sveco-Danici (1679) is a near-contemporaneous history of Torstensson’s War and as such the only one of its kind. The book is written from the Swedish perspective, which is not surprising given its author’s position as the official court historian of the Swedish King Charles XI. Boeckler’s narrative focuses on the diplomatic rather than the military front, and the peasant/soldier conflict is not a prominent feature in his discourse. As a general history of the war Boeckler’s Historia is still a very useful reference source. A more
particularist chronicle originated from the Danish-held Glückstadt. This was the *Diarium Tychopolitanum*, which appeared in print in 1646. Its author remains unknown, but he was clearly an eyewitness of the war in Glückstadt. While the chronicle gives a very detailed account of the military activities in and around Glückstadt, we must keep in mind its heavy Danish bias. The *Diarium Tychopolitanum* was reproduced in its entirety by the Schleswig-Holsteiner local history journal *Neue staatsbürgerliches Magazin* in 1832.

Memoires are generally more personal, subjective, and detailed than chronicles and histories and are as such more useful sources for qualitative research. Some aspects of irregular warfare in 1627–1633 were discussed by the Scottish officer Robert Monro in his memoirs from 1637. There are two Swedish memoires that deal directly with Torstensson’s War. One is the diary of the scholar Petrus Magni Gyllenius, who lived in the warzone near the Norwegian border and witnessed at first hand some of the fighting in Värmland. The other source is the autobiography of Gustaf Horn’s daughter Agneta Horn, who, as a young girl, participated in her father’s expedition into Scania and was present at the Swedish siege of Malmö.

1.7 LITERATURE ON TORSTENSSON’S WAR

Torstensson’s War is short of secondary works, and many of those that do exist tend to concentrate on the naval campaigns at the expense of the small war between peasants and soldiers. J. A. Fridericia nevertheless described warfare east of the Sound as “Guerillakrig” that bore resemblance to the earlier border-conflicts between Denmark and Sweden, characterized as they were by pillage and cruelties against the civilian population.66 Vilhelm Vessberg had a very keen eye for peasant/soldier conflict in Scania and Jämtland, and his two-volume book is consequently rich with observations concerning insurgency and counterinsurgency. Vessberg based his study on a wide range of Swedish and Danish primary sources, which lend certain authority to his findings.67 Vessberg’s contemporary Carl Oscar Munthe wrote from the Norwegian perspective. He only covered the military events along the Swedish-Norwegian frontier but did it with great detail.68

More recent works tend to be less narrowly-concentrated on Torstensson’s War than Vessberg’s and Munthe’s classics. Lars Ericson Wolke, Göran Larsson, and Nils Erik Villstrand included two separate chapters on Torstensson’s War in their history of the Thirty Years War.69 Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean have covered Torstensson’s War in the context of Scottish military immigration (both Sweden and Denmark employed Scottish soldiers in Torstensson’s War).70 Peter Englund too allocated some chapters to Torstensson’s War in his history of the Thirty Years War. Englund paid some attention to the mental landscape of those Hallanders and

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66 Fridericia 1907, 258.
67 Vessberg 1895 and 1900.
68 Munthe 1901.
69 Ericson Wolke, Larsson, and Villstrand 2006.
70 Murdoch and Grosjean 2014.
Jämtlanders who found themselves under Swedish rule as a result of the lost war. More specialist studies shed light on events of particularist interest, such as that of the alleged massacre of Scanian peasants at Borstbäcken or that of Swedish soldiers at Mörsil in Jämtland. A very useful recent contribution has been made by Andreas Karlsson and Anna Karlsson, who have studied various incidents in seventeenth-century Halland relating to insurgency and Torstensson War. Their research is based on Swedish and Danish archive sources. The best modern work is nevertheless by Stefan Persson, whose monograph *Gränsbygd och svensskrig* deals with the interaction between the centralized Danish state and the border society in Scania. Persson relies heavily on Danish primary sources and for the period 1643–1645 on the Danish Chancellery’s copybook in particular. Individual articles relating to Torstensson’s War can be found in Swedish and Danish journals, namely the Swedish and Danish issues of the *Historisk Tidskrift* as well as the Danish *Historie Jyske Samlinger*. The Scanian local history journal *Ale Historisk tidskrift för Skåneland* is a veritable treasure-trove of information on Torstensson’s War. In 2007, the journal dedicated its second issue in its entirety to Gustaf Horn’s military campaign in Scania.

The background of *snapphanar* and other insurgents has been a topic of heated historiographical discussion for several decades. The most controversial issue is the purported difference between *snapphanar* and *friskyttar*. According to an entrenched historical consensus, *friskyttar* generally denotes somewhat more ‘regular’ irregulars. Lars Ericson Wolke, Göran Larsson, and Nils Erik Villstrand define *friskyttar* as a “militarily organized group that was paid by the King and whose leaders were appointed by the King.” Their military purpose was not specifically guerrilla warfare but rather watch duties inland and along the coast. Carl Gustaf Liljenberg indeed thought it more appropriate to simply characterize them as “bondevakt.” In the secondary literature the *friskyttar* are generally identified with particular leaders, such as Michel Pedersen (alias Mikkel Gønge) during the Nordic Seven Years War or Svend Poulsen in the Second Northern War. No such named leaders among Scanian irregulars are identified in Torstensson’s War, unless one wants to view Bent Mogensen as one. The etymology of the *friskyttar* alludes to clandestine activity and/or shooting (*Swedish skytten*: shooter, hunter), which makes it a natural synonym to *snapphanar*.

The irregular nature of the *friskyttar* remains an open issue. Stefan Persson questions the traditional view that regards Michel Pedersen and his troops as sixteenth-century guerrillas. According to Persson, Pedersen’s harquebusiers were part of the regular army and their conduct of guerrilla warfare and reconnaissance activities was more incidental than planned. Peter Englund has argued that in the later Second Northern War Scanian *snapphanar* could be divided into two categories: Danish dragoons, who were irregular in their appearance and military methods but all the same recruited soldiers led by professional officers, and genuine peasant guerrillas, who waged

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71 Englund 1993.
74 Wolke, Larsson, and Villstrand 2006, 295.
75 Asmussen 1983, 621.
76 Liljenberg 1975, 87.
77 Persson 2011b, 7.
spontaneous and unorganized guerrilla warfare on their own initiative.78 Dick Harrison has identified no fewer than three distinctive groups of snapphanar: genuine peasant insurgents, companies of friskyttar that were part of the regular army, and “the real snapphanar”, who were refugees, deserters, or even common outlaws hiding in the woods.79 These distinctions may well apply to the Second Northern War and the Scanian War, but evidence from Torstensson’s War undermines the notion of any neat categorization between different types of snapphanar. The sources do not indicate that there would have been any distinctive friskyttar-companies operating in Scania, as there had been in the earlier Nordic Seven Years War. This may be explained by the sudden outbreak of the war, which left the Danes with little opportunity to organize their defences in Scania and Halland.

The difference in meaning between snapphanar and friskyttar remains a controversial issue in modern-day Sweden. The recent edition of Alf Åberg’s classic work from 1951 articulates this problem in its title Snapphanarna: Skånsk motståndsrörelse eller laglösa mördare? [Snapphanar: Scanian Resistance Fighters or Lawless Murderers?]80 Arne Blom and Jan Moen regard the word snapphanar both “misused and misguided.”81 Historically the snapphanar are associated in Swedish historiography with outlaws and brigands, which gives the term derogatory meaning. According to Alf Åberg, this association arose from the fact that many of those Scanians recruited as irregular militiamen in the sixteenth century came from outside the peasant society and were in fact unemployed farmhands, homeless peasants, destitute vagrants, deserters, and in some cases even outright thieves and bandits.82 Dick Harrison has argued that the association between snapphanar and brigands was already commonplace in the seventeenth century. Snapphanar was a word used by the Swedish military authorities to identify their peasant enemies, but the Scanian irregulars never used it to describe themselves.83 Stefan Persson laments that the unreflective use of the term snapphanar has turned it into a catch-all concept that covers all the groups fighting the Swedish invaders, “the organized friskyttar-companies, peasants who offered open resistance with or without visible leadership, loose parties of forest bandits, and other groups.”84

To Sixten Svensson the word snapphanar is simply offensive and part of a long historical tradition that aims to disparage local Scanian patriots as criminals and terrorists. Svensson’s study of Scanian guerrillas in the seventeenth century was titled provocatively Sanningen om snapphanelögnen, “the truth about the snapphanelie.” Svensson did not deny that the odious concept covered genuine outlaws and miscreants; what irked him was that the later historians had grouped friskyttar, local patriots, and other legitimate combatants together with mere criminals and brigands, the real snapphanar in Svensson’s mind.85

78 Englund 2000, 698.
79 Harrison 2015, 76–77.
80 Åberg 2014.
81 Blom and Moen 1995, 9.
82 Åberg 2014, 44–45.
83 Harrison 2015, 76–79.
84 Persson 2007, 381.
85 Svensson 2005, 8.
In the context of Torstensson’s War there is little logic in any attempt to categorically differentiate between snapphanar and friskyttar. The important question is not so much who waged guerrilla warfare but how it was fought and to what effect. The military circumstances, mainly the necessity to fight the Swedish invaders with guerrilla tactics, were what made the snapphanar; no-one was automatically cast into that role by occupation, social standing, or birth. As is the case with many modern conflicts, attempts to quell the insurgency through counterinsurgency warfare may in some instances have actually fomented resistance and created new insurgents. There exist many cases from Jutland, in which the Swedish soldiers drove out the previous occupants from the houses that the Swedes had designated as their billets. These evictions, Finn Askgaard has argued, may have contributed to the growth of insurgency by creating a pool of potential insurgents who would have had a vested (and indeed personal) interest in fighting the Swedish invaders. In such cases the irregular war itself made the snapphanar.

General works on war and warfare in early modern Scandinavia form the last corpus of secondary literature. The best monograph on northern warfare is by Robert I. Frost, who discusses the nature of north-eastern European warfare in the context of the Military Revolution. Frost argues that military-technological change was dependent on the physical and social structures on north-eastern Europe. Different northern nations followed different paths in the Military Revolution, which was characterized not only by technological change but by environmental, social, and institutional continuity as well. Frost offers a synthetic overview of several north-eastern European nations; other authors have concentrated specifically on Denmark and Sweden. Gunner Lind has written by far the most thorough and well-researched study of the Danish military institutions in the seventeenth century. Paul Douglas Lockhart supplements the picture by providing crucial political and constitutional perspectives into Danish military history during the first half of the seventeenth century. Mats Hallenberg and Johan Holm provide an insightful overview of the origins and development of the Swedish system of peasant levy (uppbåd) and its effect on the socio-political self-understanding of the Swedish peasant class. The best overview of early seventeenth-century Swedish armies, military organizations, and tactics is still the second volume of Michael Robert’s biography of Gustavus Adolphus.

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87 Frost 2000.
89 Lockhart 1996.
90 Hallenberg and Holm 2017.
91 Roberts 1958.
2 STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS OF WARFARE IN SCANDINAVIA 1643–1645

2.1 GOVERNMENT, SOCIETY, AND ARMY IN EARLY MODERN SCANDINAVIA

At the outbreak of Torstensson’s War both Sweden and Denmark were monar- 
hies, yet the former was hereditary and the latter elective. Despite this fundamental difference, 
both Christina and Christian IV had to operate within very similar constitutional 
constraints. The hands of Christian IV had been fettered by the capitulations 
(haandfæstning), which he had to sign as a precondition to his coronation in 1596. 
This coronation charter did not make him the prisoner or puppet of the aristocracy or 
the Estates, but it did set such limits to his power that he could not act, or even aspire 
to act, as an absolute ruler. The key limitations to Christian IV’s powers were that he 
could not declare war, bring foreign troops to Denmark, nor levy taxes or conscript 
soldiers from among the peasants or nobility without the consent of the rigsråd, the 
Danish council of state. These limits, however, left him free to tax and levy soldiers 
from towns, freeholders, and royal and Church tenants.92 Furthermore, the coronation 
charter did not limit Christian IV’s powers as the Duke of Holstein, in which capacity he 
was a Reichsfürst or an Imperial Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. The constitutional 
restraints were of limited effect because Christian IV was independently wealthy on 
account of the Sound Tolls. He could thus afford to raise an army, though he could 
not necessarily afford to maintain one.

As a hereditary monarch, Queen Christina was not bound by electoral capitulations, 
but her powers too were limited by two charters, the coronation oath and the Form of 
Government. The former was a result of negotiations between the heir apparent and the 
Estates. In 1617, the late King Gustaf Adolf had promised to rule his realm according 
to the existing constitution (King Christopher’s Land Law from 1442), to maintain the 
Lutheran faith, to fill the highest offices with native nobles, to consult the riksråd in 
matters of war and foreign policy, and to desist from collecting extraordinary taxes and 
conscripting soldiers without first consulting both the riksråd and the Estates General 
(riksdag).93 There was little doubt in 1643 that Christina too would commit herself to this 
same coronation oath, as she eventually did (her successor Charles X did not). In 1634, 
the aristocratic regency institutionalized Gustaf Adolf’s coronation oath into a Form of 
Government, under which the monarch was expected to rule “with the council of the 
riksråd” in all matters of state. Later in her reign Christina refused to acknowledge the 
Form of Government, as her late father had never said a word about it.94

Beneath the monarch in both countries stood the respective councils of state, the 
Danish riksråd and the Swedish riksråd. The Danish riksråd was an influential yet fluid 
body of government, a bastion of the magnate elite among whom Christian IV sat as

92 Jespersen 2000, 49.
94 Villstrand 2011, 267.
the *primus inter pares*. The size, composition, or the powers of the *rigsråd* were not fixed. There were typically five offices in the *rigsråd*: kongens kansler, rigshofmester, rigskansler, rigsadmiral, and the rigsmarsk. While the rigskansler, or the Chancellor of State, held the most prestigious office, the rigshofmester was recognized as the most powerful position as he handled the finances of the state. The *rigsadmiral* and the *rigsmarsk* were in charge of the navy and army respectively. The administrations through which these officials operated were limited in size and were often of non-permanent nature. Up to 1645, the King had the power to nominate members to the *rigsråd*, and he was not obliged to fill any vacant seats. The coronation charter vested Christian IV with the responsibility of promoting the *rigsråd* and the nobility and ruling with their assistance. The *rigsråd* did not act as a permanent government, and it only convened when summoned to do so by the King. When in session, however, the *rigsråd* could carry out its discussions without the King being present, and in decision-making it presented unified and corporate resolutions that did not reveal any internal divisions. By and large, the *rigsråd* was mainly interested in maintaining the political and economic status quo, in which the King was expected to live off his domains and the privileges of the nobility remained in place. The *rigsråd* and the King were not opposed to one another but rather shared sovereignty in the abstract and impersonal concept of the ‘Crown of Denmark’. It was a concept that embodied the interests of the Oldeburg dynasty as well as those of the aristocratic elite. According to this principle, the King ruled with the *rigsråd* and not over it.

The Swedish *riksråd* had borne much resemblance to its Danish counterpart up until 1634, when the Swedish *riksråd* was reorganized on collegial basis. There existed six *kollegia* in 1643. The Chancellor (*kansler*) was in charge of the *kanslikollegium*, which handled all official correspondence, with particular emphasis on matters of foreign policy. The Lord High Steward (*drots*) presided over the Svea Court of Appeal (*hovrätt*) and its parallel courts in Åbo, Dorpat, and Jonköping, which together constituted a judicial collegium. The Treasurer (*skattmästaren*) ruled over the *kammarkollegium* and the state’s finances. The Lord Admiral (*riksadmiral*) controlled the Admiralty or the *amiralitetskollegium*. The *bergskollegium* or the Mining College, established in 1637, was administered by the Mining Master (*bergmästaren*). The *krigskollegium* or the War College operated under the Lord Marshal (*riksmarsk*). The institutional logic behind its establishment was the need to create a centralized framework for national defence. This need was motivated by the threat of a renewed Danish-Swedish war at a time when Gustaf Adolf and many of the military commanders were away in Germany. As Christina had been only a small child when her father died in 1632, the *riksråd* had assumed the powers of regency. This regency ended in December 1644, when Christina officially took over the reins of power from Axel Oxenstierna in a ceremony at the conclusion of the *riksdag*-session. The *riksråd* and its erstwhile leader Oxenstierna

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95 Jespersen 2000, 50.
96 Jespersen 2011, 40.
97 Lockhart 2014, 66.
99 Steckzé 1930, 33.
100 Ahnlund, 1933, 238.
nevertheless exerted great influence over matters of policy and state throughout the last year of Torstensson’s War (and well into the late 1640s).

At the local level both Denmark and Sweden were divided into administrative provinces. The Danish len were quite numerous and generally small in size. The len were technically royal fiefs, and they were administered by the lensmænd, who enforced law, collected taxes, and even supervised military service and recruitment. Local administration in noble demesnes was in the hands of the landlords themselves. The Danish len were to extent mirrored by the Swedish län, but there were certain crucial differences between the two. The län or provinces were a relatively new innovation in Sweden, as that realm had still been divided into medieval castle fiefs (slottlän) at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Form of Government had institutionalized the län and placed them under the rule of landshördingar or provincial governors. The duties of the landshördingar were articulated with some detail in 1635. The central idea behind the establishment of län and their placement under the authority of the landshördingar was the separation of two spheres of authority, civilian and military. The landshördingar represented the former sphere, and their powers were limited in such a way that they could not raise or lead military forces at their own initiative.

The ståthållare or stadtholder was a dead institution in Sweden by 1643, as that office had been effectively replaced by the landshörding. It was still used in Germany to administer Imperial Circles (Reichskreise) and other major territories under Swedish control. The business of the ståthållare in Germany, however, was to keep the old civil administration in operation and not to introduce any Swedish traditions of government. In Denmark this institution still lived in the office of the statholder, of which there were three: each in Norway, Holstein, and Copenhagen respectively.

As the royal bailiff, the statholder represented the monarch both at times of war and peace. The statholder in Norway and Holstein were responsible for overseeing the raising and furnishing of troops. The statholder in Copenhagen was the highest civil authority in the capital city, and was empowered to lead the rigsråd sessions whenever the rigshoffmester was prevented from appearing in person. At the grassroots level the local administration in both Sweden and Denmark was devolved to royal bailiffs, sheriffs, and village councils.

Sweden and Denmark were also organized into judicial districts. The reign of Gustaf Adolf had seen the introduction of hovrätten or courts of appeal. By 1643 there were four such hovrätten: the Svea Court in Stockholm and three provincial courts of appeal in Jonköping, Dorpat, and Åbo. In addition to being the highest courts of appeal for serious crimes, the hovrätten were the only courts where nobles could be judged; they were also vested with the responsibility of inspecting the minutes from all subordinate courts. Below the hovrätten operated the lagmansrätt or civil law court under the judicature of lagmän (judges), who were typically members of the nobility. Sweden was accordingly divided into nine mid-level judicial districts called lagsagor. These districts comprised of several tingslagor, which marked the judicial boundaries of häradsrätter or trial courts. They were chaired by a häradshörding, an

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101 Lockhart 1996, 47.
102 Lappalainen 2017, 120–122.
103 Ibid., 120.
104 Roberts 1958, 622.
appointed judge, who was assisted by twelve nämdeämnnen or lay jurors. These lay jurors were typically notable local peasants, while the judges were still predominantly nobles in the 1640s.\textsuperscript{106} The Danish judiciary was structurally somewhat different. The highest judicial authority in Denmark was the rettetinget, which effectively meant the King and the råd. On provincial level Denmark was divided into five lądsting (provincial courts), which were presided over by lándsdommere (high court judges). At grassroots level were the town (byting), rural (herredsting), and manorial (birketing) courts. The byfôg and herredsfôg, the judges of byting and herredsting respectively, were appointed by the local lensman on behalf of the Crown; in manorial courts the landowner had the right to appoint the judge (birkefôg).\textsuperscript{107}

The Duchy of Holstein and the Archbishopric of Bremen and Verden, which were ruled indirectly by the Danish royal house, were not administratively part of Denmark proper. As the Duke of Holstein and the Archbishop of Bremen, Christian IV and his second son Frederick (III) were respectively intermediate rulers of their German fiefs and as such vassals of the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand III. Christian IV and Prince Frederick did not have their own titled subvassals, even though their German princedoms were divided into feudal sub-districts known as Âmter (singular Amt). The Âmter were relics of the Middle Ages, when the princely jurisdictions had existed as collections of subordinate fiefs. These districts had remained small, usually incorporating only two or three parishes, and they had never established themselves as foci of local identities – that role was still reserved for villages and towns. By the early modern age they had nevertheless acquired increased cohesion as administrative units for the articulation of princely demands on the population, meaning essentially tax-collection.\textsuperscript{108} The districts were governed by an Amtmann, often a noble who was based in a castle or a market town. His governance was typically passive rather than active: the Amtmann generally settled to ensure that the local elected institutions carried out the business of daily governance and administration.\textsuperscript{109}

As all countries in seventeenth-century Europe, Sweden and Denmark too were Estate-societies. This meant that the society was internally stratified, with the nobility at the top and the peasantry at the bottom. Clergy, burghers, and freeholders were typically situated somewhere between the two extremes, except in the Catholic parts of Europe, where the clergy still regarded itself as the first Estate. The Danish and Swedish Estates were not only social but also political Estates, which meant that they could participate in political life via the Estates General. The composition of the Danish Estates General (råd) was fairly typical in contemporary Europe, with representation by the noble, clerical, and burgher Estates. The Swedish råd differed from its Danish counterpart and many other European parliamentary bodies in that it included a fourth Estate of freeholder peasants. As the Swedish monarch needed the approval of the råd for new taxes and conscriptions, he was forced to heed the opinion of the freeholder peasants as well. The Estates of Holstein and Bremen were not included in the Danish råd and instead referred to the institutional framework of the Holy Roman Empire. The Estates of the Archbishopric of Bremen consisted of the cathedral chapter, prelates and abbots, nobility, and the cities of Bremen, Stade,

\textsuperscript{106} Karonen 2008, 64.
\textsuperscript{107} Jespersen 2000, 117–119.
\textsuperscript{108} Wilson 2017, 370.
\textsuperscript{109} Whaley 2012, 489–490.
and Buxtehude. Holstein had only two political Estates, the combined Estate of priests and nobility (“Prälaten und Ritterschaft”) and the Estate of the major towns, namely Kiel, Flensburg, Itzehoe, Rendsburg, Schleswig, and Haderslev.

The organizing principle, and indeed the legitimation, of the Estate-societies in Sweden and Denmark was war and military service. The Noble Estate, which enjoyed fiscal and political privileges in both countries, had traditionally drawn its status from cavalry service, called rusttjänst in Sweden and rostjeneste in Denmark. The Military Revolution had challenged the effectiveness of cavalry service and thus also the legitimacy of the nobility’s privileged position. Impoverished Swedish nobles had been at great pains to produce required numbers of cavalry soldiers in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Most nobles were able to supply one soldier at best; many failed to do even that. In 1616, the cavalry service -rendering nobles had lamented to royal officials that they did not have the means to procure horses and indeed asked the Crown to supply them with mounts. Even the numbers that could be potentially produced were not high enough in the age of the Military Revolution, when army sizes continued to grow.

Over the course of the sixteenth-century wars, the embattled rusttjänst-institution had been augmented by cavalrymen of non-noble background. The most notable source of supplementary cavalry troops had been the Knaben. They were peasants or other commoners, who had equipped a horseman for military service, and had in return been exempted from most ordinary taxation. They were also granted the right to collect the notorious contribution of borgläger, which questionable privilege made them particularly odious to their less well-heeled peers among the peasantry. At times of peace these peasant cavalrymen often served as farmhands for nobles and affluent landowners and used their horses for ordinary transportation and agricultural work. In Finland they were mockingly referred to as ‘muck-riders’, because they harnessed their horses in front of manure-filled sledges instead of riding them to war like true mounted warriors. These muck-riders did not provide their cavalry service within the framework of the peasants’ uppbåd but rather as an adjunct to the nobility’s rusttjänst: there is nevertheless at least one case, in which Finnish peasants are known to have performed their uppbåd-duty as cavalry service. During the Russo-Swedish War in 1578, a group of peasants in the Viborg slottslän (castle fief) in Finnish Karelia formed a fana or troop of some 200 men under the command of Tuomas Teppoinen, a peasant from the district of Äyräpää. Kimmo Katajala, who has investigated the primary sources relating to this fana, has concluded that the peasants did not qualify as Knaben, because they were not automatically granted tax-exemptions but had to apply for them on their own initiative. The tax-exemptions were neither granted by the monarch (John III), as was the case with frälse-status and ennoblement, but by more modest authorities, namely the castellan of the Viborg Castle and the steward of Kexholm.

The Knaben, muck-riders, and other domestic artifices failed to make up the shortfall in Swedish cavalry forces. Therefore the early Vasas had begun to rely increasingly on

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110 Pratje 1759, 202.
111 Bremer 1844, 161–162.
112 HSH, xxv, 21, 1616, Berättelse till konung Gustaf Adolf om tänkesättet och ställningen bland Almogen i Småland och Östergötland.
113 Katajala 2004b, 155.
114 Katajala 2010, 171.
foreign volunteers and military entrepreneurs, who were willing to serve as officers and to provide for soldiers from their own resources. In return for their services, Erik XIV, John III, and Charles IX ennobled some of these foreigners, which in its turn grew the numbers of the nobility. The increased demands of warfare and the steady influx of foreign professional soldiers created favourable conditions for the separation of noble status from the rusttjänst alone, thus making non-military servitors eligible for noble status. The emergence of the Swedish service elite was a gradual process that reached completion during the reign of Gustaf Adolf, who institutionalized its status in the Riddarhus Table of Ranks in 1626. The Riddarhus also institutionalized the internal stratification of the Noble Estate. The new service elite formed the lowest stratum of the nobility that was preceded in rank by the descendants of the riksråd-aristocracy and the titled stratum of counts and barons (friherre).

The Danish rostjeneste-elite had failed to make this transition by 1643. The native Danish nobility still entertained the notion that they alone were capable of rendering cavalry service, and they effectively shut the doors from most foreigners or upstarts who aspired to rise to the ranks of the nobility through military service. The cavalry troops were not nobles themselves, as the French envoy Charles Ogier explained in his diary in 1634, but rather professional soldiers in the employment of nobles. For many generations hardly anyone had been elevated into the ranks of the Danish nobility, with the discreet exception of a few foreign nobles who served as officers in the Danish armies. From 1641 onwards, the incorporation of foreign nobles was regularized with a set of conditions that required the entrants to show proof of their noble pedigree and to swear an oath of allegiance to the Danish Crown.

The elevation of a few foreigners into the Noble Estate did not change the fact that the nobility failed to produce effective numbers of cavalry soldiers, even though the reason behind this was not so much the impoverishment of Danish nobles but their small numbers. The Kejserkrig (“Emperor War”) against the Holy Roman Emperor in 1624–1629 had been a shock to the rostjeneste-system: the thousand or so cavalry soldiers that the nobility had managed to field were no match for the 50,000 strong Imperial Army mustered by the military entrepreneur extraordinaire Albrecht von Wallenstein. It was becoming clear that the nobility’s cavalry-service was something of an anachronism in the age of the Military Revolution. In the absence of any regular resistance against the invaders, some of the peasants in Holstein and Jutland had taken up arms and “cut down many Imperialists.” The endemic guerrilla warfare waged by the Danish and Holsteiner peasants in 1628–1629 effectively eroded the constitutional legitimacy of the rostjeneste-system and the social privileges attached to it.

Sweden and Denmark were somewhat untypical states in early modern Europe in their insistence of military service from all able-bodied males, no matter what their social standing was. The tradition of universal military service took the form of a general levy of peasants. This levy, known as opbud in Denmark and uppbåd in Sweden,
traced its origins to medieval Scandinavia, whose kings had little capability to muster military forces from any other sources. In practice the levies were mustered by the use of heralds and message batons. According to the sixteenth-century Swedish historian Olaus Magnus, the heralds would ride out on the command of royal bailiffs and issue message batons, essentially symbolic objects rather than actual messages, which the peasants themselves would then pass on from one household to another. Upon receiving the baton, all able-bodied males above the age of fifteen were expected to muster at designated points with their weapons and enough provisions to sustain them for at least ten or twelve days. The failure to do so could be considered treason, unless the peasants had compelling reasons to stay home. Sole supporters of families, for instance, were generally exempted from service in the levies.\textsuperscript{121}

Militias were not exclusive to the Scandinavian countries, and they could still be found in other western European states such as England, Spain, and the Dutch Republic. Some seventeenth-century political theorists, such as Michael Lundorp, venerated and even idealized systems of “conscripted militias”, even when they consisted of common peasants. Such men were not by any means “contemptible” commoners but, as Lundorp reminded, historically many of them had been “keen soldiers and mighty men of valour chosen from among the people.”\textsuperscript{122} However, with the exception of the Dutch Republic, the militia-institution had greatly withered in most continental countries by the beginning of the seventeenth century. M. S. Anderson has characterized the seventeenth-century militias and feudal levies as “embarrassed ghosts of the past”, which assessment, while harsh, points to the very real shortcomings of the militiamen in comparison with the professional armies of the age – namely their poor standard of training and their lack of enthusiasm for military service.\textsuperscript{123}

The Danish \textit{opbud} existed in two forms, the \textit{borgervæbning} and the \textit{landeværn} ofburghers and peasants respectively. They had the character of local, self-organized military forces that existed independently of the central government. Every able-bodied man was, theoretically at least, eligible for service in either levy.\textsuperscript{124} In practice the peasants could secure an exemption from the \textit{opbud} in return for an extraordinary tax, as had often happened during the sixteenth-century wars.\textsuperscript{125} The \textit{opbud} was implemented everywhere in the Oldenburg realm, even in the Imperial Duchy of Holstein, where it was called \textit{Ausschuβ}. The \textit{Ausschuβ} mirrored the continental militias, which were more selective and better trained than the general levies elsewhere in Denmark. The Duke of Holstein-Gottorp had wanted to make his militia even more professional by placing a number of regular officers in its charge. The Estates of Holstein-Gottorp naturally objected to such a fiscal obligation.\textsuperscript{126} In April 1638, when there was an apparent danger of an Imperialist incursion into Holstein, Christian IV had summoned every able-bodied (“Wehrhaffte”) man in Schleswig-Holstein and Dithmarschen to Itzehoe for a general muster of the \textit{Ausschuβ}.\textsuperscript{127}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{121} Olaus Magnus 2010, 297; Hallenberg and Holm 2017, 17.
\item\textsuperscript{122} Lundorp 1617, 430.
\item\textsuperscript{123} Anderson 1988, 20–21, 24.
\item\textsuperscript{124} Lind 1994, 24–25.
\item\textsuperscript{125} Asmussen 1983, 625.
\item\textsuperscript{126} Lind 1994, 34.
\item\textsuperscript{127} Vieth 1733, 465.
\end{itemize}
As in Denmark, the uppbåd in Sweden was based on a royal prerogative that had not been written down in the law. Early levies could be of considerable size: Olaus Magnus claimed that Gustavus Vasa had raised an army of 12,000 Dalecarlian peasants in his war against Christian II in 1521. Usually the uppbåd was limited to one man from every fifth household in Småland and one from every sixth elsewhere in Sweden. Military crises and protracted wars on home territory necessitated more intensive levies: during the Twenty-Five Years War in 1563–1598 some districts in eastern Finland had been required to provide one man from every single household. The main shortcoming of all peasant levies was their unprofessional nature, which generally placed them at a disadvantage when pitched against experienced soldiers. The two advantages of the native peasant levy were loyalty and cost, although both these qualities have been traditionally exaggerated by Swedish and Finnish historians.

The idea that native conscripts and levied peasants were distinguished by their loyalty is based on a negative interpretation of mercenaries, who were thought to be inherently untrustworthy. Writing in the 1930s, the Finnish military historian Arvi Korhonen viewed recruited mercenaries just as unreliable as those military forces that served on the basis of feudal fealty. The untrustworthiness of mercenary armies was increased by their heterogeneous ethnic composition and their “un-folkish” nature, Korhonen argued. Paid mercenaries were quick to change their colours, as they had little interest in whom they fought for or why. If their wages were not paid in time, there was a danger that the mercenaries would rebel or defect to the enemy. A particularly gifted condottiere might even take advantage of his position and pursue policies that were detrimental to his employer. No amount of contrary evidence concerning the commitment of mercenaries to their employers seems to affect the entrenched view that mercenaries were ineffective, disloyal, and generally the worst option for troops, David Parrott has despaired. Parrott’s own research on early modern military entrepreneurship has shown that there exists little concrete evidence to support these traditional prejudices against contracted soldiers. In this context the assumed moral superiority of standing armies and peasant levies seems more qualified; mercenaries, at least, were willing to fight anywhere and anytime, unlike the Swedish and Danish levies, whose service was limited within the boundaries of their native realms and an agreed duration that typically ended with the harvest season.

Another persistent myth concerns the supposed cost-effectiveness of native levies. Jan Glete has described the militias and levies as being cheaper than hired troops. Mirkka Lappalainen has even characterized them as being “outrageously inexpensive” in comparison to recruited soldiers. While the levies did not have to be paid wages like the regular troops, their proposed cheapness requires further qualification. All early modern armies consumed food, drink, hay, and other resources from their immediate surroundings, and peasant levies were no exception. Unpaid

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128 Olaus Magnus 2010, 298.
129 Frost 2000, 33.
130 Katajala 2010, 221.
131 Korhonen 1939, 33–34.
132 Parrott 2012, 6–8.
133 Glete 2002, 32.
134 Lappalainen 2014, 182.
levies were less of a fiscal burden than the hired troops, but economic considerations nevertheless featured heavily in any decisions to employ native levies. For instance, during the Rupture War with Russia in 1656, the riksråd forbade Ernst Johan Creutz, the landshövding of the Nyland and Tavastehus län in Finland, to muster and lead peasant levies against the enemy, as it was feared that the peasants would subsist off the land and ruin farms and manorial estates before reaching the theatre of war. The riksråd was also worried that the mobilization of peasant levies might hamper the approaching harvest season, a concern that was perfectly justified as the levying of peasants carried with it an opportunity cost in the form of forfeited or delayed agricultural work.135

Here, perhaps, it is best to briefly explain the meaning and use of the term opportunity cost. Modern economic science defines the opportunity cost of a good as the quantity of other goods sacrificed to make another unit of that good. Opportunity cost represents a trade-off, in which more of one commodity implies less of the other. It is therefore inescapably linked to the concept of production efficiency, in which more output of one good can be obtained only by sacrificing output of another good.136 Jurgen Brauer and Hubert van Tuyll have made a case for using economic science as an analytical tool in the field of military history. According to Brauer and Tuyll, planning and prosecuting war requires choices. In this sense military history and economic science co-exist in each other’s provenance, as economic science (or at least its neoclassical school) is at heart analysis of decision-making.137 The present inquiry is not an attempt to disprove or vindicate the case made by Brauer and Tuyll. This research simply adopts one key concept of economic science, the opportunity cost, as an analytical tool for showing the problems of decision-making behind the allocation of military resources for competing purposes. Modern economic science assumes that the choices for different avenues of production are made by the market (essentially consumers).138 This assumption does not apply to war, in which such decisions are made by the military leadership alone. The employment of the opportunity cost as an analytical tool poses the question which individuals or institutions made the decisions for the allocation of military resources in the Swedish and Danish chains of command in 1643–1645. This question is not relevant for the themes of insurgency and counterinsurgency alone but for the much larger debate about the nature of the early modern Military Revolution as well.

Opportunity costs presented themselves behind all decisions to muster or employ peasant levies. If large numbers of peasants were tied down in military service for any prolonged period, the wheels of labour-service and taxation would have stopped turning, thus bringing the fiscal-military state to a standstill. As constitutional traditions and military realities prevented the deployment of peasant levies overseas, they could only be used on domestic soil. This scenario was one which all early modern states wished to avoid. If one of the central tenets of the Swedish military state had been the need to make war pay for itself, another guiding principle was the necessity to fight wars anywhere but at home: “It is much better to fight, plunder, and burn in the enemy’s land than to let him do the same on ours”, Erik XIV had summed up the latter principle

135SRRP, xvi, 526, 3 July 1656; SRRP, xvi, 544–545, 10 July 1656.
136Begg, Fischer, and Dornbusch 2003, 7.
138Begg, Fischer, and Dornbusch 2003, 8.
in 1564.\textsuperscript{139} The mobilization of native levies violated both these principles, as war could not be made to pay for itself on domestic soil. At an age when all military commitments placed a heavy burden on the nascent European state, uppbåd-levies might be better characterized as being less outrageously expensive than other forms of troops.

Mid-seventeenth century Sweden and Denmark were exceptional European states in the sense that they both possessed standing armies of native conscripts. This system, which was institutionalized in Sweden in the first decades of the seventeenth century, had evolved from the peasant levies. In the aftermath of the Dacke Rebellion in 1544, Gustaf Vasa used his own administrative channels (namely royal bailiffs and individual nobles) to recruit a force of a few hundred peasant soldiers, who would receive payment for their military service and whose names would be subsequently registered “so that one might locate them when they were needed again.”\textsuperscript{140} This practice of “writing out” (utskrivning) registered eligible peasants for extended levies, and there remained for a long time considerable confusion over the official status of the new practice. Over time the utskrivning evolved by fits and starts into a standing army of native recruits that could be used for extended military campaigns beyond the Swedish homeland.\textsuperscript{141} By this account utskrivning signified a profound departure from the traditional uppbåd, which had been restricted to national defence on domestic soil and only for a limited duration.\textsuperscript{142} Utskrivning was used only to produce infantry; the raising of cavalry units relied on rusttjänst, volunteering, and recruitment. The organizing principle behind utskrivning was one of rotes. Before 1627 all peasants on skattjord or tax-paying free land as well as royal tenants were organized into files of ten men, while frälserotarna or files on demesne land consisted of twenty men. After 1627 all rotes were organized into files of ten, but this ratio was abandoned in 1635, when it was reduced to 1 in 30 for demesne peasants and 1 in 15 for the rest.\textsuperscript{143}

Whenever the riksdag agreed on a renewed conscription, one man was taken from each file for military service. The lists for eligible soldiers were maintained by the local parish priests, who also participated in the local conscription committees that decided which individual from any given rote would be chosen for military service. Only able-bodied men between the ages of fifteen and forty were eligible for military service. The choice for the conscripted individual depended largely on local preference. Sole supporters of families and valuable workers were rarely conscripted; anyone regarded by the local community as labour surplus was likely to find himself in the army, even though outright vagabonds and feckless drifters were generally scorned by the royal utskrinningskommissar.\textsuperscript{144}

After being registered, the conscripts were sent to a place of muster, from where they were forwarded to the lifeguards – the most professional element in the native army. There the conscripts received basic training in the art of infantry warfare, which essentially meant drill in the use of muskets and pikes in dense formations.\textsuperscript{145} It was

\textsuperscript{139} Hallenberg and Holm 2017, 82.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 53.
\textsuperscript{141} Frost 2000, 33–34.
\textsuperscript{142} Villstrand 2000, 264–265.
\textsuperscript{143} Frost 2000, 205.
\textsuperscript{144} Roberts 1958, 207–209; Villstrand 2011, 157.
\textsuperscript{145} Roberts 1958, 239.
this formal training in the proper art of war that ultimately separated the conscripts from levied peasants, whose military training was typically limited or non-existent. A telling anecdote of the latter state of affairs comes from Danish Halland, where, in early 1644, one levied peasant named Svend Hansen was described in the local protocols as being “unaccustomed to his musket.” Hansen’s unfamiliarity with weapons and drill did not prevent the Danish military authorities from sending him to watch duty on the Småland border. At the first alarm Hansen accidentally discharged the musket he did not quite know how to use, thus killing another levied peasant who happened to stand in the bullet’s path.146

Conscripts too cost money. During campaigns they were paid wages just like the recruited soldiers. Those on garrison duty were paid a smaller wage called läning. In peace-time conscripts were maintained out of land revenues from appointed farms or hemman. The farmer would deduct one eighth of the rent he owned to the Crown and pay it to the soldier (a free peasant, who owned his own farm, deducted the portion as a tax-concession). The soldier for his part would work for the farmer in return for pay and upkeep. An enterprising farmer could thus distribute the greater part of his tax-payments among soldiers billeted upon his hemman.147 Officers and civil servants were maintained in a similar way through förläning and beställning, in which they received tax revenue from certain Crown farms.148 Some officers and cavalrymen were billeted permanently on farms in a system known as indelning, in which a prosperous peasant supported one or more soldiers in return for tax reductions.149 The Swedish system of utskrivning was well-entrenched by the 1640s, and the tempo of utskrivningar was beginning to quicken thanks to the revitalized Swedish war effort in Germany.

The development of a native standing army took a different path in Denmark. As in Sweden, the national army in Denmark evolved from the universal peasant levy or opbud. The Kalmar War had taught both sides that contemporaneous warfare required large numbers of proficient troops. The conundrum was that the peasant levies, which could be called up in the thousands, were cheap but not proficient, while the professional mercenaries, who were proficient but expensive, could not be hired and sustained in large enough numbers. Christian IV sought to address this problem by instituting a semi-professional native army led by a full-time officer corps.150 The military organisation, which Christian IV set up in 1614, was not an actual standing army. The officer corps and the system of mobilization were on a permanent footing, but the soldiers were rotated. The semi-standing army consisted of two landsdelsregimenter, one from Jutland and another from Scania.151 The soldiers were recruited from 4,000 specially-assigned royal farms, which were granted fiscal privileges in return for providing and supporting a soldier. This system of indelning meant that the soldiers would live and work at the designated farm during those times that they were not being trained or serving in their regiments. When the soldier served on the field, the Crown took over the responsibility for supporting him. Instead of

147 Roberts 1958, 215.
148 Frost 2000, 120–121.
150 Frost 2000, 139.
serving in the army themselves or sending their sons to the military, the royal peasants usually hired a substitute to serve on their behalf. The system instituted in 1614 was reformed in 1620. The four thousand Crown farms could not alone support the landsdelsregimenter, in addition to which such a narrow base of recruitment did not allow the expansion of the army size. The soldier-farms were reduced to 400, which were to support officers only. The obligation for supporting the army was extended to all royal and ecclesiastical farms, which were expected to provide conscripts. Such farms were organized into recruitment units or lægd of nine farms. Each lægd was expected to supply one soldier. The lægder provided an army of 5,000 men. The potential recruits were catalogued and ‘written out’ in a process called udskrivning, which resembled the contemporaneous Swedish system of utskrivning in more than just name. Recruits were placed on the lists and called up during mobilization. The Danish lægd were essentially the equals of the Swedish rota. The legitimacy of conscription rested on the opbud, as it did in Sweden. The main difference was that the Danish recruitment was not based on a set ratio of troops but on a quota system according to administrative divisions. The nature of conscripts differed from Sweden as well. While in Sweden it was generally the peasants themselves who were called up from the rota, the Danish lægd-peasants paid collective taxes to finance a soldier.

This arrangement placed the direct economic burden for maintaining the soldier on the Crown. The problem was that the Crown was in great trouble trying to finance the standing army from its own resources alone. The aristocracy was quite happy to have a strong army but not a strong monarch. Therefore the fledgling standing army was financed with existing royal revenues and a plethora of extraordinary taxes. The amount of taxes extracted from Denmark and Norway rose by 255 percent between 1638 and 1642. The failure to reform the state finances in tandem with the establishment of the standing army led to corruption, galloping public debt, and general administrative chaos. When the nobility clung on to its fiscal privileges and the constitutional traditions prevented the sale of Crown goods, the financing of the military forces was realized by placing an ever higher tax-burden on the peasant class and by involving the urban burghers in the financing as creditors.

In the first quarter of the seventeenth century the Norwegian part of the Danish realm was almost wholly without an army. The defence of Norway rested on the peasant levy, which was commanded by the lensmænd. “It was a parody of an army, ill-trained, insufficiently armed, and without officers”, the Norwegian historian Øystein Rian exclaimed. During the Kalmar War the peasant levy became unravelled; instead of fighting the enemy, many levied peasants simply turned their backs on him and returned to their homes. In 1625, when Christian IV went to war against the Holy

152 Lind 1994, 40–41.
153 Ibid., 44.
154 Ibid., 44.
155 Frost 2000, 140.
156 Lind 1994, 45.
158 Ibid., 359–362.
159 Rian 1984, 87.
Roman Emperor, Norway possessed only 60 professional soldiers in two garrisons at Akershus and Bohus. “Norway may have then been the most unmilitarized country in continental Europe”, Rian asserted.160

The Danish involvement in the Thirty Years War necessitated radical rethinking and reorganization of the Norwegian military system. In 1627, the Norwegian statholder Jens Juel introduced a garrison tax, which maintained four fortified garrisons of 330 men each.161 One year later Juel formulated a proposition for a standing Norwegian military force, which plan received royal confirmation as the official Krigsordinans.162 According to the 1628 Krigsordinans, the Norwegian peasant levy would be reorganized into a standing force of 6,200 men, who would be commanded at the company-level by professional officers and at a regimental level by the lensmænd.163 Jens Juel’s reforms essentially introduced the Danish udkrivning to Norway. The Norwegian udkrivning however, was implemented with certain modifications. The lægder were organized into units of four houses, not nine. The lægder were organized provincially, and it was the statholder’s responsibility to decide who would be ‘written out’ into the military service. The financing of the Norwegian army rested on the Norwegian Estates and not the Danish King. This arrangement was even written down in the Norwegian constitution or grundlag. The most conspicuous Norwegian alteration dealt with the officer corps. Unlike in Denmark, where the nobility effectively monopolized officers’ vacancies, Norwegians specifically sought out non-noble officers for their own army.164

The standing army conceptualized in the 1628 Krigsordinans did not initially rest on a permanent basis. Christian IV was reluctant to finance the Norwegian forces, and the fiscal responsibility for their upkeep was largely devolved to the Norwegian Estates. In 1630–1638, this Norwegian militia fell into decline, and the standing army only began to recover from its malaise in 1639–1643, when the Estates agreed to allocate new resources for its maintenance.165 The new standing army did not yet fully replace the older institution of peasant levies. The opbud remained the only existing military reserve in Norway up until the era of absolutism, when the Danish military was turned into a permament institution. Between 1660 and 1709, the infantry element of the Norwegian militia was expanded into 9,500 conscripts and 2,000 recruited soldiers, who were further bolstered by a reserve of 4,000 conscripts – thus removing any remaining need for an institutionalized peasant levy.166

160 Rian 1984, 87.
161 Ibid., 87.
162 DBL, viii, 571.
163 Rian 1984, 87.
164 Lind 1994 61.
165 Rian 1984, 87.
166 Ibid., 87.
2.2 MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS IN SWEDEN AND DENMARK

The military hierarchy within the armies themselves followed roughly the same principles in both Sweden and Denmark. Field marshals led armies, general majors commanded corps, colonels oversaw regiments, and captains commanded companies. The largest military units were armies, followed by corps consisting of two or more regiments. During the Kejserkrigen the Danish corps were separated into two functions, administrative and operational. On one hand the corps comprised a fiscal and administrative whole, but did not operate militarily in the same form. On the other some corps existed only as battlefield formations. An example of the former corps was that commanded by Magdeburg’s ecclesiastical Administrator Christian Wilhelm. His two regiments could function as operative units on the battlefield, but as corps they were too small to fight independently. Christian Wilhelm’s corps was an administrative entity, whose primary reason for existence was to enhance the Administrator’s princely status. Duke Christian of Brunswick’s corps in early 1626, on the other hand, functioned both as an administrative and operational contingent.

The Danish krigsordning of 1614 defined regiments as permanent administrative units. Every regiment was to be commanded by two colonels, who were supported by a full staff: a lieutenant colonel, major, quarter master, provisions master, and “other such officers.” Regiments comprised of either cavalry or infantry. The typical size of a Danish regiment was 8 to 10 companies, altogether 500–1,000 cavalymen, or 1,000–3,000 footmen. As was the case with the corps, regiments too would assume different forms as administrative units and field regiments. The landsdelsregimenter created in 1614 were not battlefield formations but vehicles for mobilization. Hired regiments, for their part, could be marched straight into battle.

Regiments were composed of companies. These were fixed tactical units, although in the Dutch military system they could also be the basic units of recruitment. The Danish infantry, consisting traditionally of German recruits, had already adopted the company as its tactical organisation in the sixteenth century. On the battlefield companies could be organized into battalions of 200–300 men. Battalions, however, had never been thoroughly systematized, and regiments were broken up into battalions only when it proved necessary. The cavalry, for a long time the preserve of the rostjeneste-nobility, only organized itself tactically in 1550–1609, when pistols and harquebuses replaced the lance and thus necessitated tactical co-operation between individual cavalymen. When the rostjeneste was mustered nationwide in 1609, Christian IV arranged the cavalry into permanent tactical units called fænnike or banners of 150–200 men each. At the same the cavalry was given a “permanent corps

167 Lind 1994, 300–301.
166 Ibid., 300–301.
165 Ibid., 40.
170 Ibid., 474.
171 Ibid., 474.
of officers, who, in addition to tactical command in war, were also responsible for training the fänike during peace-time.”

SWedish regiments were reorganized in 1616 into provincial landsregimenter. Each Swedish province was expected to raise one regiment of 3,000 men or 12 companies. The system never got into working order, and it was revised in 1621. Only four regiments had managed to muster at full strength; consequently it was agreed that regiments would have to be mustered with less troops. At the same time Sweden introduced a new tactical unit by joining two fänikor into a field regiment. There then remained two types of regiment side by side: the provincial regiment, an administrative peace-time organisation, and the tactical field regiment for times of war. The much larger provincial regiment was subdivided for administrative purposes into three field regiments. By the late 1620s the provincial regiment’s administrative functions had been transferred to the civil authorities, namely bailiffs and landshövdingar, and the provincial regiment atrophied out of existence.

The provincial regiment’s demise was expedited by the emergence of a new tactical unit, the brigade, which was a combat-group of three, later four, squadrons – effectively a combination of two field regiments. Much like the battalion, the brigade was a formation for set-piece battles; it played no role in the small war that was being fought outside battlefields and fortified positions. The provincial regiments were revived in the Form of Government of 1634, which established 23 infantry and eight cavalry regiments in Sweden and Finland. All soldiers in the landsregimenter were expected to train and drill regularly – either every Sunday at the nearest fortification or church at the lead of a corporal, or annually every May during a national muster of landsregimenter. Soldiers were also used in labour duties, such as fortification-construction or even mining work, which elicited complaints about “forced labour and thraldom.”

The smallest Swedish military units were squadrons and companies consisting of individual soldiers. The fänika or banner remained the largest tactical and administrative unit for infantry until 1611. Before that time the composition of the regiments was so loose and their size so variable that they played little role either as administrative or tactical formations. Fänikor could attain the strength of 500 men, but typically they included only 200–300 foot soldiers. In 1618, the fänikor were finally confirmed to contain 272 men. Two fänikor would form a squadron, which was purely a tactical unit. After fänikor came the companies. The squadron finally gave way to the field regiment. The provincial regiments had called for companies of 272 men. This structure was revised in 1621 and the size of companies was halved to 148 men. The muster rolls of the Dalecarlian Infantry Regiment from 1644 show that the size and composition of the companies was still fairly standardized at the outbreak of Torstensson’s War. Every company in the Regiment was commanded by three “öfver officerer” (captains, lieutenants, and ensigns) and fifteen “under officerer” (sergeants

175 Roberts 1958, 221–222.
176 Ibid., 222.
and corporals). The size of the companies in the Dalecarlian Regiment was fixed to 139–148 men. The ratio of pikemen to musketeers in the armies was three to four. The cavalry too underwent changes. The smallest tactical and administrative unit of the cavalry had originally been the *fana* (banner), which consisted of 250 riders. Cavalry was reorganized in the early 1620s into companies of 125 men each. For some time the largest cavalry unit was the squadron, which consisted of three, later even four or five, companies. By 1630, the cavalry too had been organized into regiments. It was these smaller formations that were typically involved in the small war outside encampments and fortified towns.

Both Sweden and Denmark employed war commissars to oversee certain managerial aspects of warfare. In Sweden the war commissars constituted a somewhat irregular and unformalized institution. The war commissars were subordinate to the central government and they answered either to the kammarkollegium, the riksråd, or the monarch himself. As such they were effectively equal in rank to the *ståthållare* and *landshövdingar* and superior to the royal bailiffs. In the military hierarchy they were expected to be of equal rank to the colonel-proprietors, whose recruitment and supply efforts they were often instructed to oversee.

However, the war commissars’ exact position in the military chain of command was often obfuscated by their lack of formal military rank. Erik Trana, the Finnish-born war commissar in Gustaf Adolf’s German army, only held the title of a *generalkrigskommissar*, which did not automatically situate him anywhere in the military hierarchy. When he was captured by the Imperialists in 1632 and taken to Wolfenbüttel, his captors wanted to exchange Trana for Colonel Reinhard von Walmerode, the Imperial *Generalkriegskommissar* and *Hofkammerat* (a servant of the Imperial Treasury), whom they regarded as Trana’s only exchangeable peer in Swedish captivity. The Imperialists also considered Trana to be superior to his fellow prisoner, Colonel James King, who was released against a ransom of 1,400 thalers. Trana, on the other hand, could not offer the higher sum expected from him, for which reason he was forced to remain in captivity. This conundrum of military ranks and corresponding ransoms was finally solved by Trana’s escape from Wolfenbüttel in early 1633. One year later Trana was officially assigned the military rank of a colonel, but this was only because he was contracted to raise his own cavalry regiment. Arvi Korhonen, the Finnish historian who wrote Trana’s biography, was nevertheless convinced that, before his violent death at the siege of Minden in October 1634, Trana was promoted to the rank of a general major “so that he would not be equated with the run-of-the-mill German colonels, and that he could be authorized by his military rank to partake in all councils of war.”

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180 KrA Rullor öfver infanteri i Dalarna/0022/1644/4, January 1644.
181 Roberts 1958, 221.
182 Ibid., 223.
184 Korhonen 1939, 77.
185 Korhonen 1953, 398.
186 Ibid., 398, 406.
187 Ibid., 433.
188 Ibid., 454.
The Swedish war commissars were essentially a wartime institution, and they were usually employed on foreign soil or recently conquered territories, which in the first half of the seventeenth century meant Ingermanland, Livonia, Prussia, and Germany. This meant that they usually worked beyond the Swedish administrative framework and were forced to rely on foreign institutions and networks to successfully conduct their business of supplying and managing armies. For instance, when he was still the war commissar of Dorpat in 1625, Trana was forced to rely on the existing Polish tax administration in order to collect contributions from northern Livonia.189 His other duties involved the procurement of supplies via local subcontractors, the inspection of Livonian fortresses, hospitals, and arsenals, and the assessment of Finnish saltpetre works and their rates of production.190

In the Swedish homeland such supervisory duties were considered to fall within the jurisdiction of the krigskollegium.191 At the outbreak of Torstensson’s War, the highest executive representative of the krigskollegium was General Major Lars Kagg, who might be considered as the nearest domestic equivalent to a generalkrigskommissar, even though he did not officially hold such a title.192 His deputy in this capacity was Colonel Henrik Fleming, who had accumulated administrative experience as the ståthållare of Viborg and Nyslott, the landshövding of Ingermanland, and an assessor of the krigsråd.193 Gustaf Horn was accompanied in his Scanian expedition by at least one war commissar named Johan Kruse, who was subordinated to the kammarkollegium (see chapter 5.1).

In Germany, the Swedish war commissars generally remained resident at certain key locations in 1643–1645. One such war commissar was Carl Gregersson Andeflycht, who resided in Minden and acted as a middleman between Stockholm and the local government bodies of occupied or allied territories in western Germany, for instance the city council of Frankfurt am Main.194 In 1644, he accompanied Königsmarck on his military expedition to Bremen and stayed briefly at Verden, where he took part in the negotiations between Königsmarck and the Bremener Estates.195

Other Swedish war commissars in Germany were Peter Brandén in Erfurt and Marienberg and Michel Thalmann in Chemnitz, although the latter is described in Christian Lehmann’s contemporaneous Saxon chronicle as a “Caβirer” or a treasurer.196 There appears to have been a division of commissarial duties between Brandén and Thalmann. The former collected contributions from Marienberg, Anneberg, Schwarzenberg, and other smaller localities and forwarded them to the central magazine in Chemnitz, whereas the latter tallied them and made them available for use for the city’s Swedish commandant Colonel Muhl.197 Brandén and Thalmann did not follow Torstensson’s field army on its expedition to Holstein and Jutland. Instead

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189 Korhonen 1953, 134.
190 Korhonen 1943, 328.
192 Ibid., 148–149.
193 SBH, i, 338.
194 SRA RR, B196, 9 December 1638.
195 Zetterqvist 1891, 38.
196 Lehmann and Heidler 2013, 147–150.
197 Ibid., 148–150.
they remained in Saxony, which effectively makes it a moot question whether they played any role in the Swedish counterinsurgency operations against the Danish and Holsteiner peasants.

During Torstensson’s War the krigskollegium employed its own commissars, who were not identical to the traditional war commissars such as Johan Kruse or Carl Gregersson. As Kagg and Fleming were absent from Stockholm much of the time, the daily routine of the krigskollegium fell to its assessor (and famous cartographer) Anders Bureus, who could not manage all of the work himself (the ageing riksmarsk Jacob De la Gardie, who nominally headed the krigskollegium, was of little help). Bureus therefore delegated some of his duties to the commissars, who constituted an intermediate administrative layer between Bureus and the secretariat.198 The commissars usually dealt with the purely fiscal aspects of the krigskollegium’s work. They scrutinized invoices from various subcontractors and monitored the fulfilment of contract obligations with the suppliers and other military entrepreneurs. At times they would oversee utskrivningar and musters of recruited troops.199

While the Swedish war commissars operated mainly in foreign theatres of war, the Danish war commissariat existed on domestic soil on a permanent basis. Closest to central government stood the Generalkrigskommissariat, which was first and foremost a fiscal institution subordinated to the Treasury (Rentekammer).200 There were three generalkrigskommissæren, one for Denmark and two for the Duchies of Holstein-Schleswig and Holstein-Gottorp.201 During the Kejserkrigen, the generalkrigskommissæren had in effect assumed full military responsibility for their designated sectors. The defence of the Danish island in 1628–1629, however, had been managed by a committee, meaning essentially a combination of commissars and officers subordinated to the krigsråd in Copenhagen.202 The generalkrigskommissæren at the outbreak of Torstensson’s War, Cai Ahlefeldt, Knud Ulfeldt, and Otto von Rüdigheim, were responsible for the management of the unionshæren, that is, the combined body of the Danish and Holsteiner armies.203 The three generalkrigskommissæren were supposed to manage the army collectively in co-operation with the Holsteiner General Major and the rigsmarsk. Their duties included channeling tax funds to the troops, organizing border and coastal watches, and strategic and defensive decision-making during times of enemy invasion.204 The Swedish invasion in December 1643 effectively removed the Duchy of Holstein-Gottorp from the Generalkrigskommissariat’s sphere of influence. While Knud Ulfeldt remained in Copenhagen to direct the overall war effort with Christian IV and the rigsmarsk Anders Bille, the commissarial duties in Holstein fell to Cai Ahlefeldt, who was forced to improvise a defence on both sides of the Elbe in co-operation with Count Penz and General Major Buchwald.205

198 Steckzén 1930, 123–125.
199 Ibid., 123–125.
200 Jespersen 2000, 71.
201 Lind 1994, 325.
202 Lind 2011, 84–85.
203 Lind 1994 325.
204 Ibid., 326, 333.
205 Ibid., 331.
Separate from the *Generalkrigskommissariat* stood the land commissariat. While the *Generalkrigskommissariat* was financed with the union taxes collected from Denmark and Norway (and circulated via the King’s personal exchequer), the land commissars had their own sources of peacetime income for the upkeep of the armed forces. The Scanian and Sjællander land commissars traced their finances almost exclusively from the local tolls and licences. The land commissariat in Fyn was also to receive a significant portion of its military financing in the shape of voluntary contributions from the local nobles, while the Holsteiner commissars funded the union army with taxes collected from the Duchies themselves.\(^{206}\)

The land commissars were, up until the end of Torstensson’s War, royal servants (*kongelige embedsmænd*), but in late 1645 the land commissariat’s status was changed into a permanent representative body of the Noble Estate.\(^{207}\) Prior to Torstensson’s War, the land commissars had not been very conducive to the project of national defence; the rather self-serving fiscal policy of the noble land commissars had been to save revenue, promote tax reliefs, and to help the landed elites retain and even accumulate capital. This effectively meant that the nobility did not contribute as much to the mustering and maintenance of the professional army as the other Estates and the peasants – which fact did not escape the attention of the lower social strata.\(^{208}\)

During Torstensson’s War the land commissars were joined by other regional war commissars, whose duties were almost exclusively of military nature. In Jutland and Fyn the government instituted eleven new war commissars, whose chief responsibility was the organization of coastal watches. None of the commissars in Fyn or Jutland had any responsibility for actual military operations: all such decisions were made by the *rigsmarsk* Anders Bille alone.\(^{209}\) In Sjælland the traditional land commissars were effectively sidelined by the provisional *generallandkommissær* who assumed wide-ranging responsibilities over affairs of military preparedness. Some of the *generallandkommissær* served double roles as *lensmænd*, which obfuscated the boundary between military and civilian spheres of authority.\(^{210}\) In Scania the commissarial duties were in practice carried out by Tage Thott in Malmö and Ebbe Ulfeldt in Kristianstad. The two Scanian land commissars, Gabriel Kruse and Gunde Rosencrantz, did not perform any actual military duties until late 1644, when Rosencrantz was reassigned as a *proviantkommissar* responsible for directing contributions to the King’s field army in Scania.\(^{211}\) The role of the Scanian commissars in the management of localized insurgency is discussed with more detail in chapter 6.4.

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\(^{206}\) Lind 1994, 328.

\(^{207}\) Jespersen 1981, 90.

\(^{208}\) Ibid., 98.


\(^{210}\) Ibid., 334–335.

\(^{211}\) Ibid., 334.
2.3 STRUCTURES OF WARFARE IN THE NORTH

The physical structures of warfare in early modern Scandinavia were provided by climate and terrain. Lying partly above the Arctic latitude, Scandinavia is largely defined by the former structure. Sweden is situated in the so-called western wind belt, where the prevailing winds come from west or south-west, bringing often heavy precipitation with them. Southern Sweden, namely Småland, Scania, Blekinge, Halland, and Bohuslän, belong to the temperate climate zone, while the more northern parts, Jämtland, Härjedalen, and Dalarna, fall within the cold temperature zone. Winter season begins in November and ends in March. Today the average January temperature is 0 in Scania and -17 in Lappland. The shifting of the polar front zone causes fluctuations in the average temperature.\footnote{Sveriges meteorologiska och hydrologiska institut: http://www.smhi.se/kunskapsbanken/klimat/sveriges-klimat-1.6867.} Thanks to the phenomenon known as the Little Ice Age, the average temperature in seventeenth-century Sweden was two degrees lower than what it is today. Summers tended to be as warm as today, but winters were colder, began earlier, and lasted longer.\footnote{Ljungqvist 2011, 441.} There is, however, no evidence that the winters of 1643–1645 would have been particularly harsh.

Seasonal change dictated warfare everywhere in Europe. Armies operated very rarely, if ever, during winter months. Typical campaign season in central Europe began in March; by early November armies were already preparing to settle into winter-quarters. The Swedes were not an exemption to this rule, but they could tolerate winter conditions better than continental Europeans and thus extend the campaign season further into the winter months (and conversely initiate it earlier). Wintry conditions nevertheless set some obstacles to conventional warfare in the far north. Deep snow could hinder the movement of unmounted troops, although it allowed for the use of ski troops, a Nordic peculiarity in the early modern era.\footnote{Olaus Magnus 2010, 174.} Even worse was the frost heave that turned dirt roads into muddy morass and stopped artillery trains dead in their tracks. Frozen rivers and lakes, on the other hand, facilitated the movement of troops and equipment.

Scandinavian geography imposed its own structures on early modern warfare. Jämtland falls within the subarctic vegetation zone, or taiga. Almost unbroken forest covers the entire province. Jämtland’s northern latitude and upper altitude (1,796 metres at Helagsfället) make the woods stunted and harder to pass through. As everywhere else in Sweden, the dominant species of tree are birch, spruce, and pine, which attain shorter lengths in Jämtland than further south. Tall hills (mountains in the west), bogs, rivers, and lakes hinder movement through this area. Even today only a few motorways snake their way through Jämtland into Norway. Dalarna and Värmland further south look very same to Jämtland, with the exceptions that the terrain becomes more flat as one approaches the shores of the Lake Vänern and that the trees grow higher. All these provinces were sparsely populated in the seventeenth century. Neither the Danish nor the Swedish regimes had precise understanding of the geographical layout of Jämtland and Härjedalen. When the Swedes took over the provinces in 1645, they soon realized that the existing map of
the area, the famed “landcart” (Svecia, Dania, et Norvegia) of Anders Bureus from 1635, did not satisfactorily reflect the reality on the ground. After visiting the provinces in 1647, the landshövding Johan Berndes commissioned new maps that would explain the general layout of the land as well as the exact border between Sweden and Norway. These maps portrayed individual villages and parish districts. They also included information on the local agricultural resources, which matter would have been of considerable interest to the Swedish overlords of the newly-conquered territories.

Småland, Scania, Halland, and Bohuslän are still covered by large tracts of forest, with deciduous trees being predominant in Bohuslän and coniferous woods more common in Halland, Småland, and Scania. In the early modern age, the frontier zone between Småland and Scania was particularly heavily forested, which caused its own difficulties for armies operating there. During the Nordic Seven Years War in 1563–1570 the Danish cavalry had been repeatedly forced to dismount due to the thick woods of Småland. The supply wagons in the Danish baggage train or Tross were often breaking down or getting stuck in the mud or snow while travelling along the forest roads, the condition of which was invariably poor. Unlike the wilderness of northern Scania, the provinces of Halland, Scania, and Bohuslän were already extensively cultivated and populated in the seventeenth century. The kind of broken landscape visible today, with its rolling fields and rocky fences reminiscent of continental Europe, goes back all the way to the late Middle Ages. The topography is flat compared to Jämtland, with rocky hills only appearing in western Bohuslän. Blekinge, the southernmost Danish province in Sweden, remained something of an anomaly. To this day much of Blekinge is covered by thick coniferous forest. Christer Bonde, who in 1658 had been sent by Charles X to investigate the recently conquered areas, reported on the difficult surroundings of Blekinge: “The land of Blekinge itself is so filled with hills, woods, and dangerous roads that an army could not pass through it by land on account of snapphanar, timber barricades, and other hindrances.” Bonde had a keen eye for the problems posed by terrain on regular armies as well as its potential for the conduct of guerrilla warfare. An army marching through the woods would be constrained and slowed down by the difficult terrain, which would conversely act as a force multiplier for guerrillas and insurgents.

The conditions in Jutland and Holstein were more typical of western and central Europe. Situated between the Baltic and the North Sea, the Jutland peninsula (which also includes the northern part of Holstein) is flat and weather-blasted; today the region of Dithmarschen is spotted with wind turbines that transform the fierce winds into clean energy. In the seventeenth century the roads in Jutland were few and generally in poor condition. Streams, dikes, and canals intersected much of the land and made travel even more difficult. During the cold winters of the Little Ice Age these inland waterways almost invariably froze solid. The northern and western parts of Jutland were predominantly heathery scrubland. Woodlands were more

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215 RAOSB, ii: 11, 296–297, 302, 7 February 1646, 22 May 1647, Johan Berndes to Axel Oxenstierna.
216 SRA Projekt Åldre geometriska kartor/Lantmäteriet/SE/RA/81003/1/V1.
217 Tidander 1886, 8–9.
218 HSH, vi, 151, Friherre Christer Bondes berättelse om Skånes, Hallands och Blekinges tillstånd och förbättring.
common in the southern reaches of the peninsula, where they generally grew along the coastline and waterfronts and not inland.220

The Civitates Orbis Terrarum, a multivolume study of world cities appearing in several editions in 1572–1617, described the land of Holstein as having a “great abundance of wood”, and that the Duchy indeed got its name from woods and forests (German “Holz” means wood).221 Otherwise the Civitates characterized Holstein as a flat country with few hills, and being “in no way uninhabited.”222 In the 1570 map by Peter Böckel, many parts of Dithmarschen, the westernmost peninsula of Holstein notorious for its local insurgents or Mosebønder, were designated as paludes or floodlands. The eastern parts of Dithmarschen were shown as being heavily forested.223 The flatness of the country and its coastal situation subjected it to floods caused by the North Sea storms. In 1643, Dithmarschen had been hit by an inundation “that had despoiled the land so severely that for many years grass and corn had not been able to grow,” as one local official lamented to Prince Frederick in 1645.224 In December 1644 another major flood covered much of Glückstadt and caused damages worth of 30,000 thalers.225

The Archdiocese of Bremen and Verden was situated on the North Sea coast and between two major waterways, the Elbe and the Weser. The climate in Bremen, according to the nineteenth-century historian Peter von Kobbe, was “more cold than warm.”226 The North Sea brings heavy precipitation to the region, and the visibility near the rivers is often poor due to mist and fogs. The region between the Elbe and the Weser was flat and not heavily forested, with marshland and moors being the dominant types of terrain in the eastern parts along the Elbe. The marshlands and rivers also subjected the Archbishopric to repeated floods and inundations.227 The community of Hadeln was hit by a devastating storm in 1625 that broke some of the dikes and flooded the market towns of Otterndorf and Altenbruch. When the deluge expanded inland it covered much of Wursten in water.228

In October 1634 the coastline from the mouth of Weser to the northern part of Jutland was hit by a storm of unprecedented severity. The inundation that followed the erosion of the dikes had an economic and demographic impact of catastrophic proportions: contemporaries estimated that the deluge killed 50,000 heads of cattle and as many as 6,000 people in the Weser region.229 In western Jutland the storm and the subsequent inundation killed another 6,000 people.230 The contemporaneous eyewitness Volmar von Jessen claimed that the flood killed all in all some 30,000

220 Bojesen 2005, 141.
221 Braun and Hogenberg 2015, 478.
222 Ibid., 478.
223 Karte von Dithmarschen um 1570. Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek: https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/item/TV7572RXFGFH2TJLSUYMTGSCOC7BSM.
224 Lucht 1854, 159.
225 Theatrum 1651, 609.
226 Kobbe 1824, 2.
227 Ibid., 2–3.
228 Chronik des Landes Hadeln 1843, 275.
229 Ibid., 298.
230 Nielsen 1900, 264–265.
people in Holstein and southern Jutland, but the historian M. H. Nielsen later qualified this death toll to the more moderate figure of 11,000–12,000 casualties. The economic devastation caused by the storm of 1634 continued to affect the daily life of the peasant population for many years to come. These repeated and devastating inundations were at least partially caused by the underdevelopment of the Bremener marshlands and coastal regions. The first and only lines of defence against storms and deluges were the dikes, which were concentrated in the coastal areas. The marshlands were only subjected to systematic drainage and canal-construction in the eighteenth century and until then those regions had remained sparsely populated.

Torstensson’s War was largely fought in regions that have since changed territorial lordship, often more than once. Halland, Scania, Bohuslän, Blekinge, Jämtland, and Härjedalen were all part of the Danish-Norwegian realm during Torstensson’s War, but today all these provinces belong to Sweden. Further south the Danish royal family claimed suzerainty over Schleswig, Holstein, and the Archbishopric of Bremen and Verden, which had been ruled by Prince Frederick from 1621 and 1623 onwards. Today all these territories lie within the borders of Germany.

The Oldenburg possessions in northern Germany did not constitute any single and unified unit; instead they were geographically dispersed and separated from one another by other sovereign territories. Southern Jutland and Holstein were ruled by three branches of the House of Oldenburg. The Duke of Sonderburg governed two separate enclaves: the town of Glücksburg plus the islands of Als and Ærø off the coast of Jutland and a territory just north of Lubeck in Holstein. The Duchy of Holstein-Gottorp consisted of two large segments in Jutland that incorporated the towns of Åbenrå, Tønder, Husum, Schleswig, and Rendsburg. Further south the Duchy governed two territories: one south of Kiel and another between Hamburg and Lubeck. The Duchy of Holstein-Gottorp also covered a part of the Wangrien Peninsula as well as the entire Island of Fehmarn. The rest of Holstein and southern Jutland was ruled by the Duke of Holstein-Schleswig (Christian IV) either directly or jointly with the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. The Danish royal family did not rule these principalities in any consistent capacity but as a conglomerate of fiefs. Neither did these territories all belong to the same Imperial Circle (Reichskreis), as Holstein was part of the Lower Saxon Circle while Bremen and Verden belonged to the Circle of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia. In the former Circle Christian IV was the de facto leader (Kreisausschreibender Fürst), while in the latter Circle, dominated as it was by the ecclesiastical Elector of Cologne, his son Prince Frederick was merely an ordinary member.

Despite these complexities of sovereignty, Kathrin Zickermann has characterized the wider Elbe-Weser area as its own geo-political region, which was tied together by links of commerce and networks of patronage and kinship. A key member in the wider Oldenburg network was Duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp, who

233 Kobbe 1824, 8–9.
234 Dahlerup 1988, 46.
236 Zickermann 2013, 15–16.
co-ruled Holstein and even parts of Schleswig with Christian IV – the ducal seat was indeed the Gottorf Castle in Schleswig. While Frederick III was the sovereign ruler of his own principality, he was bound to Denmark by a formal defensive pact that had been first concluded in 1533. The pact, which was renewed in 1637, stipulated that at times of military crisis Denmark would provide the joint army with 3,000 foot, while the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp committed another 1,000 infantry. The manpower for the proposed contingent was to be initially provided by the “Landfolket eller Aussusuz”, but after eight weeks of service half of the levied troops could be replaced by recruited soldiers. This arrangement reflected the respective rulers’ appreciation of the peasant levies’ capacity for rapid mobilization as well as a preference for recruited troops in protracted warfare.

The mutual pact did not mean that Frederick III felt any devotion or even amity towards Christian IV; the nineteenth-century historian Wilhelm Schaefer indeed described their relationship as one of thinly veiled enmity. Some of the bad blood between the two branches of the House of Oldenburg dated back to the sixteenth century, but a more recent source of grievance was the troubled division of estates inherited by both Christian IV and Frederick III from the late Count of Schauenburg, who had died in 1640. Frederick III felt that, as the direct descendant of the medieval counts of Holstein-Schauenburg-Pinneberg, he alone should have been entitled to the inheritance. In the end he received only a third of the fief, while the rest went to Christian IV.

The lower social strata in Holstein-Gottorp, namely the peasantry, had no particular reason to share their Duke’s antipathy towards the Danish King. When the Holsteiners had gone to war during the Kejserkrig in 1625–1629, they had done so under the command of Christian IV in his capacity as the supreme military commander (Kreisoberst) of the Lower Saxon Circle. In 1626, a general levy had been carried out in both of the two Duchies, and urban militiamen as well as peasant irregulars had joined the Lower Saxon army commanded by Christian IV. The Holsteiner peasants appear to have accepted the Danish King’s position of military leadership.

The Oldenburg possessions in northern Germany did not border Sweden; many of their provinces in the north did. Nordic historians have long debated questions of national allegiance and local identity in Scania and other border provinces. The Swedish historian Jerker Rosén proposed that Danish Blekinge constituted a single cultural entity with Swedish Småland, while the Danish historian Knud Fabricius identified a dominant Danish rigskultur among the landed elites in Scania. Alf Åberg on the other hand emphasized the particularist nature of Scania, which according to him comprised of several individual cultural provinces. Among these

237 Kurzgefaβte Geschichte der Streitigkeiten des herzoglichen Hauses Holsteingottorp mit der Krone Dänemark 1762, 22.
238 Rockstroh 1909a, 327.
239 Schaefer 1864, 27.
240 Ibid., 27.
241 Tode 2000, 149.
242 La Roche 1848, 199, 210.
243 Rosén 1942; Fabricius 1906.
was the forested border district of Göinge, where the largely illiterate peasant population spoke a local dialect that was neither proper Danish nor Swedish.\footnote{Åberg 1987, 12–13.} On the other side of the border the Smålanders were by language clearly Swedish, but from Stockholm’s point of view Småland was still a border province with a troubled past. During the Dacke Rebellion in 1543, many rebellious Smålanders had fled to Blekinge, whose population Gustaf Vasa accused of actively supporting the rebellion in Småland.\footnote{Hallberg 1996, 3–4.} The concept of a political frontier dividing Swedish Småland from Danish Blekinge was still a novelty in the 1540s, as the two provinces had only recently shared a common political framework in the Kalmar Union. Over the course of the last hundred years, however, Sweden and Denmark had fought two bloody wars in the region, and by 1643 the Småland frontier marked a distinct delineation between peoples of differing political allegiances.

Language and politics also separated Jämtland and Härjedalen from the neighbouring Swedish provinces of Ångermanland, Värmland, and Dalarna. The inhabitants of Härjedalen and Jämtland were Norwegians by language and by their political allegiance to the real union of Denmark-Norway, the successor state to the medieval Kalmar Union. The one common denominator between Swedes and Norwegians (and in fact all other Danes) was the shared Lutheran faith, which meant that intra-Scandinavian wars were exempted from the kind of confessional undertones that characterized many other European conflicts of the early modern era. There could be no forced conversions of peoples who were already Lutherans. The ecclesiastical institution, however, could also act as a divisive force in the North. While some ecclesiastical boundaries did not correspond with the existing temporal borders between Sweden and Denmark (see chapter 6.2), the Lutheran churches in both Sweden and Denmark acted as supporters of state power and royal authority.

While Johannes Rudbeckius, the bishop of Västerås, had successfully defended episcopal independence against royal encroachment in the 1620s and 1630s, the lower clergy in Sweden had accumulated a number of administrative responsibilities that essentially made them representatives of both ecclesiastical and state authorities. In the so-called regal parishes (which most Swedish parishes were), the priests were indeed confirmed in their positions by the monarch.\footnote{Roberts 1973, 156–157; Villstrand 2011, 334–337.} One of the priests’ chief duties was to nurture both religious and political orthodoxy among the parishioners. The relationship of the state and the church was thus reciprocal: the state bolstered the authority of the church with its sanctions against heresy and the church committed itself to support the state in temporal matters.\footnote{Roberts 1973, 134.}

The situation in Denmark was not much different. The Danish Lutheran Church in the 1640s was for all purposes an extension of royal authority. The first decade of the seventeenth century had witnessed a theological strife between orthodox Lutherans and the more reformist Melanchthonians. The former faction prevailed after Christian IV decided certain theological and ecclesiastical issues in their favour. Jens E. Olesen has interpreted Christian IV’s actions in the context of the Konfessionalisierung-process that was taking place in Germany, where territorial rulers sought to impose confessional uniformity over their subjects. In Denmark,
the King’s policy of eliminating factionalism within the church, particularly such reformism that smacked of crypto-Calvinism, enhanced religious uniformity as well as royal authority over church and society, and generally strengthened the state. Such a policy could easily be expected from a King, whose personal motto was *Regna firmat pietas*.\(^{248}\) As Paul Douglas Lockhart has pointed out, “royal support for and control of the church paid rich political dividends.”\(^{249}\) The clergy remained fiercely loyal to Christian IV right up to his death in 1648, and disseminated royalist propaganda against the King’s enemies and opponents, were they foreign or domestic.\(^{250}\)

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248 Olesen 2003, 87–88, 92.
249 Lockhart 2001, 14.
250 Ibid., 14.
3 LENNART TORSTENSSON'S WAR IN HOLSTEIN AND JUTLAND

3.1 ORIGINS OF TORSTENSSON'S WAR

The origins of Torstensson’s War were largely connected to issues of Baltic trade via the Sound and the general military-political situation in the Holy Roman Empire. Axel Oxenstierna feared that Christian IV might take advantage of Sweden’s involvement in the German war by forcing Swedish shipping to pay higher tolls or even launching an attack against Sweden with Polish help. The reason behind Denmark’s jealousy, Oxenstierna pondered, was Sweden’s growing cultural and commercial might etiam sub armis, that is, despite Sweden’s entanglement in the continental war. Oxenstierna was convinced that Christian IV was looking for an excuse to pick a quarrel with Sweden. What irked Oxenstierna was the way in which the Danish King reinterpreted previous treaties to his own advantage. As it was, Sweden had already been granted toll freedoms at the Sound in the treaties of Stettin (1570) and Flacksjöbäck (1591). These treaties had established that Swedes were exempted from tolls regarding those goods that “belonged to themselves”, i.e. exports that originated from Sweden itself. In their later border conferences the Swedish and Danish state councils had agreed that imports of salt and foreign beverages would be included in the toll-free goods. Now Christian IV had once again begun to collect tolls on beer and wine by appealing to the original clauses in the Treaty of Stettin. Oxenstierna saw this as a dangerous precedent, as Denmark could in the future extend the tolls to imported salt, “which is very vital to us.” Oxenstierna’s patience with Denmark was clearly running out; instead of enduring Danish slights, Oxenstierna favoured resolve in the face of Danish provocation. Christian IV could not be allowed to think that he could scare the Swedes into concessions because of their on-going involvement in the German war.

Over the course of late winter and early spring 1643, Christian IV continued to supply the Swedish riksråd with fresh sources for enmity and discontent. It was being rumoured in Europe’s diplomatic circles that Denmark was seeking a dynastic alliance with Poland-Lithuania and Russia. A much more serious provocation was Christian IV’s demand that all Swedish ships passing through the Sound should lower their flags in recognition of the Danish King’s dominion over the Baltic Sea. Christian IV also continued his attempts to subject Hamburg and the commerce along the Lower Elbe to shipping tolls, which Christian IV intended to impose in his capacity as the Duke.

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251 SRRP, x, 8–9, 20 January 1643.
252 Hammarström 1873, 14.
253 SRRP, x, 24, 17 February 1643.
254 Ibid., 24.
255 Calendar of State Papers 1925, no. 294, 24 July 1643, Gerolamo Agostini to the Doge and the Senate, 24 July 1643.
256 Ibid.
of Holstein. As if these provocations were not enough, Christian IV had the gall to demand that Swedish troops leave their billets and garrisons in a number of towns in Mecklenburg because the towns had been pledged to the Danish Crown by the late Duchess of Mecklenburg, Christian IV’s aunt Sophia von Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp. Axel Oxenstierna responded to this provocation in a riksråd session on 9 March by threatening the Danish resident ambassador that Sweden would adopt a very negative stance towards Danish mediation at Osnabrück if Christian IV continued to “mess with our businesses.”

On 13 May 1643 the riksråd discussed the justification for a war against Denmark. After some preliminary discussions the drots Per Brahe forwarded to the riksråd a list of potential causes for war:

1. The Danes have offered us only curses and not gestures of good will.
2. We have protected him [Christian IV] with our war [in Germany].
3. The Danes have exchanged letters with the enemy [the Emperor] to our detriment.
4. They have stirred up Poland and Russia against us.
5. They are trying to damage our trade with all means possible and are subjecting our ships and goods to their own taxation.
6. They will close the Sound and force us to suffer distress.
7. They have dragged the Queen Mother away from Sweden [the Queen Mother Maria Eleonora had relocated to Denmark in defiance of the riksråd’s will in 1640].

The casus belli presented by the riksråd was convincing, but Oxenstierna nevertheless ruminated on the gravity of the decisions to be made: “War is easy to begin but hard to see through, especially now that we are encumbered by the great German War”, he pondered. The final decision between war and peace was made on 19 May. Oxenstierna presented three questions to the riksråd:

1. Should Sweden attack first or wait for a Danish attack?
2. Can Sweden claim ius in bello and if not, how should it proceed?
3. How to proceed if, in a possible peace treaty, Pomerania needs to be restored in return for a satisfaction?

The riksråd addressed these questions in the following way:

1. That Sweden should attack first.
2. There is sufficient reason to go to war.
3. As the situation dictates.

257 Mahrenholz 1874, 7.
258 Schwerin, Bukow, Eldenau, Sanitz, Boizenburg, Schwaan, Stargard, Gnoien, and Dassow.
259 KCFEB 1641–1644, 307, 23 February 1643.
260 SRRP, x, 57, 9 March 1643.
261 SRRP, x, 139–140, 13 May 1643.
262 Ibid., 141.
263 Ibid., 161, 19 May 1643.
After these decisions were made, the riksråd moved on to discuss practical matters regarding the planning and conduct of the war.

How, we may ask, did irregular warfare affect the origins of Torstensson’s War? Endemic warfare, often irregular in nature and carried out by non-state actors, did contribute to the outbreak of several other conflicts in early modern Europe. The Militär Gränitz between the Habsburg territories and the Ottoman Sultanate as well as Poland-Lithuania’s nebulous eastern border in Ukraine were two frontiers that simmered with continuous conflict no matter whether the dominant state powers in those areas were at peace or not. The militarized frontier zones of eastern and south-eastern Europe were populated by martial societies and veritable warrior cultures. The steppes of Ukraine and southern Russia provided roaming grounds for Russo-Polish Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars. Steppe warfare was conducted in sparsely-populated regions and across great distances.264 The Austro-Ottoman Militär Gränitz was populated by the martial societies of Uskoks and Hajduks, who served the Habsburgs as frontiersmen and mercenaries, as well as by the feudal elite of Turkish sipahis, who fought ghazi or religious war of conquest against Christian Europeans.265 These martial societies, akin to private military entrepreneurs and military forces controlled by the Estates and noble magnates, represented an alternative form of military organization to the standing armies maintained by centralized states, as well as a challenge to the sovereign rulers’ claim for the monopoly of violence.266

Seventeenth-century Sweden did not have any permanently militarized frontiers resembling the Militär Gränitz or the Ukrainian steppe. Perhaps the nearest Scandinavian analogy to the Militär Gränitz was the Russo-Finnish border, where the under-resourced Swedish Crown had been forced to rely on local uppbåd-levies as substitutes for regular troops. During the Twenty-five Years War (1570–1595), much of the burden for defending Finland, and indeed the responsibility for taking the fight to the enemy in his bases along the shores of Lake Ladoga and the White Sea, had largely rested on the irregular peasant levies. Yet the Russo-Finnish frontier did not become a theatre of simmering endemic war, as the irregular warfare between Finns and Russians did not take place during agreed truces, which were in force for most of the seventeenth century.

Sweden’s borders with Denmark-Norway were even more quiescent. During times of war the levied peasants in Sweden and Denmark would answer the Crown’s call with varying degrees of enthusiasm, but at times of peace they did not engage in any cross-border warfare. Recent research in fact indicates that Swedish and Danish peasants interacted regularly across the border. Cross-border trade was the primary form of co-operation, particularly between Swedish Småland and the Danish provinces of Halland and Blekinge. Marriages between Swedish and Danish peasant families were also fairly common.267

The unguarded frontier between Sweden and Denmark-Norway, in most places traversing through difficult and covered terrain, did nevertheless attract outlaws and bandits from both realms. Already in the mid-1610s a group of bandits operating from Blekinge carried out several systematic raids into Sweden. The outlaws were led by

264 Frost 2000, 47–53.
a local official of some kind, and they appear to have been organized in a military manner. The bandits were finally hunted down in 1617 on the explicit orders of Christian IV himself.268 Nine years later, on the Swedish side of the border, groups of deserters took to the woods in the Kronoberg län and made the roads unsafe for wayfarers. An offer of general amnesty finally succeeded in luring the deserters out of the woods and rejoining their regiments.269 In 1634, the bandit problem in Kronoberg had gotten so out of hand that the landshövding Otto von Scheiding had been forced to levy a number of cavalrymen and foot soldiers to combat the rapacious brigands in his province.270 It was not at all uncommon to find deserters in the ranks of bandits and outlaws. In 1628, Sweden and Denmark concluded an agreement, in which both countries agreed to extradite caught deserters to their country of origin.271 A similar provision had already been included in the Russo-Swedish Peace of Stolbova (originally concluded in 1617 but ratified in 1634), which stipulated in its twentieth clause that those guilty of desertion, murder, or theft (“Förräderij, Mord, Tjuverij”) would not be harboured on either side of the border but would be hunted down and returned to their country of origin along with whatever property they might have stolen.272

In his research of surviving judicial sources, Kenneth Johansson has discovered a high level of violent crime in the Swedish frontier districts in the early decades of the seventeenth century.273 Mats Hallenberg and Johan Holm have suggested that one possible reason behind the high occurrence of violence may have been the ongoing militarization of the Swedish peasantry, whose integration into the military organization as conscripts and uppbåd-levies did not go smoothly, and in fact elicited protests from the peasants as well as created conflict between the local communities, soldiers, and representatives of the central administration.274

Frontier regions were favourite haunts for outlaws and bandits, who could always slip across the border to avoid the hand of law. Brigands and outlaws in the frontier regions were therefore a problem to both Sweden and Denmark. When, in 1639, a mixed band of Danish and Swedish brigands was committing robbery and arson in the border regions between Småland and Scania, the authorities on both sides of the border co-operated in their respective manhunts. Most outlaws were killed on sight; those that were caught alive were extradited to their country of origin, where they could expect swift and terminal justice at the hands of local provosts and landshövdingar. Those peasants that harboured any outlaws were punished with heavy fines, often double or even quadruple the amount specified in the law. Swedish authorities even forbade such peasants to carry firearms on public roads and paths – even though the

269 Hallenberg and Holm 2017, 171.
270 Wittrock 1948, 74.
274 Hallenberg and Holm 2017, 70.
possession of firearms could not be fully proscribed, as the riksråd admitted. It was clear that neither of the two realms had any toleration for cross-border banditry.

While local bandits in Scania, Blekinge, and Småland clearly exploited the presence of the Dano-Swedish border, the Scanian border did not constitute the kind of a “middle ground” that was often the stage for endemic raiding warfare in North America or south-eastern Europe. Such middle grounds were places “in between cultures, peoples, and in between empires and the nonstate world of villages.” Anthropologists have defined them as areas being “continuously affected by the proximity of a state, but not under state administration.” These qualifications do not quite apply to the Dano-Swedish border between Scania and Småland. In the Middle Ages, the Danish Crown had built a string of castles and strongholds to demarcate an otherwise underpopulated border wilderness between Scania and Småland. On the Swedish side of the border there emerged at the same time a class of noble landowners, who used their manorial strongholds as staging points for intensive colonisation of southern Småland. Therefore one could find spheres of political authority on both sides of the border already in the Medieval Period, even though the border itself remained unmarked and ill-defined for a long time. In the early modern age the Scanian border followed a similar path of evolution as the Russo-Swedish border in Finland, where the Peace of Stolbova transformed the border from a nebulous frontier zone into a demarcated line separating two territorial states from one another. Exact borders between Sweden and its neighbours were also represented in contemporaneous maps. Such demarcated and increasingly monitored territorial borders left little space for the kind of endemic and unauthorized raiding warfare carried out by martial frontier societies such as the Uskoks and Hajduks in the Austro-Ottoman Militär Gränitz.

The existing evidence appears to rule out the possibility that irregular or endemic warfare, or any threat of it, would have contributed to the origins of Torstensson’s War. The causes of the war rested primarily on long-standing political and commercial disagreements and on the Swedish concern that Christian IV might, for whatever reason, close the Sound for Swedish traffic. With the exception of brigandry, the Dano-Swedish borderlands were characterized more by cross-border commerce and social relations than endemic or irregular warfare. The possibility of peasant resistance and irregular warfare only emerged in the planning phase of the war, after the decision for an invasion had already been made in Stockholm.

275 SRRP, vii, 517–518, 27 May 1639.
276 White 1991, x.
277 Fergson and Whitehead 1992, 3; Sandberg 2016, 180.
278 Persson 2007, 12.
281 Katajala 2006, 104.
3.2 SWEDISH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

The first plans for raising peasant levies were made on 29 May, when the riksråd contemplated raising “wartgelders” (a Dutch term for local militias), particularly Dalecarlian miners. On 3 July the riksråd issued a directive to the landshövdingar in Uppland, Östergötland, and Södermanland, advising them to strengthen the morale of the common folk in anticipation of the coming war. During the summer the riksråd concentrated on alliance-building, recruitment of German and Scottish soldiers, and on extracting fiscal and military resources from the reluctant Livonian Estates. Peasant levies and border defences did not feature much in the riksråd’s internal discussions. There was some discussion about including an “uthskott” or a deputation of the Estates in the military preparations. It was particularly important that the landshövdingar would know “what would happen in the winter”, Oxenstierna argued, and would therefore be better prepared for utskrivning and other duties to come.

While the Estates and the civilian institutions were kept in the dark, the military men began to organize border defences against Denmark. A document dated on 16 April 1643 and written in the conspicuous handwriting of Lieutenant General Lars Kagg lists the strengths of Swedish garrisons in Gothenburg, Kalmar, Jönköping, and elsewhere near the Danish frontier. Throughout June and July Kagg was busy in Västergötland, inspecting fortifications and organizing de-forestations by slash and burn. The latter project was a typical precaution against sieges, but it also worked against border-crossing infiltrators, who would be deprived of terrain cover. The krigskollegium was vested with the responsibility of repairing and maintaining border fortifications and furnishing magazines with supplies, particularly in Östergötland. The krigsråd collected information on existing stocks of munitions and other military necessities and considered how new border fortifications might be built and operated.

On 12 August Kagg had a meeting with Axel Oxenstierna and Per Brahe. They instructed Kagg to make preparations for war, namely to muster horses, to make sure the artolleriehuset or arsenal at Vadstena was combat-ready, and to prepare for a rapid mobilization of uppbåd-levies. Meanwhile the slow build-up of military forces resulted in some internal troubles. Gustaf Leijonhufvud, the landshövding of the Örebro län, wrote to Axel Oxenstierna in September and alerted him to the fact that a group of brigands, comprising partly of deserters, was creating havoc in the province. The brigands emptied the peasants’ households, and robbed and killed travellers on public roads in broad daylight. Catching the brigands in the act was difficult, Leijonhufvud complained, as they posted lookouts and spies disguised as women. One Crown peasant had allegedly managed to address the brigands and...
had asked what induced them to act so impudently. The brigands had replied that when the winter came, they would “lean towards the King in Denmark”, i.e. cross the western border and seek shelter in Norway.\footnote{RAOSB, ii:11, 323–324, 8 September 1643, Gustaf Leijonhufvud to Axel Oxenstierna.} The riksråd advised Leijonhufvud to employ both soldiers and peasants to catch the outlaws. A bounty of 40 copper coins was to be paid for each captured soldier-brigand. Any low-rank brigand could be put to death on the spot if they resisted arrest; if the manhunters encountered deserted officers, they should attempt to capture them alive and “proceed with them in a lawful manner.”\footnote{SRRP, x, 275.} Desertion of course was not a uniquely Swedish problem, and some Danish deserters too made their way to Swedish Kalmar around that time. They were swiftly returned to Denmark, in accordance with the 1628 treaty regarding the extradition of deserters.\footnote{SRRP, x, 282, 3 October 1643.}

Utskrivning was once again discussed on 3 October. The riksråd agreed that the mobilization should be prioritized to “worthy karlar”, which wording suggests militarily experienced peasants. “They tolerate better the hardships of war”, the riksråd concluded. The riksadmiral Carl Gyllenhielm added that because the conscripts had the habit of slipping away during utskrivning, the parish clergy should be instructed to keep up-to-date books of births, deaths, and recruitments. Oxenstierna and other members of the riksråd pointed out the impracticality of such registration, as both mature and adolescent peasants had the tendency to relocate in their search for employment as farmhands. The riksråd then discussed the problems of utskrivning in the Bergslagen mining zone. Brahe raised fears that utskrivning would hinder the mining operations and drive potential workers to Norway. Oxenstierna and other members countered this reasoning by claiming that there were plenty of idle men in Bergslagen, many of whom were there for the sole purpose of avoiding conscription. If some did in fact escape to Norway, they would nevertheless eventually drift back to Sweden, Oxenstierna convinced his peers.\footnote{Ibid., 275.}

The riksdag finally met between 10 October and 20 November. The discussions with the Peasant Estate concerned contributions and utskrivning. The regime defended its decision to muster domestic forces on the grounds of military expediency: recruited soldiers “serve us badly, because they waste the land, as I well know”, Oxenstierna explained his decisions to the Peasant Estate on 13 October. “We have decided not to send out for foreign troops for the sake of our realm’s security”, he continued. The Swedish military effort in Germany would have failed had they not been able to send native reinforcements to Torstensson’s aid. “We cannot trust foreign troops in the same way.”\footnote{SRRP, x, 302, 13 October 1643.} Oxenstierna’s dismissive attitude towards recruited foreign soldiers (or plain mercenaries) was consistent with his earlier views. As Magnus Linnarsson has shown, Oxenstierna had argued against their use in 1621–1636, when Sweden became involved in the Livonian and Polish wars as well as in the larger German conflict. Linnarsson has concluded that this aversion was ideological and followed a European pattern that was linked with Niccolo Machiavelli’s denouncement of mercenaries in his book The Prince. Practical necessities nevertheless overrode such ideological
scruples, and during the Thirty Years War Sweden amassed one of the largest recruited armies in Europe.\textsuperscript{295}

However, in the context of Torstensson’s War we should also consider another factor behind Oxenstierna’s reluctance to wage the war with foreign recruits: the armies that would attack Denmark in Scania and Jämtland would have to be staged in and transported through Swedish home territory. This would have placed them in direct contact with the native peasantry, which prospect appeared troubling in the light of recent history. Over the course of the Twenty-Five Years War, Sweden had been forced to maintain military forces in the eastern parts of the realm. The size of the army in Finland had varied at any given time between 1570 and 1595, but the total number of troops had reached 17,000, of which 10,000 were German, Scottish, and Dutch recruits.\textsuperscript{296} These recruited troops made themselves very soon odious to Finnish peasants. The recruited soldiers were entitled to collect \textit{borgläger}, a contribution of money, goods, shelter, and transport services. The soldiers began to misuse this privilege very early on, and already in 1574 the bailiffs were complaining that the Scottish mercenaries travelling through the islands of Kimito and Nauvo on their way to Estonia were helping themselves to whatever they wanted in the peasants’ hovels. The excessive and violent collection of \textit{borgläger} incited peasants to resist the soldiers by force, which in its turn led to open conflict in several districts in south-western Finland.\textsuperscript{297} The peasants’ hatred of the \textit{borgläger} and the overbearing and ill-mannered soldiers collecting it was a major contributor, if not the dominant reason, behind the large-scale peasant war that erupted in Finland in 1596 (more on \textit{borgläger} and the historiographical debate surrounding it in chapter 7.4). The Club War, as the Finnish peasant rebellion became later known, cost the lives of some 3,000 Finnish peasants.\textsuperscript{298}

Some peasants in the \textit{riksdag} raised their concerns about the planned conscription. They worried that the conscripted troops would be put to ill use, perhaps against the peasants themselves, as the whole \textit{utskrivning} was viewed by some as a mere government ploy against peasants.\textsuperscript{299} Oxenstierna responded that fleeing from conscription presented a far greater collective danger to the peasants, as it would result in all sorts of shifty and itinerant men to be roaming around the countryside. Staying home and responding to the Crown’s directions was the best way for the peasants to get through the whole business, and it would also result in fewer men being called up. Per Brahe chimed in by reminding the peasants that the need for manpower did not concern the defence of Sweden alone but the German military effort as well.\textsuperscript{300}

The \textit{riksdag} session on 13 October ended with the peasants’ request that their conscripted formations would be officered by their own peers.\textsuperscript{301} This request appears to have been a case of Estate-politics, in which the peasants wanted to deny the nobles any leadership positions in the projected conscript-formations and peasant levies.

\textsuperscript{295} Linnarsson 2015, 70–71.
\textsuperscript{296} Katajala 2004b, 154.
\textsuperscript{297} Katajala 2002, 182–183.
\textsuperscript{298} Ylikangas 2009, 339.
\textsuperscript{299} \textit{SRRF}, x, 303, 13 October 1643.
\textsuperscript{300} Ibid., 303.
\textsuperscript{301} Ibid., 304.
After this request (which went unanswered) the consultations with the peasants were brought to an end. The riksdag dissolved on 20 November. The Estates had agreed on two utskrivningar in 1644 and 1645. They also agreed on a grain tax, which could even be doubled if the harvest in 1644 proved to be good. A special deputation of the three upper Estates deliberated on the Danish war. The Estates devolved the decision for war to the riksråd and Queen Christina.302 These deliberations were kept secret, and they do not appear in contemporaneous news reporting on the riksdag's convening.303

Torstensson’s campaign against Holstein and Jutland saw little preparations for irregular warfare. Torstensson had already chastised insurgent peasants in Bohemia and Moravia, and in this sense his army could be regarded experienced in counterinsurgency warfare. Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch have suggested that Torstensson himself initiated the war as a pre-emptive strike that would have effectively removed Denmark as a serious threat to the main war effort in Germany.304 This view is not supported by the riksråd protocols, which show that the war against Denmark originated in a small political circle in Stockholm. The riksråd’s discussions on the desirability of war against Denmark did not include Torstensson, who was at the time commanding a field army in Moravia on the other side of Europe. Lennart Torstensson, who was only made aware of the coming war with Denmark after the final decision had already been made in Stockholm, was not the architect of the war that would later come to carry his name.

On 25 May 1643 the riksråd sent a number of instructions to Torstensson, who so far had remained oblivious to the riksråd’s bellicose designs in the north. The riksråd was acutely aware of the vulnerability of Sweden’s land borders with Denmark, and in order to bolster domestic defences the riksråd instructed Torstensson to halve four regiments and send four companies from each to Sweden. The operational instructions directed Torstensson to advance towards the Baltic coast in late August/early September and to settle in winter quarters in Jutland and Holstein. The Swedish troops should be placed so that they would hinder Danish recruitment attempts in Brunswick, Lüneburg, and the Oldenburg patrimonial lands. By placing troops between Denmark proper and the Oldenburg lands the Swedes would tie down the Prince-Archbishop of Bremen’s (the future Frederick III’s) forces for that princedom’s “landz defension.”305

General Torsten Stålhandske was instructed to detach an armée volante (on armée volante, see chapter 5.7) from the main body and to secure Torstensson’s flank in Pomerania and Mecklenburg. Later in September or early October the whole army should position itself between Hamburg and Lubeck and divide the occupied territory into quarters, each held by a regiment. Anyone who resisted Swedish occupation by force could be regarded as an enemy combatant and be slain without restriction. “And where you should encounter assembled military folk, be they Danes or Germans, you should destroy them and drive them away from all locations, whether they be at the entrance to Holstein or anywhere else”, the instructions continued, thus suggesting that the preceding passage referred to armed peasants and other insurrectionary civilians.306 Eric Hansson, the commander of Wismar, was directed to launch a sea-

302 Boye 1825, 59–60.
303 Theatrum 1651, 191–192.
304 Grosjean 2001, 164; Murdoch and Grosjean 2014, 155.
305 RAOSB, i:16:2, 432, 25 May 1643, riksråd to Lennart Torstensson.
306 Ibid., 432.
borne assault against Sjælland and the other Danish home islands. Once the Swedes had landed, they should convert part of their infantry into dragoons, who would “ride up and down” the island, prohibiting the enemy from assembling his forces and generally spreading “great consternation” among the defenders. The success of the projected invasion rested on the fact that most of the Danish army in Sjælland consisted of volunteer cavalrymen and conscripted infantry, whose military experience was not on par with the battle-hardened Swedes.\(^\text{307}\)

The military preparations in Sweden progressed slowly, and in early July the riksråd discussed delaying military operations against Denmark. It was now proposed that Torstensson would not advance beyond the Lower Saxon Circle, where he would join forces with General Major Hans von Königsmarck and “hold the lands in order and be ready for any eventualities.”\(^\text{308}\) These discussions were articulated into official instructions, which were dispatched to Torstensson on 31 July. On 31 August the riksråd received Torstensson’s letter from 20 July and realized that the Field Marshal was already on his way towards the Baltic coast. Plans for a delayed war had to be abandoned.

The government sent a new set of instructions to Torstensson on 30 November. The riksråd acknowledged the fact Torstensson had already left Moravia and was approaching the Baltic coast. These new instructions were in many ways identical to those of 25 May, but they nevertheless contained more detailed instructions regarding the treatment of Danish combatants and non-combatants. Hired soldiers, including their officers, should be persuaded to move under Swedish colours whenever possible. Volunteer cavalrymen and conscripted infantrymen should be disarmed and disbanded. If Duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp allowed his troops to transfer to Swedish service, his lands should be protected from all mistreatment. If he became difficult, Holstein-Gottorp should be made to contribute to the Swedish army’s upkeep.\(^\text{309}\)

Those lands and townships in Jutland, Holstein, and the islands that fell to Torstensson were to be subjected to the orderly collection of contributions. In order to succeed in this, Torstensson was instructed to divide the conquered territories into quarters, each assigned to one segment of the army. Those inhabitants who desisted from armed opposition and paid their contributions willingly, whether they were nobles, priests, burghers, or peasants, should be protected from the excesses of the soldiers. Any members of the nobility, clergy, or bourgeoisie, who committed violent or criminal acts against the Swedes, should be arrested and subjected to legal proceedings. “But regarding those of the common folk, who must be forced to obedience, their treatment will be best decided by yourself”, the riksråd instructed Torstensson.\(^\text{310}\) By occupying Jutland and other Danish lands and subjecting them to billeting and contributions the Swedes would be able “to tie our horses to his [Christian’s] round-pole fence”, in other words, to strain the enemy’s domestic resources with Swedish military presence. This strategy would make it very difficult for Christian IV to raise new troops or reinforce existing formations.\(^\text{311}\) Finally the

\(^\text{307}\) RAOSB, i:16:2, 432, 25 May 1643, riksråd to Lennart Torstensson.

\(^\text{308}\) SRRP, x, 209, 8 July 1643.

\(^\text{309}\) RAOSB, i:16:2, 444, 30 November 1643, riksråd to Lennart Torstensson.

\(^\text{310}\) Ibid., 444.

\(^\text{311}\) Ibid., 445.
riksråd reminded Torstensson to send part of his officer corps to Sweden, “according to the right proportion so that those regiments that remain there abroad can be correctly managed and that those [military] people who are here at home will come to proper order and will be able to perform their duties obediently and attentively.” The riksråd was particularly eager to receive senior officers in Sweden.312

Axel Oxenstierna wrote a final set of preliminary instructions to Torstensson on 13 December. The main design against Denmark, Oxenstierna wrote, remained unchanged. Oxenstierna only emphasized how important it was to secure Pomerania before proceeding against Denmark. The only reconsideration touched the state of affairs in Germany. The previous instructions from 30 November had advised Torstensson to leave behind strong garrisons in Germany, particularly in Leipzig. Torstensson had countered this strategy and instead suggested that the army would proceed to Denmark and Holstein in full force. After some deliberation the government had decided to follow Torstensson’s suggestion. Oxenstierna finally reassured Torstensson about the military developments in Sweden: “On this side [of the Sound] our military preparations are made so that our dear friend will not be placed in danger, and that from this side of the Sound there will not be sent any enemies at our dear friend’s throat.” Oxenstierna promised that they would make on their side of the Sound as strong a campaign against the Danes “as the harsh Swedish winter allows.”313

The Chancellor was not being entirely honest to Torstensson. Because of the earlier communication breakdowns the military preparations in Sweden had been seriously delayed and there were not yet any assurances that the Danes would not be able to detach reinforcements from their Scanian and Norwegian garrisons and send them against Torstensson’s army.

3.3 THE INVASION OF HOLSTEIN

The envoy Jacob Törnesköld had left Stockholm in mid-June. His travel to Torstensson’s headquarters in Moravia had taken him over three months. The condition of roads in Germany was poor and indeed insecure. In early July 1643 a Swedish contingent of 800 cavalry destined to Osnabrück to act as Johan Oxenstierna’s escort was attacked in Lüneburg by a force of 400 peasants, apparently mustered by the officers of Duke George of Brunswick-Lüneburg. After losing two officers and ten riders to the insurgents the Swedes regrouped and counterattacked the peasants, killing 200 of them and wounding another 150.314 Torstensson’s own lines of communication in Moravia had been severely compromised on account of Imperialist cavalry patrols and “Papist Wallachs”, who seized correspondence to and from Torstensson’s headquarters. Torstensson had attempted to make the roads safer by felling woods in their immediate vicinity, a military measure later implemented in Scania.315

Imperialist activity detained Törnesköld at Oppen for several weeks. Törnesköld finally reached Torstensson’s headquarters at Eulenburg on 23 September. It was then that Torstensson received the first instructions dated on 25 May.

312 RAOSB, i:16:2, 446, 30 November 1643, riksråd to Lennart Torstensson.
313 RAOSB, i:16:2, 452–453, 13 December 1643, Axel Oxenstierna to Lennart Torstensson.
314 Gazette du 1 Août 1643 N. 95, 641.
315 Chemnitz 1856, 134.
Torstensson sought to conclude a cease-fire with the Imperialist high commander Matthias Gallas, who, unexpectedly perhaps, agreed to a cessation of hostilities and an exchange of prisoners. Then Torstensson made his way into Silesia and towards Pomerania, under the very credible pretext of driving out the Imperialist general Johann Ernst Krakau, who had recently invaded Pomerania via Polish territory. Torstensson of course knew that the defence of Pomerania fell to General Major Königsmarck, who had not sent for Torstensson’s assistance. As it turned out, Königsmarck was perfectly capable of ejecting Krakau on his own and even of causing serious losses to the enemy in the process. Torstensson kept his true intentions hidden from friend and foe alike and continued to project an illusion that his advance north was directed against Krakau’s Imperialist force. Torstensson’s army was being shadowed by Gallas, but from a distance. At one point it appeared as if Torstensson was heading towards the Upper Palatinate in order to form a conjunction with the French forces there under the command of Count Guébriant. The alarmed Bavarian authorities commanded all able-bodied “Landvolck” to take up their arms and maintain watch near the mountain passes.

Torstensson reached Holstein in early December. The advance of his army was rapid: it was reported from Hamburg in early 1644 that the Swedes had covered “above a hundred Dutch [German] miles” in sixteen days. Torstensson occupied Kiel and concluded an agreement with Duke Frederick III of Holstein, who, in order to protect his possessions and subjects, promised to repudiate his alliance with Denmark, to pay a contribution to Sweden, and to turn over a regiment of 1,800 foot to Swedish service. Torstensson also placed a Swedish garrison of six companies in Kiel. From Kiel Torstensson staged an assault against the nearby sconce of Christianpris on 19 December. The Christianpris garrison, only some 50–60 strong, refused all calls to surrender and put its trust on the fort’s favourable position at the end of a small peninsula as well as on its strong artillery. The Swedes, however, managed to overcome Christianpris in a savage night assault. Torstensson, who was possibly vexed by the Danes’ obstinacy, set out to make an example of the garrison and had the prisoners put to the sword. Only the Danish commander Axel Broppin was spared.

The massacre of defeated defenders or civilian inhabitants of conquered towns is one of the more controversial topics in the history of early modern warfare, and one that divides historians into those who regard massacres as being characteristic of early modern warfare and those who view them as exceptional events. The debate about the uniqueness or commonplaceness of massacres has often revolved around certain individual incidents. In nineteenth-century German historiography the debate was confessional and focused on the destruction of Magdeburg in 1631, which event the Protestant historians tended to see as evidence of Catholic brutality and which the

316 Chemnitz 1856, 134–142, 169.
317 Ibid., 170.
318 Ibid., 173.
319 A Relation of the Entrance of the Swedish Armie into the Territories of the King of Denmark 1644, 2.
320 Gazette du 23 Janvier 1644 N.9, 58.
321 Gazette du 6 Février 1644 N. 14, 89.
322 Theatrum 1651, 215.
Catholic historians belittled as a fate suffered by “a thousand other towns.”

A similar debate in Ireland and Britain concerned the towns of Drogheda and Wexford, whose defenders and civilian inhabitants were massacred by Oliver Cromwell’s armies in 1649. The Irish view, recently asserted by Micheál Ó Siochrú, rejects the typicality of such atrocities that took place in Magdeburg, Drogheda, and Wexford and instead argues that they “proved the exception rather than the rule and in no way explain or justify Cromwell’s shocking tactics.”

British historians and Irish revisionists, on the other hand, argue that the soldiers and civilians in Drogheda and Wexford “did not just die in an isolated incident which was an exception and not the rule” and that the accounts of the massacres are highly exaggerated and indeed dubious.

It is indeed difficult to view the tragedies at Magdeburg, Drogheda, and Wexford as isolated incidents because they had several precedents in early modern Europe, including that of Ronneby in present-day Blekinge. This Danish town was stormed by the Swedes in 1564. Swedish and Danish historiography has traditionally viewed Ronneby as an example of King Erik XIV’s personal cruelty and viciousness. This view has been supported by primary source evidence, namely by King Erik’s own gloating description of the massacre of Danish soldiers and civilians: “Therein was pure murder. Water in the stream was coloured red like blood. And our enemies were so forsaken that one could hardly do anything but slay them like a herd of swine.”

The established view has been later nuanced with the proposition by Albert Vejde, that while the massacre at Ronneby was barbarous, it had its own logic, as it served to promote a real-political interest, namely the desire to prevent unsanctioned trade cross the Danish-Swedish border. Lars-Olof Larsson saw similar calculations behind the massacre. Erik XIV made several attempts to win over the population of Blekinge and Scania to the Swedish side, as he intended to annex those provinces from Denmark. While subservience was to be rewarded, intransigence (as shown by the defenders of Ronneby) had to be punished. Erik XIV was prepared to pacify Scania and Blekinge to the extent that he toyed with the idea of deporting all Danish inhabitants and replacing them with Swedes – thus essentially conducting what modern political discourse calls an ‘ethnic cleansing’. There was also a purely military incentive for the policy of no quarter: in the prevailing military situation Erik XIV did not prefer to grant the defenders of Ronneby such accords that would allow them to leave with their weapons and baggage and to rejoin the main Danish army.

Larsson argues that the destruction of Ronneby and the massacre of its inhabitants was a normal practice in the context of early modern warfare. It is true that fortresses and towns that refused ‘sensible’ accords and insisted on continuing combat against all odds were liable to be sacked by their conquerors and that their defenders could

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324 Ó Siochrú 2009, 5.
325 Royle 2006, 531; Reilly 1999 and 2014.
326 Larsson 1968, 34.
327 Ibid., 33.
328 Vejde 1929, 54–64.
329 Larsson, 2005, 94.
expect little or no quarter from the enemy. However, as Jeppe Netterstrøm points out, the wholesale massacre of women and children was inconceivable in the context of the traditional laws of war, the *ius in bello* and the medieval concept of *Pax Dei* or Divine Peace.332

While the civilian massacres akin to Ronneby (or Magdeburg and Drogheda) could not be fully justified by the existing laws of war, the killing of Christianpris’s defenders was in no way an extraordinary event in the context of seventeenth-century positional warfare. Surrender in the seventeenth century was a matter of negotiation that was expected to conform to certain rules and regulations. Garrisons that surrendered early were likely to receive ‘honours of war’, meaning that they would be entitled to march out with their possessions, followers, and carrying with them their small arms (cannons usually became spoils of war). At this stage many recruited soldiers were also liable to switch sides and move under the victor’s colours. Those that surrendered late were likely to be treated as prisoners of war, while those that continued to fight until the walls were breached could expect little or no quarter.333 Christianpris’s insistentigent defenders would fall within the latter category.

It is also possible that the defenders of Christianpris were massacred because they were not deemed lawful combatants; the manifest of Christian IV issued on 30 January claimed that the Christianpris sconce was manned solely by “Landvolck”, in other words levied peasants instead of regular soldiers.334 We shall return to the issue of lawful and unlawful combatants in chapter 7.1, and here it suffices to note that in the seventeenth century the concept of lawful combatants did not generally include peasants. If the defenders of Christianpris were indeed massacred because of their status as unlawful combatants, the atrocity could be understood in the context of modern military theory as a ‘destabilization tactic’. Terrorists and insurgents sometimes use such methods to intimidate the civilian population and to show them that the government can no longer protect them.335 Conversely government forces waging counterinsurgency warfare may resort to destabilization tactics in order to punish suspected insurgents or to set a frightful example so as to deter others from joining or supporting the insurgency. It is therefore possible that Torstensson hoped at the very beginning of the invasion that the slaughter at Christianpris would discourage other peasant militiamen from taking up arms in defence of the Oldenburg state.

The distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants had nevertheless been muddled by the emergence of standing militias that consisted of part-time soldiers such as levied peasants or town burghers. An English version of the manifest translated “Landvolck” as “Trained Bands.”336 This is an interesting choice of words, as it suggests in the English context that the defenders of Christianpris were indeed understood to have been lawful combatants. The Trained Bands had been the closest equivalent to a national army in the Elizabethan and Early Stuart England; by 1623 it was estimated that the Trained Bands could muster up to 160,000 men.337 The Highlander clans in

334 Theatrum 1651, 215.
336 Two Manifestos or Declarations 1644, 5.
337 Firth 1992, 5.
Scotland also maintained their own militias, or “instant regiments”, as Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean call them, varying in size from a couple of hundred to several thousand men.338

The quality of the English Trained Bands was inconsistent, with many of them being poorly trained and led. Their mustering for an inspection of men and arms was more consistent. Musters seem to have happened annually at least in 1631–1637, when Charles I made an effort to turn the Trained Bands into a “perfect militia”, a bulwark of English defence against all potential foes, particularly the Scots.339 At the beginning of the English Civil War most Trained Bands were disarmed and dissolved, with the notable exception of the 18,000-strong City of London Trained Bands, which the Parliamentarians incorporated into their army as an emergency reserve. The London Trained Bands were sufficiently well-trained to distinguish themselves at the first battle of Newbury in 1643.340 The Trained Bands were not therefore irregulars or unlawful combatants without ius ad bellum or the right to wage war; on the contrary, up until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1642, they were the single most important English contingent to possess that right. The English translation of Christian IV’s manifest would consequently offer no justification for the massacre of the Christianpris garrison on the grounds of them being unlawful combatants instead of legitimate soldiers.

Christianpris was rich with spoils of war: money, ammunition, and weapons.341 Steinburg, Itzehoe, and other towns were soon brought under Swedish occupation without a fight.342 Either their garrisons had been unnerved by the slaughter of Christianpris’s defenders or they simply saw no sense in fighting against such uneven odds. General Major Mortaigne captured the fortress of Breitenburg with some kind of a stratagem (called “krieges-Ränk” by Eberhard Wassenberg and “sonderlicher List” by Adam Olearius).343 Georg Keller, the secretary of Johan Adler Salvius at Osnabrück, boasted to Hugo Grotius that Mortaigne had only lost eight men in the same enterprise that had cost Tilly and Wallenstein 1,700 men in their storming of Breitenburg in 1627.344 The former figure seems suspiciously low, while the latter appears as exaggeration. Count Franz Khevenhüller did not mention in his contemporaneous chronicle any heavy imperial casualties at Breitenburg in 1627; he simply related how the fortress was stormed and its defenders put to the sword.345 The same description was later repeated in the Theatrum Europaeum, which apparently used Khevenhüller’s chronicle as its source.346 Robert Monro, who gave a more detailed account of Breitenburg (defended as it was by four Scottish companies from Monro’s own Mac-keys Regiment) put the number of Imperial casualties “above a thousand men”, which suggests a figure closer to 1,000 than 1,700.347

338 Murdoch and Grosjean 2014, 14.
339 Langelüddecke 2003, 1279, 1301.
341 Theatrum 1651, 260.
342 Wassenberg 1645, 543.
343 Olearius 1663, 267; Wassenberg 1645, 543.
344 BHG januari–september 1644, 20, 7 January 1644, Georg Keller to Hugo Grotius.
345 Khevenhüller 1724, 1430.
346 Theatrum 1662, 986.
347 Monro 1637, 39. i.
While the casualty numbers relating to Mortaigne’s conquest of Breitenburg appear inconclusive, the use of a stratagem in the fort’s capture does not sound at all inconceivable. The use of stratagems in the capture of towns and cities was a well-established practice in the Thirty Years War, and it is indeed possible that Mortaigne had captured Breitenburg with minimal casualties. Gualdo Priorato, the Venetian chronicler of the Thirty Years War, recounted several instances where towns had been taken by a ruse of some kind, typically by infiltrating the enemy stronghold in disguise. In January 1632 Swedish troops under the command of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar entered Mannheim by pretending to be Imperialists and then took control of the town gates and the riverside port. Later in 1632 armed peasants hired by the Imperialist commander Johann von Aldringen surprised the Swedish garrison at Neuenburg-Rhein by entering the town disguised as merchants and hiding firearms under their overcoats. Four years later the Swedes and their Hessian allies captured Minden by having it infiltrated by soldiers disguised as peasants.

In 1640, Brandenburgers (then allied with the Imperialists) attempted to take the Swedish-held Frankfurt an Oder by surprise. The Brandenburgers’ plan involved planting grenades and petards to the city walls prior to the assault. The explosives were smuggled to the walls in wagons guarded by twenty soldiers disguised as peasants. The sappers were discovered by the vigilant Swedes, and most of them were either killed or captured before they could put their plan to action. Furthermore, on the very eve of Torstensson’s War in July 1643, Königsmarck had captured Halberstadt from the Imperialists by infiltrating the town gates with Swedish soldiers disguised as peasants, who had claimed to enter the town in search of temporary work (“Tage-Arbeit”). The rewards of such risky and bold operations could be high. At Halberstadt the Swedes had captured the town’s commandant Count Tattenbach, several other senior officers, and 400 ordinary soldiers, who latter had all changed sides and enlisted in the Swedish service. A variation of this established ruse was provided by the Dutch in 1646, when they infiltrated the gates of Tirlemont (in Flanders) with soldiers disguised as Capuchin monks and Jesuits. There were also other stratagems. In early 1631 a Swedish force of merely 300 foot and 100 cavalry persuaded the Imperial garrison in Anklam to surrender by setting so many fires outside the town that “it seemed as if the whole Army had been there.” Mortaigne’s capture of Breitenburg at least happened smoothly, as the town was not torched to the ground or demolished to bits in the process. The audacious and opportunistic employment of irregular tactics and stratagems, it seems, could occasionally circumvent the necessity to conduct protracted and demanding sieges – the key qualifications of the Military Revolution, according to Geoffrey Parker.

348 Priorato 1648, 68.
349 Ibid., 152.
350 Ibid., 347.
351 Gazette du 8 Septembre 1640 N. 113, 624.
352 Pufendorf 1688, 56.
353 Ibid., 56.
354 Gazette du 16 Mars 1646 N. 26, 179.
355 Priorato 1648, 21.
The French newsletter *Gazette* reported that by 16 January the Swedes had advanced through Schleswig and Holstein “without any real resistance.” This does not necessarily mean that travel in Holstein or along the Elbe was perfectly safe for the Swedes. When Johan Adler Salvius prepared to travel from Osnabrück to Hamburg in late December 1643 (to find out more about Torstensson’s military plans), he gladly accepted the 100-strong cavalry escort offered to him by Johan Oxenstierna, even though he did not think it likely that the “Jutes should pose me any danger.” The danger to Swedish lines of communication was not Imaginary. In early January Georg Keller warned Hugo Grothus in Paris that “the Swedish post has been intercepted from Glückstadt and the letters have been opened.” Mail from Germany to Sweden had to be rerouted very early on to take a northern route via Livonia, Ingermanland, and Finland.

Additional protection to Swedish lines of communication was provided by the fieldworks that the Swedes constructed just outside Hamburg “on an elevated position by the River Elbe.” The construction was done by 400 men, “who worked night and day.” Whether these 400 labourers were Swedish soldiers, hired labourers from Hamburg, or local peasants is not detailed by the *Gazette*, the primary source that reported on the construction. Maurice of Nassau had already insisted in the 1590s that the soldiers should do their own digging, and the principle was later adhered to by Gustaf Adolf. This practice deviated from the established tradition, under which all military and non-military duties had to be specifically stipulated in the official terms of service. While the duty to dig field-fortifications may have been a contractual matter open to negotiation to recruited soldiers in continental Europe, in Sweden it was an unquestionable duty ordered by the Articles of War. This does not necessarily mean that the Swedish army always carried out all of its own construction work, and it is possible that the builders of the field-works were hired or impressed peasants. They were the most obvious source for extra manpower when armies had to commence large-scale construction operations, such as the digging of counterworks in siege warfare. For instance, when the Spanish set out to besiege the French-held Aragonian city of Monzón in 1643, they impressed 4,000 local peasants to construct the “circonuallation” or the counterfortifications that protected the besiegers.

Meanwhile the main force, under the command of Carl Gustaf Wrangel and consisting largely of infantry and artillery, advanced north through the Segeberg district. Torstensson allocated some thousand musketeers as garrison troops in the various Holsteiner towns. According to the *Theatrum Europaeum*, the Holsteiner nobility joined forces with the Dithmarschen peasants to resist the Swedes. They were

357 *Gazette du 6 Février 1644* N. 14, 90.
358 APW, ii: c: 1, 117, 22 December 1643, Johan Adler Salvius to Johan Oxenierna.
359 BHG januari–september 1644, 20, 7 January 1644, Georg Keller to Hugo Grothus.
360 SRA RR, B222, 31 January 1644.
361 *Gazette du 30 Janvier 1644* N. 12, 77.
362 Ibid., 77.
363 Roberts 1958, 185.
364 Ibid., 241.
365 Mercure 1648, 196.
366 Wassenberg 1645, 543.
speedily defeated by the Swedes, who inflicted great destruction on the rebellious households in the process. An English news pamphlet written by Joseph Avery reported that 150 peasants, “with some Souldiers being there”, were slain and another 300 taken prisoner. Avery (or Averie, as his name also appears in the sources) had been the secretary of the English company of Merchant Adventurers in Hamburg since 1612. From 1631 onwards he had also been a Stuart envoy in Hamburg. In this dual capacity as a merchant and a diplomat Avery became particularly well-acquainted with a number of Anglo-Scottish soldiers who frequented the wider Elbe-Weser region in the latter half of the Thirty Years War. It is therefore likely that Avery’s information on the military events in Jutland and Holstein originated directly from the Swedish camp, particularly from those English and Scottish officers who served in the Swedish army.

Christian IV and the Danish government had remained oblivious to the Swedish threat until Torstensson’s eruption into Holstein in December. Even then Torstensson had attempted to play time by claiming that he was in Holstein only to seek winter quarters for his army. Seizure of Danish forts finally dissipated all illusions about Torstensson’s true intentions. What remained unclear was the political will behind Torstensson’s operations. At first Torstensson denied any hostile intent and instead assured to the Schleswig-Holsteiner military officials that he was simply seeking winter quarters in the Duchies’ territories. Duke Philip of Glücksborg (a minor member of the House of Oldenburg) had nevertheless received reports on 17 December that the Swedes were already issuing salvaguardias in the occupied localities in exchange for contributions and were generally affecting the ducal territories with all manners of “Spolirung.” In late December 1643 Christian IV dispatched a commission to Vibe to ask Torstensson whether or not he was acting under orders from Queen Christina. Torstensson’s positive answer was tantamount to a declaration of war and all official ties between Sweden and Denmark were therefore severed.

In the weeks following the violent capture of Christianpris, Christian IV began issuing patents for the recruitment of new regiments. The rigshofmester Corfitz Ulfeldt and the rigsadmiral Jørgen Vind were given wide powers to acquire ammunition, provisions, and other necessities for the “landets defension.” One of the forms of this national defence was labour duty. In December 1644 Tranekær’s lensman Christoffer Urne (who also held the post of a war commissar) in Sjælland was ordered to mobilize

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368 Avery 1643, 4.
369 Zickermann 2013, 135.
370 Ibid., 141–143.
371 Theatrum 1651, 220.
374 SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Johan Axelsson Oxenstierna av Södermörre E 979, 6 January 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Oxenstierna.
375 UUB W 841, 6 January 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to Erik Oxenstierna.
376 KBB 1644–1645, 4, 5 January 1644.
Crown peasants and other royal servants to “make as many palisades as are needed for Fårevelje [for its defence]; the Crown’s servants as well as those of nobility shall then maintain them there.”

The military preparations extended to all the Estates. The King had sensed that some of the nobility were reluctant to carry out their rostjene-sted-duty and consequently sent out a missive reminding the nobles of their duty towards the Fatherland and exhorted them to furnish company-sized units with sufficient numbers of men and horses. On 30 January the King ordered the towns and peasants of Fyn to supply the rigsmark with whatever necessities he required for the country’s defence. On 18 March the government sent a public letter to the peasants of Læsø, a small island in the middle of Kattegat, and exhorted them to show obedience to the royal commander Steen Rodsteen. Rodsteen himself was sent on his way with instructions to set up a defensive force among the local “landfolket” and to make sure that the “King’s loyal subjects would not be surprised by the enemy.” Rodsteen was also instructed to allow members of the local nobility to leave the island and seek refuge in Sjælland or Fyn if they so wished. He was not, however, invested with powers of recruitment. This remained the duty of Jørgen Orning, the lensman of Åstrup, who received separate orders to raise 100 boatmen from Læsø and send them to Copenhagen. The burghers of Copenhagen were also organized into a militia that was invested with the responsibility of maintaining watch on the city walls day and night. The militiamen were responsible for the good maintenance of their muskets and ammunition, and were expected to present their equipment to corporals for inspection.

Christian IV also called for an udskrivning of every third man in Fyn; the towns and peasants were obliged to furnish the recruits with provisions for eight days, “and every second or third peasant should have a wagon and a horse with him.” The clergy were invested with the special missions of keeping up morale among the parishioners, spreading government propaganda, and channeling God’s aid to the beleaguered nation. While Gunner Lind has noted that the existence of Danish patriotism is difficult to trace from the existing seventeenth-century sources, Sebastian Olden-Jørgensen has identified the emergence of patriotic discourse in those broadsheets, which appeared in Denmark during times of war in 1625–1629 and 1643–1645. The fervourly religious content of some of these broadsheets, such as the lyrics to the hymn En liden Trøstesang from 1644, suggest that similar patriotic and protonationalist discourse was disseminated from the pulpits as well. The Danish Crown certainly demanded unwavering loyalty from all of its subjects. On 24 March, when the war had already spread to the Scanian and Norwegian parts of the realm, the government issued a printed patent that prohibited Christian IV’s subjects from taking up any duty

378 KBB 1644–1645, 5, 7 January 1644.
379 KBB 1644–1645, 20, 30 January 1644.
380 KBB 1644–1645, 55, 18 March 1644.
381 KD, v, 264–265, 18 March 1644.
382 KBB 1644–1645, 20, 30 January 1644.
383 KBB 1644–1645, 20–21, 1 February 1644.
in the enemy’s service. Any Danish subject discovered in the enemy’s service was to be punished by death.386

Finally the Estates were burdened with extra taxation. The peasants were reminded that there would be a general levy of land taxes in the following Easter. The districts of Laholm, Halmstad, Varberg, and Kristianopel were obliged to pay half the tax only, while Jutland was exempted altogether on account of the enemy invasion.387 Mercantile towns were hit by a doubled tax on all transactions of corn, oxen, and other goods. The tax on clergy was doubled as well. Every dean and parish priest was expected to pay eight thalers in taxes by Easter.388 Earlier in January the government had ordered the stattholere and the lensmænd to collect from their districts all available silver and gold as forced loans. The government promised to pay back the monies after the war’s end.389 The billeting of troops could be considered another form of taxation. This is how Leon Jespersen has viewed the establishment of the bonde-milits in 1614, as its war-time billeting was liable to become the burden of the land-owning elites.390 The government missive from 23 January reminded the landkommissærer in Fyn that the responsibility for billeting troops fell to all peasants, whether they were tenants of the Crown, nobility, or the church. Only the nobility’s own ugedagstjenere (tenants of the nobility living close to the manor and liable for weekly labour service) were exempted from billeting.391

3.4 ARMING THE NATION

In his book *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz titled the chapter on guerrilla warfare as ‘Arming the Nation’.392 Clausewitz never addressed any possible problems in supplying the levied peasant masses with weapons; he seems to have assumed that all nineteenth-century power states were capable of arming their nations if they wished to do so. One of the major claims of the Military Revolution is to identify the time frame when nascent territorial states became powerful enough to raise, equip, and sustain such mass armies on a permanent basis. Michael Roberts located this “great and permanent transformation” between 1560 and 1660.393

Sociologists, political scientists, and historians have later come to label these transformed war-making states as power states (*Machtstaaten*). One of the key characteristics of such power states is their ability to raise and arm standing armies, even mass levies that include every able-bodied man in the nation. Charles Tilly condensed this relation between war and state formation into his oft-quoted maxim “war made the state and the state made war.”394 The Nordic historians, who generally

387 KBB 1644–1645, 14, 22 January 1644.
388 Ibid., 15.
389 KBB 1644–1645, 6, 9 January 1644.
392 Clausewitz 1997, 308.
393 Roberts 1995, 29.
394 Tilly 1975, 42.
accept the paradigm of power states, disagree slightly on their terminology and definitions. Danish historians generally prefer to use the terms *makstat* and *skattestat*, which emphasize the state’s control over the society and its fiscal resources. Swedish historians, namely Sven A. Nilsson and Jan Lindegren, have preferred the term *militärstat*, which emphasizes the war-making nature and the violence-monopoly of the early modern state. Jan Glete, on the other hand, has embraced the Anglophone term *fiscal-military state*. Glete defined the fiscal-military state as a complex organization with a dynamic and logic of its own. The fiscal-military state represented an accumulation of administrative, operational, and technical experience that aimed at both extracting resources and using them efficiently in the interest of the centralized state. As an institution the fiscal-military state was composed of an administration for resource-extraction as well as permanent armed forces. More recently, Mats Hallenberg and Johan Holm have suggested that early modern Sweden was a *förhandlingsstat* or a negotiation state. The Swedish military state, Hallenberg and Holm postulate, assumed its shape and form from the necessity to consult with the free peasants (*skattebönder*) and to recognize them as political partners in exchange for resources from the rural economy.

The military preparations of the surprised Danish central government do not support the notion of a powerful *Machtstaat* capable of meeting the demands of war from its own resources alone. The Danish Crown simply lacked some of the basic military resources to fight the enemy. Shoes, for instance, were in short supply, and the Noble Estate indeed volunteered to provide 20,000 thalers from the “landekisten” or provincial treasuries in order to supply the troops with proper shoes. The most pressing material shortage concerned firearms. It was known in diplomatic circles already in early 1644 that the Danes were ill-equipped for war and that they were trying to acquire large quantities of muskets, pistols, match, ammunition, and gunpowder from foreign countries, for instance the Dutch Republic. The domestic production of muskets was largely in the hands of Jacob Petz, who had been commissioned in 1640 to produce muskets and pistols at his factory in Lyngby, near Copenhagen. In 1642, he had contracted to supply the Crown with 2,000 muskets per annum. Such a modest rate of production would have made it exceedingly difficult to maintain any sizeable reserve of muskets in the Tøjhuset. The shortfall of muskets would have to be met from other sources outside the royal arsenal.

On 15 January the government ordered the rigshofmester Corfitz Ulfeldt to gather the 100 muskets that were stored at the royal arsenal and deliver them to the Waldemar castle, whence they would be redistributed to the peasants “to defend the land with.”

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399 Hallenberg and Holm 2017, 248–249.
400 AORSH 1644–1648, 7, 1 March 1644.
402 KD, iii, 210, 29 March 1640.
403 Arup 1955, 112.
404 KBB 1644–1645, 9, 15 January 1644.
On 20 January Christian IV ordered his castellans at the blockaded Koldinghus Castle to carry out an inventory “of everything that is there.” This opaque order more likely meant the inspection of weapons and ammunition.405 The next day the rigsmarsk received orders to find out how much gunpowder, match, and ammunition the watchmen in Fyn and Langeland were using in their round-the-clock watch duties and to calculate how long the existing stocks would last. The government felt impelled to remind the rigsmarsk that it was not necessary to keep the muskets’ matches alighted all day long.406 Another concern was the condition of existing firearms. We learn from a government missive from 4 March 1645 that many of the muskets belonging to conscripted soldiers in Sjælland were in poor condition (possibly due to negligence) and had to be collected by officers for repairs. In the meantime the conscripts were to be supplied with whatever firearms the local lensmænd might scrape together from their districts.407

Sometime in March Christian IV had learned that Lady Sophie Rantzau possessed a number of muskets “that belonged to the country’s defence.” He then wrote to her and asked her to hand over the weapons to Corfitz Ulfeldt, who would redistribute the weapons. The King promised to compensate Lady Rantzau for the muskets once the war was over.408 These weapons were not likely part of Lady Rantzau’s personal arsenal but firearms stored by Lady Rantzau’s demesne peasants. Earlier in March the King had also learned that the common folk in the provinces of Vordingborg, Copenhagen, Antvorskov, Korsør, and Sæbygård were lacking “bøsser og andet gevær”, which alluded to firearms and other weapons. He therefore ordered the lensmænd to inquire from the neighbouring towns whether the burghers possessed any extra firearms that they could forward to the peasants. Once again the Crown promised to provide compensation for the redistributed weapons after the war was over.409

The Danish towns were generally well-stocked with firearms and other weapons. A muster in Sölvesborg in 1639 revealed that every able-bodied burgher in the town possessed a weapon of some kind. Of the one hundred mustered burghers, 53 had a “Bøse” (any generic gun), 93 a “Gewehr” (in this context meaning a sword), and thirteen a musket. Thirty-three burghers carried either a pike or a halberd, while only twenty wore full armour consisting of a breastplate and a helmet.410 Two-thirds of the 100 burghers were therefore armed with muskets or harquebuses, while the remaining third carried pikes and halberds. This was the standard ratio between musketeers and pikemen in most armies of the early modern age.411 However, from the state’s perspective the towns did not present a significant source of surplus weapons, as the muskets and pikes were needed first and foremost for the defence of the towns and cities themselves. If they were besieged by the enemy they could not necessarily rely on outside supplies. Urban communities had to be self-reliant in matters of defence.

405 KBB 1644–1645, 12, 20 January 1644.
408 KBB 1644–1645, 68, 30 March 1644.
409 KBB 1644–1645, 47, 12 March 1644.
410 Granmark 2003, 9.
411 Wilson 2009, 89; Montecuccoli 1756, 27.
Another potential pool of military firearms existed in the peasants’ hovels. In 1599, the historian and rigskansler Arild Huitfeld had dismissed the native levies as being poorly armed with pikes and muskets, incapable of even “shooting an animal.”

Huitfeld’s tirade, however, seems to have served his desire to disparage the recruited element in the Danish army, and his dismissal of the peasant levies was as credible as his description of the recruited soldiers as foreign sell-swords, “who are our friends today and our enemies tomorrow,” according to Gunner Lind, the Danish peasants were generally well-armed and the countryside was rife with weapons of all kinds, including muskets.

There is evidence to support this assertion. At Vendsyssel in northern Jutland the Swedes seized from a single peasant two “Langbøsser”, one musket, and a pair of pistols. The “Langbøsser” meant long-barreled muskets with snaplocks, as we can learn from the Norwegian Rigs-Registranter in October 1591. In Halland, a list of goods stolen from a peasant’s house in 1647 included four muskets and a pistol.

There were other weapons too in the peasants’ hovels. On the eve of the Nordic Seven Years War, the levied peasants were expected to muster “with the swords and weapons that they could best come up with.” In 1610, the English pamphleteer Anthony Nixon described irate Jutlander peasants threatening a group of shipwrecked English mercenaries with “Bills, Halberds, two-hand swords and diverse other weapons.” Nixon’s booklet is source-critically problematic, as he appears confused about a great many things (he mistakes Jutland for an island and confuses the Swedish military commander Pontus De la Gardie with his son Jacob), but his anecdote about melee weapons may have had some truth behind it. Olaus Magnus at least attributed similar selection of fearsome hand weapons to Nordic peasants in his Historia.

Some of the peasants’ melee weapons were even used to arm the regular troops. In September 1644 Christian IV complained that the infantry contingent in his planned expedition to Scania was poorly equipped with “sydgeuer”, meaning swords and other melee weapons (for more on sidegewehr, see chapter 6.6). Christian IV suggested that the soldiers should be supplied with “peasants’ axes and war hammers that they could carry in their belts.” In the seventeenth century war hammers were typically weapons of the cavalry, and they appear to have been fairly common among the Croatian light cavalry during the Thirty Years War. The war hammer’s spiky protrusions could deliver very serious wounds. In 1644, the Swedish Ensign (and future Field Marshal) Rutger von Ascheberg was hit in the head by a Croatian “Spitzhammer.” Ascheberg later lamented that it took “a good quarter of a year

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412 Vaupell 1872, 9.
413 Ibid., 9.
414 Lind 1988, 100.
415 Klitgaard 1932, 225.
416 NRR 1588–1602, 216, 4 October 1591.
418 Asmussen 1983, 624.
419 Nixon 1610, 9.
421 KCFEB 1584–1648, 340, 29 September 1644.
422 Brnardic and Pavlovic 2010, 40, 46.
before I was myself again and could resume my duties.”

Another fiercesome hand weapon was the morning star, a spiked mace or flail, which the Danes appear to have produced in Halmstad. The morning stars seem to have been common weapons in at least some Danish units during Torstensson’s War: during the postwar inventory of material losses, Major Patrick Dunbar reported that his infantry company was missing thirty morning stars but only one sword.

The royal missive from September 1644 seems to imply that axes at least would be acquired from the peasants, although the phrasing does not fully exclude the possibility that the war hammers would be acquired from some other sources. The royal arsenal at the Tøjhuset, however, does not appear to have held any such reserves of war hammers. The inventory from 1646 (admittedly three years after the beginning of the war) revealed that the melee weapons kept in the Tøjhuset consisted only of 81 long swords (“Hele Slagsværd”) and 196 short swords (“Halve Slagsværd”). No morning stars are mentioned in the inventory either. The chief domestic supplier of swords to the Tøjhuset was the local Copenhagen Guild of Swordmakers.

The inclusion of war hammers in the peasants’ arsenal raises the question whether or not Danish peasants were capable of mounted warfare. We shall later encounter allusions to mounted peasants, or at least combatants appearing to the Swedes as mounted peasants, and learn that some Scanian peasants were indeed eligible to serve as dragoons. In Dithmarschen too at least one company of militiamen served as dragoons in April 1644. However, these examples must be qualified by the military and social structures that would have placed restrictions on the peasants’ ability to wage war from horseback. The first restriction would have been the lack of formal training in cavalry warfare. The drill instructions issued to the Scanian landværn in May 1646 only included the usual evolutions for musketeers and the maintenance of one’s place in an infantry formation. There was no suggestion that the levied peasants should be trained to fight from horseback.

The second restriction was social. The cavalry service, or rostjeneste, was the domain of the nobility; it alone justified the nobility’s fiscal and political privileges in Denmark. While the failure of the nobility to perform this duty in any effective form had repeatedly forced the Crown to employ recruited cavalry in times of war, the nobility maintained the pretension that rostjeneste as an institution did not exist outside the Noble Estate. In fact, the nobility appears to have viewed all forms of cavalry service as an extension of its own rostjeneste. During the riksdag sessions in March 1644, the nobles rather grandly handed over their horses for the “landsens defension” so that they might be used to furnish “some dragoons.” In the same

423 HH, xxxiv: 1, 8–9, Fältmarskalken Rutger von Aschebergs journal och korrespondens till år 1680.
424 SRA Strödda handlingar Danska kriget 1643-1645 RA/754/2/M 1291, 2 February 1644, Brodde Jakobsson to Bengt Bagge.
426 Blom 1887, 615.
427 Lind 2013, 408.
428 DRA Krigsrådet i Glückstadt/Regeringskansliet i Glückstadt/XV/Militaria/No 23. Besväringer over Skatter m. v. fra Befolkningen i Ditmarsken og Krempe og Wilster Marsk m.m. samt Frederik (III)’s Ordner desang, 1644–1646, fol. 9, 26 April 1644.
429 KBB 1646, 193–194, 30 May 1646.
430 AORSH 1644–1648, 6–7, 1 March 1644.
breath the Noble Estate also expressed its firm belief that the realm would be best defended by mounted warfare – thus making a case for the continued military relevancy of its own rostjeneste-duty.431

Levied peasants were still expected to appear at musters and drills with their own weapons in the seventeenth century.432 Even the demesne peasants were armed, even though their firearms were kept by their manorial lords.433 Therefore, in April 1644, we find the Crown Prince Christian, then inspecting the defences at Malmö, ordering those Scanian peasants who had earlier carried out insurgent operations in the vicinity of Lund to come forward and present their muskets to him. Any such weapons that might please the Prince were to be requisitioned in return for a monetary compensation.434 However, while there were still numerous firearms in the peasants’ hovels in 1643–1645, their quantity was smaller than what it had been in the past. Karl-Erik Frandsen has argued that the extension of the conscription to include even demesne tenants in 1638 further militarized the Danish society, as “there were hardly any farmstead in the whole country that was not either directly or indirectly involved in the military system.” A side-effect of this militarization was the strengthening of the state’s claim over the monopoly of violence at the expense of the armed peasantry.435 As evidence of this consolidation of the state monopoly of violence Frandsen cites the missive from November 1641, in which the King ordered the Scanian lensmænd to arrest and disarm any “vagrants and other fellows” that roamed the countryside armed with muskets.436 Such requisitions, whatever their initial motive was, would have ultimately removed firearms from the civilian society and placed them in the arsenals of the emerging power state.

The royal family provided some of the required firearms from its own resources. Christian IV had already in September 1643 planned to supply the “landtfolkit” (meaning peasant militias) with 4,000 new muskets.437 In October 1643 he finally contracted Albert Baltser Bernts to supply the Crown with the muskets, which would be delivered to the peasants over winter.438 At the very beginning of the war in December 1643 the toll commissioner (and later the Danish envoy in Moscow) Niicke Kocke negotiated the procurement of an unquantified number of muskets from Danzig. The King’s letter from 27 December 1643 seems to suggest that the King and Kocke were negotiating some form of compensation for this private procurement.439 It is possible (or even likely) that the King was never able to fully pay back Kocke, as the latter died already in early 1645. In March 1645 Christian IV nevertheless granted to his widow Else exemption from taxes and any obligations to billet troops on her estates, which would qualify at least as some kind of compensation for the procured muskets.440

431 AORSH 1644–1648, 6–7, 1 March 1644.
432 Lind 1994, 34.
433 Jespersen 2000, 129.
434 PCB 1643–1647, 123–124, 17 April 1644.
436 Ibid., 170.
437 KCFEB 1641-1644, 387, 5 September 1643.
438 KCFEB 1641–1644, 403–404, 8 October 1643.
439 KCFEB 1641–1644, 426, 27 December 1643.
440 KBB 1644–1645, 253, 18 March 1645.
In February 1644 Prince Christian set out to furnish at his own expense a “brigade” of 600 soldiers for the defence of Falster and Lolland.\textsuperscript{441} Christian’s instructions had originally suggested that, according to the established military practice, one third of the brigade should consist of pikemen, but this sentence was later struck off from the missive and replaced with the decision that “soldiers in question shall all be musketeers.”\textsuperscript{442} The change of mind may be explained by the training of pikemen, which required more time and effort than that of musketeers. This meant that the 600 soldiers, some of whom Christian intended to supply with mounts and turn them into dragoons, would require at least 600 muskets plus possible sidearms for the proposed dragoons. The horses for the dragoons would come from the bailiffs and priests in Lolland and Falster, as well as from both royal and demesne peasants, who were expected to furnish one horse between five peasants.\textsuperscript{443} On 19 February the Prince had already commissioned Didrik Klöcker, a merchant from Flensborg, to go to Lubeck and purchase there 300 pairs of pistols.\textsuperscript{444}

On 23 March the Prince ordered the royal armourer Christoffer Schwencke to hand over “400 Dutch muskets” to Major Jörgen Maes, the commander of the newly-raised brigade, against a receipt. The Prince, for his part, promised to compensate the royal arsenal for the cost of the weapons.\textsuperscript{445} This proceeding bordered on an artifice, as it did not increase the quantity of available firearms, but merely earmarked some of the existing stock for the Prince’s own use. We can only surmise that Prince Christian was at the time short of money and could not afford to place an order for 400 muskets in Lubeck or anywhere else. The dragoons would also have to be furnished with swords. On 9 March Prince Christian ordered Captain Justus von Stein to buy “undergevær” or swords from Danzig for the “Prince’s recruited troops.”\textsuperscript{446}

The shortage of firearms was somewhat alleviated in August, when the King ordered the transfer of 3,000 muskets from Glückstadt to Denmark.\textsuperscript{447} There remained, however, a shortage of musket balls that lasted until the end of the war. In March 1645 the government ordered the military commissars in Sjælland to procure led by any means necessary, either by buying it on credit or “loaning” it from churches.\textsuperscript{448} After the war, in May 1646, two Hamburg-based military industrialists, Leonhard Marselis and Albert Balser Bernts, reported to the government that in 1644 they had delivered to the land commissars the previously mentioned 4,000 muskets, which were then redistributed in Jutland according to the King’s orders.\textsuperscript{449}

The outsourcing of military procurements was not limited to weapons alone. Henrik Müller, the chief secretary of the King’s personal treasury (\textit{Kongens eget Kammer}), supplied the Crown in 1640–1649 with almost everything from foodstuffs to ships to the total value of 690,000 thalers, thus making Müller one of the Crown’s chief creditors.

\textsuperscript{441} PCB 1643–1647, 62–63, 21 February 1644.
\textsuperscript{442} PCB 1643–1647, 85, 11 March 1644.
\textsuperscript{443} Ibid., 83.
\textsuperscript{444} PCB 1643–1647, 62, 19 February 1644.
\textsuperscript{445} PCB 1643–1647, 102, 23 March 1644.
\textsuperscript{446} PCB 1643–1647, 79, 9 March 1644.
\textsuperscript{447} KBB 1644–1645, 110, 30 August 1644.
\textsuperscript{448} KBB 1644–1645, 242, 4 March 1645.
\textsuperscript{449} KBB 1646, 165, 19 May 1646.
after the war. As David Parrott has shown, there was nothing extraordinary about the employment of such subcontractors and military entrepreneurs during times of war. No early modern state was able to provide all of the material and fiscal means of warfare from its own sources alone, for which reason the European states routinely outsourced material procurements and military recruitment to private contractors. The early modern governments had little interest in controlling production and distribution of military supplies. Effective military entrepreneurship, however, required private capital or at least access to capital. Henrik Müller rather ingeniously used state resources to finance his own military enterprises. From 1641 onwards Müller was the toll-master of Copenhagen, which position allowed him to appropriate some of the revenue to himself – either by having some of the tolls paid directly to him or by overcharging the imports and then pocketing the difference.

Perhaps the best way to get an overview of the Danish supply of firearms is to take stock of the royal arsenal, the Tøjhuset in Copenhagen. The best and most thorough investigation of the Tøjhuset and its contents was published by Otto Blom in 1887. As Blom found out, the Tøjhuset had been inventoried only three times during the reign of Christian IV: in January 1592, May 1609, and August 1646. The hand-held firearms had not been differentiated by their type but by the service branches using them, namely infantry and cavalry. Therefore the inventories could only be presented in the following form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Cavalry</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1592</td>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1609</td>
<td>17,063</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>17,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1646</td>
<td>8,117</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>8,786</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though the cavalrymen of the era were frequently armed with harquebuses and firelocks, the tiny numbers of cavalry firearms suggests that only pistols were included in the cavalry category. All muskets would therefore be included in the infantry category. In August 1642 Christian IV informed Corfitz Ulfeldt that the Tøjhuset contained enough muskets to arm 15,000 men, which figure indicates decrease from the 1609 level. One likely explanation for the difference would be the Kejserkrigen, which had resulted in material losses that were only partially replaced between the wars. The inventory had been further depleted in late 1642, when Christian IV had agreed to supply his nephew, the embattled Charles I of England, with a quantity of “gewehr och Munition.” The drastic drop in the number of stored muskets in 1646 is explained by Torstensson’s War. Some of the muskets would have been lost in action and others distributed to soldiers and peasants, who had not yet returned all of them by August 1646.

450 DBL, xi, 582.
451 Parrott 2012, 201.
452 DBL, xi, 582–583.
453 Blom 1887, 608.
454 KCFEB 1641–1644, 381, 26 August 1643.
455 KCFEB 1641–1644, 257, 24 October 1642.
The Tøjhuset burned down on 12 February 1647. According to a German news pamphlet, the fire destroyed enough “Ober- und Under-Gewehr” to arm 15,000 men (the same number of weapons reported by Christian IV in 1642) and caused damages to the cost of “a ton of gold.” A new inventory (or technically a post-fire damage assessment) conducted in March-April 1647 revealed that the Crown possessed mere 450 muskets, 87 of which had been acquired after the fire. If measured by the quantity of possessed muskets alone, the Oldenburg realm hardly qualified as a military power state in 1647. The Tøjhuset did not, of course, contain all the muskets available for the realm’s defence, as individual garrisons and cities had their own arsenals. One of the largest arsenals was maintained in the Glückstadt garrison, which received 2,500 new muskets, 200 carbines, and 300 pistols in 1646. These weapons were not delivered from the Tøjhuset arsenal but were ordered from Albert Baltser Bernts’s arms factory in Hamburg. Such extensive refurbishment of weapons suggests that the war against Sweden had placed a heavy burden on the previously existing stock of firearms in Glückstadt.

The inventory of the Tøjhuset in August 1646 would have included at least some, if not even most, of those muskets that the Crown had earlier distributed to peasants. The first missive to recall the muskets distributed to peasants was issued on 22 October 1645, when the King instructed all the lensmænd to furnish local churches with gunracks that would be used to store the “gevær” collected from peasants. A week later the King instructed Malte Juel, the lensman at Kristianstad, to collect muskets from “the three Blekinger companies” and to store them fully accounted for and with great care. Christian IV also kept an eye on the execution of these orders. In June 1646 he sent a stern missive to the land judge Oluf Brockenhuus, demanding to know why some “delinquents” in the Copenhagen len had not deposited their muskets in the churches as ordered.

One final anecdote reveals the Oldenburg state’s inconsistent approach towards the shortage of firearms and ammunition. In January 1644 Prince Christian ordered the royal armorer (tøjmester) Christoffer Svenke to hand over six muskets together with their accessories and two lispund (roughly 17 kg) of gunpowder to the pharmacist Peter Gagelman. The cost of these weapons were to be deducted from the debt of 1,600 thalers that the Prince owed to Gagelman on account of the English sweets, sugar, and aromatic ingredients, which the Prince had earlier purchased (import duty free) from Gagelman. It is difficult to fathom what possible military use these muskets would have had in the hands of a pharmacist and a purveyor of imported sweets. The personal convenience of the Crown Prince, it seems, eclipsed in importance the pressing shortage of muskets and munitions.

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456 Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio 1647, 88.
457 Blom 1887, 609–615.
458 KCFEB 1645–1648, 166, 23 May 1646.
459 KBB 1644–1645, 503, 22 October 1645.
460 KBB 1644–1645, 513, 29 October 1645.
461 KBB 1646, 229, 25 June 1646.
462 PCB 1643–1647, 51, 14 January 1644.
463 PCB 1643–1647, 22, 28 March 1643.
3.5 SEDITION AND PROPAGANDA

Sedition and espionage were the two most pressing irregular threats to Denmark in early 1644. News of the Swedish onslaught created popular discontent that was typically directed towards the tax-exempted nobility, whose failure to defend the land through their rostjeneste was an enduring (and not entirely unjustified) source of grievance among the tax-burdened lower Estates. Some of the popular anger was directed against the Crown’s representatives. When news of the Swedish invasion reached Sjælland, the inhabitants of Helsingør began to riot and assaulted a high-ranking customs official, whom they accused of causing the war. The riots only calmed down after the Crown sent troops to Helsingør from Landskrona.464

A more dangerous problem was the insolent behaviour of the bargemen at Dragsminde, Middelfart, and Korsør. The bargemen had refused to transport the King’s troops and had even threatened to burn their own barges. Their mutiny was a major concern, as the Crown relied on barges to transport troops and supplies between Jutland, Odense, and Sjælland. Christian IV sent out several missives, in which the rebellious bargemen were threatened with arrest and imprisonment. The threats apparently worked, as we learn no more of the bargemen’s demonstrations from the pages of the Danish Chancellery’s copybook after 21 February.465

The government regarded the local nobility as the best gaugers of sentiments and mood among the peasant class. In March 1645 the government instructed the land commissars in Sjælland to consult the local nobles about the commitment and patriotism among the commonalty and to mete out punishments to possible shirkers and defeatists.466 Karl-Erik Frandsen argues that there were only few instances of peasant opposition to levies and conscription. One rare example comes from the Skads herred in Jutland, where, on 9 January 1644, one peasant publicly refused to partake in any military training and subsequently agitated other peasants to follow his example.467 Frandsen’s view seems justified as far as Jutland and the islands were concerned, but his argument cannot be extrapolated to include Norway (see chapter 6.6).

From very early on, the Crown took steps to counter Swedish spies. On 21 January the Danish Chancellery wrote to Hans Lindenov, the lensman in Kalundborg, and informed him that it had come to the King’s attention that there were spies on the island of Samso. The government instructed Lindenov to pursue these spies diligently, capture and try them, and then execute them without any further delay.468 The suspected spies were allegedly disguised as women, a stratagem already employed by the brigands in the Örebro län.469 Swedish envoys, accredited agents, and other diplomatic representatives too posed a security risk. After Torstensson’s invasion all Swedes in Copenhagen were rounded up and arrested. They were then allowed to have free passage to Sweden in exchange for the Danes and Holsteiners who were

466 KBB 1644–1645, 247, 9 March 1645.
467 Frandsen 1995, 170.
468 KBB 1644–1645, 13, 21 January 1644.
469 KCFEB 1641–1644, 438, 20 January 1644.
similarly detained in Stockholm. The resident Swedish ambassador Johan Strömfelt was deported to Sweden via Halland.\textsuperscript{470} Enemy nationality was extended to include those Germans whose native princedoms were allied with or occupied by Sweden. In February 1644 Christian IV ordered the \textit{lensmænd} in Sjælland, Scania, and Fyn to detain all ships from Rostock, Wismar, Stralsund, Stettin, “or any other town in which there is a Swedish garrison”, and to confiscate any cargoes they might carry.\textsuperscript{471} In Halland, the \textit{lensman} Niels Krabbe forbade innkeepers and burghers in Laholm to offer accommodation to any strangers unless they were permitted to do so by the mayor or the bailiffs.\textsuperscript{472}

The Danes conducted their first offensive operations in the sphere of public opinion. In January 1644 Brodde Jakobsson arrested four Danish peasants, who had crossed the border carrying a letter written by the Danish \textit{lensman} Knud Jensen. In his letter Jensen had placed all blame for the war on Sweden alone. Jakobsson confiscated the letter, banished the Danes back to their side of the border, and finally asked the \textit{riksråd} how he should deal with any similar events in the future. The \textit{riksråd} discussed the incident on 1 February and decided that from thereon the \textit{landshövdingar} should hang outright any Danish disseminators of hostile propaganda.\textsuperscript{473} The following day the \textit{riksråd} instructed Jakobsson to deliver in the future all such “Danish rogues” to the \textit{landshövdingar} and their hangmen.\textsuperscript{474} In the \textit{riksdag} session in October 1644 the government instructed the peasants “to guard themselves against carrion flies that attempt to sow disagreement between the Estates.”\textsuperscript{475}

In February 1644 Andreas Prytz, the bishop of Gothenburg, received a sealed letter from one of his deacons. Inside the letter, Prytz informed Axel Oxenstierna, was a manifest from Christian IV, addressed to Prytz personally. Prytz did not open the letter himself but took it with him to the \textit{landshövding} Nils Assersson Mannerskiöld, who opened the letter and read its contents to Prytz. The manifest was so disturbing that Prytz immediately instructed his subordinate priests not to read any further Danish letters themselves, but to deliver them unopened to the local bailiffs, who would then forward the toxic manifests to the \textit{landshövdingar}.\textsuperscript{476} A month later Prytz informed Oxenstierna of another Danish manifest circulating in the Älvsborg län. “But I have held the manifest with me in secrecy and have not shown it to anyone”, Prytz assured the Chancellor.\textsuperscript{477} Later in June the \textit{riksråd} still exhorted Mannerskiöld to remain vigilant against any Danish propaganda and to maintain “good mood” among the commonalty.\textsuperscript{478}

The exact contents of these Danish propaganda manifests are unclear, but if they shared at least some of the accusations made by Christian IV in his printed and publicized manifest from January, the Swedes were very likely presented as un-

\textsuperscript{470} KBB 1644–1645, 19, 28 January 1644.
\textsuperscript{471} KBB 1644–1645, 27, 16 February 1644.
\textsuperscript{472} Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 24.
\textsuperscript{473} SRRP, x, 448–449, 1 February 1644.
\textsuperscript{474} SRA RR, B222, 2 February 1644.
\textsuperscript{475} Generalstaben 1944, 40.
\textsuperscript{476} RAOSB, ii:12, 648, 25 February 1644, Andreas Prytz to Axel Oxenstierna.
\textsuperscript{477} RAOSB, ii:12, 649, 25 March 1644, Andreas Prytz to Axel Oxenstierna.
\textsuperscript{478} SRA RR, B222, 3 June 1644.
Christian invaders, who broke the existing peace treaties with Denmark and subjected the lands of Christian IV to pillage, devastation, and other “Enormiteten.”\footnote{Theatrum 1651, 215.} Christian IV’s earlier manifest had also carried with it a distinctively religious undertone, in which the Swedes were presented as “bloodthirsty and false enemies”, who had attempted to hijack the cause of Evangelical solidarity for their own base purposes.\footnote{Ibid., 217.} It was perhaps this kind of religious polemics that rattled bishop Prytz so much, unaccustomed as he might have been to the confessional ‘hate speech’ so prevalent in continental Europe.

Otherwise most Danish propaganda appealed to the emerging international law rather than the Bible. The ultimate goal of Christian IV’s manifest was to show that the Swedish invasion of Denmark was a violation of earlier treaties and established political practices. To make his case Christian IV appealed to a wide international audience, ranging from the Emperor and Spain to the Dutch Republic and England. In its 1944 analysis of Torstensson’s War and Danish propaganda the Swedish General Staff concluded that the driving force behind the propaganda effort was Christian IV himself, who conducted propaganda warfare in all fronts available to him as a monarch and an Imperial Prince.\footnote{Generalstaben 1944, 41.}

The aforementioned Danish manifests are examples of what is today called information and propaganda warfare. Modern discussion about information warfare defines it largely through the technology it utilizes to achieve its ends, usually the disruption of telecommunications, power supply, and transport systems. While some definitions of information warfare can be narrow and precise, it is usually understood very inclusively as a collection of several subfields of warfare. The RAND Corporation defines information warfare as “the process of protecting one’s own sources of battlefield information and, at the same time, seeking to deny, degrade, corrupt, or destroy the enemy’s sources of battlefield information.” This process includes other subareas of warfare: “operational security, electronic warfare, psychological operations, deception, physical attack on information processes, and information attack on information processes.”\footnote{Nichiporuk 2002, 188.}

While the above definitions give it a very modern and high-technological outlook, information and propaganda warfare predates the modern era and the internet, and in its effective form it can be traced back to the early days of the printing press, which enabled the large-scale production and distribution of the written word and woodcut or etched images. Information and propaganda warfare came to its own right during the Thirty Years War, when every protagonist in the war used pamphlets and press to further their own religious-political agendas and to degrade those of their enemies. The word “propaganda” indeed originates from this very era, when it first appeared in the name of the Counterreformist missionary organization Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fidei (“Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith”), established in Rome in 1622. One of its subdivisions was the Missio Danica, which had sent clandestine missionaries to Denmark in the early 1620s.\footnote{Bäckström 2013, 303–304.}
The early period of the Thirty Years War saw several information and propaganda scandals, which were not entirely dissimilar to the Wikileaks controversies of our own time.\textsuperscript{484} The first scandal occurred already in 1619, when the Imperialists captured letters that revealed the ambition of Duke Charles Emmanuel of Savoy to get elected as the new King of Bohemia. The revelation, coming after Frederick V of the Palatinate had already been elected by the Bohemian Estates, caused great personal embarrassment to Duke Charles Emmanuel and caused him to distance himself from the Bohemian rebellion.\textsuperscript{485} In 1621, Ernst von Mansfeld captured Imperialist correspondence that revealed the secret agreement between the Emperor Ferdinand II and Duke Maximilian of Bavaria to transfer the title of the Elector of the Palatinate from Frederick V to Duke Maximilian. The letters, which were published in 1622 under the title \textit{Cancelleria Hispanica}, also showed the great influence that Spain exerted over decision-making in Vienna.\textsuperscript{486} The third major controversy emerged in 1623, after the conquest of the Palatinate, when the Imperialists discovered the extensive diplomatic correspondence between the Palatine chancellor Christian von Anhalt and various rulers in Germany and abroad. The Imperialists published some of the more scandalous parts of the correspondence as the \textit{Heidelberg Protocols}, in which the sharptongued Anhalt described various princes and monarchs (including Christian IV) in very unflattering and indeed ridiculing terms.\textsuperscript{487}

Some of the propaganda aimed at influencing the psychology of certain influential individuals. The best example of such psychological warfare is the tract \textit{Altera secretissima instructio}, which aimed to turn Frederick V against his German and European allies.\textsuperscript{488} Other propaganda could take the form of an “apology”, where one protagonist sought to defend his actions and decisions in front of the incipient public sphere that was already taking shape in early modern Europe.\textsuperscript{489} One such apology was published in 1622 by Mansfeld, who sought to explain his previous and heavy-handed treatment of the Bohemian Estates.\textsuperscript{490} Perhaps the best-known apology is the one, which Gustaf Adolf was forced to publish after his failure to come to the rescue of the beleaguered city of Magdeburg in 1631.\textsuperscript{491}

Göran Larsson has identified three categories of war propaganda in the Thirty Years War. The first category was composed of simple writings or manifests that had confessional or political content. The second category consisted of relations, which were outwardly newsletters but which often contained some political bias or agenda. In the third category were flysheets that might contain all sorts of things but which typically had wider circulation than any other category of propaganda.\textsuperscript{492} The manifests, which the Danish peasants attempted to disseminate in Småland, fell within the first and third categories; the letter addressed personally to Prytz belonged to the

\textsuperscript{484} Bäckström 2013, 500–502.
\textsuperscript{485} Ibid., 189.
\textsuperscript{486} Ibid., 229–230.
\textsuperscript{487} Ibid., 232–233.
\textsuperscript{488} Malcolm 2007, 140–160.
\textsuperscript{489} Habermas 1991, 14–26.
\textsuperscript{490} An appollogie made in defence of the illustrious Prince, Ernestus Earle of Mansfield 1622.
\textsuperscript{491} Watts 1634, 95.
\textsuperscript{492} Ericson Wolke, Larsson, and Villstrand 2006, 311–316.
first category. More or less distorted news reporting was an example of the second category.

Despite these robust Danish efforts at information and propaganda warfare, Larsson has concluded that Swedish propaganda was much more honed and calculated than the Danish one.\textsuperscript{493} The Swedish General Staff concluded in the same vein that while the Danes argued passionately that the law of nations was on their side, the Swedish propaganda effort had a more “real-political emphasis.”\textsuperscript{494} This real-political emphasis emerged as a single overriding goal: to justify the Swedish war of aggression in front of the international audience and, if possible, the subjects of Christian IV. The focus of the Swedish propaganda efforts, Larsson argues, was the Dutch Republic, where the “freer political climate” facilitated the dissemination of Swedish propaganda.\textsuperscript{495}

The Swedish justifications for war appeared in manifests and flysheets. The initial Swedish invasion of Holstein was accompanied by a propagandist manifest (reproduced in the \textit{Theatrum Europaeum}), which justified the action as a countermeasure to alleged Danish and Holsteiner infractions of \textit{ius in bello}. The city of Rostock, the manifest claimed, had allowed transit to Imperialist troops, while the Danes had repeatedly fomented sedition among the recruited troops in Swedish service. The manifest also made much about the purported Danish abduction of the Queen Mother, while the more concrete reasons behind the Swedish invasion, namely the obstruction of Swedish maritime traffic, unfavourable Danish mediation at Osnabrück, and conspiratorial diplomacy with Poland and Russia, were hidden away at the end of the manifest as casus belli of minor importance.\textsuperscript{496} Later in 1644, the Swedes circulated a printed letter from Axel Oxenstierna to his son Johan in Osnabrück. In this pamphlet, which was a prime example of ‘white’ propaganda, Axel Oxenstierna elaborated Swedish war aims in Germany (namely “satisfaction” for the Swedish war efforts on behalf of the Protestant Estates) and also accused the Danes of fomenting “jealousie” between Sweden, France, and the German Estates. A copy of this pamphlet still survives in the Danish Rigsarkivet.\textsuperscript{497}

The Swedish justifications for war appeared also as pictorial flysheets, perhaps the most popular propaganda medium during the Thirty Years War. Göran Larsson has examined two pictures, which both sought to portray the Danish Sound dues as excessive or indeed unjust. In one copper drawing from 1644, Christian IV and Lennart Torstensson are shown playing a board game over the outcome of the war. The game takes place on a shore located between the Kronborg Castle in Sjælland and Castle Kärnan in Scania – therefore implicitly by the Sound itself. In the background one can see foreign traders filling Christian IV’s coffer with riches, which imagery sought to portray Christian IV as being avaricious and greedy. As Larsson points out, the picture unintentionally reveals the Swedish ambitions for the control of the same lucrative Baltic trade tolls.\textsuperscript{498} Another flysheet, which appeared originally in the Dutch Republic, portrayed the Danes as screeching swine and the Dutch as docile sheep. The flysheet implied that the Dutch paid the Danish tolls too obediently,
while the Danes made great noise about the Swedish challenge to their monopoly of the Sound dues. \(^{499}\)

The aforementioned examples of Swedish propaganda were largely directed to an international audience, namely third parties in the Dutch Republic, England, and Germany. On the homefront the responsibility for disseminating propaganda was largely devolved to the Swedish church. The breakout of the war was announced to the domestic public by the parish priests, who read to their congregations a printed order that explained the reasons for the war. This was done first and foremost to allay possible fears among the people and to prepare them for the coming war effort. The *casus belli* as presented to the domestic audiences was largely identical with the talking points of Sweden’s international propaganda. \(^{500}\) The Swedish victories that followed were also celebrated by thanksgiving ceremonies, of which there were four in 1644 alone. \(^{501}\) The military circumstances surrounding these victories, however, were not explained to the congregations in any detail. \(^{502}\) The Swedish attempts to influence the commoners in Denmark itself were largely concentrated on Jämtlanders and Norwegians (Swedish propaganda and information warfare in the North will be further discussed in chapter 6.2).

Aside from propaganda, both Swedes and Danes also conducted information war – or perhaps more accurately disinformation war. This disinformation war was expressed in the deliberate obfuscation of military and political events, typically in attempts to highlight the enemy’s defeats and to downplay one’s own setbacks. The approach of Louis De Geer’s auxiliary fleet from the Dutch Republic in the summer of 1644, for instance, was surrounded by false rumours manufactured either by the Danes or the Imperialists. On 31 May 1644 Schering Rosenhane, the Swedish resident in Münster, asked Johan Oxenstierna and Johan Adler Salvius to confirm the rumours that half of the auxiliary fleet had been sunk and the other half captured, that Carl Gustaf Wrangel, the commander of the fleet, had been imprisoned together with his immediate subordinates, and that Louis De Geer himself had drowned in the sea. \(^{503}\) Rosenhane also lamented about “vexatious Jute-news that come daily in printed form from Cologne.” \(^{504}\) This false news claimed that Gothenburg and even Jönköping had fallen to Christian IV and that the enemy armies were already approaching Norrköping. \(^{505}\) Some of the rumours, however, originated from the uncertainty surrounding the nature and purpose of the auxiliary fleet. The Danish legates in Hamburg were feverishly trying to find out the actual goal of De Geer’s fleet. The Danes even suspected that the fleet might sail past the Danish islands and Gotland in its true mission to attack Ösel off the coast of Estonia. \(^{506}\)

\(^{499}\) Ericson Wolke, Larsson, and Villstrand 2006, 320.

\(^{500}\) Sjöberg 2016, 62–63.

\(^{501}\) Ibid., 63.

\(^{502}\) Ibid., 64.

\(^{503}\) Ibid., 244.

\(^{504}\) Ibid., 244.

\(^{505}\) APW, ii: c: 1, 243, 31 May 1644, Schering Rosenhane to Johan Oxenstierna and Johan Adler Salvius.

\(^{506}\) Ibid., 244.

\(^{506}\) DRA Tyske Kancelli, udenrigske Afdeling/Speciel Del/Tyskland/Hamburg/A. III. B. 44/ Gesandtskabsrelationer med bilag fra Martin Rasch og beretninger fra dr. Laurentius Langermand, Gabriel Gomez o. tl. 1634, 1639–52, 7 June 1644.
3.6 EARLY PEASANT RESISTANCE IN HOLSTEIN AND JUTLAND

By the end of December 1643 the Swedish position in Holstein-Gottorp was consolidated. Duke Frederick III had promised to remain neutral in the coming conflict, in addition to which he had agreed to pay a contribution of 100,000 thalers to the Swedish war chest. The armed forces of the Duchy, namely two regiments, were dissolved. Some of the troops entered Swedish service, others travelled south to join the Danish garrison at Glückstadt.507 Christian IV’s second son Frederick, the Archbishop of Bremen and Verden and Christian IV’s designated successor as the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, did not yet have official military command over the Danish-Holsteiner forces in Glückstad and Stade. At the outbreak of the war Frederick had been at Glückstadt, where he had celebrated his nuptials with Sophie Amalie of Brunswick-Lüneburg in October 1643. Sometime in late January 1644 he and his young wife travelled from Glückstadt to Verden, where Frederick still held official residence. Interestingly enough, they were accompanied by a retinue of fifty soldiers and two hundred levied peasants, who remained in Verden to reinforce the garrison there.508 Armed peasants, dismissed earlier as brutes and animals by Christian IV, may not have made for a prestigious retinue, but they were apparently regarded perfectly acceptable companions in times of danger.

The Swedish invasion of Holstein had driven many civilians to Glückstadt, and by the end of 1643 one hundred wagonloads of evacuated goods had reached the fortress.509 On 20 December 1643 no more goods were allowed to leave Glückstadt by water, “no matter whether the merchandise belonged to burghers or foreigners.”510 This decision was taken by the Glückstadt council of war (Kriegsrath), which was presided over by the Imperial Count Christian Penz, Christian IV’s former envoy to Dresden and Vienna.511 Penz worked laboriously to strengthen the defences in Glückstadt. He constructed a new block house and organized the town burghers into four Fähnlein (roughly 200–500 men each) that, according to the existing burgher privileges, were allowed to elect their own “Ober- und Unter-Officiere.”512 Another privilege was exercised by the Mennonites, who were exempted from military duties by a royal degree.513 According to a memorandum drawn up by Count Penz, the military strength of the Glückstadt garrison stood at 7,000 men at the end of February 1644. This figure presented by Penz did not quantify between infantry and cavalry, and it does not appear to have included any levied peasants inside the city’s walls.514 The Glückstadt garrison had already taken its first enemy prisoners before the end of

507 Avery 1644, 3.
508 DBL, v, 294–295; Gazette du 20 Février 1644 N. 18, 113.
509 NSM, i, 874, Diarium Tychochopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
510 Ibid., 875.
511 DBL, xiii, 4–5.
512 NSM, i, 874, Diarium Tychochopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
513 Ibid., 874.
January. The 28 Swedes that had been captured by 20 January included one lieutenant colonel, one *rittmeister*, one captain, and four lieutenants.\footnote{DRA Tyske Kancelli, Slesvig-holsten-lauenborgske Cancelli/Ind. Afd/A IV. Indkomme breve/89. Relationer fra guvørnør i Glückstadt Christian Pentz 1629–37, 1639–45, 20 January 1644.}

At the beginning of January 1644 Torstensson detached a contingent from the main army and headed north into Jutland. By that time the Swedish occupation of Holstein had already disrupted Danish lines of communication between Copenhagen and continental Europe. The Danish negotiators at Osnabrück lamented their ignorance of the military events in Denmark because “all of their letters had been intercepted.”\footnote{APW, ii: a: 1, 202, 2 January 1644, Johann Weikhart von Auersperg and Johann Baptist Krane to Ferdinand III.}

The Swedish government, which realized that Denmark’s diplomatic isolation from the Westphalian negotiations would ultimately make it harder for Sweden to conclude its war with Christian IV in a beneficial peace agreement, soon instructed Torstensson to provide all Danish diplomats free and unhindered passage between Denmark, Hamburg, and Lubeck.\footnote{APW, ii: c: 1, 211, 15 April 1644, Christiana to Johan Oxenstierna and Johan Adler Salvius.}

The task was finally devolved to General Major Caspar Mortaigne, who drew up letters of safe conduct that granted the Danish envoys in Osnabrück free travel “across the land for themselves and for their people and goods.”\footnote{DRA Tyske Kancelli, udenrigske Afdeling/Special Del/Sverige/AL 40/1644–48 Akter og dokumenter vedr. det politiske forhold til Sverige, after January 1644.}

The lines of communication between Osnabrück and the Baltic ports had become increasingly precarious for the Swedes themselves as well. They were not imperilled only by the Holsteiner insurgents and Danish troops, but also by the Imperial cavalry patrols that operated from their Westphalian garrisons.\footnote{APW, ii: c: 1, 226, 24 May 1644, Johan Oxenstierna and Johan Adler Salvius to Christina.}

In May 1644 Johan Oxenstierna and Johan Adler Salvius suspected that at least some of their correspondence to Stockholm had been intercepted by the “erkebiskepsen i Bremen folk”, meaning Danish troops operating from Bremen.\footnote{APW, ii: c: 1, 229–230, 27 May 1644, Johan Oxenstierna and Johan Adler Salvius to Christina.}

The collection of intercepted Swedish correspondence in the Danish Rigsarkivet is indeed voluminous, consisting of 45 folios from 1639 to 1645. The first letter captured during Torstensson’s War is from Lennart Torstensson to Axel Oxenstierna dated on 28 January 1644, informing the latter about the early stage of hostilities in Holstein.\footnote{DRA Krigsrådet i Glückstadt/Regeringskancelliet i Glückstadt/XV/Militaria/No. 27. Oppsnappede svenske breve 1639–1645, fol. 2, 28 January 1644.}

The last letter is dated almost exactly a year later on 29 January 1645, and appears to be from Colonel Mortaigne in Pinneberg.\footnote{DRA Krigsrådet i Glückstadt/Regeringskancelliet i Glückstadt/XV/Militaria/No. 27. Oppsnappede svenske breve 1639–1645, fol. 45, 29 January 1645.}

The closest thing to the exposure of a major military secret is the captured list of all the Swedish naval vessels that includes the men-of-war as well as all the smaller vessels and their respective complements (54 men-of-war, 41 smaller ships, and 1,932 men) – excluding, however, those ships that comprised Admiral Maarten Thijssen’s auxiliary Dutch fleet.\footnote{DRA Krigsrådet i Glückstadt/Regeringskancelliet i Glückstadt/XV/Militaria/No. 27. Oppsnappede svenske breve 1639–1645, fol. 4, 1644.}
The initial hindrance to Swedish lines of operation was caused by the insurgents. According to the Gazette, the Jutlander peasants had prepared for a Swedish invasion by demolishing the main bridge crossing the River Kolding and constructing several fortified positions along potential avenues of advance. Torstensson finally made enemy contact on 9 January, when he encountered a troop of 1,200 Danish cavalry near Kolding. The engagement resulted in a Swedish victory. Avery’s pamphlet, which refers to Major General Robert Douglas as its eyewitness source, attributes heavy losses to the Danes. Only 200 riders made it back to the Danish main encampment at Kolding, with “the most part of their Officers killed, and their Principalls taken prisoners.” The Gazette, on the other hand, described the battle as “un rude combat”, in which both sides suffered heavy casualties. It is likely that the battle was devastating to the Danes, but is equally feasible that the Swedes too suffered more than just nominal casualties.

After defeating the Danish cavalry, the Swedes proceeded to besiege the enemy infantry in the main Danish encampment at Snoghøj opposite Middelfart on the other side of the Belt. The Danes had reinforced the encampment with a substantial force, the exact size of which differs in primary sources. The Gazette described the Danish force as 15,000 strong, “with the majority of the troops consisting of land militia.” Eberhard Wassenberg claimed that the Danish force consisted of 9,000 men, “part peasants, part soldiers.” Avery’s pamphlet estimated the Danish infantry to be some 7,000–8,000 men strong, with more than half of the force consisting of armed peasants. A report received by Duke Philip of Glücksborg from a Danish colonel described the Danish force as being “gevorbene [recruited soldiers] und Landvolck [peasants] im 8,000 starck.” Access to actual eyewitness accounts lends more support to those figures presented by Avery and Duke Philip’s correspondence. The historian Klas-Richard Böhme, however, suggested that only half of the Danish contingent, roughly 1,000 recruited soldiers and 3,500 levied peasants, actually engaged the Swedes, with the other half of the army still remaining in Fyn on the other side of the Belt.

Only a few days into the siege Torstensson ordered a heavy artillery bombardment in preparation for a general assault. The Danish encampment may have been only partially fortified, as Peter Englund suggests, and as a result the bombardment alone was enough to break the Danes’ fighting spirit. Be that as it may, the defenders surrendered before the Swedes could launch their assault. The Danish commander, rigsmarsk Anders Bille, escaped to Fyn with the regimental colours, chief officers, fair amount of ordnance, “and as many of the best common Souldiers, as so short time

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525 Avery 1644, 4.
526 Ibid., 103.
527 Wassenberg 1645, 560.
528 Avery 1644, 4.
529 DRA Sønderjyske fyrstearkiver/Sager på papir/De sønderborgske hertugers arkiver Glücksborg/B. Korrespondance og administration/1643–60 Breve tilhertug Philip ang. krigsurolighederne, 5 March 1644.
530 Böhme 1965, 46–47.
531 DRA Sønderjyske fyrstearkiver/Sager på papir/De sønderborgske hertugers arkiver Glücksborg/B. Korrespondance og administration/1643–60 Breve tilhertug Philip ang. krigsurolighederne, 5 March 1644.
532 Avery 1644, 4; Englund 1993, 311.
would give him leave”, as Avery explained.534 Bille left behind “sundry Captains and under Officers, besides all their Horses, and foure thousand five hundred Footmen.” Of these 4,500 prisoners “one thousand old Souldiers, and therewith many of the Bawres or Paysons also willingly ranged themselves among the Swedes Troupes”, Avery continued. The rest, apparently mostly levied peasants, were stripped of their “best clothes and sent away unto their homes.”535 Exactly the same details were told by the Gazette, which claimed to have received its report from Lüneburg on 29 January. The Swedes lost only a few soldiers in their capture of the sconce, the Gazette reported.536 The eighteenth-century historian Ludwig-Albrecht Gebhardi slightly modified the number and composition of the captured Danes. According to Gebhardi the prisoners consisted of 3,000 peasants and “roughly one thousand recruited soldiers.”537

Meanwhile the Danes were fighting back in Dithmarschen. Upon learning that the Swedish Colonel Dörfling was departing from Itzehoe with his entire cavalry regiment to meet an artillery train on its way from Flensburg, Colonel Steinberger, the military governor of Krempe, saw an opportunity for taking the enemy by surprise. Steinberger had learnt of a lightly guarded baggage train that was trailing behind the rest of Dörfling’s troops. A nighttime attack by 60 Danes from Glückstadt and Krempe caught the Swedish baggage by surprise. The following day the Danes brought fifteen prisoners, several horses, and “a mighty booty” to Glückstadt.538

Soon after this event Dörfling returned to Itzehoe with his regiment and set up quarters in Neustadt or the New Town that was located on an island (possibly an artificial one) surrounded by a tributary of the River Stör.539 He did this “partly to gain more security, partly to be able to better process the contributions from the town”, as the Diarium Tychopolitanum explained.540 Once again the Danes planned a daring raid against the Swedes. On 29 January a scouting party from Krempe reached a “Bauernschanze” on the Hohenweg Road between Krempe and Itzehoe (probably somewhere near modern-day Krempenmoor). What this “peasant sconce” exactly was, remains unclear. It appears likely that it was either a regular field work constructed and possibly manned by peasant militiamen, or an improvised roadblock akin to the bråtar of northern Scandinavia. Whatever the sconce was, it was clear of Swedes, for which reason the scouts invited the rest of the assault force to muster there. The Diarium Tychopolitanum related that the raiding party consisted of 800 men from Glückstadt (under the command of General Major Bauer and Lieutenant Colonel Buchwald) and another 100 from Krempe (commanded by Steinberger).541 According to the Gazette, on the other hand, the Danish contingent consisted of 650 riders from Glückstadt led by rittmeister Brim and another 150 soldiers from Krempe. The Danes were also supplied with three cannons, petards, assault ladders, “and other tools of

534 Avery 1644, 4–5.
535 Ibid., 5.
536 Gazette du 20 Février 1644 N. 18, 114–115.
537 Gebhardi 1770, 340.
538 NSM, i, 876, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645; Gazette du 27 Février 1644 N. 20, 125–126.
539 On Itzehoe, see Braun and Hogenberg 2015, 473–475.
540 NSM, i, 876–877, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
541 Ibid., 877.
The composition of the Danish party, which appears to have consisted of cavalry and dragoons only, does not suggest that the Danish raiders were joined by peasants from Glückstadt or elsewhere.

On the night of 30 January the Danes crossed the frozen moat-like tributary at several places simultaneously and surprised the Swedes in their billets. There are two slightly differing accounts of what happened next. According to the Gazette, the Danes lost 40 men in the ensuing fight. The Danish casualties included Colonel Steinberger, who was said to have been lightly wounded in the action. The Diarium Tychopolitanum made no mention of any Danish casualties. The Gazette put the Swedish losses to 200 killed and 300 captured, among the latter a colonel and a lieutenant. The Diarium Tychopolitanum narrated that only 65 Swedes were killed in the assault and that the rest were taken prisoner. Among the slain Swedes were one rittmeister, the regimental quarter master, and an infantry captain. The prisoners included 250 ordinary soldiers, lieutenants, ensigns, a field chaplain, one rittmeister, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Frölich and his wife. Colonel Dörfling and an unnamed major managed to escape to Breitenburg. The Danes also captured the entire Swedish baggage train. According to the Gazette, the Danes captured 700–800 horses, while the Diarium Tychopolitanum claimed that as many as 1,200 horses were seized that night. The Swedish casualty figures reported by the Gazette appear dubious. The Swedish losses of 500 men would have nearly amounted to an entire regiment, the loss of which would surely have been mentioned in Swedish sources or indeed celebrated by the Danish ones.

The Danes had no intention of keeping Itzehoe; instead they emptied it of all the corn that the Swedes had stored there. In early February the Danes brought out 200 wagonloads of corn from Itzehoe, 114 of which went to Glückstadt and the rest to Krempe. By the end of February Itzehoe was again back in Swedish hands. The command of the town had been transferred to Colonel Brandeshagen, who reinforced its garrison with two fresh regiments from Silesia.

The same Gazette that reported on the Danish victory outside Itzehoe also boasted that the Swedes only dared to move through the countryside in great numbers in fear of the “peasants that assembled in great numbers in the woods.” This claim too appears contestable, as the Diarium Tychopolitanum reported several small-scale actions throughout February between the Swedes and the raiding parties from Glückstadt and Krempe. On 9 February (or 29 January according to the chronicle’s Julianic timeline), freshly promoted Major Becker led a small party in a nighttime assault against the Castle Krummendiek by the River Bekau. The action cost the Danes three or four men, and Beck himself was slightly wounded by a Swedish shot. Beck brought back to Glückstadt 36 Swedish prisoners, including a Hessian

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542 Gazette du 27 Février 1644 N. 20, 125–126.
543 Ibid., 125.
544 NSM, i, 877, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
545 Gazette du 27 Février 1644 N. 20, 126.
546 NSM, i, 877, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
547 Gazette du 27 Février 1644 N. 20, 126; NSM, i, 877, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
548 NSM, i, 878, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
549 Ibid., 879.
550 Gazette du 27 Février 1644 N. 20, 127.
Meanwhile Beck’s lieutenant had commanded a similarly successful foray into Dithmarschen with a force of 100 men. He too delivered Swedish prisoners to Glückstadt, namely 28 soldiers and five offices, including one captain. It is apparent that the defeated Swedish contingents were not large units but rather company-sized formations at best. At this early stage of the war it was the fast-moving regular formations from Glückstadt and Krempe that proved to be more hazardous to the Swedes than the Holsteiner insurgents.

After the defeats near Kolding the Danish military position in Jutland collapsed. The Jutland peasants made their last desperate stand at Nørresundby, near Aalborg, on 18 January. A contemporaneous source, priest Peder Dyrskojt’s letter to Bishop Jens Bircherod, relates that the peasants had been organized by the local nobility and that they were motivated above all else by the fear of rapacious foreign soldiers – memories of the traumatic Imperialist occupation in 1627–1629, it seems, were still fresh in their minds. Dyrskojt claimed that it was his own father Lars Dyrskojt who was the peasants’ captain, but the historian Christian Petresch-Christensen identified one Peter Hoger as the true leader. Hoger was a nobleman and a former page of the royal court, who, in 1643, had used his own resources to supply the local peasants, both demesne tenants and Crown farmers, with weapons and ammunition.

The regiment-strong Swedish invasion force, led by Colonel Helmut Wrangel, advanced towards Nørresundby from Aalborg. Dyrskojt, who was then fourteen years of age, described the battle between the peasants and Wrangel’s Swedes. Most peasants were armed with “guns, spears, and pitchforks.” Thirty of the peasants had also been furnished with horses and “good long guns as weapons.” After crossing the sound separating Nørresundby and Aalborg, either by ferries or by wading across the water on their horses, Wrangel’s riders charged the assembled peasants and broke their ranks. A confused retreat ensued, during which the peasants and soldiers exchanged fire. Dyrskojt relates how his 84-year old father shot dead three Swedish riders before he himself was killed by a shot from a Swedish cavalryman’s pistol. At the time Nørresundby was equipped with a sconce that dated from the Kejserkrigen, but there is no evidence that it was manned or used in any way by the peasants. Instead the peasants retreated into the village, barricaded themselves inside the houses, and shot at Swedes from the windows. The Swedes responded in the most obvious way, that is, by setting fire to the houses and burning many of the defenders alive.

A German chronicle from 1649 claimed that the Swedes had killed 800 “Schnaphanen oder Bawren bey Wonsüssel”, but Dyrskojt gave a lower estimate of 400 dead. Given the fact that Dyrskojt was a contemporaneous eyewitness while the anonymous German chronicler most likely was not, the latter number appears more credible. The thirty mounted peasant harquebusiers were allegedly killed to the last man. The French news journal Gazette appears to have referred to the battle at Nørresundby,

551 NSM, i, 878, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
552 Ibid., 878.
553 Petresch-Christensen 1911–1914, 50.
554 Ibid., 56.
555 Ibid., 61–62.
556 Von dem Dreyssig Jährigen Teutschen Kriege 1649, ciii.
557 Petresch-Christensen 1911–1914, 67–68.
when its reporter in Lubeck related news from 12 February that Helmut Wrangel had defeated as many as 4,000 assembled Jutlander peasants. A week later the Gazette further elaborated on these news and reported that Wrangel had slain 700 peasants in this action. He had also extracted a promise from the surviving insurgents not to raise their arms against the Queen of Sweden ever again. The figures reported by the Gazette appear, once again, exaggerated. The information that reached Copenhagen was even murkier. On 31 January Christian IV repeated to Corfitz Ulfeldt a rumour that the “peasants at Vendsyssel had battled some of their [the Swedes’] people.” He did not discuss the details surrounding the outcome of the battle nor estimate any casualties on either side.

Those peasants that had not been killed in action were captured and incarcerated in Aalborg. Dyrskøjt related that 90 peasants were crammed into a small dungeon, where most of them died from asphyxiation and thirst. The material destruction to Norresundby itself was considerable. Swedes plundered every house, including the priest’s estate (prestergaard) and the local church, under the pretext of a forced contribution. Many of the houses were then intentionally torched by the Swedes, even those that had not housed peasant combatants.

While the flames of war were rising higher in Jutland and Holstein, the Archbishopric of Bremen-Verden, an ecclesiastical fiefdom administrated by Prince Frederick, still experienced relative calm. Prince Frederick was not automatically drawn into the Danish-Swedish war as his liege lord was not Christian IV but the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand III. The local Estates, which gained political representation through the cathedral chapter, wished that the Archbishopric should remain neutral in the coming war between Sweden and Denmark. The justification for the Archbishopric’s neutrality originated from an agreement made in 1635 between the Bremener Estates and Sweden. The agreement had stipulated that Sweden would recognize and honour the Archbishoric’s neutrality in return for a contribution of corn and 30,000 thalers. This policy of neutrality was challenged in early January 1644, when a Swedish contingent (one cavalry regiment and supporting dragoons) led by General Major Hans Königsmarck crossed the River Weser, ousted the small Danish garrison in Verden, and occupied the city. The occupying Swedes requisitioned whatever footwear, clothes, and weapons they found in the city. The wealthiest burghers were also expected to pay 50–100 thalers to each Swedish officer. The Bremener Estates quite justly regarded Königsmarck’s invasion as a violation of the 1635 agreement and indeed the established “ius in bello.”

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558 Gazette du 5 Mars 1644 N. 22, 139.
559 Gazette du 12 Mars 1644 N. 25, 159.
560 KCFEB 1584–1648, 308, 31 January 1644.
561 Petresch-Christensen 1911–1914, 69.
562 Ibid., 64–67.
564 Zetterqvist 1891, 34.
565 Wiedemann 1866, 284.
Prince Frederick and the Estates quickly agreed on two courses of action: firstly, to request from Torstensson a binding commitment to respect the neutrality of the Archbishopric; and secondly, to increase the size of the Archbishopric’s military forces by recruitment and the mobilization of the cavalry service -rendering nobility.567 The Archbishopric’s armed forces would have also contained peasant irregulars, as these later joined the more regular troops in their operations against the Swedes (see chapter 3.10). These measures raised concerns among the Swedes that Prince Frederick was raising troops for his father’s service. On Torstensson’s instructions, Königsmarck moved his headquarters to Hornburg, not far from Stade, where Prince Frederick had summoned the Bremener Estates.568 Königsmarck then billeted his troops in the marshlands of eastern Bremen. The Swedish troops, unsatisfied as they were with their miserable living conditions in the Bremener marshlands, began to pillage and mistreat the inhabitants of ecclesiastical fiefs, manorial estates, and peasant communities alike.569 At least one civilian – a peasant woman – was murdered by the Swedish cavalrymen.570 Königsmarck also took hostages from the upper social stratum in order to gain further leverage over the vacillating Estates.571 It was around this time that the first hostilities broke out between the Swedish soldiers and Prince Frederick’s troops.572

While the Swedes and Bremeners were already fighting one another in the marshlands, Königsmarck pressed the Estates convening in Stade for contributions. Königsmarck based his demands on the Swedish-Bremener treaty from 1635, in which the local Estates had agreed to support the Swedish war efforts with a combination of contributions and billets.573 Ordinary revenue still remained the prerogative of the Prince-Bishop.574 The Bremener Estates, which did not wish to be drawn into the Danish-Swedish conflict, finally agreed to pay Königsmarck monthly contributions. Königsmarck had demanded a contribution of 90,000 thalers, but the hard-pressed Estates were initially capable of raising only one-third of that sum.575 Prince Frederick, who did not participate in these negotiations, used this time to block routes of advance and therefore to prevent Königsmarck’s troops from spreading out from the marshlands into the western parts of the Archbishopric.576 The sporadic violence soon escalated into an open war. In February Königsmarck lost in action as many as 600 men over the course of only a few weeks.577 While the regular Bremener troops carried out most of the actual fighting against the Swedes, the local peasants assisted them by passive resistance if not by anything else. Only those rural districts that were actually

567 Zetterqvist 1891, 35.
568 Ibid., 35–36.
569 Gazette du 19 Mars 1644 N. 27, 169.
570 Wiedemann 1866, 284.
571 Zetterqvist 1891, 38.
572 Ibid., 37.
574 Ibid., 27.
575 Theatrum 1651, 296.
577 Wiedemann 1866, 286.
occupied by the Swedes delivered any contributions to Königsmarck. Conversely the peasants provided supplies, billets, and assistance to Prince Frederick’s troops.\textsuperscript{578}

There was little that Königsmarck could do to break the military-political deadlock in Bremen, as he lacked the kind of infantry and artillery that would have been needed to reduce the towns and fortifications held by Prince Frederick’s troops.\textsuperscript{579} Perhaps the most effective form of peasant resistance at this stage was the intentional breaking of the dikes, which caused large parts of the Bremener marshlands to become flooded. The Gazette identified a causal link between the man-made inundation and Königsmarck’s decision to withdraw the bulk of his troops from Bremen.\textsuperscript{580} Be that as it may, on 18 March Königsmarck marched southeast towards Lüneburg and Saxony with the bulk of his troops.\textsuperscript{581} In April 1644 we already find Königsmarck’s troops positioned between Chemnitz and Dresden, where they proceeded to demand fire-ransoms from the local communities, thus adding to the miseries of war already experienced by the Saxon civilians.\textsuperscript{582} Königsmarck, who did not wish to relinquish the Swedish foot-hold in Bremen, nevertheless left Swedish garrisons at Verden, Langwedel, and a number of smaller castles and fortified manors.\textsuperscript{583} In February Königsmarck had already instructed the Estates to deliver their contributions to these strongholds, which essentially turned them into fortified magazines in support of the Swedish war effort in Bremen-Verden.\textsuperscript{584}

\section*{3.7 SMALL WAR IN HOLSTEIN}

After Nørresundby the peasant insurgency in Jutland appears to have somewhat toned down. While Torstensson prevented further excesses from his troops by imposing strict discipline, he also burdened Jutland with heavy impositions in order to prevent the Danish Crown from organizing resistance or recruiting troops there.\textsuperscript{585} In early February the Swedes even landed on the Island of Rømø on the west coast of Jutland, where they captured a number of Danish ships that had been moored there. Only a few days later, on 9 February, a Danish raiding party of 100 men onboard two galeasses sailed out from Glückstadt, landed on Rømø, and set fire to the captured ships after having removed their cannons, which the Danes then brought back to Glückstadt.\textsuperscript{586}

The real focus of warfare, however, was on the eastern coast of Jutland, opposite Fyn and Sjælland. In February the Swedes attempted to cross the Little Belt and capture Fyn with a force of 70 boats. The amphibious assault was thwarted by the Danes, who welcomed the Swedes with a heavy fusillade that sank some of the smaller

\begin{enumerate}
\item Zetterqvist 1891, 39.
\item Ibid., 39.
\item Gazette du 9 Avril 1644 N. 34, 215.
\item Theatrum 1651, 313.
\item Lehmann and Heidler 2013, 151.
\item Theatrum 1651, 313.
\item Böhme 1967, 27.
\item Generalstaben 1944, 74.
\item NSM, i, 878–879, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645; Petersen 1935, 263.
\end{enumerate}
boats. The Swedish flotilla turned around and sought sanctuary in Jutland, but it was intercepted by Danish men-of-war, which dispersed the flotilla and sank several more boats. The *Theatrum Europaeum* reported that on 26 April a 9,000-strong Danish force, part soldiers, part peasants, attacked the Swedish sconce opposite Middelfart from both land and sea. The sconce was manned only by 60 Swedish soldiers, who were all killed in the assault. Torstensson immediately reconquered the sconce with artillery-supported infantry and allegedly killed 600 Danes in the process. The Danish attacking force then retreated back to Fyn. Torstensson’s personal involvement in the bloody fighting gave rise to a rumour that he was either gravely ill or had been fatally wounded in battle. According to the rumour circulating in Hamburg and Osnabrück, Torstensson “was much closer to death than life” and his army was no longer operational. This was all just wishful thinking on behalf of the Danes and Imperialists. The Swedish army had not lost any of its operational capability, and Torstensson himself was merely suffering from bouts of gout that forced him to remain in bed for prolonged periods of time.

In early March the Imperial negotiators at Osnabrück related intelligence reports to Ferdinand III that the popular mood towards the Swedes had changed in Ducal Holstein and that the people now felt great embitterment towards them. Around the same time the Danish garrison in Glückstadt organized yet another sortie against the Swedish forces occupying Dithmarschen. This force, led by General Major Friedrich von Bauer and the *generalkrigskommissar* Ahlefeldt, was 200 soldiers strong. The journal *Gazette* claimed that the Danish designs alarmed the Swedes to such extent that they deployed four cavalry regiments and three extra field pieces in Itzehoe.

On 14 March Bauer led a much larger force from Glückstadt in an attempt to assault the Swedish-held fortress of Heiligenstedten near Itzehoe. The *Gazette* related that Baur commanded 2,500 infantry and 500 cavalry, while the Swedes themselves estimated that his force consisted of 2,000 foot and 500 dragoons. The Imperial negotiators did not qualify the “armada” in any way but simply reported that it consisted of 3,000 men. The Danish military expedition was nevertheless driven back by the fierce resistance of the Swedish defenders and the fear of the approaching Swedish reinforcements from Jutland. The Swedish reinforcements from Jutland, several regiments, were designated for General Major Mortaigne, who used them to waste the countryside between Glückstadt and Krempe. While the *Gazette* did not specify it, the sizeable Danish infantry contingent may have well included those armed

587 Englund 1993, 323.
589 APW, ii: a: 1, 319, 24 March 1644, Johann Weikhart von Auersperg and Johann Baptist Krane to Ferdinand III.
590 Gazette du 19 Mars 1644 N. 27, 172.
591 APW, ii: a: 1, 300, 3 March 1644, Johann Weikhart von Auersperg and Johann Baptist Krane to Ferdinand III.
592 Gazette du 2 Avril 1644 N. 32, 209.
594 APW, ii: a: 1, 320, 24 March 1644, Johann Weikhart von Auersperg to Ferdinand Sigmund Kurz von Seftenau.
peasants who were present at the Glückstadt garrison. It is worth observing that while the Gazette gave a fairly detailed account of Bauer’s operation, the otherwise meticulous Diarium Tychopolitanum simply remarked that Bauer made an attempt on Heiligenstedten “that eventually did not succeed.” It is obvious that Danish failures and defeats received scarce attention from the anonymous chronicler of the Diarium Tychopolitanum.

The Danish raiding parties from Glückstadt operated both on land and water. On 13 March one riverine force led by Oluf Steffen returned to Glückstadt with three prisoners, 24 horses, and 1,000 thalers in specie. Two days later another riverine party led by Major Walter arrived to Glückstadt from Altona, bringing with them 81 horses and a handful of enemy prisoners. The horses, very much like many other prizes captured by the Danes, had been originally seized by the Swedes as contributions. On the same day (15 March) that Walter delivered his horses and prisoners, Colonel Steinberger arrived in Glückstadt from further west in Kisdorf, where he had fought an entire Swedish regiment commanded by Colonel Galbrecht. Steinberger’s troops had killed 50 Swedes, captured another 30, and forced the rest of Galbrecht’s regiment to retreat. A Swedish lieutenant colonel, apparently Galbrecht’s second in command (Galbrecht himself reappeared in Saxony in December 1644), was mortally wounded and died later in Hamburg. Steinberger’s war booty included 400 horses.

Further riverine operations took place in early April, when (on 4 April) one Danish party led by Major Günther returned to Glückstadt with three prisoners: Lieutenant Colonel Rantzow, rittmeister Schart, “and a cavalryman from the Landgrave’s Hessian Regiment [meaning Landgrave Friedrich of Hesse-Eschwege’s regiment].” Two days later Major Hein seized a Hamburger vessel that was carrying letters from the Hessian Landgravine Amalia Elisabeth and the town of Hildesheim to Lennart Torstensson. The Diarium Tychopolitanum did not shed light on the content of these captured letters. Most likely they dealt with the imminent threat from the Imperial and Bavarian armies against Hesse-Cassel, which danger caused the Landgravine to send her brother-in-law Landgrave Fritz to meet with Torstensson and remind him of his earlier promise to “powerfully assist” the Hessians if need be. On 8 April Major Hein delivered another batch of intercepted enemy letters to Glückstadt. This time the letters had been sent by Torstensson, but their recipient was not revealed by the Diarium Tychopolitanum. Hein reported that the letters had been given to him by peasant insurgents, who had killed the Swedish messenger carrying them.

In late March and early April the Danes sent out several parties from Glückstadt to reconnoitre Dithmarschen and Schleswig and to seek out any Swedish salvaguardia-

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596 Gazette du 9 Avril 1644 N. 34, 215.
597 NSM, i, 879, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
598 Ibid., 879.
599 Ibid., 879.
600 NSM, i, 880, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645; Lehmann and Heidler 2013, 155.
601 NSM, i, 880, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
602 Ibid., 880.
603 Helfferich 2013, 184.
604 NSM, i, 880–881, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
parties that were known to collect contributions from those areas. The Swedish contribution-collection had apparently incensed or otherwise animated many Holsteiner peasants, and in early April the exiled *Amtmann* of Haderslev reported from Copenhagen that many peasants had banded together in the territories between Lubeck and Hamburg. On 2 April a sizeable Danish sortie led by Steinberger managed to surprise at Gokels (near Rendsburg) a force of 300 Swedish cavalymen, who were in the process of enjoying their breakfast. The surprised Swedes put up a fierce fight, “so that 100 of them were slain; many others being burned alive in the houses.” According to the *Diarium Tychopolitanum*, another hundred Swedes were brought back to Glückstadt as prisoners. Once again there exist slightly differing accounts of the Swedish losses. In his letter to Hugo Grotius, Petter Spiring Silvercrona described the Swedish losses as 70 dead and 100 captured. The *Gazette* reported of many Swedes being killed and 80 made prisoner.

Lieutenant Colonel Buchwald enjoyed similar success in his expedition to the Island of Rømø, where the Swedes were known to maintain two sconces. Buchwald’s force of 600 men managed to overcome the Swedish sconces with minimal losses, capturing in the process three Swedish captains, three lieutenants, three ensigns, and 140 foot soldiers. Further east rittmeister Rantzau fought a Swedish cavalry contingent in the Wagrien peninsula and brought back “18 saddled horses” to the Island of Fehmarn.

On 9 April Major Hein reported of a successful attack against a Swedish supply convoy “belonging to General Major Mortaigne.” Three Swedes had been killed and another ten captured, including three officers. The seven remaining prisoners were ordinary dragoons. Some of the captured wagons contained military supplies such as gunpowder, a hundred pairs of pistols, and bandoliers, while others carried wine, fruit, two barrels filled with oysters (“Austern”), and an assortment of precious trinkets, most likely contributions or loot. Once again Hein managed to capture Torstensson’s letters. The same event was reported by Count Penz, whose account differed by quantifying the Swedish dead as five dragoons. According to Penz, the event had taken place on 25 March. Hein had been assisted in this operation by the so-called “Moorbauern.” According to H. Schröder, who added explanatory annotations to the reproduced *Diarium Tychopolitanum* in 1832, the Moorbauern were synonymous with the “Holsteiner freien Knechte.” These were not mere insurgents or other unlawful combatants, Schröder argued, but volunteer militiamen, who operated under the

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605 NSM, i, 880–881, *Diarium Tychopolitanum* 1643 bis 1645.
607 NSM, i, 880, *Diarium Tychopolitanum* 1643 bis 1645.
609 Gazette du 23 Avril 1644 N. 39, 247.
610 NSM, i, 881, *Diarium Tychopolitanum* 1643 bis 1645; Petersen 1935, 263.
612 NSM, i, 882, *Diarium Tychopolitanum* 1643 bis 1645.
614 NSM, i, 881, *Diarium Tychopolitanum* 1643 bis 1645.
direct supervision of Caspar von Buchwald, a war commissar and the Amtmann of Segeberg. The militiamen were organized into six rotas of 169 men each. They were provided with quarters and weapons by the military authorities in Glückstadt; as their wages they received a part of the captured booty. Their military service also exempted them from all labour duties.615 Their numbers in Glückstadt most likely varied from time to time, but in late October 1644 the war council in Glückstadt quantified their number as 600.616

The following month the French news agent from Lubeck related how the Holsteiner peasants had begun to organize themselves in bands and, acting only at night, had made the roads dangerous, killing any Swedes they happened to encounter, and at times even attacking the Swedes in their quarters.617 In April an “unidentified party” of belligerents had attacked a contingent of eighteen Swedish riders led by a rittmeister only a few miles outside of Lubeck. All the soldiers were killed in action and the rittmeister was decapitated.618 A more serious threat to the Swedes was posed by Prince Frederick, who began to concentrate new troops to Glückstadt in preparation for an operation that would win back the Dithmarschen area from the Swedes. Prince Frederick had arrived in Glückstadt on 9 April to assume the command of all troops in Glückstadt and Krempe in the capacity of a “Generalissimus.” Count Penz was appointed as the governor of both Glückstadt and Krempe, while General Major Bauer was given responsibility over all the civilians and prisoners, who latter already amounted to several hundred within the city walls. Maintaining order over the former was a more pressing task, as the restive burghers in Glückstadt were already making complaints about the “groβen Insolenz” perpetrated by the billeted troops.619

Prince Frederick and Count Penz immediately sent out 150 men to reinforce the Danish-held sconce of Kreuzschanze in Wilstermarsch (a marshland just west of Itzehoe), while another 300 foot soldiers were sent to Dithmarschen to reinforce the Danish positions there.620 Major Becker led 300 men to Stormarn near Hamburg, but he failed to make any contact with the enemy and soon returned to Glückstadt. Steinberger had more luck in his expedition to the outskirts of Rendsburg, where he reportedly engaged the enemies, killing 20 of them and bringing back to Glückstadt 60 captured horses.621 Later that month five companies of cavalry, “some dragoons”, and 230 foot under Becker’s command fought and defeated 300 Swedish horse and 250 foot in terrain described by the Glückstadt war council as “Morass” – most likely meaning the Dithmarschen marshlands.622

The most successful forays were made by the Moorbauren, who, on 14 April, delivered to Glückstadt 350 oxen captured from the Swedes. “The peasants afflicted

615 INS, i, 881, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
616 DRA Krigsrådet i Glückstadt/Regeringskancelliet i Glückstadt/XV/Militaria/No.25/Krigsrådsprotokol 08.1644–08.1645, 31 October 1644.
617 Gazette du 14 Mai 1644 N. 50, 322–323.
618 Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio 1644, 23.
619 NSM, i, 882, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
620 Ibid., 882.
621 Ibid., 883.
622 DRA Krigsrådet i Glückstadt/Regeringskancelliet i Glückstadt/XV/Militaria/No 23. Besværinger over Skatter m. v. fra Befolkningen i Ditmarsken og Krempe og Wilster Marsk m.m. samt Frederik (III)’s Ordrer desang. 1644–1646, fol. 10, 30 April 1644.
to the Swedes the kind of serious damage that they could feel”, one news source from Hamburg described the insurgents’ accomplishment.623 In Glückstadt the enterprising insurgents received a payment of 1,000 thalers for their catch.624 Two days later the Moorbauren delivered a much larger yoke of oxen to Glückstadt, one of more than 1,000 heads. This time the insurgents’ raid had not gone very smoothly, as forty of the eighty participating Moorbauren had either failed or refused to participate in the actual attack. As a result of this complication Count Penz wanted to organize the Moorbauren into a regular Fahne (squadron) and appoint professional officers as their leaders, but the Moorbauren rejected these proposals.625 However, it appears that Penz would not have been able to provide these officers from his own resources alone, as he appealed to the war commissariat that very same month to send officers for three companies.626

In late April, when the presence of Swedish ships in the Elbe forced Prince Frederick to transfer military resources to coastal batteries and newly-constructed field works, the Holsteiner Moorbauren continued to harass the Swedes inland.627 On 28 April the Moorbauren, or the “Holsteinischen freien Knechte” as they were now called in the Diarium Tychopolitanum, brought in two Swedish prisoners and ten captured horses to Glückstadt. The Moorbauren claimed to have shot dead eight Swedish cavalrymen in their action. The Moorbauren also brought in captured letters from Königsmarck, Axel Lillie, and Dörfling that were addressed to Torstensson and aired their senders’ concern over the Swedes’ ability to withstand the Danish forces in Glückstadt and the approaching Imperial armies all at the same time.628

The operations around Krempe and Glückstadt in April 1644 were not necessarily evidence of any conspicuous Danish proactivity but may have reflected increased Swedish military presence in those areas, as the Glückstadt war council reported some of these incidents as Danish successes in “intercepting” Swedish designs against the Danish garrisons.629 The continuous small war nevertheless began to take its toll on the Swedish morale. On 5 May a Danish party that had clashed with the Swedes outside Krempe and killed four of the enemy arrived in Glückstadt accompanied by four Swedish infantrymen who had defected to the Danish side.630 To counter the new danger posed by the intensification of insurgency and the consequent erosion of Swedish military resources (both material and mental), Torstensson dispatched General Major Arvid Wittenberg to Holstein with a corps of 9,000 soldiers. Wittenberg’s mission was to prevent further sorties from Glückstadt and Krempe, whose bellicose garrisons “greatly inconveienced the Swedes in their quarters.”631 According to Harald Andersson Appelboom, the Swedish resident in The Hague, Wittenberg was

623 DBB 1643–1649, 23 April 1644, 90.
624 NSM, i, 882, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
625 Ibid., 883.
626 DRA Krigsrådet i Glückstadt/Regeringskancelliet i Glückstadt/XV/Militaria/128/Nr. 15. Korrespondence vedr. troppernes anbringelse 1644–1646, fol. 28, 29 April 1644.
627 NSM, i, 883–885, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
628 Ibid., 884.
630 NSM, i, 885, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
631 Gazette du 14 Mai 1644 N. 50, 324.
also tasked to suppress the peasants, who too “impeded” the Swedes in Holstein.\textsuperscript{632} Appelboom also specified those attackers from Glückstadt who had clashed with Landgrave Friedrich of Hesse-Eschwege’s regiment as “rusticos” or peasants.\textsuperscript{633}

Sometime in late April/early May Wittenberg struck camp between Oldesloe and Lubeck. Wittenberg then commanded his troops to wage brutal counterinsurgency warfare against the local peasants. Some peasants were slain and “many tortured.”\textsuperscript{634} The Swedes also torched at least a dozen villages.\textsuperscript{635} The news disseminated from Hamburg reported double the number of burned villages.\textsuperscript{636} These atrocities were reported as reprisals for previous insurgent activities and for the fact that many peasants had joined the Danes in their sorties from Glückstadt and Krempe.\textsuperscript{637}

Wittenberg’s reprisals did little to discourage the peasant insurgents; in early May peasants again joined a Danish military expedition that attempted to surprise Landgrave Friedrich of Hesse-Eschwege’s regiment in its encampment near Neumünster. The Gazette did not quantify the Danish force, but the Diarium Tychopolitanum reported that it consisted of 600 men under the command of Major Günther plus an unquantified number of “Schnaphanen” who joined the Danes along the way.\textsuperscript{638} This time the Swedes received forewarning of the Danish attack and, having been reinforced with 300 dragoons, managed to ward off the Danish offensive.\textsuperscript{639} This same episode appears to have been reproduced in a more opaque form by a German news chronicle. The pamphlet Relationis Historicae related how, on 27 April, a contingent of 500 musketeers and 400 peasants had attempted to attack Colonel Dannenberg’s troops in an unnamed town. The Swedes, who had received forewarning of the impending attack, lured the attackers into a trap, slaying all the peasants and offering quarter to the 182 surviving musketeers. At the time Dannenberg appears to have served as part of Torstensson’s field army in Holstein and Jutland, as the Relationis related the incident in the context of the war between Sweden and Denmark.\textsuperscript{640} While the details of the event differ between the Gazette and Relationis, both sources agree that this particular action was a costly failure to the hybrid contingent sent out from Glückstadt.

At Hanrau, according to the Gazette, the Danes nevertheless managed to ambush an unquantified contingent of Swedes, killing 35 of them and capturing as many as 200, including a lieutenant colonel, four captains, two lieutenants, two ensigns, and a number of “lesser officers.”\textsuperscript{641} The deployment of four additional Swedish cavalry regiments at Neumünster eventually managed to suppress at least some of the sorties from Glückstad and Krempe, but the peasant insurgents still continued to harass

\textsuperscript{632} BHG januari–september 1644, 372, 2 May 1644, Harald Andersson Appelboom to Hugo Grotius.
\textsuperscript{634} Gazette du 21 Mai 1644 N. 53, 343.
\textsuperscript{635} Gazette du 28 Mai 1644 N. 57, 371.
\textsuperscript{636} DBB 1643–1649, 23 April 1644, 90.
\textsuperscript{637} Gazette du 21 Mai 1644 N. 53, 343.
\textsuperscript{638} NSM, i, 885, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
\textsuperscript{639} Gazette du 4 Juin 1644 N. 61, 398.
\textsuperscript{640} Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio 1644, 24.
\textsuperscript{641} Gazette du 4 Juin 1644 N. 61, 398–399.
the Swedes despite the harsh Swedish countermeasures that involved the torture of captured insurgents.\textsuperscript{642}

On 1 May Anders Bille organized a Danish naval expedition that carried out a night-time surprise attack against Kolding and destroyed those Swedish ships that Torstensson and Carl Gustaf Wrangel had assembled there. The Danish chronicle \textit{Compendium Cosmographicum} later boasted that Bille had utterly defeated four Swedish regiments in Kolding, destroyed all the ships and smaller vessels in its harbour, and taken several hundred prisoners.\textsuperscript{643} The \textit{Gazette}, on the other hand, reported that the Swedish had lost one colonel, two lieutenants, one major, two ensigns, and 21 soldiers.\textsuperscript{644} The operation against Kolding coincided with the arrival of the Dutch auxiliary fleet under the command of Admiral Maarten Thijssen. Torstensson assigned such priority to naval operations that he transferred 800 musketeers from Ribe to the Dutch flotilla of 24 ships. The Swedish troops boarded the Dutch vessels at the Listerdyb Sound in the northwest corner of the Jutland Peninsula, where they were confronted by a Danish fleet on 16 May. The Dutch flotilla, which consisted of merchantmen converted into military use, suffered defeat against the much more powerful Danish men-of-war.\textsuperscript{645}

While Bille’s naval expedition raided Kolding, another Danish military expedition took place in Bremen. There 2,000 peasants assisted by an unquantified number of regular soldiers from Glückstadt attacked the Swedes in their quarters around Verden, forcing most of the Swedes to retreat all the way to Nienburg some 50 kilometres further south. The Bremener peasants and the Danish soldiers also attacked the Swedish garrison that Königsmarck had left in Langwedel just north of Verden. The town’s Swedish commandant, however, had at least part of the town burnt before retreating behind the walls of its medieval castle. There the Swedes expected to hold out until they were relieved by reinforcements sent out from Minden.\textsuperscript{646} These Swedish troops consisted of both infantry and cavalry; the former contingent returned promptly to Minden, but the cavalry still lingered around Langwedel in an attempt to prevent any further Danish threats to Swedish lines of communication.\textsuperscript{647} Prince Frederick had decided to defend Langwedel (or what remained of it) and left a strong garrison there while the core of his army advanced east towards the Elbe.\textsuperscript{648}

The Danes in Langwedel remained under constant threat of Swedish counterattacks, particularly after Königsmarck’s return to the Archbishopric at the head of an army of 3,000 cavalry and 500 foot in mid-July. The \textit{Gazette} reported that Königsmarck met obstinate resistance from the local peasants, many of whom were killed by the Swedes. The danger from the insurgents and Danish troops forced Königsmarck to allocate most of his infantry to guard the baggage train.\textsuperscript{649} On 17 July it was reported from Stade that Königsmarck had killed 400 Danes outside Bremen and captured

\begin{footnotes}
\item[642] Gazette du 2 Juillet 1644 N. 74, 490.
\item[643] Compendium Cosmographicum et chronologicum 1646, 489.
\item[644] Gazette du 18 Juin 1644 N. 67, 438.
\item[645] Petersen 1936, 243–262; Peterson 2015, 157–160.
\item[646] Gazette du 18 Juin 1644 N. 67, 439.
\item[647] Gazette du 25 Juin 1644 N. 71, 467.
\item[649] Gazette du 30 Juillet 1644 N. 88, 595.
\end{footnotes}
four cannons from the enemy. The threatening appearance of Swedes just outside Bremen had caused most of the local population to seek safety on the other side of the River Weser. On 22 July the “Königsmarkisken” troops stormed a sconce outside Langwedel that was defended by forty peasants and eight soldiers under the command of a lieutenant. The peasants were almost all killed while the soldiers were taken prisoner and brought to the Swedish camp. By the end of July Königsmarck had subjected most of the Archbishopric to contributions. After the Bremener Estates had promised to pay Königsmarck a monthly contribution of 8,000 thalers, his army once again left the Archbishopric and proceeded south towards Halberstadt.

These Danish operations by hybrid contingents of soldiers and peasants along the Elbe and Weser left a legacy of unrestrained insurgency that quickly degenerated into plain brigandage. On 3 June the Hamburger Kriegs-Rath or war council decided to furnish a small flotilla of boats manned by musketeers to combat those “Schnaphanen” that were threatening traffic and commerce along the Upper Elbe. Because it was not in the Danes’ interests to endanger their already precarious relations with Hamburg (the nexus of recruitment and military subcontracting), it must be concluded that these disruptive “Schnaphanen” operated at their own account and more as brigands than legitimate combatants.

3.8 INFRINGEMENT IN ITZEHOE

These military setbacks forced Torstensson to postpone his plans for an amphibious operation against Fyn and Sjælland. Instead of continuing his attempts to organize a fleet in Jutland, he decided to wait for the Dutch auxiliary fleet, which the industrialist and financier Louis De Geer was busy raising in Amsterdam. The Danes did not immediately realize that the threat against Fyn had dissipated and continued their preparations for the island’s defence. Christian IV and the rigsråd envisioned a defence based on the recruited elements already present in Fyn, namely the 600 recruited dragoons and another 500 men raised by the local nobility. The rigsråd had little faith in the peasant levies. “The landfolk cannot be relied upon, as experience has shown”, the rigsråd contemplated in an apparent reference to the military disaster outside Middelfart in January. The rigsråd nevertheless agreed to mobilize 400 peasants organized into two companies if the enemy invasion of Fyn appeared imminent. A deputation of the Noble Estate also suggested a general udskrivning of all able-bodied men in Sjælland. All eligible men were to be supplied with a “vis gewehr” and organized into fifty companies that were properly drilled and led by professional

650 Gazette du 6 Août 1644 N. 92, 631.
651 Theatrum 1651, 319.
653 Gazette du 3 Septembre 1644 N. 105, 724.
654 SHGV, ix, 117, 3 June 1644, Extractus Kriegs-Raths Protocolli.
655 Generalstaben 1644, 74–75.
656 ADFT, ii, 107, 12 May 1644, indstilling til Rigsrådet angaaende Fyens Forsvar imod de Svenskes angreb.
657 Ibid., 108.
658 Ibid., 107.
officers. The nobility, which volunteered to train and lead these companies, regarded such duty as an extension of its own rostjene service.

On 15 June, it was reported from Hamburg a week later, a military expedition from Krempe had managed to infiltrate the Swedish-held Itzehoe and take the town by surprise. According to the Gazette as well as the chronicler Eberhard Wassenberg, the operation had originated from reports that the town’s commander Colonel Brandeshagen had departed to Rendsburg with most of his troops. The Gazette reported that Brandeshagen had only left a hundred or so soldiers at Itzehoe, but according to Wassenberg the Swedish garrison was 300 strong. The Diarium Tychopolitanum gave Itzehoe’s remaining garrison the strength of at least 500 men.

The primary sources describing the event with any detail all agree that the Danish infiltration was achieved with the kind of a classical ruse that was discussed in chapter 3.3. Once again the attackers infiltrated an enemy strongold in disguise; on this particular occasion the chosen disguise was that of peasant women. This disguise was not at all unusual for clandestine operations and, as we have previously learned, it was used by the brigands in Småland and the alleged Swedish spies in Samso (see chapters 3.1 and 3.5). The bonnets and scarfs worn by peasant women would hide the men’s facial features, while the long and multi-layered skirts would have provided ample cover to hide pistols, swords, and other weapons, perhaps even short-barrelled firelocks similar to the pedrenyals used by the Catalans.

The most detailed account of the event was given by the Diarium Tychopolitanum. According to the chronicle, there were three infiltrators, two of whom the Diarium Tychopolitanum described as being “Leibschützen” or specialist light infantry (see chapter 4.11). Adam Olearius related in his own Holsteiner chronicle that the infiltrators were “Dänische Officirer.” The two Leibschützen (or officers) were disguised as peasant women carrying baskets full of vegetables, while a third infiltrator appearing as a timberer (the perfect excuse for wielding a ready axe) followed them further away. At the causeway leading to the town gates one of the Leibschützen drew a pistol from under his skirt and shot dead the Swedish Wachtmeister or the watch captain. The infiltrators then opened the gates and allowed the rest of the Danes to enter the town, “first taking control of the market square and then proceeding further inside the town, killing all those who raised weapons against them”, as the Diarium Tychopolitanum narrated.

All the sources agree that the storming of Itzehoe was a major Danish victory. The Diarium Tychopolitanum reported that the Danes took on 15 June 400 Swedish prisoners and the following day another 90 who were discovered to be hiding in the town. The loot from Itzehoe and its immediate sconce included eight standards, “4 blue and 4
black, emblazoned with a golden sceptre and a crown”, three heavy regimental pieces, four lighter cast-iron cannons, 40 pairs of pistols, “and a good booty of horses and other Mobilien.”A slightly different account was given by Wassenberg, who believed that most of the 300 Swedes in Itzehoe had been killed and that those prisoners brought back to Glückstadt were mainly officers. Wassenberg also elaborated that the Danish war booty included 30,000 thalers. As far as the number of slain Swedes is concerned, Wassenberg’s account is less convincing that that of the Diarium Tychopolitanum. The latter chronicle was based on eyewitness sources, while Wassenberg wrote his history in the distant Vienna. Wassenberg was also an Imperialist and a Catholic propagandist, who had every reason to portray intra-Protestant warfare as being more ferocious and brutal than what it actually was.

The Diarium Tychopolitanum also included Colonel Brandeshagen and his deputy Lieutenant Colonel Frauen among the prisoners of war. They were brought to Glückstadt on 18 June, “but were released by Count Penz and escorted to Breitenburg.” On that same day Colonel Steinberger captured thirteen Swedes, who had been sent out from the Castle Heiligenstedt to collect contributions from the surrounding countryside. Steinberger then attacked the Swedish sconce itself and took more prisoners. Heiligenstedt remained under Danish siege until 26 June, when the Danes accorded honourable terms of surrender to the castle’s Swedish garrison of 23 men and its commanding lieutenant named Ziegler. Thirteen of the Swedish soldiers travelled to Breitenburg with their commander while the remaining ten defected to Danish service.

Breitenburg itself was not quite safe from incursions by insurgents and Danish troops. Around the same time when one force of Danes took Itzehoe by a ruse, another party from Glückstadt ambushed a Swedish convoy outside Breitenburg, capturing one lieutenant and 35 common soldiers with the loss of a single Dane. On 24 June the Gazette’s informant reported from Kiel that Holsteiner peasants assisted by regular troops from Glückstadt had managed to demolish “le pont de Bredabourg”, most likely meaning the bridge over the River Stor between Breitenburg and Itzehoe. During the summer, Breitenburg was becoming increasingly isolated from the other Swedish-controlled areas thanks to the activities of the Danish raiding parties and local insurgents.

The capture of Heiligenstedt appears to have been part of a larger Danish military operation. It was reported from Hamburg on 29 June that Prince Frederick had departed from Glückstadt at the head of a sizeable army of 6,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, and 3,000 peasants. The strategic aim of the excursion was Dithmarschen, where Prince Frederick had hoped to offer battle to the Swedes in circumstances favourable to his

668 NSM, i, 887, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
669 Wassenberg 1645, 573.
670 NSM, i, 887–888, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
671 Ibid., 888.
672 Ibid., 888.
674 Gazette du 16 Juillet 1644 N. 83, 556.
own army. The Swedes, however, did not venture out in force from their Holsteiner garrisons or from Jutland, and Prince Frederick soon returned to Glückstadt.

The Swedes did not let the fall of Itzehoe and Heiligenstedt go unpunished. On 21 June Wittenberg sent out 29 fänikor (“Cornet-Pferden”) of dragoons to the outskirts of Itzehoe. Their advance against Itzehoe itself was stopped by the Danish soldiers who had taken up firing positions in the ditches as well as by the Swedish dragoons’ own lack of tactical cohesion (“nichts ausrichten könnten”). Instead of assaulting Itzehoe, the dragoons turned their attention towards the Krempe Moor peasants, five or six of whom were shot either in their own homes or outside in the fields. On 28 June a Swedish expedition from Breitenburg torched the village of Münsterdorf, apparently in reprisal for the loss of three Swedes who had been gunned down in the proximity of the village. These Swedish punitive expeditions resulted in further clashes with Danish troops and local insurgents. On 22 June the “Holsteinischen freien Knechte” brought in six captured Swedes to Glückstadt and reported having killed more than fifty Swedes near Cappeln. The Swedes had been commanded by one Colonel Penz, “a man who should not be confused with our own Count Penz”, as the Diarium Tychopolitanum elaborated. On 26 June the same Holsteiner militiamen reported having ambushed a coach that had allegedly belonged to the Swedish Colonel Slebusch. The Holsteiners claimed to have shot dead three passengers and nine escorting cavalrymen; the driver was taken prisoner. Colonel Steinberger in his turn responded to the Swedish expeditions by raiding Breitenburg and seizing from the Swedes sixty “dragoon horses.”

Torstensson’s operations in Denmark came to an end in the summer, when the Imperial Army stirred from its winter quarters and advanced north in an attempt to catch Torstensson between two fronts. The Imperialist commander Matthias Gallas advanced towards Denmark in a leisurely way. Gallas’s slow progress did, however, create anxiety among the Swedes, who were not certain whether the Imperialists’ actual military object was Pomerania, Bremen, or Holstein/Jutland. Any doubts about the approaching Imperialists’ goal dissipated on 16 July, when the Imperialist army appeared in Holstein, two months after departing from northern Bohemia. The Imperialist army struck camp at Oldesloe only five leagues (twenty kilometres) from Lubeck. The Gazette reported that Gallas commanded as many as 15,000 men, and that his army was strong in infantry but weak in cavalry. The Danish pamphlet Relation fra Fyn Lybeck estimated that after Gallas had joined forces with the Danes in

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675 Gazette du 16 Juillet 1644 N. 83, 556.
676 Gazette du 23 Juillet 1644 N. 86, 574.
677 NSM, i, 888, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
678 Ibid., 888.
679 Ibid., 888.
680 Ibid., 889.
681 Ibid., 889.
682 BHG januari–september 1644, 559, 9 July 1644, Hugo Grotius to Nicolas van Reigesberch.
683 NSM, i, 889, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
early August, the combined strength of the two armies reached 20,000 men.\textsuperscript{685} While the Swedish historian Lars Tingsten also placed Gallas's strength in the same range of roughly 14–15,000 men, his qualification of the Imperialist army suggested that it was dominated by the cavalry contingents and not infantry.\textsuperscript{686} According to Gallas himself, the size and composition of his army in mid-August was 5,000–6,000 cavalry, 300 Croats (meaning light cavalry), 1,200 dragoons, and 4,500 infantry, excluding the 900 cavalry and 1,600 infantry supplied by the Danes (the fact that he could not decide whether his encamped army included 5,000 or 6,000 cavalry reflects poorly on Gallas as an operational commander).\textsuperscript{687}

Torstensson lingered in Jutland as long as he could in order to give support to Swedish naval operations against Denmark. On 9 July Torstensson oversaw the invasion of Fehmarn, which operation escalated into a major naval conflict at Kolberger Heide. This was the battle, in which Christian IV, who commanded the Danish fleet on board his flagship \textit{Trefoldighed}, was wounded and lost his right eye. Even though the Danes succeeded in driving the Swedish fleet back to Kiel and blockading them there, Kolberger Heide was a strategic defeat for them as the Swedes managed to land an invasion force on Fehmarn, the military historians of the Swedish General Staff asserted in the 1940s.\textsuperscript{688} However, the Danes too derived some strategic success from Kolberger Heide, as the Danish control of the seas effectively disrupted Swedish maritime lines of communication between Holstein and Pomerania/Mecklenburg.\textsuperscript{689} On land the Imperialists managed to capture Swedish diplomatic correspondence from Christianpreis to Osnabrück. The letters were sent to Vienna where they were deciphered, revealing what “devious plans the enemy had plotted” for the on-going peace negotiations in Westphalia.\textsuperscript{690}

The Swedish occupation of Fehmarn and the adjunct operations in Wagrien (a peninsula between Kiel and Travemünd) contained their own elements of insurgency and localized resistance. On the Island of Fehmarn itself the Swedish eruption was sudden and traumatic. The invasion on 9 July was preceded by heavy naval bombardment from the Swedish men-of-war; a contemporaneous chronicler had counted 390 cannon shots from the Swedish ships.\textsuperscript{691} The Swedes captured 400 Danish soldiers, who were later sent to Christianpreis as prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{692} After overcoming last vestiges of resistance the Swedes began to pillage the countryside. The Gottorper bailiffs and the local clergy immediately reached out to Torstensson and General Major Mortaigne in order to save the island from further devastation and agreed to pay the Swedes contributions. According to Conrad Schmalfeldt, a Gottorper administrator in Fehmarn, the contributions consisted of 20,000 thalers in cash and 1,000 barrels of wheat.\textsuperscript{693} An anonymous recollection of the events of 9 July

\textsuperscript{685} Relation fra Fyn Lybeck 1644, 2.
\textsuperscript{686} Tingsten 1932, 251.
\textsuperscript{687} DBB 1643–1649, 131, 19 August 1644, Matthias Gallas to Ferdinand III.
\textsuperscript{688} Generalstaben 1944, 99–102.
\textsuperscript{689} Relation fra Fyn Lybeck 1644, 3.
\textsuperscript{690} DBB 1643–1649, 136, 7 September 1644, Ferdinand III to Matthias Gallas.
\textsuperscript{691} NSNA, iv, 95, 29 June 1644, Fehmarsche Aufzeichnung.
\textsuperscript{692} BHG januari–september 1644, 586, 18 July 1644, Harald Andersson Appelboom to Hugo Grotius.
\textsuperscript{693} NSNA, iv, 92, 6 July 1644, Conrad Schmalfeldt to Duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp.
related that the “Brandschatz” amounted to 52,000 thalers and 155 “Last” of corn (one Last equalling 24 barrels in Holstein). According to the same source the Swedes had also requisitioned 809 horses from all parts of Fehmarn.694

The only organized resistance in Fehmarn had been carried out by the local militiamen who were led by David Uckermann, the mayor (Bürgermeister) of Burg auf Fehmarn, and Jürgen Bünger, the bailiff (Landvogt) of Avendorf. The militiamen, however, had been defeated at the very beginning of the invasion on 9 July, and 73 of them had been killed in action.695 The Gazette gave a more inflated figure of 200 Danish killed in action.696 The Swedes had encountered more serious insurgency in Wagrien. A French informant reported from Kiel on 24 June that insurgent peasants had killed fifty Swedes near Neustadt on the eastern coast of the Wagrien Peninsula. The Gazette did not elucidate whether these severe Swedish losses were inflicted in a single engagement or whether they resulted from several guerrilla-style actions.697

Later in August Gallas reported to Ferdinand III that a Swedish cavalry contingent had attempted to storm a Danish sconce at Rosenfeld (on the River Schwerin between Wangrien and Kiel) but that they had been driven back by soldiers and local peasants. “Therein Colonel Sack as well as many officers and soldiers, all in all 500 Swedes, lost their lives”, Gallas wrote to the Emperor.698 Sack’s tactic had involved the use of dismounted dragoons as skirmishers who infiltrated the houses just outside the sconce. However, fierce Danish fusillade from the sconce forced the Swedes to abandon their positions, thus resulting in the loss of cover and even more casualties.699 The distinctively pro-Swedish edition of Theatri Europaei from 1647 quantified the Danish defenders to have been 150 men strong but did not qualify whether or not this number included peasants. According to the Theatri, Colonel Sack’s contingent consisted of 500 cavalry and dragoons, most of whom (“mehrentheils”) were killed in the failed operation. Colonel Sack himself, however, was not among the casualties, as he died shortly afterwards in another clash with a much larger Danish contingent that attempted evacuation to Danish ships somewhere west of Fehmarn. After the battle the Swedes allegedly counted 1,300 Danish dead on the shore, many of whom had apparently drowned while attempting to reach the ships.700

The claimed Danish sea victory at Kolberger Heide and the encouraging presence of Imperialist allies in Holstein appear to have toned down the operational activity of the Glückstadt garrison and the Holsteiner insurgents. The only major foray against the Swedes in the late July took place on 30 July, when, on the explicit orders from Count Penz, Colonel Steinberger burned the main bridge (“Störbrücke”) outside the Swedish-held Breitenburg, capturing in the process eleven Swedes.701 On 5 August Torstensson, whose field army was reduced to some 5,000–6,000 men by losses and the need to garrison key towns and strongholds, decided to meet the approaching

694 NSNA, iv, 96, 29 June 1644, Fehmarsche Aufzeichnung.
695 Ibid., 95.
696 Gazette du 6 Août 1644 N. 92, 630.
697 Gazette du 16 Juillet 1644 N. 83, 556.
698 DBB 1643–1649, 136, 12 August 1644, Matthias Gallas to Ferdinand III.
699 Theatri 1647, 630.
700 Ibid., 630.
701 NSM, i, 889, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
Imperialist army outside the confines of Jutland.\textsuperscript{702} However, the Danish claim that the Swedes had lost five entire regiments by early August appears exaggerated.\textsuperscript{703} Torstensson nevertheless decided to move south towards Germany, where he would not have to fight with his back to the sea. Operations along the Elbe also allowed for a conjunction with Königsmarck’s contingent if such need should appear.\textsuperscript{704}

Count Penz had joined forces with Gallas in the expectation that the joint Danish-Imperialist army would assault Kiel, where Torstensson had concentrated his field army in August. The Imperialists, however, made no such move against Torstensson and instead settled to pillage and destroy a number of villages between Hamburg and Lubeck. Christian IV, whose fleet had already gone on the offensive to prepare for a two-pronged attack against Kiel from both land and sea, was reportedly greatly dissatisfied with Gallas and his lack of military effort.\textsuperscript{705}

In early August, the chronicle \textit{Theatrum Europaeum} tells us, a reconnoitring Imperialist contingent of 1,000 cavalry and some auxiliary dragoons launched a surprise attack against Kiel, killing 70 Swedes, including a lieutenant colonel and the “Torstensohnische Jägermeister.”\textsuperscript{706} This last term is somewhat cryptic. In the general German vocabulary of the time, \textit{Jägermeister} meant a master of the hunt, but it may have also referred to a leader of sharpshooters or other specialist infantry, who were often known as \textit{jägern} (see chapter 4.11). The Danish pamphlet \textit{Relation fra Fyn Lybeck} appears to have referred to this very same incident when it reported of an Imperial victory over a Swedish contingent of 400 cavalry on 5 August. According to the \textit{Relation}, the Swedes were commanded by Colonel Höckling, “one of Torstensson’s principal and best officers”, who was killed in action with most (“mestendeel”) of his men.\textsuperscript{707} It is difficult to say whether Torstensson’s \textit{Jägermeister} and Colonel Höckling (or Heuking, as his name is sometimes spelled) were one and the same person. What we do now is that Höckling had been captured in December 1641, when he commanded a cavalry squadron in General Major Slange’s regiment.\textsuperscript{708} Höckling had only rejoined the Swedish army in June 1642, when the Imperialists and Swedes exchanged a great number of captured officers.\textsuperscript{709}

If these two sources refer to the same event, there appears to be some major discrepancies between them. To begin with, the \textit{Relation} placed the incident in the “Marschlenden”, where 400 Swedish cavalry had been previously defeated in another alleged clash.\textsuperscript{710} Kiel, however, is located a considerable distance away from Dithmarschen and the Elbe. “Mestendeel” of 400 riders is also significantly more than just 70 men, while Colonel Höckling does not appear to have served the Swedes in general or Lennart Torstensson in particular in any capacity outside that of a cavalry officer. In a muster roll from June 1643, Höckling is listed as a colonel in command

\textsuperscript{702} Tingsten 1932, 250.  
\textsuperscript{703} Relation fra Fyn Lybeck 1644, 1.  
\textsuperscript{704} Theatrum 1651, 429.  
\textsuperscript{705} Gazette du 3 Septembre 1644 N. 105, 723.  
\textsuperscript{706} Theatrum 1651, 518.  
\textsuperscript{707} Relation fra Fyn Lybeck 1644, 2.  
\textsuperscript{708} Gottfried 1745, 796; Mankell 1865, 266.  
\textsuperscript{709} Gottfried 1745, 839.  
\textsuperscript{710} Relation fra Fyn Lybeck 1644, 2.
of 83 cavalrymen. At the second battle of Breitenfeld on 23 October 1642 Höckling commanded three squadrons of cavalry at the first rank of the army's right wing. The Saxon chronicler Christian Lehmann described Höckling as a prolific collector of contributions in Saxony in 1639–1640. It was in this capacity that Höckling was captured by the Saxons in early 1640, as he was leading a convoy of 250 cavalry, 200 foot, and a baggage train loaded with ammunition and loot from Bohemia and Saxony. In the light of this evidence, it becomes difficult to view Höckling as a commander of light infantry or Torstensson’s personal master of the hunt – or as a particularly distinguished officer, for that matter. What is certain, however, is the fact that Höckling’s name no longer appears in the list of the Swedish army in Germany at the beginning of 1645.

Having already been effectively abandoned by Torstensson, Kiel finally surrendered to the Imperialists on 13 August in return for accords. The slim Swedish garrison had consisted of only 150 men, sixty of whom were apparently native Swedes and therefore transported to captivity in Leipzig. The rest of the soldiers, whom Gallas identified as Danes and Germans, were released (and very likely transferred to Imperialist service). The captured Swedish officers were expected to be exchanged for Imperialist prisoners in Swedish captivity. Some hundred Swedish cavalry, including colonels Wittkopf and Hack, managed to escape the city before its surrender to the Imperialists. The city’s transfer did not proceed very smoothly, as there was some pillaging by the Croats and the Holsteiner peasants, who latter bore particular grudge against a city that had supplied Torstensson’s army with soldiers partaking in the repression of local insurgency. Further north the Danes and Imperialists set to besiege Christianpreis from both land and sea.

Meanwhile Torstensson advanced rapidly west, brushing aside localized resistance on the way. In mid-August Torstensson’s army quickly overcame a series of Danish-held forts and sconces that guarded entrance into Schleswig-Holstein. One of the forts was the Castle Segeberg, which the Swedes (according to the contemporaneous geographer Caspar Danckwerth) destroyed because it served as a lair for “Schnaphanen.” The defence of Dithmarschen and its adjunct marshlands was left at this point to an unquantified number of Danish infantry and “Landvolck.” At Eiderstedt the Swedes allegedly killed as many as 1,300 soldiers and peasants guarding a pontoon bridge over the River Eider. This high figure given by the Gazette, however, seems dubious as it was not reported by other contemporaneous sources.

711 Mankell 1865, 270.
712 Ibid., 268.
713 Lehmann and Heidler 2013, 98, 100, 110.
714 Mankell 1865, 278–281.
715 DBB 1643–1649, 13 August 1644, Matthias Gallas to Ferdinand III.
716 Theatrum 1651, 518.
717 Gazette du 3 Septembre 1644 N. 105, 724.
718 Ibid., 724.
719 Danckwerth 1652, 234.
721 Gazette du 3 Septembre 1644 N. 105, 724.
After crossing the Eider, the Swedes torched the ships and boats forming the pontoon. By denying the Imperialists access to the resources of Dithmarschen and other parts of western Holstein, Torstensson attempted “to ruin the Imperialists without combat”, as the Gazette elaborated on the Swedish strategy. On 21 August it was reported from Lubeck that Torstensson was finally retreating from Holstein and Schleswig altogether. The Swedish army remained on the eastern side of the Elbe as it headed towards the Lüneburg lands. A reckless pursuit of the retreating Swedish army by the Danish Colonel Ulfeldt led to the destruction of his entire company of 150 men.

The Swedes did not entirely abandon their position in Jutland and Holstein, as they had left garrisons at Christianpreis, Breitenburg, Pinneberg, Trittau, and a number of smaller localities. These remaining Swedish forces in Holstein and Jutland were commanded by general majors Mortaigne and Wittenberg, who also commanded between them some 2,000 cavalry — some of them, however, apparently kept at Trave. The Danes had attempted to besiege some of these garrisons but without any success. Breitenburg was placed under “circumvallation” by a modest force of 1,600 men, which force was sufficient only for blockading the roads leading in and out of Breitenburg. The siege of Pinneberg was lifted in early September, when a relief expedition of 150 cavalry and 40 musketeers led by Landgrave Frederick forced the besieging Danes to abandon their entrenchments in haste and retreat “in great confusion” to Glückstadt. By the end of September Kiel too had opened its gates to Helmut Wrangel’s troops, thus once again making its city garrison available for military service under Swedish colours.

Torstensson’s subsequent military operations against Gallas belong to the context of the Thirty Years War rather than the Danish-Swedish conflict, even though the two armies clashed already in late August while they were both still on Holsteiner soil. It suffices to note here that irregular warfare did not play any significant part in Torstensson’s further battles with Gallas despite the fact that the Imperialists had been reinforced with “a few hundred Snapphaner.” It is likely that these irregulars had been recruited from Dithmarschen, which was visited by Prince Frederick and the
generalkrigskommissar Ahlefeldt right after the Imperialist envoy Cresse had arrived in Glückstadt to make arrangements for Danish-Imperialist military co-operation on 24 July. By the end of August most of the Danes in Imperialist service had disbanded and either returned to Glückstadt or drifted to Lubeck and Hamburg. The Danes had been generally dissatisfied with Gallas’s lack of fighting spirit, and in particular with his failure to engage Torstensson’s field army in a decisive battle when both armies had been in close proximity near Kiel. Gallas for his part was frustrated by the Danes, who had not delivered him those victuals, monies, and the 3,000 auxiliary soldiers and levied peasants that they had earlier promised. Be that as it may, Christian IV identified in the Swedes’ evacuation of their position in eastern Holstein an opportunity for a strategic strike against Torstensson himself. On 17 August the King suggested to Corfitz Ulfeldt a surprise raid against the Pomeranian coastal town of Barth, which allegedly housed Torstensson’s wife and child. What Christian IV intended to do with Beata De la Gardie and Anders Lennartsson if he had actually caught them, the sources do not reveal. In the light of the general principles of warfare, however, it is unlikely that Christian IV would have wanted to inflict them any harm; instead it appears probable that he would have used them as high-profile hostages and personal leverage in order to extract military-political concessions from Torstensson. Barth itself was a valuable target as well, because it could be used as a base of operations for Danish “freebooters” or subcontracted privateers (as Christian IV indeed suggested). The matter nevertheless remains a contrafactual scenario, as no Danish raid appear to have been launched against Barth. The projected raid should have been carried out from the sea, and it appears likely that Christian IV was ultimately unwilling to designate precious naval resources for such a risky expedition. Defending Barth from the land would have also necessitated the placement of a strong Danish garrison there, which allocation of land troops would have entailed yet another opportunity cost for Christian IV.

3.9 HELMUT WRANGLER'S WAR IN JUTLAND AND HOLSTEIN IN 1644

Torstensson marched down from Jutland in full force with his 18,000-strong field army, but already in September he detached Helmut Wrangel from the main army and directed him to take responsibility for the theatre of war in Jutland. The removal of Swedish forces had strengthened Copenhagen’s grip over Jutland, and in late August the Jutland land judge Erik Juell had contacted the government and informed it how the people in Jutland were seeking ways to defend themselves against future Swedish incursions. The Jutlanders asked the government for help and guidance in organizing “landets defension” among “Crown and demesne peasants, trade towns, and common men.” The King had responded to the Jutlanders’ pleas with encouraging words and had suggested that the Jutlanders themselves recruit volunteers and organize defences on their own initiative. He did not promise any immediate or direct government

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733 NSM, i, 889, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
734 Gazette du 17 Septembre 1644 N. 113, 778.
735 Gazette du 24 Septembre 1644 N. 117, 810.
736 KCFEB 1641–1644, 492, 17 August 1644.
assistance. Three weeks later he did, however, order some muskets and cannons to be distributed for a planned “Expedition” into Jutland. The available muskets sufficed to arm two-thirds of a thousand-man regiment; the rest were armed with pikes.

By late August much of Jutland was again under Danish control to the extent that the Crown could regulate economic life there. On 23 August the government had directed the lensmænd in Jutland to circulate a government missive that prohibited the export of corn. A week later Christian IV revoked this order and authorized the export of corn as long as any money received from its sales was used for the common war effort or defensionsværk. The government was also anxious to make sure that the Danish military demands would not appear as insufferable as the Swedish ones: when the government contemplated moving troops through Jutland to Prince Frederick’s assistance in Holstein, it advised land commissars to ensure that the Jutland peasants would be protected from any mistreatment by the Danish soldiers.

In mid-September, when it seemed that the Swedes had finally vacated the Jutland peninsula, the Danish government rushed in to organize the extraction and exploitation of local resources. The nobles in Jutland volunteered to donate half of the rent they received from their tenants for common defence. In a fit of patriotic generosity they also promised to squeeze further contributions from their tenants and day labourers over the course of the next fiscal year. Because the majority of the peasants in Jutland were either freeholders or royal tenants, the main responsibility for organizing the extraction of resources nevertheless fell to the Crown’s own representatives. The government ordered the lensmænd to make sure every Crown tenant household paid an extraordinary contribution equal to the official land rent, half by the following March, the rest by Easter. The contributions were delivered to the land commissars in return for official receipts. The government gave assurances that the collected monies would be used for Jutland’s own defence over the course of the next fiscal year [1645].

The King also promised to use half of the already collected dues from Jutland for that land’s defence during the current fiscal year [1644]. Christian IV appointed four land judges and castellans (Gregers Krabbe, Niels Krag, Erik Juell, and Mogens Høegh) as war commissars and authorized them to use the collected contributions for military purposes at their own discretion.

The only specific instruction concerned manpower: the commissars were to see through the earlier udskrivning and to raise additional levies (landeværn), which were then to be deployed at any “needed locations.” In the meantime the Crown attempted to revive governance in Jutland by summoning the provincial diet (landsting). The diet, which by sheer luck managed to convene at Vejle in the interval between

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737 KBB 1644–1645, 102–103, 23 August 1644.
738 KCFEB 1641–1644, 497, 11 September 1644.
739 KCFEB 1641–1644, 498, 17 September 1644.
740 KBB 1644–1645, 110, 30 August 1644.
742 KBB 1644–1645, 118, 13 September 1644.
743 Ibid., 119.
744 Ibid., 120–121.
745 Ibid., 120.
Torstensson’s retreat and Helmut Wrangel’s renewed invasion of Jutland, concerned itself largely with the collection of taxes and other forms of contributions from the Estates and the peasantry.\footnote{Generalstaben 1944, 77.}

The Danish authorities’ return to Jutland did not escape Torstensson’s attention. Christian IV’s representatives were busy raising resources from Jutland in order to support the Danish war effort, which was something that the Swedish riksråd had previously ordered Torstensson to prevent. In early September, around the same time that the Danish authorities began to make tentative attempts to reassert control over Jutland, Torstensson detached from the main army a contingent, which returned to Jutland under the command of Helmut Wrangel.\footnote{Generalstaben 1944, 77.} Initially Wrangel appears to have commanded only 2,000 cavalry and 500 infantry, but over time he received reinforcements.\footnote{NSM, i, 890, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.} Wrangel’s full contingent, which numbered roughly 1,200 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 400 dragoons, could be characterized as an armée volante, although it has never been officially labelled as one. Wrangel’s primary mission was to exhaust the land with brandskatter and the sort of violence that usually accompanied their collection and thus prevent the enemy from utilizing the resources of Jutland and Holstein for military purposes.\footnote{Generalstaben 1944, 77.} The problem of potential enemy resources was partly due to the Swedes’ own negligence: the Swedes had retreated from Ribe in such haste that they had left behind stores of corn and “Spanish salt’, which had been discovered by the recently returned mayor Peder Sørensen.\footnote{KBB 1644–1645, 138, 21 October 1644.} Destroying such stores now became a Swedish military priority.

When Wrangel began his advance through Holstein in late August 1644, he received word that a force of 1,000 peasants had assembled outside Kolding. Helmut Wrangel forwarded this information along the chain of command to Carl Gustaf Wrangel in Wismar, who in his turn reported the intelligence to Axel Oxenstierna.\footnote{RAOSB, ii:8, 594, 11 November 1644, Carl Gustaf Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna.} In reality the insurgents did not directly confront Helmut Wrangel’s army but rather stalked it, reporting its movements to the Danes in Glückstadt and picking off any unwary stragglers.\footnote{NSM, i, 891, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.} There were only two major engagements between the Swedes and the insurgents in Holstein at this stage. One engagement took place at the Steinburger sconce, where the Swedish defenders had sallied out and attacked the “Moorbauren”, who then asked Count Penz for military support in order to take the sconce from the Swedes.\footnote{Ibid., 891.} Another action occurred outside Itzehoe, where a hybrid contingent of 400 dragoons and an equal number of “Schnaphanen” clashed with Wrangel’s troops but were in the end routed and forced to retreat back to Glückstadt.\footnote{Wassenberg 1645, 585.}

\footnotetext[746]{ADFT, ii, 114–115, 31 August 1644; ADFT, ii, 115–116, 2 September 1644; ADFT, ii, 116–117, 3 September 1644, Aktstykker, verkommenne et Stændermøde i Veile, om Landets Forsvar imod de Svenske Angreb.}
\footnotetext[747]{Generalstaben 1944, 77.}
\footnotetext[748]{NSM, i, 890, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.}
\footnotetext[749]{Generalstaben 1944, 77.}
\footnotetext[750]{KBB 1644–1645, 138, 21 October 1644.}
\footnotetext[751]{RAOSB, ii:8, 594, 11 November 1644, Carl Gustaf Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna.}
\footnotetext[752]{NSM, i, 891, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.}
\footnotetext[753]{Ibid., 891.}
\footnotetext[754]{Wassenberg 1645, 585.}
Helmut Wrangel’s first objective in Holstein was to relieve the besieged Pinneberg and Breitenburg, and to once again recapture Itzehoe from the Danes.⁷⁵⁵ Rendsburg had already fallen to the Danes, who had brought in “Ingenieurs” to strengthen the existing fortifications and to construct a new magazine for victuals. The Danes had also bolstered the town’s defences with additional cannons.⁷⁵⁶ The Swedish reconquest of Itzehoe was accompanied by pillage and destruction. According to Eberhard Wassenberg, the Swedes burned several houses in the town “and cut down all who were found in arms.”⁷⁵⁷ The Diarium Tychopolitanum, however, stated that the Swedes murdered a single burgher and plundered some houses, including the town church.⁷⁵⁸ On 1 October 400 Danish dragoons and “some fusiliers” from Glückstadt attempted to storm the Castle Wandsbeker just outside Hamburg. The night-time escalade failed disastrously, and the Danes returned to Glückstadt with two wagons loaded with their dead and wounded.⁷⁵⁹

After leaving Itzehoe and bypassing the now Danish-held sconce at Steinburg, Wrangel reached Breitenburg, which was being besieged by the Danes. Wrangel’s attempt to lift the Danish siege failed despite the fact that the besieged garrison sought to assist him by sallying out from the fortress with a force of fifty men. On 8 October the Swedish garrison was finally forced to surrender due to the lack of firewood and medicines. The Breitenburg garrison appears to have suffered from the same malady that was affecting the Swedish and Danish armies in Scania and Sjælland (see chapter 5.3). The Gazette reported that thirty of the town’s 120 Swedish defenders were sick.⁷⁶⁰ The Diarium Tychopolitanum further elaborated that the town’s commandant Lieutenant Colonel Mortaigne was himself mortally ill.⁷⁶¹ This, of course, was not true, as Mortaigne was still alive the following year, when he fell in combat while commanding the Swedish garrison at Ribe. The Swedes were allowed safe conduct to either Christianpreis (according to the Gazette) or Kiel (according to the Diarium Tychopolitanum).⁷⁶² The Danes then billeted 200 of their own soldiers in Breitenburg for the duration of the winter.⁷⁶³ While Wrangel advanced northwards towards Jutland, the military vacuum in Holstein was filled by Swedish reinforcements from Pomerania and Silesia. Two thousand new troops arrived there in November, the infantry contingent being commanded by Colonel Gunn and the more numerous cavalry by Colonel Gratzsky.⁷⁶⁴

Jutland was not under Swedish occupation, and Wrangel and his armée volante never treated Jutland as anything but a war zone. Wrangel rapidly reconquered Haderslev, Ribe, and Kolding, thus frustrating Christian IV’s attempts to reinstate

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⁷⁵⁵ Gazette du 22 Octobre 1644 N. 130, 903.
⁷⁵⁷ Wassenberg 1645, 585.
⁷⁵⁸ NSM, i, 891, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
⁷⁵⁹ Gazette du 22 Octobre 1644 N. 130, 903.
⁷⁶⁰ Gazette du 19 Novembre 1644 N. 137, 968.
⁷⁶¹ NSM, i, 892, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
⁷⁶² Gazette du 19 Novembre 1644 N. 137, 968; NSM, i, 892, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
⁷⁶³ Gazette du 19 Novembre 1644 N. 137, 968.
⁷⁶⁴ Gazette du 26 Novembre 1644 N. 142, 980.
Danish administration over Jutland. Haderslev was defended by a hybrid contingent of peasants and soldiers. The conquering Swedes allowed all the peasants to return to their homes after having disarmed them; the regular Danish soldiers, on the other hand, were pressed into Swedish service.\textsuperscript{765} At Ribe the two hundred-strong Danish garrison surrendered to the Swedes.\textsuperscript{766} Wrangel set up a base of operations at Randers, from where his troops carried out violent excursions into the surrounding countryside.\textsuperscript{767} The town apparently held substantial stores of corn, which was all requisitioned by Wrangel.\textsuperscript{768}

The restored Danish governance in Jutland began to crumble once again. On 24 September the government authorized the aforementioned Peder Sørensen to remove “women, children, corn, and cattle” from Ribe or “any other town in Jutland” to Glückstadt and to Glückstadt alone, without any toll fees or other fiscal-administrative impediments.\textsuperscript{769} Not long afterwards Sørensen himself departed from Ribe, and in March 1645 we find him crossing the Bay of Biscay on a diplomatic errand to Spain.\textsuperscript{770} In late November Christian IV suggested to the \textit{rigsråd} that tax-collection should be resumed in those parts of the realm that were not under enemy occupation; by late November this qualification no longer included many parts of Jutland.\textsuperscript{771} In December 1644 the government still issued missives to \textit{lensmænd} in Jutland asking them to give account of royal manors and their resources, but in 1645 the Danish Chancellery limited its correspondence to Jutland’s land commissars. We learn from a government missive dated 30 May 1645 that the local \textit{lensmænd} were by then absent, and that some of their responsibilities had been delegated to the Jutland bishops.\textsuperscript{772} Exactly what these responsibilities were remains unclear. As Leon Jespersen has pointed out, the temporal administration done by Danish ecclesiastics has not yet been fully studied.\textsuperscript{773}

On 3 November 1644 the Danish government had requested the Jutland commissars to inform how many fighting men they had managed to muster and advised them to send any available forces to Prince Frederick’s army in Holstein, “so that Jutland can be better defended.”\textsuperscript{774} The idea was clearly to ramp up military activities in Holstein so that the Swedes would be forced to transfer at least some of their troops there from Jutland. Count Penz had already made a foray out of Glückstadt on 2 November. The Count’s troops had engaged in combat with an unquantified number of Swedes and later brought back fourteen saddled horses and seven captured cavalrymen; “Most of the enemies had been slain”, the \textit{Diarium Tychopolitanum} elaborated on the outcome of the action.\textsuperscript{775}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{765} Gazette du 31 Decembre 1644 N. 153, 1055.
\item \textsuperscript{766} Wassenberg 1645, 584.
\item \textsuperscript{767} Generalstaben 1944, 77.
\item \textsuperscript{768} KCFEB 1645–1648, 13, 3 February 1645.
\item \textsuperscript{769} KBB 1644–1645, 127, 24 September 1644.
\item \textsuperscript{770} KBB 1644–1645, 257, 22 March 1645.
\item \textsuperscript{771} KCFEB 1641–1644, 463, 20 November 1644.
\item \textsuperscript{772} KBB 1644–1645, 333, 30 May 1645.
\item \textsuperscript{773} Jespersen 2000, 140.
\item \textsuperscript{774} KBB 1644–1645, 143–143, 3 November 1644.
\item \textsuperscript{775} NSM, i, 892, \textit{Diarium Tychopolitanum} 1643 bis 1645.
\end{itemize}
On 24 November a much larger Danish expedition marched out from Glückstadt, headed by an advance guard of Prince Frederick’s own “Feuerröhre.” This term, which refers to the use of firelocks or harquebuses instead of the regular matchlock muskets, may indeed imply that the advance guard consisted of light infantry or sharpshooters, possibly such as the Holsteiner Free Militia or even the insurgent Schnapahnme (on Feuerröhre see chapter 6.6). The advance guard was followed one day later by the artillery and Count Penz’s own regiment. The Diarium Tychopolitanum appears confused about the course of this military expedition. The Danes allegedly headed for Rendsburg and Ribe, but news of approaching Swedish reinforcements under Königsmarck’s command forced Prince Frederick to send most of his troops back to Glückstadt. The Diarium Tychopolitanum nevertheless claimed that the Danes managed to capture Ribe from the Swedes, killing the town’s commander Lieutenant Colonel Mortaigne in the process. This, however, happened in January 1645 and not in November 1644.

In December 1644 the Danes started to muster troops in a single camp located in the district of Kropp-Stapelholm, roughly halfway between Rendsburg and Flensburg. The projected size of this contingent, the muster of which was overseen by the rigsmarsk Anders Bille himself, was 520 cavalry (seven companies) and 500 foot (twelve companies). These troops were expected to be reinforced by another 500 foot from Jutland. It is difficult to see how these latter reinforcements could have been anything but levied peasants. According to the Gazette, the Danish troops were poised to be joined by local peasants who failed to show up and decided to stay home instead. In January 1645 Christian IV expressed his wish that the government in general, and rigsmarsk Anders Bille in particular, would think of best methods to utilize the manpower “that is everywhere in the land to oppose the enemy in Jutland and inflict them all possible damage so that the aforementioned land [Jutland] would not remain so powerless in the face of robbery and pillage and other forms of devastation.

The Danes, however, do not seem to have been utterly powerless in the face of the Swedish foraging parties. In early December the Swedes had sent out a small salvaguardia-party from Kiel consisting of twelve cavalrymen and five dragoons. Their mission was to round up several hundred heads of cattle, as Helmut Wrangel had instructed Kiel’s commander Colonel John Gunn to collect a weekly contribution of 700 thalers. Near the village of Lehmkuhl, south of Kiel, the Swedes were beset by Danes “through the betrayal of the Pretzers”, the latter term referring to the inhabitants of the nearby town of Préeetz. Six of the Swedes survived the encounter, with the rest being either killed or captured. Gunn, who did not want to take any responsibility for the debacle, did not elaborate on the exact nature of the Danish assailants. While it is perfectly possible that the Swedes fell into an ambush set up by local insurgents, it is equally plausible that they had been attacked by regular Danish troops. If the

776 NSM, i, 892, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
777 Ibid., 892.
779 Gazette du 24 Decembre 1644 N. 152, 1044.
780 KBB 1644–1645, 190, 22 January 1645.
781 KrA Karl Vigo Keys samlingen/ 0035:0418/0/1, December 1644, John Gunn to Carl Gustaf Wrangel.
people of Preetz had not themselves prepared the ambush, they had at least related information of the Swedish salvaguardia-party’s strength and mission to some nearby Danish troops who then proceeded to act on the intelligence received from civilian informants.

3.10 HANS KÖNIGSMARCK RETURNS TO BREMEN IN 1645

The year 1645 began with a conjunction of two Danish armies commanded by Prince Frederick and Anders Bille near Hadersleven. The actual co-ordination of the conjunction had been left to the generalkrigskommissar in Schleswig-Holstein, Cai von Ahlefeldt, who was instructed to maintain operational secrecy over his designs. Christian IV had also instructed both Anders Bille and Prince Frederick to maintain strict discipline over their troops, so that there would be no repeats of previous transgressions, when Holsteiner recruits (“Soldatesche”) in Kolding had pillaged churches and even a house belonging to the rigsmarsk Anders Bille himself. The unnecessary “despoliation” and “ruination” of the land would have to be avoided, the rigsmarsk Anders Bille further instructed his own subordinates, who would have also included the levied peasants in Jutland and Holstein. Some excesses, however, would have to be expected from an army that was forced to live off the land by means of “fourage.”

The Danes managed to recapture Ribe after a brief siege that culminated in a general assault. According to the Theatrum Europaeum, the Danes lost 300 men in the assault, while the Swedes lost all 160 members of the Castle Ribehus garrison, including its commander Lieutenant Colonel Mortaigne. An archived Danish report gave a more detailed description of the Swedish losses. In the town of Ribe itself the Swedes had lost 50 men dead and captured. The Swedish death toll at the castle reached 150 ordinary footsoldiers and “Unterofficiere” or warrant officers. Among the dead officers were two captains, one major, and the garrison’s commander Lieutenant Colonel Mortaigne himself. The only Swedes captured alive at the castle were the regimental quartermaster, one lieutenant, one ensign (“Fendrich”), and 3–4 ordinary soldiers. Helmut Wrangel, who had been at the time in northern Jutland with the bulk of his army, was unable to come to Mortaigne’s aid due to the lack of provisions in the devastated countryside between northern Jutland and Ribe. Further south the irregular contingents operated in the outskirts of Hamburg, where the “Schapphanen”

782 Theatrum 1651, 637.
787 Theatrum 1651, 637.
788 ADFT, ii, 124, 1644, Designation der Todten und gefangenen auff Ripen.
789 Ordinari Post Tijdender N. 5 Anno 1645, 2.
pillaged a manor belonging to the Swedish Colonel Slebusch – even going so far in their vandalism as to smash in the windows and tear down the walls.\textsuperscript{790}

At the beginning of 1645 the Danish-Holsteiner troops in Jutland consisted of 2,354 cavalry, 2,002 infantry, and 192 dragoons.\textsuperscript{791} These troops nevertheless proved insufficient to dislodge Helmut Wrangel’s army from its fortified positions in Aalborg, Kolding, and other key locations along Jutland’s eastern seaboard.\textsuperscript{792} The exact organization of Wrangel’s armée volante remains clouded. The chronicle \textit{Theatrum Europaei} gave Wrangel a strength of 4,000 cavalry, 1,200 infantry, and 400 dragoons.\textsuperscript{793}

A Danish intelligence report drawn on the information received from Swedish prisoners at Ribe estimated that Wrangel possessed 3,150 cavalry in eight regiments. His army also contained an unquantified number of infantry organized into three regiments, plus one regiment and three squadrons of dragoons.\textsuperscript{794} According to the nineteenth-century historian Julius Mankell, who based his research on archived muster rolls, Wrangel’s army in Jutland stood at 4,370 men at the beginning of 1645.\textsuperscript{795} This figure broke down to 2,820 cavalry (ten regiments), 650 dragoons (24 companies), and 880 infantry (three regiments).\textsuperscript{796}

The fallen Lieutenant Colonel Mortaigne, who should not be confused with General Major Mortaigne, was entered in the rolls as a commander of dragoons. His entire command of four dragoon companies was struck off from the rosters as having been “ruinerad.”\textsuperscript{797} It is apparent that the slaughtered Swedish garrison at Ribe consisted of these very same dragoons. Helmut Wrangel’s command would have also included the Swedish garrisons at Christianpreis and elsewhere in Holstein, which amounted to 778 extra men, thus putting his total strength above 5,000.\textsuperscript{798} Lastly it should be noted that the Danish intelligence report relating to Wrangel’s strength was fairly accurate. The Danes underestimated the exact number of Swedish regiments by two, but in the case of the quantified cavalry they appear to have overestimated the actual number of Swedish troops only slightly.

The joint offensive by Anders Bille and Prince Frederick did not succeed in drawing out Wrangel in an uneven battle with the combined Danish army of some 7,000 men. Instead of fighting the Danes, Wrangel remained inside his well-stocked fieldworks at Aalborg and simply waited for the Danish force to be consumed by hunger.\textsuperscript{799} When they could not force Wrangel into combat, the Danes settled to blockade Kolding and to attack Pinneberg instead.\textsuperscript{800} When Wrangel finally broke camp, the now 9,000-strong Danish force had great difficulties in keeping up with him. Wrangel’s mobile armée

\textsuperscript{790} Theatrum 1651, 637–638.
\textsuperscript{791} ADFT, ii, 124, 1645, Notits om de danske Tropper i Jylland.
\textsuperscript{792} Theatrum 1651, 637–638.
\textsuperscript{793} Theatri 1647, 635.
\textsuperscript{794} ADFT, ii, 123, 1644, Notitser om de Svenskes Styrke i Jylland og deres Tab ved Stormen paa Riberhuus.
\textsuperscript{795} Mankell 1865, 279.
\textsuperscript{796} Ibid., 279.
\textsuperscript{797} Ibid., 279.
\textsuperscript{798} Ibid., 280.
\textsuperscript{799} Theatrum 1651, 638.
\textsuperscript{800} Ibid., 638.
volante wore out its enemy by marching in circles across Jutland and Holstein, thus increasing the attritional effects of hunger and desertion on Prince Frederick’s and Anders Bille’s armies.\footnote{Theatrum 1651, 639.} After finally ridding himself of his Danish pursuers, Wrangel quickly recaptured Ribe, allegedly killing all of its Danish defenders. News of Wrangel’s approach also induced Count Penz to give up the siege of Pinneberg and return to Glückstadt.\footnote{Ibid., 640.} At the beginning of February Wrangel had reached Hamburg, where he entertained himself in the company of Duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp, who was once again strong-armed into paying the Swedes a hefty contribution of 25,000 thalers.\footnote{Ibid., 658.} On his way back to Pinneberg from Hamburg Wrangel demolished the pontoon bridge, which the Danes had earlier laid across the Elbe at Altona.\footnote{Ibid., 658.} It seems apparent that this was done in order to prevent further excursions to the outskirts of Hamburg by the Danish and Bremener Schnaphahnen.

On 15 February Wrangel finally clashed with a Danish army under the command of Bauer and Ahlefeldt. The battle was a disaster to the Danes, who lost some 300 killed and 150 taken prisoner. Wrangel himself had presented the victory to his superiors as utter “ruinirung” of the opposing enemy force, which news elicited elated congratulations from the Swedish riksråd.\footnote{Ibid., 658.} The Danish contingent had been surprised in a marching formation, which was always a compromising situation for any army in the early modern age. The Danes were effectively routed despite the cavalry element’s more or less determined attempt to hold off the enemy so that the rest of Bauer’s troops might retreat in an orderly fashion. The exact size and composition of the Danish force is difficult to reconstruct from the existing sources. According to the protocols of the Tyske Kancelli, Bauer commanded personally at least 1,300 men, who were qualified as cavalry, infantry and dragoons.\footnote{DRA Tyske Cancelli, Slesvig-holsten-lauenburgske Cancelli/A VII/Sager vedr. land- og sjøforsvar/152. Akter vedr. krigen med Sverige 1644–1645, 28 February 1645.} Twelve days later Bauer and Ahlefeldt still commanded between them some 1,000 cavalry.\footnote{KBB 1644–1645, 236, 28 February 1645.} The Danish contingent does not appear to have included any element of levied peasants.

Survival of the cavalry later raised the suspicion that it had, under Bauer’s command, fled the field of battle and thus caused the disaster.\footnote{Theatri 1647, 1042.} The defeat had alarmed Prince Frederick to the extent that he organized a “depositium” of eyewitness accounts from the surviving officers.\footnote{DRA Tyske Cancelli, Slesvig-holsten-lauenburgske Cancelli/A VII/Sager vedr. land- og sjøforsvar/152. Akter vedr. krigen med Sverige 1644–1645, Bericht deβen so vorbei und nach dem Einfall 1645.} The deposition and the subsequent investigations implicated that Bauer had failed his duties as a military commander. The investigations into the events of 15 February were opened in November 1645 on the King’s command.\footnote{KBB 1644–1645, 526, 22 November 1645.}

\footnote{SRA RR, B230, 17 March 1644.}

\footnote{DRA Tyske Cancelli, Slesvig-holsten-lauenburgske Cancelli/A VII/Sager vedr. land- og sjøforsvar/152. Akter vedr. krigen med Sverige 1644–1645, Bericht deβen so vorbei und nach dem Einfall 1645.}

\footnote{KBB 1644–1645, 236, 28 February 1645.}

\footnote{Theatri 1647, 1042.}

\footnote{DRA Tyske Cancelli, Slesvig-holsten-lauenburgske Cancelli/A VII/Sager vedr. land- og sjøforsvar/152. Akter vedr. krigen med Sverige 1644–1645, 28 February 1645.}

\footnote{KBB 1644–1645, 526, 22 November 1645.}
naturally asserted his own innocence and denied any accusations of misconduct. While Prince Frederick engaged the Swedes in Holstein and Jutland, his southern flank became exposed to Königsmarck’s army that had once again arrived on the scene from Saxony. Königsmarck commanded a formidable force of 27,000 men, but his army was spread out over a large area across Lower Saxony. Königsmarck’s base of operations was nevertheless within the Archbishopric of Bremen-Verden, which placed him dangerously close to Prince Frederick’s strategic rear. In early February Königsmarck had amassed a small flotilla of barques at Hamburg, and he then used this flotilla to attack Buxtehude, a part of the Archbishopric’s “Alten Land” on the western bank of the Elbe. The Bremener troops that were hastily sent to confront Königsmarck’s assault consisted (according to the Theatrum Europaeum) of both regular soldiers and peasants. The outnumbered Bremeners, however, stood little chance against Königsmarck’s army and were soon forced to abandon their field works at Hornburg and retreat further west towards Bremen itself.

On 15 February the town of Stade, which was defended by a hybrid force of soldiers, urban militiamen, and armed peasants, was attacked by the Swedes from land and water and was subsequently forced to capitulate. The regular soldiers in Stade either transferred to Swedish service or were given free passage to Glückstadt; the Theatrum Europaeum, which narrated these events, did not elaborate on the terms accorded to the peasant irregulars. It seems likely that they were disarmed and sent away by the Swedes; another option might be that they joined those regular troops that relocated to Glückstadt. If the peasants were all killed after surrendering to the Swedes, as indeed had happened in Alsace twelve years earlier (see chapter 7.1), the Theatrum Europaeum would have surely mentioned the atrocity. After leaving a Swedish garrison in Stade, Königsmarck proceeded to lay siege to Bremervörde, Ottersburg, and Rotenburg. Bremervörde capitulated on 6 March, and its recruited garrison transferred to Swedish service. Ottenburg and Rotenburg fell to the Swedes some ten days later. The government in Stockholm received news of the Archbishopric’s conquest with joy and congratulated Königsmarck of his “fortunate progress” in Bremen.

Bremervörde, the official residence of the Archbishop of Bremen, did not remain long in Swedish control. In the early hours of 30 July 1645, a Danish party from

813 Theatri 1647, 1042.
814 Mankell 1865, 279–280.
815 Theatrum 1651, 660.
816 Ibid., 660.
817 Ibid., 660–661.
818 Ibid., 661.
819 Ibid., 663.
820 Zetterqvist 1891, 53.
821 SRA RR, B230, 9 March 1645.
Glückstadt took the town by surprise – once again resorting to the time-tested ruse of infiltrating the town gates with soldiers disguised as peasants. According to the Gazette, the ten disguised soldiers announced their desire to discuss the delivery of certain contributions with Lieutenant Colonel Kraft, the town’s Swedish commandant. When Kraft arrived to the gates, the infiltrators stabbed him to death and opened the gates so as to allow the rest of the Danish assault force to enter the town. The author of the Diarium Tychopolitanum boasted that the “auscommandierten” Danes did not suffer a single casualty; nearly all those Swedes that were found in arms, on the other hand, were killed, and the Danes also took 138 prisoners, including nine officers.

The Gazette reported that the town was only defended by 65 Swedes. The Gazette appeared confused over the fate of the town’s Swedish defenders; in the issue from 2 September the Gazette claimed that most of the Swedes were taken prisoner; two issues later the Gazette reported that most members of the garrison had in fact been killed. Frederick Gaspard Dessebrock, the apostate bailiff of Bremervörde who had transferred to Swedish service in March, fled to Stade but “abandoned his wife, his children, and all his possessions to the mercy of the Danes.” From Bremervörde the Danes, who now numbered 700 foot and 200 cavalry, seized control of the sconce at Mohr, subjected the Archbishopric to Danish contributions, and effectively cordoned off Swedish-held Stade.

The Danish counteroffensive fell short of re-establishing any real Danish control over the Archbishopric. It is evident that Königsmarck had already taken steps to consolidate Swedish rule in the Archbishopric by that time. On 18 May it was reported in Glückstadt that the soldiers had brought in a prestigious Swedish prisoner named “von Dühren.” He was characterized by the Diarium Tychopolitanum as the appointed “Swedische Landdrost im Erzstift Bremen.” When the Archbishopric of Bremen (but not the actual city of Bremen) was handed over to Sweden after the war, the Landdrost was situated in the hierarchy of the new Swedish civilstat just below the governor, who was Königsmarck himself. In Swedish Bremen the Landdrost (initially Jakob von Steinberg in 1646) headed the Cammer Collegium (treasury) instead of the Dicasterium (court of appeal), thus making him a fiscal instead of a judicial official.

While the Swedish rule in the Archbishopric was still provisional in the spring of 1645, Dühren’s appointment reflects Königsmarck’s necessity to place the collection of local contributions on an organized and tax-like basis. The consolidation of an orderly and consistent fiscal regime would have also served the purpose of pacification, as the local peasants would no longer be driven into armed resistance by the rapaciousness and license of soldiers who tended to collect contributions at sword-point. The Bremener peasants at least did not spontaneously rise up in support of the final Danish

822 Gazette du 9 Septembre 1645 N. 117, 843.
823 NSM, i, 897, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
824 Gazette du 2 Septembre 1645 N. 115, 819.
825 Gazette du 2 Septembre 1645 N. 115, 819; Gazette du 9 Septembre 1645 N. 117, 843.
826 Gazette du 9 Septembre 1645 N. 117, 843.
827 Ibid., 843.
828 NSM, i, 895, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
829 Ibid., 895.
830 Zetterqvist 1891, 187–189.
counteroffensive in August 1645. The peasants' reluctance to carry out any major insurgency on behalf of their liege lord Prince Frederick may have been influenced by the fact that the Danish troops too imposed their own contributions on the local population.\textsuperscript{831} It had indeed grown increasingly difficult for the Bremener peasants to differentiate between the Swedish and Danish soldiers; by the summer of 1645, many of the soldiers operating from Swedish-held Stade were former subjects of Prince Frederick. After capturing Stade and the other localities in March, Königsmarck had begun to beat the drum in Bremen, attracting subsequently some 10,000 fresh recruits from a territory that had been spared much of the horrors of the German war for the past ten years.\textsuperscript{832}

The Swedes did not attempt to pacify the insurgent marshlanders with orderly administration alone; the sharp edge of the Swedish counterinsurgency comprised of destabilization tactics, or ‘fire and steel’ in the vocabulary of the age. On 30 January Christina instructed Königsmarck to lay waste to the “Marschländerna” between the Rivers Elbe and Weser.\textsuperscript{833} Further east Helmut Wrangel’s troops had already subjected the Dithmarschers to “plunder, despoliation, and other fiendish and great excesses.”\textsuperscript{834} Wrangel had also recaptured the Steinburg sconce, where the Swedes had killed 150 of the Danish defenders and captured over four hundred, all of them German veterans (“alte Teutsche Knechte”) from Colonel Buchwald’s Regiment.\textsuperscript{835} News of Wrangel’s approach created panic among the Dithmarschers, many of whom fled to Glückstadt with their families and belongings.\textsuperscript{836} The Wilstermarsch sconce, which the Danes and the local peasant labourers had reinforced with a moat and a ring of palisades, appeared too strong for the Swedes to try and take by storm. The fortification-work at Wilstermarsch was overseen by Count Penz himself, who had stayed there until 19 March, when he finally returned to Glückstadt after having transferred the command of Wilstermarsch to Lieutenant Colonel Becker.\textsuperscript{837}

The devastations of war were exacerbated by natural disasters. In March 1644 Glückstadt was inundated by yet another swelling of the River Elbe, which caused extensive material damage to the circumvallations and sconces. It was estimated by the despairing town fathers that not even “a ton of gold” would have sufficed to cover the costs of repairing the damages caused by the flood.\textsuperscript{838} The necessity to redirect funds to repair the city’s fortifications forced Penz to suspend some of the wages for his recruited troops, which in its turn brought the dissatisfied soldiers to the brink of revolt.\textsuperscript{839}

The presence of sizeable Swedish forces under the command of Königsmarck and Wrangel in Holstein and Bremen induced the Holsteiner Estates to convene a Landtag, which discussed the possibility of raising an 8,000-strong military force for

\textsuperscript{831} Gazette du 9 Septembre 1645 N. 117, 843.
\textsuperscript{832} Zetterqvist 1891, 54–55.
\textsuperscript{833} HSH, ii, 117, 30 January 1645, Christina to Hans Königsmarck.
\textsuperscript{834} NSM, i, 894, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
\textsuperscript{835} Theatrum 1651, 661.
\textsuperscript{836} Ibid., 662.
\textsuperscript{837} NSM, i, 893–894, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
\textsuperscript{838} Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio 1645, 13.
\textsuperscript{839} Ibid., 13.
the “defense of these lands.”\(^{840}\) It was proposed by the Estates that this projected defence force would be financed “in the Hollander manner.”\(^{841}\) This opaque reference appears to indicate the employment of the so-called *solliciteurs-militaire*. These were a Dutch peculiarity, an intermediate military-organizational stratum of businessmen, who concluded contracts with the company commanders. The *solliciteurs-militaire* advanced money to the troops in return for an agreed monthly compensation. If the military employer, in this case the Holsteiner Estates, failed to make its own payments to the *solliciteurs-militaire* in full or in time, the soldiers were nevertheless ensured pay so that they could at least buy food for themselves.\(^{842}\) Jonathan I. Israel has argued convincingly that it was the regular and punctual payment of military wages that ensured relatively smooth relations between the military and civil societies in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic.\(^{843}\) Such an arrangement would have made sense in the Holsteiner context, in which the Dithmarscher peasantry had already been driven into armed resistance by Helmut Wrangel’s large-scale occupation of their land. There was a real danger that ill-paid and uncontrolled soldiers would have ultimately found themselves in a three-cornered fight against both the Swedes and the insurgent peasants. This was the frightening scenario, which the Holsteiner Estates apparently sought to avoid when they considered the subcontracting of Dutch-style *solliciteurs-militaire*.

The Swedes’ encroachment into Dithmarschen inevitably brought them into conflict with the local insurgents. On 23 March the “Holsteinischen freien Knechte” brought eleven captured Swedes to Glückstadt and reported having killed another 24 Swedes. The insurgents suggested to Count Penz that the Swedish prisoners of war should be exchanged for a number of their own, whom the Swedes held captive at Tittau. Whether or not this exchange of Swedish prisoners for captured Holsteiner insurgents was ever carried out, the *Diarium Tychopolitanum* does not tell.\(^{844}\) The fact that the Holsteiner “freien Knechte” even suggested such an exchange of prisoners nevertheless indicates that the Holsteiner militiamen viewed themselves as legitimate combatants and not as mere peasant insurgents operating outside the established *ius ad bellum* (see chapter 7.1).

The Swedish military did not necessarily share this view of insurgents as legitimate combatants. In May 1645, according to a contemporaneous pamphlet, Wrangel had learnt of the existence of a “Schnapphanische Haupt-Quartier” in the marshlands outside of Hamburg. He quickly dispatched 1,200 cavalry there, who then overcame the encamped insurgents with the loss of 20 riders. A great number of the otherwise unquantified insurgents were killed on the spot, while most of them were captured and sent to Segeberg. There their principal leaders were allegedly impaled alive (“lebendig gespisst”) and the bodies of over thirty of them were displayed on racks along the roads.\(^{845}\) This Swedish mop-up operation appears to have been linked to the proclamation of the Hamburg authorities to seek out and punish all “scoundrels

\(^{840}\) *Theatrum* 1651, 663.

\(^{841}\) Ibid., 663.

\(^{842}\) Nimwegen 2010, 170.

\(^{843}\) Israel 1995, 268.

\(^{844}\) NSM, i, 894, *Diarium Tychopolitanum* 1643 bis 1645.

\(^{845}\) *Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio* 1645, 58.
or Schnapphahnen” that had sought refuge in Hamburg and were now engaged in “reconnoitring” inside the city.\footnote{Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio 1645, 58.} This insinuated context of criminal activity raises the question whether the Swedish enterprise to hunt down the Schnapphahnen was a counterinsurgency operation or a mere police action to apprehend and punish ordinary brigands and cutthroats.

### 3.11 THE WAR ENDS IN HOLSTEIN AND BREMEN

Christian IV spent much of 1645 anguishing over a possible Swedish invasion of Sjælland and the other islands. In March 1645 Christian IV ordered a general muster of all able-bodied men in Copenhagen.\footnote{KD, v, 276, 25 March 1645.} He also billeted there 200 dragoons, who were assigned to patrol the coastline.\footnote{KD, v, 276, 26 March 1645.} After learning news of a Swedish fleet leaving Stockholm, Christian IV enforced the Copenhagen garrison in May 1645 with an extra cavalry squadron.\footnote{KD, v, 282, 25 May 1645.} The acute fear of Swedish spies induced Christian IV to order an inquiry of all “foreigners in or outside the city” and to instruct the city council to keep track of all people, whether natives or foreigners, entering or leaving the city during daytime (at night the city gates were kept closed).\footnote{KD, v, 279, 23 April 1645.} In August 1645 the King ordered the deputy rigsadmiral Niels Trolle to investigate all letters sent to “foreign cities” from Helsingør and Copenhagen.\footnote{KD, v, 286, 1 August 1645.}

By early May 1645 the Danes had once again regained control of Jutland to the extent that they could raise 300–400 new troops there.\footnote{KBB 1644–1645, 302, 6 May 1645; KBB 1644–1645, 305, 6 May 1645.} By the end of the month the Danes were already manning sconces in Jutland with troops from Fyn.\footnote{KBB 1644–1645, 332, 30 May 1645.} The focus of warfare had shifted south towards Holstein, where the Danish-held Itzehoe and Rendsburg stood in the way of Helmut Wrangel’s lines of communication. Wrangel’s armée volante was strong in cavalry but weak in infantry, which made it difficult for Wrangel to lay siege to Itzehoe and Rendsburg.\footnote{RAOSB, ii:8, 645, 4 April 1645, Carl Gustaf Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna.} After Königsmarck reinforced Wrangel with 1,800 musketeers, the latter finally managed to begin besieging Rendsburg in late April 1645.\footnote{RAOSB, ii:8, 653, 30 April 1645, Carl Gustaf Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna.}

At the very end of May Count Penz attempted to either lift the siege or at least break through the Swedish encirclement in order to deliver reinforcements to Rendsburg. The impetus for this course of action originated from information delivered by a local peasant, who related that the besieging Swedes had grown overly confident and had in fact detached sizeable contingents from the siege and transferred them
The attack was planned to take place on 1 June with the force of 300 “commandeered” cavalry and 60 “Feuerröhren”, the latter term apparently referring to either light infantry or peasant insurgents. The overall plan was to bring as many Danes to Rendsburg as possible; the primary military goal, nevertheless, was to attack the two Finnish cavalry companies that were encamped at Jevenstedt some six miles south of Rendsburg. The Danes, however, advanced carelessly, and one of their standard-bearing cavalrymen was either killed or captured by the Finnish sentinels. Having been alerted to the presence of approaching Danes, the Finns set up an ambush, which shattered the Danish formation and forced Penz’s troops to flee in disarray. As a result, the pursuing Finnish cavalry “shot many of them dead and took a large number of prisoners.” The Danes also lost their remaining standards, but these were recovered from the battlefield by a Danish peasant (quite possibly one of the “Feuerröhren” who had joined the expedition) and later delivered to Count Penz at his quarters in Wilster.

The siege of Rendsburg dragged on throughout the summer and well into the autumn. The Swedes stormed the outer works several times, but they were always driven back by the defenders. It was firmly believed in Copenhagen that these failed assaults had cost the Swedes several hundred dead. One major assault in July failed on account of the strong winds and heavy rains, which rendered the Swedish attackers’ matchlock muskets inoperable. The cold and wet weather also dampened the general mood in the Swedish siege works, and in September Wrangel’s infantry had already begun to desert. This was not a serious setback for the Swedes, as the capture of Rendsburg had never been a priority mission as far as Oxenstierna and the riksråd were concerned. The siege, of course, was not a pleasant experience for the defenders either. According to the contemporaneous eyewitness Marx Odde, a burgher in Rendsburg, the Swedes bombarded the town fiercely with incendiary and explosive ammunition, which killed indiscriminately soldiers and civilians alike. Some of the victims were children.

According to Adam Olearius, the defenders had consisted of “not many recruited soldiers” as well as burghers and “some peasants.” The pamphlet Relationis Historicae described the Danish garrison as having consisted of 1,000 soldiers, 300 armed burghers, and 500 peasants. Marx Odde, however, wrote that the garrison

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856 NSM, i, 895, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
857 Ibid., 895.
858 Ibid., 895–896.
859 Ibid., 896.
860 Ibid., 896.
861 Ibid., 896.
862 AORSH 1644–1648, 67, 23 May 1645.
863 Olearius 1663, 284–285.
865 RAOSB, ii:8, 554, 29 May 1645, Axel Oxenstierna to Carl Gustaf Wrangel.
866 Helmcke 1850, 18, 32.
867 Olearius 1663, 284.
868 Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio 1645, 57.
had initially stood at 800 men; at the end of the war there would have remained only 150 soldiers. Odde qualified the garrison as having consisted of four companies of soldiers, one company of burghers, and one company of armed peasants. There were also two other companies of workers and labourers, who were used mostly for construction work. It appears likely that these two work companies too consisted largely of peasants. While the exact size of the garrison is difficult to discern from such differing accounts and views, the primary sources nevertheless agree that the peasants made up part of the garrison. On 24 April this embattled force managed to carry out a successful sally, which resulted in the deaths of fifty Swedish soldiers. The attackers brought back to Rendsburg a number of Swedish prisoners as well as three field pieces and a “Feurmörsel” or a siege mortar.

It was also reported by the pamphlet Relationis Historicae in May 1645 that the Swedes had uncovered a plot to sabotage their fleet in Wismar. The alleged plot involved setting some of the berthed Swedish men-of-war on fire with “cunning instruments.” The suspected saboteurs, who were all Lubeckers, were apprehended by the Lubecker authorities before they managed to put their plan to action. The Swedes demanded harsh punishments for the suspected arsonists and threatened Lubeck with “fire and sword” if their demand was not met. The Lubeck city council resolved the thorny issue by extraditing the suspects to Wismar. In Wismar the Swedes interrogated one suspect, who admitted that he had planned on igniting the powder magazine of the Swedish man-of-war Tre Lejonen with the help of a local accomplice. When asked whether he served Christian IV, the suspect claimed to have acted “in the Emperor’s and not in the King’s name.” While this incident appears as a rare attempt to export insurgency into Swedish-held cities, its wider context is that of the protracted war between Sweden and the Emperor and not necessarily Sweden’s war against Denmark. The Swedish interrogation report fails to shed light on the true motives of these would-be-arsonists. As citizens of an Imperial City (which Lubeck was) the saboteurs may have acted out of loyalty and devotion to their immediate overlord Ferdinand III. The pamphlet Relationis presented a more cynical view of their motives by claiming that the arsonists had acted in the expectation that they would be handsomely rewarded for their efforts by Christian IV (and not the Emperor).

The Swedish fleet assembled at Wismar was used one month later to invade the Danish-held Island of Bornholm. The Swedish fleet, which transported a field regiment of 900 men to Bornholm, was commanded by Carl Gustaf Wrangel himself. Bornholm’s coastal defences consisted of a number of field works that were manned by 3,000 armed peasants, the pamphlet Relationis Historicae reported. A volley of artillery fire from the Swedish men-of-war disheartened the peasants, who quickly abandoned their positions and allowed the Swedes to proceed inland without any serious resistance. The Castle Hammershus, the sole Danish stronghold on the island, was bombarded into submission by the Swedish siege guns in a matter of hours. The

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869 Helmcke 1850, 35.
870 Ibid., 37–38.
871 Olearius 1663, 284.
872 Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio 1645, 60.
873 RAOSB, ii:8, 663–665, 22 May 1645, Handlingar ang. ett upptäckt anslag att uppbränna svenska flottan i Östersjön.
874 Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio 1645, 60.
3,000 peasants apparently dispersed to their homes without further resistance; a small island like Bornholm offered little room for the effective conduct of insurgency or guerrilla warfare.875

Carl Gustaf Wrangel reported to Stockholm on 4 April that Helmut Wrangel’s cavalry had devastated Jutland and Holstein to the extent that it was difficult for enemy forces to subsist in those places, while the Swedes themselves could still seek winter quarters in Jutland.876 On 25 April Helmut Wrangel surprised in Dithmarschen a Danish contingent on its way from Friedrichstadt to Glückstadt. After a brief engagement the Danish commander Colonel Heinrich von Buchwald “together with his senior and junior officers, common foot soldiers, cavalrymen, standards, banners, field pieces, and baggage were all taken prisoners (excluding those who were slain).”877 The accompanying list of prisoners in Carl Gustaf Wrangel’s letter does not specify any captured peasants, merely 600 “Gemeine von der infanterie” and 200 “Gemeine zu ross.”878 Either the Danish expedition from Friedrichstadt did not include any levied peasants or they appeared to the Swedes indistinguishable from the ordinary “Knechten.”

For the remainder of the war the Danish garrison at Glückstadt remained inert for much of the time, although there were occasional ventures out of the city. In mid-May a cavalry contingent from Glückstadt skirmished with the Swedes, taking 18 prisoners and shooting dead a few others.879 The Swedes had greatly increased their control of the seas, and in July some Swedish ships ventured down the Elbe and subjected Glückstadt to naval cannonade.880 The Glückstadt garrison made its final foray in early August, when a military expedition commanded by Count Penz bombarded a fortified Swedish encampment at Wilstermarsch, ultimately forcing the Swedes to abandon their position.881 The move towards a more defensive posture was partly explained by the fact that the Danes expected a Swedish attack against Krempe. The garrison was placed in a defensive posture in July, when Penz had ordered an inventory of victuals and ammunition inside the town. The findings of the inventory resulted in the appeal for more provisions and ammunition – 2,000 barrels of corn and 200 barrels of gunpowder were simply not enough to sustain a siege or to repulse a determined Swedish assault.882

The conclusion of a peace treaty at Brömsebro on 13 August nominally ended the hostilities in Jutland and Holstein as well. The Swedish negotiation position at Brömsebro appears to have benefited from the flow of news regarding the events in Holstein and Bremen. In May 1645 Axel Oxenstierna had indeed thanked the Hamburger postmaster Heinrich Schute (who was also Johan Adler Salvius’s son-in-law) for his timely reports that had been very useful in the on-going peace negotiations.

876 RAOSB, ii:8, 645, 4 April 1645, Carl Gustaf Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna.
877 Ibid., 656.
878 Ibid., 656.
879 AORSH 1644–1648, 67, 23 May 1645.
880 NSM, i, 897, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
881 Ibid., 898.
with Denmark.\textsuperscript{883} The intermittent disruption of the Swedish lines of communication in Holstein and Jutland had failed to produce any decisive Danish advantage in the negotiation tables.

The peace treaty did not immediately translate into cessation of all hostilities. On 17 August an 800-strong Swedish cavalry contingent that was sent to Jutland to collect contributions ran into a Danish force of 500 cavalry, 300 infantry, and 200 dragoons near Kolding. The outnumbered and outgunned Swedes led by Colonel Würzburg were utterly destroyed in the ensuing battle. Two hundred Swedes lost their lives while most of the rest were taken prisoner. Among those captured was Colonel Würzburg himself.\textsuperscript{884} The situation in Bremen was somewhat different, as the Swedes and Danes only entered into a cease-fire there. On 13 September a French informant reported from Bremen of a “rude skirmish between the Swedes, who were in Stade & Boksethude, & the Danes from Glückstadt & Bremervörde, in which many from both sides were killed or wounded; but now everything is at rest since the publication of the peace, which returns home all those [Swedes] who were withdrawing from the Duchy of Holstein.”\textsuperscript{885}

The cease-fire held better during the winter months, but in 1646 the hostilities erupted again in Bremervörde, whose governor Eggerich opted to continue hostilities in the expectation that he would be helped out by the Imperialists.\textsuperscript{886} Eggerich’s situation, however, became increasingly difficult in March 1646 when Königsmarck himself appeared outside the city walls with fresh troops and a formidable artillery train. The Swedish siege guns inflicted severe damage to the walls and field works, which the levied peasants inside the city rushed to repair under enemy fire.\textsuperscript{887} The 500-strong garrison nevertheless made at least one successful sortie, which resulted in the death of sixty Swedes and the capture of several others.\textsuperscript{888} When, on 5 April, Eggerich was faced with an imminent Swedish storming, he chose to avoid further bloodshed and agreed to capitulate.\textsuperscript{889}

Attritional warfare in Jutland and Holstein had reduced some localities to veritable wastelands. Already in August 1644 the pamphlet \textit{Relation fra Fyn Lybeck} had lamented the poor economic conditions in Holstein, “because the cattle and corn have been ruined or taken away by the many guests [Swedes] that had been there.”\textsuperscript{890} In December 1645 a French news agent reported from Hamburg that Christian IV had set out to travel in Holstein “in order to remedy all those disorders that the war had caused in those lands and to inform himself against certain officers who had not performed their duties [this latter sentence referred to General Major Bauer’s court martial].”\textsuperscript{891} At the early stage of his journey Christian IV commented on the desolation

\textsuperscript{883} SRA Johan Adler Salvius samling E 562, 11 May 1645.
\textsuperscript{884} Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio 1645, 101.
\textsuperscript{885} Gazette du 30 Septembre 1645 N. 128, 916.
\textsuperscript{886} Theatri 1647, 1063; Zetterqvist 1891, 75–76.
\textsuperscript{887} Gazette du 28 Avril 1646 N. 43, 288; Theatri 1647, 1099.
\textsuperscript{888} Gazette du 21 Avril 1646 N. 40, 268.
\textsuperscript{889} Theatri 1647, 1099.
\textsuperscript{890} Relation fra Fyn Lybeck 1644, 3.
\textsuperscript{891} Gazette du 6 Janvier 1646 N. 3, 23.
surrounding Haderslev and the scarcity of food or fodder there. The Swedes alone could not be blamed for all of the material destruction. The Danes themselves had been as anxious to deprive the enemy of potential resources as the Swedes: in March 1645 the government had ordered the land commissars in Jutland to requisition all the corn that the local peasants had bought from the Swedes and to place it in specific magazines. After seven months of warfare these stores had either been depleted or destroyed. The King was forced to order provisions from Copenhagen because he could not expect to find any at his next stop in Flensburg.

The situation in Holstein appeared even more insolable. “The land here in the Duchies [Schleswig and Holstein] is much more spoiled than Jutland or Scania,” Christian IV observed. “A great number of the nobility here in the land [Holstein] are utterly ruined so that many of them will never be able to recover”, he continued. Many of the noble landowners had fled to Lubeck; their flight had not been intended by the Swedes who indeed enticed them to return to their estates with promises of amortization of outstanding contributions. Lower Saxony, which had been the theatre of war between Königsmarck and his Imperialists adversaries, had hardly fared any better. The Swedish and Imperialist soldiers had pillaged the countryside with such thoroughness that many peasants had abandoned their farms and fled to Holland, the Imperial negotiators at Osnabrück observed. In Bremen, the cathedral chapter lamented to Christian IV how the Archbishopric had suffered from both the ravages of war and the fiscal burden brought about by the enemy occupation. Not only had the Estates been forced to pay Königsmarck heavy ransoms in the form of salvaguardias, but they had also been encumbered with the forced billeting of Königsmarck’s “Soldatesca.”

The war had also taken its toll on the Danish military. The marching of troops hither and thither had impoverished the land and made it more difficult for the peasants and burghers to billet and feed the rostjeneste-cavalry and other forces, the Noble Estate lamented in March 1645. The cavalry itself lacked horses and weapons, while the ordinary infantrymen were so stricken that they were more likely to become brigands and plunder the houses of the poor peasants than face the enemy in battle. Later in June the nobles suggested to the rigsråd that “under officerer” were needed to train and lead the levied “landfolchet”, as the nobles felt that they could no longer...
perform these duties on their own. The rigsråd favoured this plan, and although its implementation was not yet fully possible, the rigsråd agreed that in the future the allocation of sufficient numbers of officers to train and lead the levies would alleviate the burdens of the nobility.

The lost war and the destruction accompanied by it left Denmark with a bitter financial legacy. The Swedish occupation of Holstein and Jutland in 1644 had cost an estimated 100,000 thalers per month in billeting and contributions. The research carried out by Klas-Richard Böhme on the Swedish cameral sources shows that some of these contributions were paid in goods such as grain, hay, butter, beer, and cattle, and were then assigned a monetary value in the records. The contributions paid by Duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp amounted to at least 127,000 thalers. The inhabitants of Dithmarschen, the most contested territory in the small war between the Swedish soldiers and local insurgents, paid 132,470 thalers in contributions in 1644 alone.

After Christian IV’s death in 1648, the national debt stood at four million thalers, much of which was owed to war-time financiers and subcontractors such as Henrik Müller, Leonhardt Marselis, and Albert Baltser Bernts. In order to address these debts the new King Frederick III was forced to introduce new taxes, such as the sales tax on beer and wine. This accise was bitterly opposed by the burghers in Copenhagen, Helsingør, and Odense. In the last city the burghers drew up a collective appeal, in which they complained their destitute caused by the “recent hostilities”, particularly by the “great billeting and loaning of goods”, which had accompanied the war effort in Fyn. In Schleswig the tax burden (essentially rent and monetary substitution for labour service or hoveri) of the peasants rose from 12–15 thalers in 1639–1643 to 12–17 thalers in 1646. This may not seem like a dramatic rise, but as Carsten Porskrog Rasmussen has pointed out, the earlier tax rate was already extremely high and on the threshold of what the peasants could actually pay. In late 1645/early 1646 the discrepancy between the nominal tax level and the factual intake of tax revenue reached its lowest point during the period 1643–1654, and the difference between nominal and factual tax income in the Aabenraa district in eastern Schleswig, for instance, reached 25 percent (after 1646 the difference levelled out to marginal). In other words, for every four thalers nominally imposed by the taxman, only three were actually collected in 1645–1646.

The Peace of Brömsebro ultimately forced Prince Frederick to relinquish his positions as the Archbishop of Bremen and Prince-Bishop of Verden. The two
Bishoprics were subsequently handed over to Sweden. Königsmarck had begun to establish new administration in the occupied Bremen-Verden already in March 1645, when he set up a seat of provisional Swedish government in Stade. The government was headed by Königsmarck himself, who was being assisted by a council of three Swedish-appointed administrators. Königinse was rewarded Königsmarck for his military feats on 4 May 1645 with a donation of Neuenhaus in Bremen and Rotenburg in Verden. Given his already pre-eminent military-administrative position in the occupied Bremen-Verden, it is hardly surprising that Königsmarck was appointed as the first governor of the Swedish-owned Archbishopric.

The appointment of Königsmarck as the new ruler of Bremen-Verden was not without its implications for those peasants, who had waged insurgency against the Swedish forces of occupation in the spring of 1645. The marshland peasants, who had been Königsmarck’s most unrelenting local opponents, were burdened with a heavy contribution of 32,000 thalers and an obligation to billet Swedish troops. This punishment-like imposition bore some resemblance to the old system of borgläger, which had been used in the late sixteenth century to oppress troublesome Finnish peasants on the eve of the infamous Club War (1596–1597). Königsmarck’s resolve to consolidate Swedish rule in Bremen-Verden also shaped the physical landscape. Königsmarck obligated the local towns to reinforce their existing fortifications and defensive works. Forests previously owned by the local cloisters were cut down and the timber was used as construction material for the new fortifications. Incidentally enough, this policy would have also deprived terrain cover from any diehards who might have otherwise contemplated the continuation of insurgency against Königsmarck and his new Swedish regime.

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913 Zetterqvist 1891, 53–54.
914 SRA RR, B226, 4 May 1645.
915 Theatrum 1651, 688.
916 Zetterqvist 1891, 57.
4 GUSTAF HORN’S WAR IN SCANIA

4.1 PLANNING THE SCANIAN WAR

Communicating Stockholm’s military plans to Lennart Torstensson had been a troubled effort, as Torstensson’s initial base of operations had been in distant Moravia. Gustaf Horn and Lars Kagg inhabited very different positions in the decision-making process than Torstensson, as they were physically present in Sweden and participated personally in the military planning from a very early stage. Therefore we do not find Horn’s and Kagg’s military instructions so much in the external correspondence as in the internal discussions of the riksråd, in whose sessions they often participated. The prospect of invading Scania first emerged on 13 May 1643, when the riksråd discussed a northern attack to support the invasion of Jutland in order to see how the Danes would guide their policy in a war of two fronts.917 Three days earlier the riksråd had discussed military command in Livonia. Per Brahe revealed in the discussions that “Gustaf Horn is needed here [in Stockholm], Kagg and I in Västergötland, which leaves for Herr Herman Wrangel.” Axel Oxenstiera seconded Brahe and confirmed that Horn was needed at home “in case something should take place with the Jute”, whereas Kagg’s familiarity with the Swedish lay of the land (“landskapet”) was indispensable.918

The strategic importance of southern Sweden emerged slowly in the riksråd’s discussions over the course of the summer. Maintaining Gothenburg was important for the Swedish recruitment efforts, as it was the only possible embarkation site for the projected Scottish reinforcements, which could also threaten Norway and disturb Christian IV’s naval operations at the mouth of the Göta River.919 Strengthening Gothenburg’s defences became an early priority: after Quarter Master General Olof Hansson Örnehufvud had delivered a rather alarming report on the inadequate state of the city’s defensive facilities in late July, the riksråd directed the kammarkollegium to provide sufficient funds for construction materials and labour wages from the two most profitable domestic taxes, the “store och lille tullen.”920 On 11 August Kagg gave to the riksråd his report on the state of defences in Gothenburg and Älvsborg.921 One month later Örnehufvud gave similar reports regarding the state of fortifications in Gothenburg and Jönköping, and on the inventories of coastal magazines near Norrköping.922 The improvement of the city’s defences was underway in October 1643, when the riksråd instructed Olof Stake, the landshövding of Värmland and Dalarna, that he should employ the commonalty in his province to fell trees, which would then be used as timber for Gothenburg’s fortifications (this missive referred to by Vessberg

917 SRRP, x, 147, 13 May 1643.
918 SRRP, x, 130, 10 May 1643.
919 SRRP, x, 192, 14 June 1643.
920 SRRP, x, 226, 24 July 1643.
921 SRRP, x, 244, 11 August 1643.
922 SRRP, x, 271, 18 September 1643.
does not appear in the Riksregistratur, which contains no entries between 10 and 31 October). The wages would be provided by the Quartermaster Örnehufvud. A similar letter was also sent on the same day to Colonel Bengt Ribbing, ordering him to employ his soldiers to assist the commonalty in Älvsborg to collect wood and make saw timber for Gothenburg’s fortification-works.

Lars Kagg revisited Gothenburg in October and reported to the riksråd that he now found everything there “to be in good footing.” By the end of the month Kagg was again back in Jönköping, where he oversaw troop musters, allocated officers for units, and organized the procurement of war materials – including those of horses, a “large proportion” of which still remained unavailable “for the Crown’s service”, as Kagg complained to the krigskollegium on 29 October. Another procurement, over which Kagg fretted to the krigskollegium, was artillery. Unlike horses, which Kagg largely procured on his own initiative, artillery would have to be requested from the krigskollegium, which in its turn would place an order on “factorinna”, meaning private gun-foundries.

The issue of local defence caused some anxiety among the Gothenburgers. In early October they wrote to the riksråd and asked how the government wished to manage the allotment of defence forces over the surrounding area. The riksråd replied that as long as the city’s defences depended on the royal garrison, the responsibility for organizing local defences fell to Her Majesty’s commandant, but when the city’s own militia had been set up, the actual division of forces could be done by Gothenburgers themselves.

On 14 November the riksråd once again began to ponder war on two fronts. Axel Oxenstierna suggested merely billeting troops in Jutland and Scania and then opening negotiations with the enemy. The riksmarsk Jacob De la Gardie’s response to this suggestion was blunt: “When one crosses the border with a weapon in hand, it is war and disrupted peace.” Oxenstierna insisted that the purpose of taking up quarters along the border was to force the enemy into negotiations. The question was whether Sweden would send an accredited commissar alone or back up its demands with military presence as it had done in 1624. Then Christian IV, who at the time was becoming entangled in the continental conflict between the Lower Saxon Estates and Ferdinand II, had blinked and acquiesced to Swedish demands regarding toll exemptions for ships sailing from recently conquered lands in Swedish Livonia. Now Oxenstierna hoped Christian IV would fall for the same ruse again.

The next time the riksråd discussed military operations in Scania and Halland was on 13 December. The riksråd wanted to make sure that Kalmar was well fortified and supplied prior to any military undertaking. Kagg had meanwhile set up his headquarters at Jönköping, from where he sent directions to nearby landshövdingar.
and advised them to make sure that the commonalty held itself in armis. This clearly meant the potential mobilization of uppbåd-levies. The riksråd also discussed whether Kagg should muster his troops in January and invade Scania and Halland or whether he should wait until spring. Oxenstierna felt that the existing garrisons at Kalmar and Gothenburg could defend their localities, but they still lacked sufficient numbers of men to conduct any offensive operations. Carl Gyllenhielm suggested placing a few hundred men along the border and reinforcing the existing garrisons at key locations. They could then follow the development of the situation and detach troops from garrisons if opportunity for offensive action arose. Brahe wanted only to “make umbrage at the border with musters”; meanwhile the government would collect further taxes from the commonalty. “Our commonalty will be confused if they are aroused so hastily”, Brahe warned the riksråd, alluding to potential civil disturbances. Peder Banér opposed the others’ caution: “Our people will be safer if we go in first.”

Finally Oxenstierna proposed a compromise. In February, when the rivers were frozen solid and would carry the weight of crossing troops, Sweden would assemble 2,000 cavalry and 3–4,000 infantry and “put the land [Scania and Halland] under contribution.” Meanwhile they would be safer carrying out musters and conscriptions. Sweden could thus also win time for further acquisitions of ammunition and apparel. Priority mission was to safeguard Västergötland, as an invading enemy could subsist there better than in Småland.

The Scanian invasion began to take shape at the very end of 1643. On 29 December the command of the invasion was officially vested to Horn and Kagg. Muster of the troops was to be conducted in the border provinces, from where the troops could be rapidly moved to the theatre of operations. Östergötland, Västergötland, and Småland cavalry regiments, as well as the nobility’s rusttjänst-companies, would attack the enemy with full might, strike fear into him, and take goods and horses from his land. It was important that the enemy would not manage to move his military resources to safety in Norway. Five thousand infantry would march to the border from Örebro and Jönköping. The riksråd would also have to write to the landshövdingar in Västmanland and Närke and forward peasants under skjutsfjärdsordning, i.e. peasants who were obliged to provide transport services, to Jönköping by 20 January 1644. The rendezvous-point for infantry was Värnemo, from where they would march to the border in three days. The first objective on the other side of the border was Tranarp. No Swedish advance was ever planned along the brand new coastal road running from Bergkvara in Småland to the port of Bodekull in Blekinge. At the outbreak of the war the Swedes simply closed the road and it was not reopened until October 1645.

Whatever winter clothing and footwear the infantry was still lacking, now was the last chance to address those deficiencies, the riksråd reminded the landshövdingar.

932 SRRP, x, 349, 13 December 1643.
933 Ibid., 349.
934 Ibid., 350.
935 Ibid., 350.
936 Ibid., 350.
937 SRRP, x, 358, 29 December 1643.
Now that the army had been formed, it was elemental to consider for ways to maintain and replenish it on the field. It was already clear that no infantry reserves could be transferred from Germany. Therefore the nobility was advised to keep its “skyttrar”, namely gamekeepers and armed farmhands, in constant preparedness for military service. The *riksråd* believed that there existed plenty of shooters, who hunted (or perhaps poached) birds and other game in the Crown’s and the nobility’s forests. In late January the *riksråd* once again reminded the nobility to allow its *skyttrar* to follow the army.

Planning the war involved intelligence-gathering by the government. On 26 December the *riksråd* wrote to Knut Soop, the *landshövding* of Jönköping, and instructed him to keep keen watch over possible military preparations on the Danish side of the border. On 31 December the *riksråd* wrote to Brodde Jakobsson and informed him that news could no longer be received from Denmark, which meant that “post roads there have been closed.” Brodde was therefore ordered to find out as much as he could about preparations of war in Denmark and Scania and about Torstensson’s possible advance in Jutland. On 6 January Jakobsson sent his reply to Oxenstierna. The nobility’s tenants from Scania and Halland had assembled at Laholm on 2 January and were at the moment in Halmstad working on the city’s moats and walls. Other peasants and farmhands had also mustered at Laholm on 4 January. “By Vittsjö one can now observe a guard post that holds watch there night and day.” Peasants and farmhands from the Göinge district had been ordered to muster at Kristianstad on 5 January. A Danish nobleman by the name of Elof Holk had inspected the border tract for the likely purpose of preparing a roadblock (“bråte”). Bengt Magnusson [most likely meaning the guerrilla leader Bent Mogensen], who was born not far from the border in Denmark, has received full powers to recruit 300 men for the purpose of sabotage if a war breaks out. Mail travel was difficult to and from Helsingborg, and Jakobsson had received no news about the goings-on in Holstein or Jutland. Jakobsson ended his report by wondering whether he should allow Dutch and German merchants to travel to Denmark, as no-one was allowed to pass from Denmark to Sweden. The Swedes were not the only ones to make inquiries in the border zone. Torstensson’s military operations in Holstein had alarmed Christian IV to the possibility that the Swedes harboured some design against Scania as well. On 18 December 1643 Christian IV instructed Iver Krabbe, Ebbe Ulfeldt, and other governors in Scania to “reconnoitre on the borders what the Swedes intend to do.”

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939 SRRP, x, 358, 29 December 1643.
940 SRA RR, B219, 31 December 1643.
941 SRA RR, B222, 27 January 1644.
942 SRA RR, B219, 26 December 1643.
943 SRA RR, B219, 31 December 1643.
944 SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Axel Oxenstierna av Södermøre E 574, 6 January 1644, Brodde Jakobsson to Axel Oxenstierna.
945 Ibid.
946 Ibid.
947 KBB 1642–1643, 647, 18 December 1643.
Gustaf Horn still attended the riksråd sessions during the first week of 1644. On 3 January the riksråd discussed recent intelligence on Denmark’s military strength. “All the Germans [recruited mercenaries] are billeted in Holstein; in Nyborg, Assens, Odense, Rensburg, Flensburg, and everywhere else is 100–200. In Glückstadt 1,500 men, in Neustadt are three or four ships. In Haderslev are folk...”948 Five days later the riksråd convened again, but by now Horn was already on his way south to assume command of the military operations in Scania and Halland. The riksråd read a letter from Älvsborg’s landshövding Johan Henriksson Reuter, who requested 2,000 flintlock muskets for the commonalty’s “armatur.” The riksråd immediately directed the krigskollegium to place an order for the weapons without further delay.949 Unlike in Denmark, where Christian IV had to requisition private arsenals for the purpose of national defence, in Sweden there existed weapons factories that could churn out firearms on demand.

On 8 January Horn departed to his post at Jönköping, for which reason military plans and directions begin to appear in a more definite form in the government’s external correspondence. The riksråd furnished Horn with a set of military instructions with no fewer than twenty individual entries. Gustaf Horn was given authority over the defence of Småland, Västergötland, and Öland, and of all the fortresses and garrisons therein. Horn was to oversee that the muster and conscription of troops proceeded without delay, that the troops were well-maintained and sufficiently provisioned and armed, and that the raised troops would maintain discipline and desist from pillaging and harming the civilian population. Horn should acquire military intelligence of Danish activities and use it to benefit his own decision-making, the riksråd advised him. Öland’s defence was assigned to Tove Bremer’s 400 Östergötlander cavalrymen, who would be assisted by local peasant levies led by the Crown’s landzofficerer, meaning bailiffs and civil servants. In a similar way the burghers in Kalmar were to be organized into companies and ordered to furnish themselves with muskets and keep themselves in military readiness. Identical instructions were issued to the inhabitants of Gothenburg.950

The government instructed Horn to set up a dragoon unit with the help of the riksjägmästare Hård or some of the landshövdingar. The landshövdingar Bengt Bagge, Knut Soop, and “whoever was to replace Johan Hindersson in Västergötland” were furthermore instructed to follow the army to the border and to maintain the commonalty there in readiness in case the Danes would launch a surprise attack over the border. If that were to happen, the peasant levies were expected to resist the enemy, but under no circumstances were they to cross the border themselves. The strategic objectives in Scania were Helsingborg, Landskrona, and Malmö. Because these localities were well-defended by Danish garrisons, Horn’s mission was to occupy the surrounding countryside and lure the enemy into open battle. It was important that the enemy would not be able to unite his forces. For this end Horn was instructed to use his cavalry to check any expeditions from Danish garrisons. Swedes were to make themselves masters of as many castles, estates, and towns as possible. Those localities that could not be occupied were to be blockaded by the cavalry. The riksråd felt that the Swedish army should be billeted and maintained in Scania and Blekinge

948 SRRP, x, 424–425, 3 January 1644.
949 Ibid., 433.
950 RAOSB i:16:2, 456–458, 8 January 1644, Christina’s instructions to Gustaf Horn.
over the winter and spring, but exactly how billets and winter quarters were to be organized was left open for later consideration.\footnote{RAOSB i:16:2, 459–460, 8 January 1644, Christina’s instructions to Gustaf Horn.}

As with Torstensson earlier, Horn was given instructions on how to treat the enemy population. Those inhabitants in towns and villages, whether they were priests, burghers, or peasants, who behaved obediently and paid taxes and contributions to Horn, were to be issued with salvaguardias and protected from any harm. Urban privileges were to be honoured as long as the towns maintained loyalty and obedience to the Swedish military authorities. Danish \textit{landzofficerer} and other agents of Christian IV, on the other hand, were a problem. They were either to be arrested and detained or, if they “gave conditions”, i.e. promised to stay away, they were to be allowed to depart to Sjælland. The \textit{riksråd} understood that such individuals were likely to be members of the local nobility; Horn was therefore instructed to proceed with discretion and to treat well those members of the nobility who appeared trustworthy and subservient.\footnote{Ibid., 460–461.}

The \textit{kammarkollegium} and the war commissar Johan Kruse were instructed to place all the villages and towns under contribution and to draw in all of the Danish King’s “regalian rights, tolls, and other privileges.” Horn and Kruse were also to appoint ombudsmen and use them to organize a civil government that could supply the military forces with provisions. The \textit{riksråd} emphasized reason and orderliness in the extraction and collection of local resources. In the treatment of enemy soldiers and captured weaponry, Horn was instructed to follow the established European practices. Whatever cannons and artillery supplies would be found in the Danish fortifications were to be requisitioned for Swedish use. The \textit{riksråd} was optimistic about the prospect of winning over enemy soldiers. Captured Danes and Germans would be recruited to Swedish service with the kind of recruitment money and terms of service that had been in practice with the Danes. By this measure the government hoped to raise an entire regiment of infantry and a squadron of cavalry.

Swedish deserters in Danish service were a more delicate matter. Technically Horn would have been in his right to court-martial and execute them, but the \textit{riksråd} wanted to proceed with caution and clemency. All deserters, whether they had run away from Germany or Sweden, were not to be driven to the enemy in despair, but to be taken back into Swedish service whenever possible. Deserters were to be returned to their original regiments; those who had been absent for a long time, were to be placed among the newly-recruited troops, which meant Danish and German captives, who had decided to enter Swedish service. “And such [deserters] who are to be found in the fortifications, warm up their blood and use them to your best ability in Her Majesty’s service”, the \textit{riksråd} advised Horn.\footnote{Ibid., 461–462.} As in earlier wars, the native soldiers still remained a valuable resource worth preserving as their mobilization had necessitated negotiations and concessions on part of the government.\footnote{Hallenberg and Holm 2017, 100.} The government also wanted him to seek ways to establish lines of communication with Torstensson. Finally the government directed Horn to keep an eye on the border region and defend it in co-operation with the local \textit{landshövdingar}.\footnote{RAOSB i:16:2, 462, 8 January 1644, Christina’s instructions to Gustaf Horn.}
These instructions were supplemented with a memorial dated on the same day 8 January. The memorial contained six points. If Horn managed to capture Helsingborg, Landskrona, or Malmö, he should immediately strengthen their fortifications and defensive facilities; if not, he should attempt to blockade any enemy-held localities and assert control over the space between them. The important thing was to ensure that the Danish garrison in Kristianstad would be unable to break out from its enclave. After conquering the three aforementioned cities and making himself the master of Scania and Blekinge, Horn would concentrate his efforts on conserving the army over the summer. Horn was to further reinforce his army with the acquisition of horses and artillery and the recruitment of new troops if such assets were available in Scania and Blekinge. Under no circumstances was he to become engaged in any long-winded siege of well-defended enemy strongholds such as Halmstad or Kristianstad. The idea was that the conserved, or indeed even reinforced, bulk of Horn’s field army could be used for an invasion against Sjælland. Such a grand operation could not be undertaken by Horn alone, for which purpose he was instructed to coordinate his efforts with Torstensson and the Swedish governors in Pomerania and Mecklenburg.

The final points of consideration touched on potential diplomatic overtures from Copenhagen. Horn was obliged to give a written account of any negotiations with the Danes to Queen Christina herself. Horn was authorized to negotiate cessation of arms but the ultimate adjudication on all matters would be deferred to Queen Christina. Under no circumstances was Horn to accept any Swedish blame for the rupture of peace. The fault for the current hostilities lay with Christian IV and his riksråd alone; Sweden had been forced into a justified war, Axel Oxenstierna and the riksråd maintained.956

4.2 EARLY PEASANT/SOLDIER CONFLICT IN SCANIA

Horn’s army crossed the Danish border and advanced into Scania on 14 February, as had been planned. Oxenstierna congratulated Kagg on the fact that, while crossing the border, the army had overcome some roadblocks.957 Roadblocks, or bråtar, as they were called in Swedish, were a traditional tool of peasant warfare in early modern Scandinavia. The Dacke rebels had employed them with great effect against the troops of Gustaf Vasa in the 1540s. The rebels would first block the soldiers’ route of advance by felling trees on the roads, after which the peasants would attack the soldiers from all directions. At one individual ambush at Kisa in 1542, the Dacke-rebels surrounded a force of 200 German mercenaries and killed most of them.958 In 1555, Olaus Magnus described in his Historia Gentibus Septentrionalibus timber barricades that hindered the enemy’s advance and offered cover to insurgents, who “fought from behind the barricades as if they were castle walls.”959 The bråtar were employed in every peasant insurgency and irregular conflict in Scandinavia between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They were particularly effective in defensive delaying-actions. Gustaf Vasa was very impressed by these “Smålander tactics” (apparently a reference

956 RAOSB, i:16:2, 463–465, 8 January 1644, memorandum to Gustaf Horn.
957 RAOSB, i:16:2, 467, 22 February 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to Lars Kagg.
958 Ling 1869, 22.
959 Olaus Magnus 2010, 306.
to the Dacke-rebels) and encouraged their use against the Muscovites in 1545. He ordered his forces in Finland to avoid direct confrontation with the Muscovites and to resort to delaying action instead: “It is probably for the best that in Finland we should resort to the methods of warfare used by the Smålanders in their rebellion, and send people to the forest roads on which the enemy is thought to move, and there to shoot them with bullets and arrows to our best ability.”

After the victory over the Muscovites at Joutselkä in 1555, when a large Muscovite force had been defeated by Finnish ski-troops using sledge-mounted artillery, Gustaf Vasa adjusted his stance towards irregular warfare, which he had formerly seen as preparatory action to regular combat, and advised his troops from thereon to use violent reconnaissance and aggressive ambushes against the enemy at all times. Timber barricades were not of course unique to Scandinavia alone. Colonel Arvid Forbus recalled how, in 1636, the Swiss forests near the Habsburg Bishopric of Tillsburg were “invested with barricades that were well-manned by peasants, who also built sconces.” However, when Bernhard von Sachsen-Weimar appeared there with his French allies, the Swiss peasants quickly abandoned their positions and threw away their weapons. Barricades could not hold off entire armies, as the Scanian peasants too would learn.

Early Danish resistance is mentioned in the Chancellor’s correspondence with his son Johan. On 25 February Axel Oxenstierna sent his son a letter, which consisted of two parts, an early draft and an amended attachment. In the first draft, written before Oxenstierna had received news of Horn’s progress, Oxenstierna described enemy defences along the border. All the roads on the Danish side of the border had been allegedly blocked with timber barricades that were manned by local peasants. What kind of resistance these improvised fortifications would offer remained to be seen, Oxenstierna concluded. In the amended part of the letter Oxenstierna related recent news of Horn’s progress. Horn had crossed the border on 14 February, quickly removed the roadblocks, and advanced three miles in a single day without any further signs of Danish resistance. On the second day Horn had reached Tranarp and was possibly already on his way towards Helsingborg. There was no information at that point whether Horn had “met any great resistance yet.”

When Oxenstierna was writing these words to his son, the first of Gustaf Horn’s extractskrifvelser was already on its way to Stockholm from Helsingborg. The report, dated 19 February, related that the Swedes had arrived at Helsingborg two days earlier. They had found the town unfortified and with only a few remaining inhabitants, yet with considerable stores of corn and salt. As Swedish troops appeared outside the city, many inhabitants took to boats in panic and fled across the Sound to Helsingør. Swedes fired pistol salvos at the boats and managed to force some of them to turn around and return to Helsingborg. Horn wondered at the complacency of the Danish burghers, who had heard the thunder of Swedish armaments but had still remained

960 Hannula 1931, 199.
961 Hannula 1931, 212; Malkki 2007, 43.
962 DGA, xi, 125, 1635–1639, uppsats af Arvid Forbus rörande 30-åriga kriget.
963 SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Johan Axelsson Oxenstierna av Södermöre E979, 25 February 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Oxenstierna.
inert in the apparent belief that the hostilities did not somehow concern Helsingborg and its inhabitants.\footnote{RAOSB ii:8, 293, 19 February 1644, extractskrifvelse.}

On their way to Helsingborg the Swedes had encountered several timber block houses, but only one of them was manned by peasants, “who fired a few shots with rifled guns ["räflade byssor"], and two of our [soldiers] were wounded, but as soon as fire has been returned, they have given themselves to flight.” So far the Swedish army had not yet encountered regular enemy troops. Horn estimated that the enemy had ten companies of Scanian and Blekinger “landzryttare” plus whatever riders the bailiffs and priests had managed to put in the field. Garrisons were likely to contain “ordinary åhrsknechter” or urban militiamen, conscripted “Landzfolck”, and recruited German soldiers, whose strength Horn estimated to have been eight companies of 300 men each. Horn was puzzled by the fact that there seemed to be “no general or any other person, who would have given orders here in this land.” Christian IV was allegedly in Fyn, while the Crown Prince Christian was at Fredriksborg Castle in Sjælland. Even Helsingborg’s own castellan Christoffer Knudsen Ulfeldt had removed himself to Malmö.\footnote{Ibid., 293.}

Christian IV was not unaffected by the fall of Helsingborg, and on 28 February he expressed a desire to visit Scania “after the snows have melted” in order to animate the peasantry there and with their assistance retake Helsingborg from the enemy. The recapture of Helsingborg would discourage the Swedes from attempting any landing in Fyn or Sjælland, the King believed.\footnote{KCFEB 1641–1644, 457, 28 February 1644.} Christian IV had initially reacted to the Swedish invasion with the intention to send an army to Scania, but the presence of heavy snows in the woods and the continuation of wintry conditions “that make everything dangerous” had caused him to postpone the military expedition to Scania.\footnote{KBB 1644–1645, 37, 29 February 1644.}

Meanwhile the local administrators did what they could to organize defences. One measure undertaken by the Danes was to try and deny the enemy access to local resources. Therefore the lensmænd in Halland instructed the peasants to deliver whatever provisions and domestic animals they had to the protection of fortified strongholds such as Laholm and Halmstad.\footnote{Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 24–25.} Many peasants were reluctant to do this, as they quite understandably feared that they would never see their possessions again after committing them to the authorities’ care.\footnote{Ibid., 25.} In Halmstad the lensman Niels Krabbe also expressed a wish that the district’s churches would deposit their cash and other valuables inside the town walls.\footnote{Ibid., 26.}

In his first extractskrifvelse from Scania, Horn described the sentiments among the local population. Scanians, who read news pamphlets and listened to rumours, had some understanding of the preceding events in Germany, Holstein, and Jutland, and they were worried about the extent to which the Swedes would subject their land to violence and contributions. Many peasants had indeed fled from their farmsteads and villages and taken refuge in the forests that covered much of the land. Horn
was optimistic about the prospect of escaped peasants returning to their homes once they had been offered protection and safety through a “publicerat patent.” After the refugees had returned to their homes, they could be issued with salvaguardias. Horn ended his dispatch with an uplifting postscriptum from 18 February, in which he reported of General Major Hans Wachtmeister’s recent victory over a few hundred enemy riders. As a result of the engagement Wachtmeister had conquered Ängelholm and taken a handsome booty. “What more may come to pass, time will tell”, Horn finished his report.971

The next report was dated on 24 February. During the past eight days that the Swedes had spent in Helsingborg they had been busy repairing and strengthening the town’s admittedly inadequate defences with palisades.972 The work apparently continued well into spring, as Horn planned on using Helsingborg as a fortified staging-area for further conquests.973 Peasants were slowly returning from their hideouts and were already delivering some provisions to the Swedish invaders. Horn hoped that once the Swedes had established a firmer foothold in Scania, the availability of provisions would correspondingly be increased. Otherwise Horn had little to report: there had been no “proper action”, and the Swedes had not encountered regular enemy forces. They had nevertheless met a peasant force, whose strength Horn estimated to have been “two fänor” or 500–1,000 men. A Swedish attack had quickly scattered the peasants “and separated them from one another.” Horn then observed that if one proceeded delicately with the peasants, they would accommodate themselves to the new circumstances, stay in their homes, and pay contributions.974

The extractskrifvelse was amended that same day. A cavalry contingent from the Västergötland Regiment had run into a peasant band of 500 men, who had been organized into two company-sized formations. This may have indeed been the same peasant force to which Horn had alluded in his earlier draft. The encounter had taken place at Annelöv, south of Landskrona. The peasants had fired at the Swedes, but once the major in command had charged at the peasants with his cavalry, the peasants had cast down their weapons and promised to return to their homes and stay there in peace. The peasants handed over their banners and the two officers who had commanded the companies. Then the peasants returned to their homes.975

On 3 March Horn reported that the Swedish army had departed from Helsingborg on 27 February and reached its destination, Lund, two days later. Horn and his troops had entered a partially vacant town. Many of the burghers had fled to Sjælland and taken much of their portable property with them: “Here we have found little at best”, Horn lamented in his report. The highest-ranking and wealthiest urban stratum had vanished into thin air, and there remained hardly any priests in Lund. The escape of the rich burghers was undoubtedly unwelcome news for the resource-hungry Swedish army, but the absence of Danish clergy was no hindrance to the imposition of Swedish rule. The Danish government was not happy to see the priests vacate their posts. On 28 February Jens Kieldsen Riber, a parish priest from Landskrona, had asked the government for permission to flee from the path of the advancing enemy

971 RAOSB, ii: 8, 294, 19 February 1644, extractskrifvelse.
972 RAOSB, ii: 8, 295, 24 February 1644, extractskrifvelse.
974 RAOSB, ii: 8, 295, 24 February 1644, extractskrifvelse.
975 Ibid., 296.
and to relocate in Copenhagen. The rigråd had originally denied him permission on the grounds that a priest should always stay with his congregation, but on 8 March Christian IV himself intervened in the matter and decided that because most of Riber’s congregation had moved to Copenhagen, it was perfectly acceptable that Riber himself would join them there.976

Meanwhile not all news was bad for the Swedes. The dearth inside Lund was not replicated outside its non-existant walls, and the surrounding countryside proved to be “a veritable storehouse of corn and other fruits.”977 Later in March a French news agent reported from Hamburg how Horn’s armies had systematically pillaged the countryside between Helsingborg and Malmö “and removed all cattle to Sweden.”978 Many of the Scanians too had fled over the border to Sweden, which sudden refugee phenomenon worried the government in Stockholm. Therefore the riksråd instructed the soldiers to treat the Scanian civilians with restraint, lest the army would find itself facing veritable destitution for the want of local supplies.979 There had not yet been such encounters with regular enemy forces that might have led to any proper action. The main sources of trouble were the local peasants, particularly those diehards that skulked in the woods. The peasants had attacked some of the salvaguardia-parties that were issuing their patents at the villages and had taken their officers as prisoners. These captured officers had then been sent to the Danish garrison at Kristianstad. “But yesterday one such peasant party of 200 men, holding watch by the Grödinge [Getinge] Bridge, was dispersed by our cavalry, and a good portion of them slain”, Horn reported.980

So far the Swedish military authorities had dealt patiently with the peasants, Horn elaborated, for the purpose of winning them over with delicate treatment. Horn’s objective was to keep the peasants at their homes, so that they could pay contributions and other “war-burdens” in an orderly manner. If the peasants would not accommodate themselves to Swedish rule, they should be scared into obedience through stern military measures.981 This line of thought prevailed in the riksråd as well, and the government indeed instructed Horn to use disciplinary measures against any recalcitrant and rebellious peasants.982

Horn finished his dispatch on a report of a recent clash at Eriksholm [today Trolleholm] Castle, the family hold of Malmö’s commander Tage Thott. There a “considerable number of peasants” had gathered under the command of the local bailiffs to offer resistance to the Swedish invaders. The Swedes had not managed to overcome the defenders until they had brought in a strong company of cavalry and two twelve-pound cannons. There were many such small, well-defendable private keeps in Scania, Horn commented, and their possession was requisite for the Swedish war effort until such time, “if God so wishes”, that the Swedes could win themselves “headquarters.”983

976 KBB 1644–1645, 43, 8 March 1644.
977 RAOSB, ii: 8, 296, 24 February 1644, extractskrifvelse.
978 Gazette du 16 Avril 1644 N. 37, 234.
979 SRA RR, B222, 2 March 1644.
980 RAOSB, ii: 8, 296, 3 March 1644, extractskrifvelse.
981 Ibid., 297.
982 SRA RR, B222, 9 March 1644.
983 RAOSB, ii: 8, 297, 3 March 1644, extractskrifvelse.
The same day that Horn issued his report, 3 March 1644, the Danish Crown Prince Christian departed for Malmö to inspect the city and its defences. The Prince’s perception of the military situation in Scania was partially inaccurate. Prince Christian had received reports, which claimed that the Swedish army was no longer advancing in Scania but was in fact retreating back to the Swedish border, having only left behind some weak forces near Ystad. This was not true, but Prince Christian nevertheless judged the news to be correct and ordered the ritmester Frederik Rantzau to venture out from Malmö with all the available cavalry and to join forces with Rudolf von Rauchhaupt’s infantry in order to pursue the enemy and to harass him to his best ability. After arriving in Malmö, Prince Christian took several actions to improve the city’s fortifications. These construction works required such materials and fuels that were not available at Malmö. Therefore, on 8 March, the Prince ordered all peasants in the Oxie and Skyts districts to deliver hay, straw, and firewood to Malmö against a future payment.

During his brief stay in Malmö, the Crown Prince managed to address some issues dealing with irregular warfare. On 8 March, in an answer to a supplication from the peasants in the Vemmenhög district apparently requesting for weapons or other forms of assistance to help carry out localized resistance, the Prince promised to assist the peasants but reminded them that in the meantime it was their duty and obligation to “perform resistance against the enemy to their best ability.” Five days later the Prince commissioned Captain Mikkel Skov to assemble a band of peasants in the Skyts district and lead them to “Bircke”, most likely Björka in the Färs district, where they would engage the enemy. The Prince also commanded the commonalty in Oxie and Vemmenhögs to obey Skov and to give him any assistance he requested.

4.3 UNSAFE ROADS AND PEASANT CAMPS

Gustaf Horn’s next extractskrifvelse was issued on 14 March. Horn began his relation with the general alarm that had been raised in the Swedish headquarters at Lund on Saturday 9 March. A party of 300 Danish soldiers and peasants had left the garrison at Kristianstad and reached Getinge only a few miles away from Lund. Getinge was one of the key strategic locations in Scania, as an ancient northward road from Lund met there another road from the coast and then crossed the River Kävlinge. A bridge existed there already in the 1640s, together with an inn and a way station for changing horses. The mission of the enemy expedition, Horn suspected, was to destroy the bridge. There appears to be some confusion over the origin and aims of the Danish expedition. Danish government instructions from 27 February indicate that the mission was originally entrusted to Tage Thott and the Malmö garrison and that the purpose was not to destroy the bridge but secure it against the Swedes. It is nevertheless possible that the expedition came from Kristianstad and that Ebbe Ulfeldt was simply proactive in his conduct of operations against the Swedes. The Danish government promised to send some cavalry for Thott’s help but did not otherwise specify what

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984 PCB 1643–1647, 69, 3 March 1644.
985 PCB 1643–1647, 76, 8 March 1644.
986 Ibid., 77.
987 PCB 1643–1647, 90, 13 March 1644.
kind of troops were to be used from Malmö (or Kristianstad), so the decision to employ armed peasants was taken someplace other than Copenhagen, most likely in situ by the respective lensman, namely Tage Thott or Ebbe Ulfeldt.988 Be that as it may, all was well by then, Horn reported, as Wachtmeister had attacked the enemy with “with a few troops of cavalry” and had cut down most of the opposing force.989 During the battle Wachtmeister’s riders managed to take a prestigious prisoner: an ensign, who belonged to the powerful Holk family.

Horn also reported that Ebbe Ulfeldt had advanced to the nearby village of Hörby with a force of 400 cavalrmen and dragoons plus an unquantified number of peasants. Once the Danes had spotted Wachtmeister’s vanguard they had retreated back to Kristianstad. Swedish losses in these two engagements consisted of a ryttmästare and a few other riders. The Swedes took a number of prisoners, who provided them with interesting intelligence. The prisoners told the Swedes that they had been led by a priest, who had convinced Ulfeldt that he could drive the Swedes out of the whole len with the help of local peasants and a few soldiers from Kristianstad’s garrison. The priest had presented himself so convincingly that Ulfeldt had given him the command of the expedition. However, “as soon as he caught a whiff of gun smoke, he fled with his fast horse, and Ulfeldt’s lieutenant captain, who commanded the soldiers, soon followed him.”990

On the night of the following Sunday, 10 March, Wachtmeister surprised another peasant party at Hoby, several miles north of Lund. According to Horn these were the same peasants that had earlier attacked the salvaguardia-party outside Helsingborg and dragged its leaders away to Malmö. Wachtmeister’s cavalry troops killed an unquantified number of peasants and torched the houses and estates of fougdar or bailiffs “who were their leaders.” Horn ended his anecdote by wishing that these violent events would give pause to the peasants and encourage them to stay in their homes. At the end of his dispatch Horn commented on the state of Malmö’s defences. The Danish garrison had walled itself inside the city, and there was no sign of enemy activity outside Malmö. There were already many cavalrymen and foot soldiers inside the city, Horn pondered, and many more were reported to be on their way from Sjælland.991 The real strength of the Danish garrison was 1,734 foot, 293 cavalry, and 425 levied burghers in March, but Horn did not appear to know this.992

Connected with these events was the alleged massacre of insurgent peasants at Borstbäcken on 25 March, an event already alluded to in chapter 1.1. According to a local tradition, the battle of March 25 was fought between 500 peasants from the Färs herred and 300 Swedes under the command of Hans Wachtmeister. The purpose of the Swedish expedition, the legend asserts, was to forage for supplies and to wreak havoc among the Scanian peasantry. The local peasants had mustered spontaneously to face the Swedish danger on their own. The peasants were said to possess a pair of three-pound cannons, which they had acquired from Övedskloster, a former Premonstratensian cloister that had been secularized and later alienated. Wachtmeister’s Swedish force, on the other hand, possessed at least two twelve-pounders. The peasants had taken

988 KBB 1644–1645, 33, 27 February 1644.
989 RAOSB, ii: 8, 297, 14 March 1644, extractskrifvelse.
990 RAOSB, ii: 8, 297–298, 14 March 1644, extractskrifvelse.
991 Ibid., 298.
992 PCB 1643–1647, 97, 16 March 1644.
up defensive positions at Norriefäladen, today a suburb of Lund, where they had constructed improvised sconces called *snappanyepporna* ("guerrilla cottages"). The brief battle had ended in the peasants’ defeat, and most of the 500 peasants were killed on the spot. After the battle Gustaf Horn himself was said to have inspected the site and commented on the peasants’ poor array of armaments – staves, clubs, spears, swords, and only a few matchlock muskets.993

The problem with this fascinating scenario is that there exists little evidence to support it. Evert Persson, who wrote an article on the battle in 2007, was quite tellingly forced to construct his work on suppositions – the Swedish losses, for instance, “were thought to have been slight”, even though Persson never clearly articulates whose thoughts he refers to.994 In preparation for the field excavations in 2007, the archaeologist Bengt Nilsson went systematically through written sources for any evidence of peasant/soldier conflict at Borstbäcken in March 1644. Only one written source made a specific reference to Borstbäcken and conflict between insurgents and Swedes in March 1644. In 1746, Ernst Wallensteen, the vicar of Kärrstorp Church, described in his *Collectio Rönbeckiana* an inscription on one of the church pillars. The inscription simply stated that on 25 March 1644 the Swedes had killed at Borstbäcken 28 men from the Kärrstorp parish.995 The inscription is once again mentioned in 1830 in the book *Beskrifning öfver Kärrstorps Kyrka*. This reference was almost identical to that of Wallensteen, but the date of the alleged killings had changed to 25 July 1644. However, the actual inscription no longer existed in 1830, as the church’s interiors had gone through extensive renovation in 1788, when the walls and pillars had been covered with chalk.996

The silence of the written sources is mirrored by the absence of physical evidence. The excavations in 2007 did not recover any human remains or pieces of artillery. The odd collection of objects – a horseshoe, a few musket balls, and a piece of a pistol’s firing mechanism – suggest only that some violent event took place at Borstbäcken sometime in the seventeenth century. According to an oral tradition, some local youths discovered a cannonball in the vicinity of the excavated area in 1918, but this finding cannot be verified.997 Neither can the claim for the several hundred dead peasant irregulars, as no human remains have ever been discovered by the excavators. Gert Jeppson, who investigated the economic impact of the Swedish occupation in the Färs district, concluded that the great multiplication of peasant farms in 1645–1650 does not support the idea that the local male population would have been decimated in any battle of annihilation in 1644.998 The alleged inscription from the Kärrstorp Church lends support to the view that a violent altercation between Swedes and peasants took place at Borstbäcken and that the date of the event was indeed 25 March 1644. The actual number of combatants, the artillery employed by both peasants and Swedes, and the spontaneous nature of the peasant organization, on the other hand, all remain unsubstantiated anecdotes.

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996 Ibid., 11.
998 Jeppson 2007b, 31–32.
The *extractskrifvelse* from 26 March begins with the comment that Horn had received no mail from Stockholm after 14 March on account of hostile peasants, who hid in the woods and made the roads unsafe. The only way to secure the travel of mail was to send “a large party” of cavalry to escort the couriers.\(^999\) The danger presented by the Scanian insurgents to Swedish lines of communication is a theme that appears in many other primary sources in early 1644. On 29 February 29 Axel Oxenstierna had written to Brodde Jakobsson and informed him that Danish peasants had constructed barricades and were generally making roads unsafe for travel. For this reason Oxenstierna was not going to dispatch single letters to Gustaf Horn via individual messengers but had instead decided to collect larger bundles of mail and send them along with a military convoy.\(^1000\) In a letter to his son Johan on 20 March, Oxenstierna remarked that the greatest difficulty the Scanian peasants had so far presented was their hindrance of travel and mail along the forest roads.\(^1001\) By then the government in Stockholm had already taken some steps to address the danger to its lines of communication. On 27 February the *riksråd* had come to the conclusion that a small armée volante should be kept in a state of preparedness near the Scanian border. For this purpose the *riksråd* ordered Fredrik Stenbock to detach 100 men from Kalmar and another 100 from Gothenburg and to redeploy them along the border in order to keep the forests clear of *snapphanar*.\(^1002\) On 9 March the *riksråd* discussed ways of making the forest roads safer. Acting on Jacob De la Gardie’s suggestion, the *riksråd* decided to detach 200 men from Jönköping and scatter them to a series of fortified road stockades (“*stacquet*”) between “Märkerö” [Markaryd] and Tranarp. Such stockades were to be built at two-mile intervals. In proposing this course of action De la Gardie had referred to his earlier military experiences in Russia (during the *smutnoye vremya* in 1609–1617), where such stockades had proven useful in protecting lines of communication.\(^1003\)

The Swedish lines of communication were also hindered by the terrain and poor weather: Horn complained about the lack of cannons, as frost heave had made roads unpassable for heavy artillery trains. The artillery had fallen behind from the start, and on 2 March the *riksråd* appealed to the *landshövding* Knut Soop that he would do everything in his power to facilitate the transportation of Horn’s “cartouver” through the Jönköping län.\(^1004\) This was asking a lot, as a single heavy siege gun might require as many as thirty animals to draw it.\(^1005\) There had been no regular enemy activity since Ulfeldt’s unsuccessful sally from Kristianstad. The only troubles came from restless peasants, who gathered here and there under the leadership of bailiffs, priests, “and other such commanders”, who assembled bands of armed peasants and “led them to slaughter, as often tends to happen.”\(^1006\) When Swedish cavalry encountered...
such peasant parties, Horn reported, they invariably ruined them, killed many of the peasants, and forced the rest to lay down their “muskets and weapons” and run back home. “Their remaining desire to cross swords will likely dissipate over time”, Horn predicted optimistically.1007

As Horn was writing these words he received breaking news from Kagg, who, acting on the information he had acquired a few days earlier, had attacked a peasant encampment four miles away from Lund “with a strong party.” The attack had turned into something of a slaughter, as Kagg reported to have slain some 300 peasants. According to Horn, Kagg was poised to attack another peasant camp not far away from the previous one. Swedish losses had been slight in these engagements. List of casualties included only three persons, a lieutenant named Fersen from the Livregiment, “who was much missed”, another lieutenant, and an adjutant. Whether Kagg did indeed attack the other peasant encampment is not confirmed in Horn’s relation. It is possible that the peasants had already dispersed before Kagg appeared on the scene or that the peasant encampment never existed in the first place.1008

A historian is justified to approach Horn’s casualty figures with a pinch of salt, as the extractskrifvelse are the only detailed narratives of military action in Scania. Competing and/or corroborating sources, such as the Diarium Tychopolitanum and the French Gazette in Bremen and Holstein, do not exist in the context of the Scanian theatre of war. Biased pamphlets and news relations from various protagonists in the Thirty Years War generally tended to exaggerate enemy casualties and play down one’s own losses. There is no reason to believe that the extractskrifvelse from Gustaf Horn’s field chancery would have been any different.

The Scanian landscape was dotted with stone manors and noble castles with walls and moats, Horn observed, and they could be employed by Swedes to keep the restless peasants in check. First, however, the Swedes would have to take possession of these keeps. Horn had heard rumours that Ulfeldt had been spotted outside Kristianstad, leading another military expedition, and Horn decided to check the veracity of these rumours himself. Horn proceeded with a strong force to Torup, which was a strong castle surrounded by two watery moats.1009 Unlike Horn claimed, Torup was not owned by Tage Thott but by Jochum Beck, who was the lensman of Silkeborg in Jutland. It is nevertheless possible that the castle’s defences were organized in Beck’s absence by Thott in his capacity as the lensman of Malmö. Thott was the greatest demesne-owner in Scania and the primus inter pares among the Scanian nobility. He was also a member of the rigsråd and had carried out several diplomatic errands on Christian IV’s behalf. He had become the military commander of Malmö by accident, as he been on a royal mission to inspect the garrison when the Swedish invasion took place in early 1644.1010 Torup’s defenders consisted of “a great number of peasants”, who deserted their posts at the sight of the approaching Swedes and vacated the castle in a hurry. All the peasants Swedes had encountered on their march to Torup were “handled roughly and a portion of them killed”, Horn reported.1011

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1007 RAOSB, ii: 8, 299, 26 March 1644, extractskrifvelse.
1008 Ibid., 299.
1009 Ibid., 300.
1010 DBL, xvii, 347–349.
1011 RAOSB, ii: 8, 300, 26 March 1644, extractskrifvelse.
4.4 CROSS-BORDER WARFARE

How well was Denmark prepared for war in Scania? Gunnar Vessberg estimated that rostjeneste, udskrivning, and recruitment efforts had raised the Danish troop strength in Scania to 8,000 men, most of whom were tied to garrisons and fortifications. Vessberg based his estimate on contemporaneous Swedish data presented in the riksråd’s internal discussions and Gustaf Horn’s extractskrifvelse from 19 February 1644.1012 This number is larger than the estimate provided by Axel Oxenstierna on 20 March, when he wrote to his son Johan that the Danes had eight companies of recruited troops and 3,000 “knechtar landfolck” or conscripted soldiers and Scanian volunteer cavalrmen dispersed in garrisons and fortifications. Until then all the enemies encountered by the Swedes had been peasants, whose numbers Oxenstierna did not presume to estimate.1013

Axel Oxenstierna and Gustaf Horn had remained impervious to the existence of Ebbe Ulfeldt’s small field army, which had been positioned east of Kristianstad in the expectation that the enemy attack would follow the coastal route from Kalmar. In early January 1644 Swedish spies had reported to the Kalmar’s landshövding Conrad von Falkenberg that the garrison in Kristianstad consisted only of three companies of infantry and no cavalry at all.1014 Vessberg estimated that after Ulfeldt withdrew inside Kristianstad and the reinforcements from Sjælland had arrived in late February, the number of troops inside the city walls had risen to two companies of volunteer landsryttere and eight companies of recruited (German) infantry.1015 Danish sources are somewhat vague on the subject: the correspondence of the Danish Chancellery suggests that Ebbe Ulfeldt had at Kristianstad at least 1,200 soldiers.1016

Neither Swedish nor Danish sources quantify the peasant irregulars in any extensive way. We do know that the Danes made some steps to mobilize Scanian peasants for military duties. Swedish reports told of a levy in Scania, where every farmhand and every fifth peasant was called to arms in late January.1017 The Danish Chancellery’s copybook does not include instructions for any such mobilization in Scania, for which reason it can be deduced that the mobilization of opbud-levies was carried out by the local lensmænd on their own initiative. The government’s focus had been on regular troops, who were to be deployed in a joint campaign by the garrisons at Malmö and Kristianstad.1018 News of persistent wintry conditions and roads rendered unpassable by frost heave caused the Danish government to call off its planned operation on 29 February. Meanwhile the garrisons were to be kept in a good state of preparedness until such time that the thaw would once again allow troop movements along the roads.1019

1012 Vessberg 1895, 16.
1013 SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Johan Axelson Oxenstierna av Södermøre E 979, 20 March 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Oxenstierna.
1014 Vessberg 1895, 17.
1015 Ibid., 16.
1017 SRA Strödda handlingar Danska kriget 1643-1645 RA/754/2/M 1291, 2 February 1644, Brodde Jakobsson to Bengt Bagge.
1018 KBB 1644–1645, 32–33, 25 February 1644.
1019 KBB 1644–1645, 37, 29 February 1644.
The closest thing to a government articulation of a ‘people’s war’ comes from a government missive to Ebbe Ulfeldt on 24 March. The King had learned that Kristianstad and its immediate vicinity still contained untouched reserves of manpower. Christian IV therefore ordered Ulfeldt to muster all available men, arm them, “and to set them in best possible order.” Because the existing garrison of volunteer cavalrymen and recruited soldiers in Kristianstad could not provide any unexploited pool of recruits, the only logical sources for new manpower would have been the local burghers and peasants. Those officers that Ulfeldt had at his disposal were ordered to lead all these troops in a way that would “best serve the country and cause the enemy as much trouble as possible.”1020

Irregular warfare in Scania spilled into Sweden very early on. The Fagerhult Forest just across the border from the Kronoberg län was infested with snapphanar, who attacked Swedish soldiers on the roads and intercepted mail. Already in late February one party of Scanian irregulars crossed the border and attacked Markaryd, where they looted a church and pillaged the peasants’ barns.1021 A similar attack took place further west, where, according to a local petition submitted to Queen Christina right after the war, a hybrid group of regular soldiers and “robber bands” (skälnhopar) had pillaged the peasants and even plundered the Sandvik parish church to such extent that the entire congregation remained in need of tax-exemptions and direct material help throughout the war and even after it.1022

In late February Ebbe Ulfeldt was planning an incursion into Västergötland with a force of peasant irregulars. Horn reacted to this threat by ordering Fredrik Stenbock’s adelsfana or squadron of rusttjänst-cavalry to stop Ulfeldt’s designs. On 18 March the riksråd had already ordered Stenbock to advance southwards from Markaryd and “lagera” his troops in Fagerhult, whence they might better prevent any enemy attempts to “turbera Correspondenslinien.”1023 When his spies informed Ulfeldt that the Swedes had moved a strong cavalry formation to the Västergötland border, he called off the planned incursion. Another hostile party of peasant irregulars had mustered at Halland, but their designs were again thwarted by Stenbock, who advanced into Halland, disarmed the peasants, subjected the rural communities to contributions, and then occupied much of the Varberg len – save for the fortified town itself.1024 Varberg was defended by a garrison of at least 500 men. Andreas Karlsson and Anna Karlsson have examined the garrison’s muster rolls and discovered that these soldiers were all peasants.1025 The companies, whose strength varied between 150 and 200 men, were organized according to the militiamen’s place of origin.1026 The size of the garrison remained essentially the same throughout 1644; while some men disappeared from the muster rolls, new levied peasants took their place.1027

1020 KBB 1644–1645, 59, 24 March 1644.
1021 Vessberg 1895, 17.
1023 SRA RR, B222, 18 March 1644.
1024 Granberg 1821, 97; Vessberg 1895, 18.
1025 Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 43.
1026 Ibid., 46.
1027 Ibid., 46.
Stenbock took control of the province without meeting much organized resistance. Petrus Canutius Bäfverveldt, the Trial Court President at Gothenburg, had indeed informed Axel Oxenstierna on 29 February that the people of Halland would submit willingly to Swedish rule on account of their “malcontrait” towards Christian IV.\footnote{1028 Vessberg 1895, 18.} Stenbock himself was under orders to protect those peasants that paid \textit{brandskatter} to the Swedish army; those who refused to do so, however, were to be treated as enemies.\footnote{1029 SRA RR, B222, 13 February 1644.} After Stenbock had consolidated his hold over Halland, the military potential of his \textit{adelsfana} became an issue of interest to the government in Stockholm. On 21 March the \textit{riksråd} discussed Stenbock’s mission in Halland and came to the conclusion that from now on his primary mission would be to protect the “correspondencelinien” between Västergötland and the theatre of war.\footnote{1030 SRRP, x, 470, 21 March 1644.}

On 30 March Horn led half of his army from Lund and proceeded to besiege Landskrona Castle just south of the town itself. Horn had feared that the Danes might torch the town once they learned of the Swedish advance, but to his and everyone else’s surprise the town of Landskrona was found intact yet abandoned by its inhabitants.\footnote{1031 Boeckler 1679, 164.} The actual siege lasted only a few days until the defenders asked for accords on 7 April. The defenders were allowed lenient conditions: they could either retreat to the ships or be escorted to Malmö. The strength of the garrison had been 400 men, but only 26 of them were regular soldiers; all the rest were peasants, who simply laid down their arms and returned to their homes after having promised to desist from further military activities.\footnote{1032 DGA, xi, 82, 14 April 1644, Jacob De la Gardie to Magnus De la Gardie.}

Meanwhile the irregular threat against Sweden emerged again. On 29 March Bengt Bagge had reported to the \textit{riksråd} that Ebbe Ulfeldt had mustered 4,000 men for a cross-border raid into Kronoberg. Bagge and other \textit{landshövdingar} were at the time meeting in Sunnerbo, and had instructed their peasants to desist from crossing the border and meeting the enemy on their own initiative. The \textit{riksråd} had learned from Horn that the strength of Ulfeldt’s cross-border expedition was only 2,000 men, most of whom were peasants and other “untrained men.” On 6 April the \textit{riksråd} therefore replied to Bagge that he should be able to maintain the border with the help of his peasants only. In case of emergency Bagge could ask Gustaf Horn for assistance. The \textit{riksråd} instructed Bagge to guard the border with the help of local peasants and 200 soldiers from the Jönköping garrison. They were ordered to construct a “Russian stockade” outside Markaryd, and three or four others along the road to Tranarp at two-mile intervals.\footnote{1033 SRA RR, B222, 6 April 1644.} That same day Fredrik Stenbock was ordered to assist in the construction work with his \textit{adelsfana}. This was the very same course of action the \textit{riksmarsk} Jacob De la Gardie had proposed on 27 February.\footnote{1034 SRA RR, B222, 6 April 1644.}

Bagge had also informed the government of a \textit{bondefred} between the peasants of Kronoberg and those of Veinge parish district in Halland. The purpose of the local peace treaty had been to “ward off and avert the criminal parties that gather together
and plunder on both sides of the border." Some of the snapphanar-parties did not necessarily differentiate between Swedish and Danish subjects but plundered any cottages and barns in an opportunistic manner. Both Ebbe Ulfeldt and the Swedish riksråd were disposed to honour the bondefred; the Swedish landshövdingar were more cautious and wanted to wait and make sure that the proposed peace did not hide any malicious Danish designs.

Meanwhile the landshövding Konrad von Falkenberg complained to the riksråd that a pillaging expedition by Scanian peasants had set out from Kristianopel and crossed the border near Torsås. At first the government hesitated to take military action against the Scanian peasants (most likely for the fear of alienating potential subjects), but finally ordered Kalmar’s commander Johan Fleming to go to the Torsås peasants’ aid with both cavalry and infantry and pursue the enemy over the border. Soon after these cross-border operations the commonalty of Södra Möre volunteered to be recruited as cavalrmen and dragoons. Swedish peasants living in proximity to the border had apparently realized their precarious situation during time of war and consequently showed initiative in matters of collective defence.

The riksråd responded to this enthusiasm by sending a lieutenant to Södra Möre to organize and oversee the recruitment of volunteer cavalrmen. While this enthusiasm undoubtedly expressed genuine loyalty to the Swedish Crown and concern for common defence, we should also bear in mind that the peasants had fiscal incentives to furnish volunteer cavalry soldiers for military service. Unlike peasants, the burghers could not provide military service in return for fiscal privileges, but this did not stop the burghers of Kalmar from volunteering to do military service and proposing to conduct a cross-border military expedition on their own. The muster of dragoons at Södra Möre also questions the claim made by Sven-Erik Åstrom that dragoons in the 1640s were a distinctively Finnish element in the Swedish army. Evidence from Södra Möre shows that dragoons were raised locally in other parts of the Swedish realm if military necessity so demanded.

4.5 GOTHENBURG IMPERILLED

In early April 1644 Christian IV attempted to seize initiative in the war against Sweden by launching an attack against Gothenburg from both land and sea. One army would approach Gothenburg from Bohuslän in the north and another from Halland in the east, while Christian IV himself would lead naval blockade on board his flagship Trefoldighed. The northern invasion force was led by the Norwegian statholder Hannibal Sehested, while the eastern operations were trusted to Ebbe Ulfeldt. The Danish plan was that Ulfeldt would proceed westwards towards Halland and raise more troops there. Christian IV’s personal participation in the blockade changed the dynamics of the Danish decision-making. As the riksråd stayed behind in Copenhagen,
Trefoldighed essentially became a floating central chancellery, from where Christian IV issued missives on civilian and military affairs alike.

The vulnerability of the long Swedish coastline had been a matter of concern for the Swedish riksråd already before Christian IV’s naval campaign against Gothenburg. On 21 March the riksråd had discussed measures for defending the Baltic coastline from Danish attacks. Among the measures taken was the organization of islanders on Kimito and Rimito on the coast of Finland into rotas that could act as a standing defensive force in the case of a Danish attack. The riksråd also decided to increase the size of the Stockholm garrison by 400–500 men. Finally the government set out to construct a new sconce at Oxelsund outside Nyköping. These new defensive measures required the kind of manpower that Sweden no longer had. The riksråd session on 22 March discussed ways of raising additional troops. There was no possibility of a renewed utskrivning, the riksråd agreed, as further conscriptions during the winter months would have aggravated the Swedish commonalty. There was no more volunteer cavalry available either. The riksråd decided to try and recruit dragoons instead, by offering a hemman of twenty pounds of butter as an incentive. Finally the riksråd concluded to raise new troops by authorizing Carl Bonde and Johan Berndes to conscript commoners in Bergsland, by recruiting dragoons in Sweden, and by subcontracting an entire regiment in Scotland.

The riksråd had become aware of Christian IV’s presence outside Gothenburg by 15 April, when the riksråd convened to discuss Danish war aims in Halland and Scania. The riksråd identified four possible scenarios. Either Christian IV genuinely attempted to invest Gothenburg or he prepared to advance into Västergötland in order to create a diversion and then move the war to Swedish soil. In the riksråd’s mind the recent concentration of Danish troops near Laholm seemed to support the latter possibility. The third scenario saw Denmark settling for its traditional prize, the fortification of Älvsborg, which Sweden had already been forced to redeem twice. The final possibility was that Christian IV had landed outside Gothenburg simply to waste the land and to draw in Swedish troops from the other theatres of war. By 19 April some details of Christian IV’s invasion were known to Axel Oxenstierna, who related them to his son in Osnabrück. Christian IV had taken “a Swedish island or two” outside the Göta estuary and had fortified an island with a timber block house. His plan appeared to be to invest Gothenburg from land with a combination of “Bagger”, or Norwegians, and Ebbe Ulfeldt’s military expedition from Halland, which latter force included many peasants. There was still no certainty over Christian IV’s actual intentions. Oxenstierna himself suspected that his operations outside Gothenburg might also be a diversion and that the enemy’s real intention was to proceed towards Scania. The threats against Gothenburg and the Scanian frontier were both equally plausible, Oxenstierna contemplated in his letter.

The riksråd came to the conclusion that danger to Västergötland overrode any other military concerns and decided to keep Gustaf Horn and his army in Scania, nearer to the Västergötland border. The defence of Gothenburg and Älvsborg was left to Carl

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1040 SRRP, x, 470–471, 21 March 1644.
1041 SRRP, x, 472, 22 March 1644.
1042 SRRP, x, 507, 15 April 1644.
1043 SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Johan Axelsson Oxenstierna av Södermöre E 979, 19 April 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Oxenstierna.
Siggesson Rosendufva, the *landshövding* of Skaraborg, and *underlandshövding* Anders Stake in Älvsborg. Both Rosendufva and Stake were ordered to raise *uppbåd-*levies for common defence, in addition to which Rosendufva was expected to recruit dragoons locally. Rosendufva and Stake would receive further assistance from Stenbock’s *adelsfana*, whose “officers could lead the peasants here and there.”1044 The *riksråd* was convinced that these troops were more than sufficient to ward off any threat from Hannibal Sehested, as his Norwegian army was thought to consist only of peasants and inexperienced conscripts, “whose courage is much lesser than that of our peasants in Västergötland.” Olof Stake, the *landshövding* of Värmland, received orders to assist Stenbock, while Knut Soop in Jönköping was instructed to defend the Halland border against any incursions by Ebbe Ulfeldt.1045

Gustaf Horn’s reaction to Christian IV’s designs can be discovered from a relation covering the period from 8 to 27 April. After the capitulation of Landskrona on 8 April, the Swedish troops worked hectically to demolish their earlier siege works and to improve the state of Landskrona’s own defences. For this purpose Kagg remained at Lund with the majority of infantry and artillery. The rest of the army broke camp on 13 April. Horn ordered Colonel Per Ribbing to position his 1,000 musketeers between Lund and Malmö. Meanwhile Horn himself would advance towards Kristianstad with an identical force. The purpose of Horn’s expedition was a combination of foraging and counterinsurgency: to secure additional supplies from any existing enemy magazines, disperse assembled parties of peasants, disarm them, and to subject the rural population to contributions.1046

Upon reaching Hörby on his way to Kristianstad, Horn left Major General Sperling there with four companies of cavalry and the majority of infantry for the purpose of assisting war commissar Johan Kruse in the collection of contributions. On 23 March the *riksråd* had already instructed Kruse to set up a number of magazines for storing the contributions for the “Armeens Entretenment.”1047 Horn himself continued toward Kristianstad with a cavalry regiment and a few companies of dragoons. On 15 April scouts brought in some local peasants, who informed Horn that on previous afternoon Ebbe Ulfeldt had commanded the local peasantry to assemble with their firearms at Träne outside Kristianstad. Ulfeldt himself was to join the peasants there with some regular troops from the Kristianstad garrison. Horn hastened to Träne in the hope of meeting the enemy in the open, but once he arrived there the majority of the peasants had dispersed, as too did the 400 soldiers from Kristianstad, who, after having bivouacked at Träne for one night, had returned to their garrison. The Swedes encountered only some thirty-odd enemies, most of whom were killed on the spot. The few prisoners informed Horn that Ulfeldt was still on his way to Kristianstad and could be intercepted at the Bönagra Bridge. Horn dispatched a party of soldiers to capture the bridge and cut off Ulfeldt’s line of retreat, but once they reached the bridge they only encountered a sentry of ten peasants under the command of a captain, who were all “fought and killed.” Ulfeldt and his troops, on the other hand, were nowhere to be found.1048

1044 SRRP, x, 509, 15 April 1644 ; Vessberg 1895, 26.
1045 Vessberg 1895, 26.
1046 RAOSB, ii: 8, 303, 8 to 27 April 1644, kort relation.
1047 RA RR, B222, 23 March 1644.
1048 RAOSB, ii: 8, 304, 8 to 27 April 1644, kort relation.
Meanwhile Hans Wachtmeister was busy subjecting the surrounding country to contributions. For this purpose he had to disperse his troops into smaller salvaguardia-detachments, which practice made his forces more vulnerable to enemy attacks. During one of these salvaguardia-expeditions Wachtmeister’s own personal adjutant named Bagge was captured by the Danes alongside with eight other Swedish soldiers. The prisoners were dragged off to Kristianstad, and were later released in exchange for a number of Danish prisoners of war, including the previously mentioned ensign belonging to the powerful Holk family. Bizarrely enough, the Danes attired their prisoners in brand new blue clothes before releasing them.\footnote{RAOSB, ii: 8, 304, 8 to 27 April 1644, kort relation.}

On 17 April Horn continued his march toward Kristianstad. Ulfeldt was not there, as by 15 April he had set up his headquarters near Halmstad.\footnote{KBB 1644–1645, 72, 15 April 1644.} While Ulfeldt’s troops had established a foothold in Halland, they were running dangerously low on ammunition, and Ulfeldt was forced to request fresh supplies of gunpowder from Iver Krabbe in Varberg.\footnote{Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 50.} Meanwhile Horn began to subject the countryside surrounding Kristianstad to contributions, which elicited an unsuccessful counterattack from the city’s garrison.\footnote{RAOSB, ii: 8, 305, 8 to 27 April 1644, kort relation.} On 22 April the Swedes received a defector from Kristianstad. The defector was a turncoat Swede, who, after having served the Danes for five years, had grown tired of “serving against his own fatherland.” It is very likely that Horn received news from the defector that Ebbe Ulfeldt was no longer in Kristianstad with his field army, and that these news prompted Horn to turn his army around and move west.\footnote{Ibid., 305.} Wachtmeister continued his efforts to collect provisions and contributions, which were forwarded to Swedish magazines in Landskrona.\footnote{Ibid., 306.}

On 24 April Horn marched to Åkarp, where he stayed the following day. Swedish reconnaissance patrols brought in a number of prisoners who told their captors that Ebbe Ulfeldt had reached Halmstad, where he was now waiting for reinforcements from Kristianstad. During the Swedes’ stay at Åkarp some peasants from the Vittsjö parish killed a Swedish cavalryman on a foraging mission. The Swedish response was to shoot dead some peasants from the Vittsjö parish and to torch a number of villages in the expectation that these destabilization-tactics would induce the peasants to desist from further resistance.\footnote{Ibid., 306.} According to the Gazette, sometime in early April a Danish expedition from Halmstad, “assisted by a force of peasants”, had fought a successful battle against 200 Swedes, killing one hundred of them and forcing the rest to flee the field of battle.\footnote{Gazette du 14 Mai 1644 N. 50, 322.} This news was reported from the distant Lubeck and its reliability may be questioned, as the Swedish sources do not relate any such serious military setback in Halland. It is nevertheless quite possible that the Danes and the peasant insurgents did succeed in besting some Swedish contingent and that there were indeed Swedish casualties, although in smaller quantity than related by the Gazette.
4.6 GUERRILLA LEADER BENT MOGENSEN

On 26 April 1644 the Swedish army left Åkarp and marched towards Laholm. On their way through southern Halland the Swedes admired the richness of the countryside. There was allegedly a particular abundance of livestock – oxen, cows, sheep, and swine. Horses were in no less supply; Swedish cavalrymen, who had previously possessed only a single mount, now trailed three or four extra horses behind them. The abundance of livestock in Halland described by Gustaf Horn is peculiar in the light of the mass slaughter of cattle that took place inside the Danish-held Varberg in January–May 1644. The purpose of the mass slaughter was to deprive the Swedes of ready cattle and beasts of burden while providing the garrison in Varberg with stores of beef that would last for several months. Between 11 January and 30 April, twelve hired peasants and seventeen women slaughtered 646 oxen in Varberg, the men working in shifts around the clock and the women amassing respectable 360 hours of work between them. The fact that this mass slaughter would have failed to make any discernible dent in the quantity of livestock in Halland can only find two explanations: either Gustaf Horn exaggerated the abundance of available livestock in his report from Halland or the actual work of slaughtering the oxen overwhelmed the butchers in Varberg. Turning live oxen into dried beef, we should remember, required more than just sufficient supplies of labour. The process of drying and preparing the beef of 646 slaughtered oxen required over 17 tons of precious salt, whose demand was always in danger of outrunning supply in the seventeenth century. Be that as it may, this episode shows that peasants (and even their wives) could provide key labour services during times of war beyond that of simple militia-duty – as efficient and prolific butchers and processors of beef, for instance.

The success of the siege of Laholm depended on the heavy artillery, which finally arrived from Jönköping via Lund on 9 May. The frost heave had slowed down the transportation of Horn’s kartouwes, which were quite literally stuck in the muddy forest roads and were therefore vulnerable to attacks by roaming *snapphanar*. In March Horn sent Staffan Klingspär, the commander of the Småland cavalry, with 800 men to escort the straggling artillery and to keep open lines of communication to Markaryd. In order to make the roads safer for the transportation of the artillery train, Horn ordered Klingspär to cut down trees on both sides of the road at the width of a musket’s firing range.

Horn’s directions regarding the treatment of *snapphanar* were stern. Firstly Klingspär was instructed to identify the leaders of the irregular bands. He was then ordered to kill any peasants that were met with weapons in hand. According to Boeckler, the logic behind this order was to avenge the previous sack of Markaryd by Danish peasants. Around the same time (on 15 April) Christian IV showed more restraint than the Swedes and advised Ebbe Ulfeldt to place the Swedish peasants in

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1057 RAOSB, ii: 8, 306, 8 to 27 April 1644, kort relation.
1059 Ibid., 28.
1060 Ibid., 30.
1061 SRA RR, B222, 10 April 1644.
1062 SRA RR, B222, 10 April 1644; Boeckler 1679, 103; Vessberg 1895, 20.
the conquered parts of the Älvsborg län under the protection of the Danish King. The peasants of Ale and Flundre indeed paid contributions to the Danes, for which treasonable act they were later in May punished by the Swedish military authorities, who billeted newly-recruited dragoons in those districts. Conversely Christian IV had little toleration for soldiers’ excesses: on 9 April the King’s missive ordered the lensman Iver Tagesen Krabbe to hang at Varberg Castle two Danish and two Swedish soldiers, who “had pillaged and robbed in the [Varberg] len.” The following month another three soldiers, two Danes and one Swede, were executed in the nearby Himle district for similar crimes.

Klingspår succeeded in joining the artillery train with the main army in late March. During his march from Markaryd Klingspår, who had now been reinforced with 300 men from Kalmar and Gothenburg, clashed with local snapphanar and succeeded in killing their leader Bent Mogensen. Biographical details on Mogensen are scant. According to the Forening Skånsk Fremtid, a local society that promotes Scanian history and traditions, Mogensen was a peasant from Fagerhult. During Torstensson’s War he allegedly mustered at the King’s orders well over a thousand peasant irregulars to fight the invading Swedes.

Mogensen’s violent end at the hands of Klingspår’s troops offers an opportunity to discuss the role and importance of individual leaders in the Scanian snapphanar-bands. In the modern age guerrilla movements tend to become identified with certain illustrious and magnetic leaders. One of them, Ernesto Che Guevara, has even become a global pop culture icon. Seventeenth-century snapphanar-leaders too are commemorated all over Scania and Halland with much local pathos. Bent Mogensen himself has a statue in Fagerhult. The slightly larger than life-size bronze statue portrays a brim-hatted and bearded man clutching a musket. No one knows what Mogensen actually looked like, and the statue’s visage stems from the imagination of its sculptor Harry Widman. The statue represents Scanian particularism and is thus a potential source of political controversy in modern-day Sweden. It was in fact vandalized in 2003, when someone severed Mogensen’s arms and removed his musket.

The issue of command in guerrilla warfare was discussed by Mao in 1938. According to Mao, guerrilla warfare did not allow as high a degree of centralization as regular warfare. Attempts to apply command methods of regular warfare to guerrilla warfare would restrict guerrilla warfare’s flexibility and sap its vitality. Guerrilla warfare did need centralized command, Mao elaborated, but only at the strategic level, where the guerrillas’ activities would be co-ordinated with regular units. Mao’s maxims would have made sense in the context of snapphanar. There was little need to encumber peasant contingents with the kind of tactical command that was

1063 KBB 1644–1645, 72–73, 15 and 19 April 1644.
1064 Munthe 1901, 49.
1065 KBB 1644–1645, 71, 9 April 1644.
1066 Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 110.
1067 Ericson Wolke, Larsson, and Villstrand 2006, 296.
1069 Helsingborgs Dagblad. 28 October 2003.
1070 Mao 1963, 181–182.
used for directing drill-like battlefield evolutions if the peasants were not employed in set-piece field battles. The *snapphanar* did require some leadership presence to uphold unit cohesion and to co-ordinate military efforts with the strategic command. From this latter perspective it would be understandable that the irregular bands were led by landowners, bailiffs, and parish priests – as Swedish sources often suggest was indeed the case. Such persons would have been familiar in Kristianstad, Halmstad, and other Danish strongholds, and conferring with them would not have introduced any awkward social situations between Crown representatives (often nobles) and lowly peasants, who did not even constitute their own Estate in Denmark.

The low esteem of peasants in the eyes of Crown officials and nobles makes it improbable that Mogensen would have held any meaningful position in the Danish military hierarchy. This approach would challenge the traditional Scanian contention that Mogensen had mustered and commanded his *snapphanar* at the King’s orders. No such order exists in the Chancellery’s copybook or in the King’s own correspondence; indeed it appears inconceivable that Christian IV, who famously referred to levied peasants as animal-like beasts, would have deigned to confer directly with a mere peasant in matters of war – the ultimate *arcanuum imperii* of the early modern statesman. It is more likely that, if he did in fact operate under orders, Mogensen would have received his instructions from Halmstad, Laholm, or Kristianstad, and even then down a chain of command from governors and *lensmænd* to bailiffs and parish priests. By this reasoning Mogensen would have been a middleman between the *snapphanar* and the actual military command. This view is supported by Brodde Jakobsson’s report, which stated that Mogensen was commissioned by his superiors to recruit 300 peasants for sabotage-missions. According to Jakobsson’s report, the key individual in charge of the border defences was Elof Holk, a nobleman.1071

Another possibility remains that Mogensen acted at his own volition, without any direct encouragement or supervision from the Danish authorities. That, according to Alf Åberg, was how the north-Scanian insurgents organized themselves in May 1658, when Scania was being overrun by the armies of Charles X.1072 Be that as it may, after Klingspår’s return to Markaryd in early April the *snapphanar* activity once again intensified in the frontier region, which suggests that Mogensen had never been the sole driving force behind the *snapphanar* in northern Scania.1073 His command may have been transferred to either a professional soldier or another local peasant leader like the Hallander “bondekapten” Amon Andersen, who allegedly led a plundering raid into Sweden in 1644. Andersen, however, does not seem to have commanded much respect among the *snapphanar*, as he ended up bickering over the distribution of meagre loot in a court of law with his former subordinates in the spring of 1645.1074

The *riksråd* had prompted Horn to take stronger measures against Danish guerrillas for some time before April. In its missive from 15 March the government instructed Horn to choose a fortified locality as his stronghold and to utilize from there the network of fortified noble manors in expanding Swedish dominion over the countryside. If there was need to reassemble the entire army for field operations, Horn was ordered to demolish any redundant fortifications lest they fell into enemy hands.

1071 SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Axel Oxenstierna av Södermöre E 574, 6 January 1644.
1072 Åberg 2014, 49.
1073 Vessberg 1895, 20.
Finally the riksråd instructed Horn to set up magazines at Helsingborg and Lund once the worst disturbances were over.\textsuperscript{1075}

Laholm’s walls were thick but severely dilapidated. Surveys made in the 1620s had revealed that the main keep was uninhabitable, the great tower of the castle was crumbling, the gates suffered from rot, and the castle cellars were slowly filling with water, which made it risky to store anything in the lower levels. The town garrison itself suffered from a chronic shortage of cannons, muskets, and ammunition – the town’s commandant Björn Ulfeldt had indeed been forced to loan 50 muskets and 36 swords from Varberg so that his troops might be adequately armed.\textsuperscript{1076} The responsibility for maintaining castles and fortresses in Scania and Halland fell to the local nobility, who had long neglected their duties – a state of affairs, which Christian IV had often lamented in vain.\textsuperscript{1077} The Danish authorities in Laholm had, however, made some provisions for a possible siege. The Crown had imposed an extra contribution on the town burghers, obliging them to hand in any precious metals they might possess for the purpose of financing the town’s defences. The burghers largely failed to do this on account of the lingering impoverishment caused by the fire that had destroyed much of Laholm in April 1637. The burghers nevertheless agreed to disable the boats and ships in the harbour by removing their masts and storing them inside the town walls.\textsuperscript{1078}

The relentless Swedish cannonade threatened to crumble the walls and induced the besieged to open negotiations on 13 May. The accords or terms of surrender reprinted in Horn’s relation were, once again, typical of the age. Officers and regular soldiers were allowed to leave with their families, personal belongings, and small arms. One notable exception to this rule was Lieutenant Iver Krabbe (not be confused with the commandant of Varberg) who was to be kept incarcerated at Helsingborg in reprisal for the alleged mistreatment of Swedish prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{1079} All other combatants found in Laholm were considered prisoners of war, although their status was carefully qualified by the Swedes. Christian Sincler’s company of 150 men from Kristianstad was allowed to return to its place of origin under Swedish escort. Foreign mercenaries, essentially a small number of Germans, were not forced or coerced to take up Swedish colours against their will. Those Danes that had been captured outside Laholm and Halmstad were either allowed to arrange their own ransoms (if they were officers) or they were kept in custody until such time that they could be exchanged for Swedish prisoners of war. “Commoners” were allowed to return to their homes on the condition that they left behind their muskets. The number of armed peasants in the Laholm garrison is not quantified in any way, which seems to suggest that their portion of the total military strength was not conspicuously high. Finally Horn ordered the Danes to leave behind their cannons, ammunition, and any supplies the Danes could not carry themselves. Horn also specified that all land books and cameral acts, which showed the Danish administration’s land rents and other incomes, were to be handed over to him.\textsuperscript{1080}

\textsuperscript{1075} Vessberg 1895, 20.

\textsuperscript{1076} Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 10–11, 55.

\textsuperscript{1077} Vessberg 1895, 27.

\textsuperscript{1078} Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 22–23.

\textsuperscript{1079} RA RR, B222, 15 May 1644.

\textsuperscript{1080} RAOSB, ii: 8, 308–309, 14 May 1644, summarisk relation.
The Swedes left a garrison at Laholm commanded by Bengt Liljehöök. A company of dragoons led by Colonel Gyllensvärd remained in the town’s proximity as a reaction force. Swedish military presence in Laholm was necessary, as the surrounding territory remained infested with insurgents well into the following year. In January 1645 Liljehöök initiated a counterinsurgency operation against “roguish peasants”, who had “always remained at Hallandsås [a district between Halland and Scania] and shot dead our folk.” The Swedes encircled the parish church, which they suspected was being attended by large numbers of insurgents. The Swedes apprehended men and women alike and drove them to Laholm “like a flock of sheep.” Some of the apprehended “rogues” managed to slip away at the beginning of the journey, but 20–30 of them were incarcerated at Laholm. One “eminent rogue”, who must have been a leader among the insurgents, was executed by firing squad. The Swedish pamphlet *Ordinari Post Tijdender*, which reported on these events, remained unsure whether Liljehöök’s operation was enough to suppress all insurgent activities in Halland. An encouraging sign was the fact that after the Swedish show of force at Hallandsås most local peasants had begun to deliver their share of the stipulated contributions to Laholm.

Laholm’s conquest was justifiably celebrated by the Swedes. Axel Oxenstierna was particularly pleased with its capture. Firstly, it further enhanced the security of Helsingborg, which was now protected by “two Swedish bastions, one on each side.” Secondly, it made the road between Helsingborg and the Swedish border safer for travel. Thirdly, it helped the Swedes to subject the population of rural Halland to contributions. The collection of contributions would be greatly facilitated if they could be sent to a nearby stronghold. This is what Fredrik Stenbock did in May when he forwarded his contributions to Helsingborg. Fourthly, it secured the “Correspondence-linien” between Halland and Scania. In his own assessment of Swedish-held Laholm’s good qualities, Gustaf Horn added a good harbour and the increased protection for Småland’s borders.

### 4.7 ARMÉE VOLANTE FOR VÄSTERGÖTLAND

Christian IV’s operations against Gothenburg made little headway. The only tangible achievement was the construction of a sconce (named Gottenbrill), which prevented the Swedish ships from sailing out from Älvsborg and Gothenburg. By late April 1644 Christian IV began to receive reports from Sjælland that the lack

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1081 Lantz 2011, 14.
1082 *Ordinari Post Tijdender* N. 4 Anno 1645, 2.
1083 Ibid., 2.
1084 Ibid., 2.
1085 Ibid., 2.
1086 Gazette du 4 Juin 1644 N. 61, 397.
1087 SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Johan Axelsson Oxenstierna av Södermöre E 979, 7 June 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Oxenstierna.
1088 RAOSB, ii: 8, 312, 12 June 1644, kort relation.
1089 KBB 1644–1645, 73, 15 April 1644.
of soldiers and coast guards was seriously compromising the security of the Danish heartlands – particularly now that the Swedish financier Louis De Geer was raising an auxiliary fleet in the Dutch Republic. The danger posed by insufficient military resources could only be addressed by the collective action of the Estates, for which reason Christian IV was disposed to summon the nobility’s representatives as well as deputations from the clerical and burgher Estates to Copenhagen. On 26 April Christian IV gave his final instructions to Ebbe Ulfeldt before departing from the theatre of operations. The King had heard that a party of Swedish cavalry had sallied forth from Gothenburg and was laying waste to the Varberg len, driving both people and cattle before them. Ulfeldt was to try and check this Swedish incursion with the forces at his disposal before retreating back into Kristianstad. Christian IV also instructed Ulfeldt’s officers to organize a military force among the royal subjects in the Varberg len. This force would then be used to inflict the Swedes greatest possible harm, with the sensible caveat that the levied troops “would not be placed at too much hazard.” Finally Christian IV instructed Ulfeldt to co-ordinate his efforts with Hannibal Sehested in Norway.

On 1 May Trefoldighed hoisted anchor and departed from Gothenburg.

The very same day when Christian IV prepared to sail back to Copenhagen, his son the Crown Prince prepared a memorandum in Copenhagen based on his experiences from the recent visit to Malmö between 13 and 29 April. The Prince returned from Malmö under the disconcerting impression that the troops stationed there, both cavalry and infantry alike, were in a state of disarray. The companies operated too independently, the Prince wrote, and without any superior commanders such as colonels or lieutenant colonels overseeing their activities. The captains and the ritimestere, who lead the forays and raiding parties against the enemy, did not inform one another of their intentions nor did they co-operate in any meaningful way. From now on, the Prince instructed, whenever the garrison in Malmö planned to carry out reconnoitring, pursue the enemy, make forays, or disrupt the enemy’s intentions by violent action, all the officers should come together and decide collectively how strong the raiding parties should be, who would lead them, and what would be the exact ratio between musketeers and cavalrmen in the designated operational contingents. Personal animosities and jealousies would no longer be allowed to get in the way of military operations. The best way to make the operations more effective, the Prince recommended, would be to reorganize the individual companies into regiments commanded by colonels or alternatively into infantry brigades and cavalry squadrons led by lieutenant colonels.

Needless to say, the Prince’s plan was not conducive to irregular warfare, which benefits from operations by small and dispersed units. Prince Christian’s frustration becomes understandable when one recalls the tactical inefficiency of the Danish raiding parties in Scania, which were typically hybrid formations consisting of both soldiers and armed peasants. So far almost every unit-sized engagement between Swedish forces and Danish raiding parties had resulted in a Danish defeat. The only way to reverse this trend, Prince Christian seems to have thought, was to beef up the Danish raiding parties into major military contingents.

1090 KBB 1644–1645, 73, 22 April 1644.
1091 KBB 1644–1645, 74, 26 April 1644.
1092 PCB 1643–1647, 139–140, 1 May 1644.
It is possible that Prince Christian’s instructions were put to effect in Kristianstad by Ebbe Ulfeldt. On 19 May a French informant reported from Lubeck how the Danish garrison at Kristianstad had fought and defeated 800 Swedes under the command of “Colonel Steinbok.” The action itself had originated from a successful Swedish operation to lift the siege of the Lillö sconce (apparently held by the Swedes), and as a result Kristianstad itself remained besieged by the Swedes “night and day.” This relation is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, if the Danes at Kristianstad had managed to defeat Stenbock’s entire adelsfana, it is likely that this would have alarmed the field command and indeed the riksråd, and left references in the extractskrifvelse, the riksråd’s protocols, or the Rigsregistratur. Secondly, Stenbock’s adelsfana would not have been able to return west to protect Gothenburg or the Swedish lines of communication after such a resounding defeat. The alleged defeat of 800 men would have implied severe losses to Stenbock’s adelsfana and its possible dragoon auxiliaries. While the exact size of Stenbock’s command is difficult to provide at any given time, on paper it consisted of no more than 500 riders – the total number of men provided by the nobility’s rusttjänst. Thirdly, the Gazette’s narrative appears to contradict itself. If the Danes had indeed managed to inflict such a serious defeat on the Swedes, surely the Swedish blockade (if not quite siege) of Kristianstad would have been lifted instead of being reasserted? Or at least the Swedes would not have been able to relieve their fellow soldiers at the Lillö sconce?

However, these source-critical problems do not necessarily mean that the Gazette’s relation was pure fabrication. It appears likely that the Danes indeed ventured out of Kristianstad in substantial numbers as Prince Christian had suggested, and that they sought to combat a Swedish detachment (quite possible part of Stenbock’s command) that had been sent to assist the beleaguered garrison in the Lillö sconce. Instead of a serious Swedish defeat, however, the battle was most likely inconclusive or did not take place at all. Reporting desultory action as a victory would have served many purposes. Firstly, it pleased the imperious Christian IV, who tended to reward failure with punishment. Secondly, it flattered Prince Christian, whose analysis and opinions of the military situation in Scania were being vindicated. Thirdly, it made Ebbe Ulfeldt, the governor of Kristianstad, look good in the eyes of the reigning King and his expected successor. Fourthly, it served propaganda purposes when the news of the Danish victory was reported in European news pamphlets such as the Gazette. Be that as it may, if the Danish sortie did take place in the quantity and manner suggested by Prince Christian in his memorandum, it would have most likely involved peasant irregulars, who were the most obvious source of extra manpower for Ebbe Ulfeldt to beef up his sallying expeditions – even though the Gazette did not specify that any peasants would have contributed to the alleged victory over Stenbock’s adelsfana.

The changed military situation was also reflected in Queen Christina’s directions from 18 May to Gustaf Horn and Lars Kagg. News from Louis De Geer was not entirely encouraging. The Dutch Republic was interested in the Danish-Swedish war only to the extent that the conflict could be utilized to promote Dutch commercial interests in the Baltic Sea, which essentially meant securing Dutch toll-privileges at the Sound. The Dutch were willing to use force to escort their Baltic trading fleet through the Sound,

1093 Gazette du 11 Juin 1644 N. 63, 411.
1094 Mankell 1865, 275.
1095 Gazette du 11 Juin 1644 N. 63, 411.
but any deeper involvement in the war was out of the question, as the continuing war against Spain still remained a military priority for the Dutch. The unenthusiastic attitude of the Republic had forced the riksråd to reconsider its own military priorities in Denmark, and the riksråd had come to the conclusion that the planned invasion against Sjælland had to be postponed and the focus of Swedish military efforts had to be moved closer to the Sound.  

The new strategy placed more importance on the Scanian theatre of war. Christian IV's operations around Gothenburg had revealed two Swedish military deficiencies, the vulnerability of Västergötland and the shortage of troops, which both issues were addressed by the Queen and the riksråd in their new set of instructions. The government wanted to create an armée volante that would react to any threat against Västergötland or Gothenburg, Sweden’s only trading port on the North Sea coast. Once Västergötland and the Göta estuary had been secured, the army could extend its territorial control in Scania and then proceed to lay siege to Malmö. The government realized that Gustaf Horn did not possess sufficient troops for both the siege of Malmö and the new armée volante, for which reason the Queen promised him reinforcements from the Swedish provinces. The riksråd revealed that it was sending to the Sound a new fleet, which was to be manned by 21 companies from the Uppland, Västerbotten, and Hälsingland regiments, “good and robust folk,” as Oxenstierna described the troops to his son. The fleet consisted of 40–50 ships, which were heavily laden with troops, ammunition, and supplies, “and well overseen by officers.”  

The requirements of the fleet necessitated that reinforcements for Horn’s field army would have to be drawn mainly from the eastern parts of the realm. An attached disposition in Christina’s letter lays out the government’s plan for the division of Swedish troops in Scania and Västergötland. Horn’s Scanian field army would consist of 29 companies (3,704 men) of cavalry and 59 companies (8,502) of infantry, which latter would be reinforced with 1,200 recruits from Livonia under the command of Hugo Hamilton. If Torstensson could send 2,000 additional infantrymen from the other side of the Sound, the projected strength of the infantry would reach 11,702 men, of which 1,200 would be designated for garrison duties in the Scanian manors and castles. Horn’s field army would then consist of 3,704 cavalry and 10,502 infantry, a total of 14,206 men.  

For the defence of Västergötland the government proposed a combination of a field army and a garrisoned force. The former would consist of 1,504 cavalry and 2,502 infantry (including 200 dragoons), the latter 2,450 infantry in Gothenburg, Älvsborg, and several sconces. The total strength of the Västergötland army would then reach 46 companies or 6,456 men (the riksråd’s own math does not quite add up). The riksråd did not specify whence the projected armée volante would draw its troops; this issue was clearly left at Horn’s own discretion. The riksråd merely suggested that the armée volante would consist of 800–1,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry. In addition to defending Gothenburg, Älvsborg, and Västergötland from Hannibal Sehested and his Norwegian army, the riksråd also envisioned an offensive role for the armée volante.

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1096 RAOSB, i: 16:2, 470–471, 18 May 1644, Christina’s instructions to Gustaf Horn and Lars Kagg.  
1097 SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Johan Axelsson Oxenstierna av Södermörre E 979, 7 June 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Oxenstierna.  
1098 RAOSB, i: 16:2, 476, 18 May 1644, Christina to Horn and Kagg.  
1099 Ibid., 477.
A special cavalry contingent reinforced with the armée volante might lodge itself in the Norwegian Viken, subject the enemy population to contributions, master Marstrand, and blockade Castle Bohus from all sides with the help of the Gothenburg garrison. By doing so the Swedes could sever connections between Denmark and Norway, gain control of the North Sea coast, and revive maritime commerce out of Gothenburg. Once Västergötland and its peoples were secured from enemy aggression, the war could be transferred to the enemy’s territory “for his own ruin.”

The “highest axiom” in terms of offensive warfare remained the opening of the Sound by taking Malmö, and any operations against Bohus and Viken were subordinated to this end. In the riksråd’s view no one else was as qualified to oversee the defence of Västergötland and to lead the offensive operations in Scania as Lars Kagg on account of his intimate knowledge of Västergötland and its bordering territories. The government instructions were not absolute orders, and the riksråd was indeed anxious to learn Horn’s and Kagg’s opinions on them. For this end they were instructed to discuss these plans with the riksråd’s envoy Jacob Törnkiöld, who would then forward the generals’ thoughts to the government in Stockholm. Horn and Kagg, who discussed the riksråd’s proposition at Landskrona in July, agreed with the government view that postponing the invasion of Sjælland was for the time being a perfectly reasonable plan.

The riksråd returned to the issue of the defence of Västergötland in early July. By then it was already decided that Kagg would take command of the armée volante in Västergötland. The government wanted to keep Kagg in a short leash. Therefore the riksråd sent the drot Per Brahe personally to Västergötland “to animate the land, oversee its defence, and to correspond with Kagg, to convey troops that are sent there for him [Kagg], and to have for his own assistance a secretary and an administrative officer [cammerare].” Brahe had already visited Jönköping in January 1644, when the Queen had advised Gustaf Horn to discuss the latest set of military instructions with Lars Kagg and Per Brahe, who latter “was now on his way to that town [Jönköping].” Brahe was well-versed in domestic politics, local administration, and judicial affairs, but had no experience of warfare or military matters.

Brahe’s assignment to Västergötland reminds one of what John Lynn called guerre du cabinet during the wars of Louis XIV. This meant the conduct of campaigns at strategic level with members of the government at close attendance. Simon Pepper already recognized signs of “command by remote control” during the reigns of Cosimo de’ Medici of Florence and Philip II of Spain in the late sixteenth century. The respective governments, meaning the workaholics Duke Cosimo and Philip II themselves, were anxious to intervene in war and to oversee its conduct. Government intervention in military affairs reflects the emergence of ‘military politics’, which meant the co-ordination of army movements and the securing of domestic resources

1100 RAOSB, i: 16:2, 473–474, 18 May 1644, Christina to Horn and Kagg.
1101 Ibid., 474.
1102 Ibid., 475.
1103 Vessberg 1895, 36.
1104 SRRP, x, 561, 4 July 1644.
1105 RAOSB, i: 16:2, 456, 8 January 1644, Christina to Gustaf Horn.
1106 Lynn 1999, 71.
and political support for the timely achievement of strategic goals. As a result of this reorientation of military decision-making from the battlefield towards the cabinet, the correspondence between commanders and government representatives greatly increased. Government intervention in military affairs also encouraged growing interest in topographical matters, which in its turn facilitated the development of military cartography.\(^\text{1107}\)

Brahe’s assignment to Västergötland did not therefore constitute a construction of an intermediate command echelon between field commanders and the government, but rather the repositioning of the ‘cabinet’ closer to the seat of war. As an office-holding member of the riksråd Brahe represented its collective authority anywhere he went. The riksråd in its turn still ruled on behalf of the deceased Gustaf Adolf – Christina did not reach political maturity until December 1644, when she turned eighteen. Even then Christina’s bid for true sovereignty would have to wait until 1649, when Christina subordinated the aristocracy to her will by pressuring the riksråd to accept Karl Gustav of Pfalz-Zweibrücken (future Charles X) as her successor.\(^\text{1108}\)

The aims of Brahe’s guerre du cabinet appeared limited. The riksråd’s instructions suggest that Brahe’s primary mission was to facilitate the transfer of troops through Västergötland by maintaining government control over civilian/soldier relations. Brahe’s presence in Västergötland, the riksråd apparently expected, would check the soldiers’ potential excesses towards the civilian population and conversely ensure that the civilians complied peacefully with the demands of war. The projection of central authority to the theatre of war via Per Brahe and his field chancellery can also be seen as an attempt to maintain institutional separation between military and civilian administrations. The constant transit of troops through Västergötland plus the ever-present threat of an enemy invasion put pressure on local landskövdingar to intervene in military affairs, which the government reform of 1634 had assigned at the local level as the preserve of the landsöverstar or land-colonels, who commanded the 28 land regiments in Sweden.\(^\text{1109}\) Brahe’s duties as a representative of the riksråd removed from the landskövdingar any need to assume direct responsibility over military-political decision-making at the local level.

The riksråd continued to discuss ways of increasing troop numbers after its instructions to Horn and Kagg. On 23 May the riksråd contemplated levying men from the Bergslagen mining zone and sending them as reinforcements to Horn and Kagg. The officers for these levied contingents were to be detached from the administration of the krigskollegium.\(^\text{1110}\) The riksråd returned to the same subject on 5 June. There still existed three realistic sources of additional troops, the riksråd pondered. One way was to increase recruitments at home. Another option was to try and raise another recruited regiment at Riga. The third way was to levy miners from Bergslagen. “Recruitment was regarded as onerous”, the scribe recorded in the minutes. This comment appears to allude to the high costs of hiring and maintaining paid professional soldiers. Instead of hiring professional soldiers the riksråd agreed to levy “a militia, which was regarded safer to manage here in the homeland.”\(^\text{1111}\) The riksråd held on to its decision to levy

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\(^{1107}\) Pepper 2010, 183–188.

\(^{1108}\) Roberts 1962, 44.

\(^{1109}\) Herlitz 1928, 113.

\(^{1110}\) SRRP, x, 535, 23 May 1644.

\(^{1111}\) SRRP, x, 539, 5 June 1644.
miners from Bergslagen: on 15 June the riksråd decided to raise a regiment-sized force of miners, half of whom were to be sent to Vänersborg, half to Kalmar. For the time being the riksråd desisted from further conscriptions and levies. On 10 July Axel Oxenstierna suggested recruiting four new regiments of hired soldiers “because it does not benefit us to raise the commonalty”, as Oxenstierna rationalized his view.

The shortage of troops was not the only obstacle that hindered the Swedish war effort in Scania and Halland. There were also occasional shortages of supplies, particularly of munitions. Axel Oxenstierna reminded the riksråd time and again that Horn needed to be supplied with further “provisions, folk, and gunpowder.” On 5 June Oxenstierna ordered that reinforcements and supplies would be transported to Scania via Kalmar. This was perfectly sensible, as many of the auxiliary troops and supplies came overseas from Finland and Livonia, and Kalmar was the safest port of embarkation near the Scanian border. Provision-wise Horn’s most pressing shortage concerned salt. In late June Horn had written to the riksråd and requested them to ship to the Scanian coast enough salt that he could fill his magazines with it.

4.8 MALMÖ BESIEGED

The supervised retreat of the Laholm garrison did not go quite as the Swedes had intended. Many soldiers slipped away from Christian Sinckler’s column and “only relatively few followed him to Kristianstad.” It is quite possible that at least some of the escaped soldiers joined the snapphanar-bands in the woods. After the Danish garrison had departed from Laholm, Gustaf Horn strengthened the town’s defensive works. Lars Kagg took up similar enterprise at Landskrona. Meanwhile Hans Wachtmeister operated between Malmö and Ystad, subjecting the local population to contributions and keeping an eye on Malmö in case its garrison might organize some kind of an expedition out of the city. On 1 June Horn departed from Laholm with 1,500 foot and ten companies of cavalry and advanced along the Halmstad road towards the River Nissan. On his way Horn managed to meet Johan Strömfeldt, the former Swedish resident in Copenhagen, who was being exchanged for his Danish counterpart at Fullebro, just outside Halmstad. According to the relation from 12 June, Horn only made passing conversation with Strömfeldt, but he nevertheless must have managed to acquire fresh intelligence about the events in Copenhagen and the Danish-held parts of Scania and Halland. Some four weeks later, on 8 June, Strömfeldt was in Stockholm giving an account of recent developments in Denmark.

On 2 June a group of Swedish cavalrymen and dragoons crossed the rain-swollen River Nissan one mile north of Halmstad and pillaged the town’s surroundings, bringing back with them one thousand heads of cattle. The Danes sent out a cavalry

\[\text{SRRP, x, 545, 15 June 1644.}\]
\[\text{SRRP, x, 563, 10 July 1644.}\]
\[\text{SRRP, x, 539, 5 June 1644.}\]
\[\text{SRRP, x, 564, 11 July 1644.}\]
\[\text{RAOSB, ii:8, 312, 12 June 1644, kort relation.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., 312–313.}\]
\[\text{SRRP, x, 562, 8 June 1644.}\]
party of their own to stop the Swedes, but they were soon driven back and forced to seek the covering fire of the town’s artillery batteries. Halmstad did not hold many secrets from the Swedes. A report from 29 May, given by a Danish prisoner of war, a gefreider or cavalryman named Efraim Larsson, had revealed the exact size and composition of the Danish garrison in Halmstad. The city was governed by Niels Krabbe, and the commandant of the garrison was Major Patrick Dunbar (“Dumback”). Krabbe commanded personally 150 and Dunbar 300 men. Subordinated to Krabbe and Dunbar were three captains, who commanded 1,050 soldiers between them. The total strength of the garrison was therefore 1,500 men, to which number someone had later added an unquantified “hallandska adelsfanan till häst”, or Hallander rostjeneste-cavalry. Larsson’s report does not specify whether any of the soldiers were armed peasants; the report simply differentiates between Danes and Germans, which latter group consisted of 250 soldiers. Strangely enough, Captain Städing’s company of 150 foot-soldiers included 40 men whom Larsson claimed were Swedes.1119

The veracity of Larsson’s information is difficult to ascertain due to the absence of muster rolls from the Halmstad garrison. However, Andreas Karlsson and Anna Karlsson have compared the receipts of food and drink consumption in the Halmstad garrison to the numerical company-strengths reported by Larsson and have come to the conclusion that Larsson’s report was generally accurate regarding the numerical strength of the companies.1120 Larsson also provided detailed information on the nature, strength, and positions of the various defensive installations in Halmstad. This information covered artillery, which Larsson not only quantified but also qualified according to the field pieces’ type and calibre.1121

The report was an exemplary piece of military intelligence, as it identified the leading enemy officers, divulged their ranks, and specified the number of companies and their respective strengths. It was very similar to an earlier report extracted from a captured Polish cavalryman in 1627. In his relation the “Tawarri” or man-at-arms named Siemon Triwotsky had divulged the size of the Polish garrison at Grudziądz and specified unit types and their strengths and even identified individual officers.1122 In 1626, another Polish captive, a nobleman named Jelski, quantified the Polish losses in a recent skirmish (100 dead) and even named individual officers killed in action (among them an English colonel named Asten).1123 Similarly, in 1638, Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar had received intelligence of the Imperialists’ operational plans and troop movements from both intercepted letters and captured enemy soldiers.1124 Professional soldiers like Larsson, Jelski, and Triwotsky were worth taking prisoner for the sake of such nuanced information alone. As Andreas Karlsson and Anna Karlsson have pointed out, professional soldiers need not have been coerced to produce information but they might have even provided it willingly – possibly against bribes or as part of their transferral of loyalty from one side to another.1125

1119 SRA Strödda handlingar/Danska kriget 1643–1645 RA/754/2/M 1291, 29 May 1644, interrogation report.
1120 Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 67–70.
1121 SRA Strödda handlingar/Danska kriget 1643–1645 RA/754/2/M 1291, 29 May 1644, interrogation report.
1123 RAOSB, i: 3, 355, 14 September 1626, Axel Oxenstierna to Gabriel Oxenstierna.
1124 HH, xxxiv: 1, 5, Fältmarskalken Rutger von Aschebergs journal och korrespondens till år 1680.
1125 Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 72.
On 3 June the Swedes constructed a bridge over the Nissan, which allowed Horn to move his entire army to the outskirts of Halmstad. Horn set up quarters at Arlösa, whence he issued “brandskattsbreff” to all the surrounding localities. The letters of extortion requested all peasants to bring four thalers, one full casket of bread, and half a casket of beer, “which taxation they delivered voluntarily little by little.” The following day Horn dispatched from Arlösa 350 cavalymen under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Häkan Nilsson. He was ordered to co-operate with Fredrik Stenbock’s adelsfana in clearing the Torup road of insurgent peasants, who had banded together and generally “acted pretentiously in these areas.” Stenbock failed to show up with his rustfjänsrider, but Nilsson’s cavalry contingent was nevertheless strong enough to disperse the peasants. Once again most of the peasants scattered in panic hither and thither. Those peasants bold enough to confront the Swedes were quickly cut down.

It was around this time that Ebbe Ulfeldt was recalled from Scania and assigned with a new post as the governor of Ösel. Vilhelm Vessberg regarded Ulfeldt’s departure “as a great loss to the Danes.” Ulfeldt’s proficiency in small war and his rapid and unanticipated manoeuvres had often thrown the Swedes into confusion and placed many hindrances along their way, Vessberg wrote. Vessberg’s assessment of Ebbe Ulfeldt’s achievements in the field of irregular warfare seems justified. While Ulfeldt did not score any actual military victories against the Swedes, he nevertheless greatly increased the friction of war for them and turned Kristianstad into a dangerous salient behind Swedish lines of operation. As long as Ulfeldt was in charge of Kristianstad, the level of irregular activity in Halland and Scania remained high; with his departure in the summer of 1644 the frequency and scale of Danish irregular operations began to wane.

Despite his aggressive operations around Halmstad, Gustaf Horn did not make any move against the city itself. On 9 June Horn returned to Laholm, where he oversaw preparations to make the Småland border and lines of communication between Västergötland and Halland more secure. These preparations included the construction of sconces at Malaklöfa and Nissastigen. On 12 June Horn and his field army departed from Laholm and proceeded towards Scania and Ystad via Landskrona. Horn chose to advance along the coastal route so that he could maintain better communications with the Swedish fleet. Horn left part of his army behind to protect the strategic rear.

Horn reached Landskrona on 15 June. After meeting with Kagg to discuss the latest instructions from Stockholm, Horn continued his march south on 18 June. According to Heinrich Boeckler, Horn left behind some sick soldiers (“aegrotis”). This is the first verified instance, in which we hear of pestilence appearing in the Scanian theatre of war. Earlier in June we learn from the correspondence of Prince Christian that some of the 500 Danish soldiers that had been employed in the construction of outworks in Malmö had fallen ill after having drunk bad water to quench their thirst. If contaminated water was indeed the source of the epidemic, it is likely that the disease would have been cholera, typhus, dysentery, or a combination of all three (see chapter

1126 RAOSB, ii: 8, 313, 12 June 1644, kort relation.
1127 Ibid., 313.
1128 Vessberg 1895, 30.
1129 RAOSB, ii:8, 313–314, 12 June 1644, kort relation.
1130 Boeckler 1679, 175.
5.3). Prince Christian nevertheless sought to combat the disease by ordering that from thereon all the soldiers employed in construction work would be paid six shillings per day so that they could buy safer beer to drink.1131

Later on 18 June Horn reached Skrävlinge, where he struck camp. The Swedes were immediately forced to defend themselves against fierce cavalry sallies from Malmö. Tage Thott threw into action all of his cavalry save the dragoons, who were either kept inside the city walls or used to conduct reconnoitring outside the city. The Swedes managed to push the Danes back to the city gates after a fierce fight.1132 The fighting at the gates of Malmö had distracted Horn to the extent that he failed to properly secure the village of Skrävlinge. There his incurious daughter Agneta, who was investigating the apparently deserted village in the company of two servants, suddenly ran into a group of 80 Danish dragoons. For some inexplicable reason the Danes mistook Agneta Horn and her attendants for a Swedish vanguard and rapidly retreated from Skrävlinge. When Gustaf Horn learned of his daughter’s close encounter with the enemy, he ordered a detachment of 200 musketeers to move to Skrävlinge and to make sure that no harm would come to his daughter or any other member of her entourage.1133

The Danes carried out a number of sallies from Malmö, none of which appear to have included any elements of armed peasants or even burgher militias.1134 We do know that armed peasants were present in Malmö in large enough numbers to cause disturbances inside the city. In April the burghers had complained to Prince Christian about conscripted soldiers and levied peasants, who had broken into the burghers’ houses “every day and night” and carried off household items, money, valuables, and even domestic animals. This caused the Prince to instruct Falk Lykke and other officers to keep better discipline among the conscripts and levied peasants.1135 These problems were not unique to Malmö, as military discipline tended to deteriorate in all cities, which offered many opportunities for vice and crime. In September 1645 the King himself was forced to intervene in Copenhagen and to order the city council to round up all insubordinate and thieving soldiers and to deliver them to military officers for proper punishment.1136

The raids from Malmö had been conducted almost solely by cavalry and dragoons, supported occasionally by regular infantry. Early modern sallies would have been much like modern-day commando raids that require the deployment of well-trained soldiers. They had to combine rapid movement with overwhelming violence, which set certain requirements for the troops regarding training, tactics, and equipment. The Danish sallies were first directed at preventing the enemy from striking camp outside Malmö, later at recovering cattle and provisions that had been abandoned outside the city. In all these instances the sallying parties had to cover some distance before reaching their mission objectives, for which reason it was sensible to form the sallying parties from cavalry and dragoons. Peasant irregulars, who mostly fought

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1131 PCB 1643–1647, 161–162, 12 May 1644.
1132 Boeckler 1679, 176–177.
1133 Horn 1961, 64; Milles 2015, 101–102.
1134 RAOSB, ii:8, 314–316, 1 August 1644, extractskrifvelse.
1135 PCB 1643–1647, 131, 24 April 1644.
1136 KD, v, 289, 17 September 1645.
on foot, would not have been suitable for these missions. Rapid and fierce sallies also required the kind unit coherence, observance of mission goals, and tactical proficiency, which ill-trained peasants did not have. Even if the Scanian peasants did excel in the use of rifled muskets, their weapons of choice would have been ill-suited for shock attacks that called for the use of close-range fusillade and melee weapons. The levied peasants may nevertheless have proved themselves useful in sieges as sharpshooters, but the existing Swedish sources do not in any way qualify the accuracy or origin of the Danish fusillade during the sieges of Malmö, Laholm, and Landskrona.

The clashes outside Malmö ballooned into major military engagements in the gossip-like news media of the day. On 24 July a Swedish messenger reported from Stralsund that General Major Sperling had fought a large Danish contingent with his cavalry, killing many enemies and forcing the rest to seek safety behind the walls of Malmö. This incident may refer to the events of 27 June, when Lieutenant Colonel Klingspår (and not Sperling) had conducted a morning raid against the Malmö suburb. Klingspår’s expedition carried away cattle, which the Danes had brought out to a pasture beneath a sconce. The Swedish audacity provoked the Danes into launching an ill-considered sally with 160 foot and cavalry. At first Klingspår feigned retreat but then suddenly turned his contingent around and charged the pursuing Danes. The surprised Danes lost sixteen men killed and another four taken prisoner. The Danes also failed to recover any of the captured cattle. The action did not immediately die out but instead continued as fusillade and small-unit skirmishing for two or three hours. Finally the Danes sent out a herald, who requested Horn to return the stolen cattle. Horn agreed to do so against a ransom of 2,000 thalers, which sum the humiliated Danes duly paid.

The plan for Malmö’s conquest had called for co-operation between Gustaf Horn’s field army and the Swedish fleet. However, on 17 August the riksråd had to inform Horn that on account of the disease among the shipcrews the naval preparations had been delayed, and the closing of the sailing season forced the fleet to stay at port. If, on account of the changed circumstances, Horn decided to lift the siege and leave Malmö, the enemy would be able to bring in supplies from the surrounding countryside, which would not only strengthen the enemy but also create shortage of supplies for Horn’s own army, the riksråd warned him. The decision to stay or leave was left at Horn’s own discretion.

Horn decided to stay and continue the siege of Malmö. On 1 August he had already written to the krigskollegium and prompted it to provide him with the “artollerie staten requirerer.” The guns did not yet exist but had to be ordered from the “factorien” or cannon-foundries. These cannons would then “complete” the siege works Horn had planned to construct around Malmö. Horn was optimistic that the existing magazines were sufficiently stocked to allow the Swedish army survive the winter in its entrenchments. The government instructed the landshövdingar to employ the commonalty in the manufacture of fur coats, shirts, socks, and shoes for the soldiers. The government also promised reinforcements for Horn, namely

1137 Gazette du 27 Août 1644 N. 101, 693.
1138 RAOSB, ii: 8, 314, 1 August 1644, extractskrifvelse.
1139 Vessberg 1895, 40.
1140 KrA 0001/E c/11 (1644), fol. 1127, 1 August 1644, Gustaf Horn to the krigskollegium.
1141 Vessberg 1895, 40.
Hamilton’s regiment, which had disembarked at Kalmar on 18 August, and the two Finnish cavalry squadrons from Stålhandske’s and Wittenberg’s regiments, which had arrived in Stockholm later that month. These preparations were carried out under certain degree of urgency: Horn had learned from Danish prisoners that Christian IV was assembling a naval expedition to relieve Malmö. Horn therefore urged the riksråd to send the fleet despite the difficulties and the late sailing season. The riksråd still insisted that the fleet could not be sent on account of rampant disease among the crewmen, and that the Danes were not likely to attack Horn across the Sound now that 3,000 of their men had marched off with the Imperialist Generalissimo Gallas.

4.9 PEASANT AGAINST PEASANT AT HALLARYD

On 5 August 1644 a Danish informant reported from Kristianstad: “Our peasants here have encouraged themselves and become Snaphaner, akin to those in Holstein.” The pamphlet Relation fra Fyn Lybeck, which printed this news, went on to elaborate on the manner of warfare conducted by the Scanian snapphanar. The peasants congregated in the woods “and gave the enemy great resistance”, the Relation reported. Only recently the peasants had delivered to Kristianstad 60–80 heads of cattle, which they had recaptured from the marauding Swedes, as well as a brand new wagon that had belonged to the Swedish “Commendanten paa Tommerup”, meaning the cloister of Tommarp in southern Scania. What loot the insurgents could not (or perhaps would not) deliver to Kristianstad, they would bury in the woods – along with the bodies of the slain Swedish soldiers. The discovery of a “large grave filled with dead bodies” (revealed to the Swedes by an “old hag”) led the Swedes to torch several peasant cottages in reprisal. The Swedes also sent out a “strong party” to hunt down the snapphanar in their sylvan hideouts, but the density of the woods and undergrowth protected the insurgents from discovery.

We can learn more about the activities of the Scanian insurgents from the reports, which Gustaf Horn issued on 24 and 25 September. During the preceding fortnight, Horn related, there had been little enemy activity in Malmö, as the siege had atrophied to sporadic exchanges of fire. Horn also reported of two peasant parties that had attempted to overcome the Swedish garrisons at Knutstorp and Eriksholm (villages west of Helsingborg). Both parties had been attacked and “ruinerat” by Lieutenant Colonel Burmeister’s Finnish cavalry. Two or three hundred peasants had been killed in the action, Horn claimed in his report.

Attached to the report of 24 September was another relation from 25 and 27 September. The report was issued at Markaryd, so it did not come directly from Gustaf

1142 Vessberg 1895, 41.
1143 SRA RR, B223, 4 September 1644.
1144 Relation fra Fyn Lybeck 1644, 4.
1145 Ibid., 4.
1146 Ibid., 4.
1147 Ibid., 4.
1148 RAOSB, ii:8, 316–317, 24 September 1644, uthur svenske lägret.
1149 Ibid., 318.
Horn himself. According to the report, the enemy had crossed the River Lagan only two miles from Knäred by barges and improvised bridges. A Swedish counterforce from Knäred had then destroyed the barges and the bridges, thus cutting the Danes’ line of retreat. An unquantified number of Danish soldiers had managed to cross the river and were currently making roads unsafe for travel. This event remains confusing, as the report does not specify whether the Danes crossed the river from north or south (Lagan runs westwards from Markaryd to the North Sea). If they crossed the river from the north they must have been soldiers from the blockaded Halmstad, possibly making their way south to join the Danish garrisons in Kristianstad or Malmö. If they crossed the river from the south, they were either a military expedition from Kristianstad or part of that cluster of snapphanar and peasant irregulars that was threatening the Swedish outposts near Helsingborg.

Over the course of the preceding week the Danes had also pillaged eight farms in the Hallaryd parish district further east. In response the inhabitants of Hallaryd had assembled a hybrid party of 2,000 “cavalrymen, dragoons, soldiers, and peasants.” The riksråd’s instructions to Gustaf Horn from 5 January 1645 reveal that the government had sent to Markaryd one company of cavalry, one company of infantry, and an unquantified number of dragoons that Conrad von Falkenberg had managed to muster in the Kalmar län. These appear to have been the regular troops used to reinforce the much larger force of levied peasants. The party was mustered and organized without prior guidance from Stockholm, Lars Kågg, or Per Brahe. The mission of the Hallaryd contingent was to cross the border, “revenge the damage that the Jutes had inflicted on our Swedish peasants here at the Hallaryd parish”, and to destroy the “fiendish party that invaded so often and pillaged.” The report from 25 September also mentioned that the enemy had made numerous attempts to assault Hallaryd itself, but his attempts had been thwarted every time thanks to the vigilance of the peasant sentries.

The report from 27 September related how the aforementioned hybrid force had slipped across the Dano-Swedish border on the morning of 26 September. The Swedish vanguard had consisted of cavalry, led by Lieutenant Per Törneson and Inspector Lars Nilsson. Nilsson’s title refers to the frälseinspektorer, who oversaw the management of tax-exempted estates on the owner’s behalf. In the case of frälseinspektorer this usually meant the management of large manorial estates; petty frälse-estates were managed by officials known as amtmän.

The Swedish party passed their own forward sentries on the border and approached a hill, on top of which the Danish peasants had placed their own outpost. Somewhat further east ran the River Helge in a north-south direction. Törneson, who was suspicious of the hill and the beech woods behind it, sent out twelve horsemen to reconnoitre the surroundings. The two Danish watch-units on the hill, all in all some hundred men, spotted the Swedish scouts and began to descend from the hill, all the while clamouring for the Swedes to come closer. The bluster of the Danish peasants clearly irritated the author of the report, who described the Danes as “scoundrels and traitors.”

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1150 RAOSB, ii:8, 316, 25 September 1644, ifrån Marckarydh.
1151 Ibid., 317.
1152 Katajala 1990, 8.
1153 RAOSB, ii:8, 317, 27 September 1644, vijdare ifrån Marckarydh.

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At the bottom of the hill the Danes suddenly observed Törneson’s company of 30 or 40 riders, one hundred dragoons led by Nilsson, plus an unquantified number of Swedish peasants. Surprised by the appearance of the Swedish reinforcements, the Danes stopped their advance but not their loud clamouring. Törnesön and Nilsson split their forces in two, encircled the Danish peasants, and cut their line of retreat to the beech forest. What followed was a veritable battle of annihilation, in which 78 Danish peasants were shot dead. “Some peasants, if only quite few, saved themselves by swimming over the River Helge”, the report related. The Danish peasants had been subordinated to a captain, who had fled from the battle and sought safety by climbing into a tall beech. Swedish riders found him and “shot him down with their pistols.” Two peasants were captured and given quarter, “the rest fell in battle.” Only two Swedes were killed in battle and none were seriously injured, despite the fact that the “Jutish peasants shot mighty accurately.” Most of the Danish peasants allegedly originated from the village of Visseltofta only a few miles from the Småland border. Later a few more Danes were killed in their own village.

The Swedes did not proceed beyond Visseltofta but turned around and returned to their own side of the border. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, Visseltofta and other villages in the Göinge district already paid brandskatt to the Swedes, so it would have been excessive to collect further contributions from them. Secondly, the Hallaryd peasants wanted to make sure their Danish neighbours knew the punitive purpose behind the expedition and wanted to prevent any rumours that might suggest the Swedes had simply come to plunder and pillage.\footnote{RAOSB, ii:8, 317, 27 September 1644, vijdare ifrån Marckarydh.}

The narrative presented by the Swedish extractskriftvelse indicates that the Danish peasants raiding the Hallaryd district did not act on their own initiative as mere brigands, as they appear to have been led by a military officer. This view is supported by Danish sources. The protocols of the peasant diets in the Fjäre and Viske districts in Halland, closely studied by Andreas Karlsson and Anna Karlsson, reveal that the local bailiffs had proscribed any unauthorized “fire-ransoming” of such Swedish subjects that had already paid contributions to the Danish authorities. Such proactivity by Danish peasants would be considered as thievery and was to be punished accordingly, the bailiffs had threatened.\footnote{Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 104–105.} \footnote{Ibid., 105–106.} In practice the authorities generally settled to confiscating the loot of the transgressors.\footnote{Ibid., 105–106.} The context of the Danish raids into Hallaryd, therefore, does not appear to have been brigandage or private war between rival peasant communities but rather irregular or even hybrid warfare initiated and directed by the Danish military authorities.

### 4.10 GUSTAF HORN’S RETREAT FROM Malmö

When Torstensson shifted his theatre of operations to Holstein in the summer of 1644, direct threat against the Danish islands dissipated. Christian IV saw in Torstensson’s departure an opportunity to break the siege of Malmö. He was also encouraged by intercepted correspondence between Gustaf Horn and Stockholm, which seemed to suggest that the Swedish fleet was not prepared to take any further action in
1644.\textsuperscript{1157} While Christian IV made use of intercepted enemy intelligence, he was also worried about possible Swedish spies in Denmark. On 22 August the government instructed the King’s natural son Hans Ulrik Gyldenløve, the lensman of Kronborg and Frederiksborg, to arrest and interrogate one Anne Nelauses, a housewife from Seeby near Landskrona. The government suspected that Nelauses was in fact a Swedish spy, who gathered intelligence on Danish military affairs during her repeated visits to Helsingør. If it indeed appeared that Anne Nelauses had informed the enemy “of the situation in the land”, Gyldenløve was authorized to prosecute, trial, and punish her.\textsuperscript{1158}

In late August Christian IV dispatched Anders Bille with 6,000 reinforcements to Malmö.\textsuperscript{1159} A few days later Christian IV himself arrived to Malmö with 5,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry and dragoons.\textsuperscript{1160} The stream of reinforcements from Fyn and Sjælland soon ballooned the army to “four thousand Germans, an equal number of Danes, and three thousand other soldiers from diverse other nations.”\textsuperscript{1161} By the end of October Christian IV commanded 13,000 soldiers in Scania.\textsuperscript{1162} Horn was now decisively outnumbered and consequently decided to withdraw his wounded and the civilian baggage train to Helsingborg.\textsuperscript{1163} On 4 September Anders Bille attacked out of the city with a cavalry contingent, but failed to make any headway against the Swedes, who had fortified themselves inside the siege works. The next day Christian IV emerged from Malmö with 4,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry and dragoons. The two armies then faced each other for a fortnight. Instead of assaulting the Swedish positions Christian IV decided to bombard the enemy into submission. Either the Swedish counterworks were outstandingly fortified or the Danish artillery was inept, as the bombardment only managed to kill five Swedish soldiers and some horses and other animals. The extractskrifvelse from 24 September ridiculed the Danes’ excessive and wasteful use of munitions.\textsuperscript{1164}

Some skirmishing did take place outside Malmö. Hans Wachtmeister defeated at the Önsvala Bridge a Danish contingent of 350 cavalrymen and 50 dragoons that had been sent to capture a Swedish transport column. One hundred Danes were killed and 30 taken prisoner. Christian IV’s appearance at Malmö also energized the local snapphanar. Drawing in cavalry reinforcements from Laholm and Engelholm, Lieutenant Colonel Burmeister engaged and destroyed a peasant contingent near Tommarp sometime in mid-September. Some days later Burmeister’s cavalry destroyed two other peasant parties that had been besieging Swedish garrisons at Knutstorp and Eriksholm. Two or three hundred peasants were allegedly slain in these actions.\textsuperscript{1165}

Horn’s position inside the siege entrenchments worsened with each passing day. There was no sign of any Swedish naval relief expedition, and the casualties continued

\textsuperscript{1157} Vessberg 1895, 41–42.
\textsuperscript{1158} KBB 1644–1645, 100–101, 22 August 1644.
\textsuperscript{1159} Boeckler 1679, 183; Vessberg 1895, 42.
\textsuperscript{1160} Vessberg 1895, 41–42.
\textsuperscript{1161} Gazette du 29 Octobre 1644 N. 132, 914.
\textsuperscript{1162} Gazette du 19 Novembre 1644 N. 137, 966; Vessberg 1895, 41–42.
\textsuperscript{1163} Vessberg 1895, 42.
\textsuperscript{1164} RAOSB, ii:8, 316–317, 24 September 1644, uthur thet svenske lägret för Malmö.
\textsuperscript{1165} Ibid., 317–318.
to mount every day on account of the pestilence inside the Swedish camp. On 27 September the Swedes set fire to their camp and marched in a battle formation towards Uppåkra near Lund. The Swedish army moved out from Malmö while screening cavalry contingents and rear guard artillery covered the retreat. This was very similar to the kind of battle-arrayed marching order, which military theorists such as Raimondo Montecuccoli and Sieur de Praissac described in their contemporaneous military treatises. An army would march in three separate contingents, vanguard, main force (battaille), and rear guard. Thus the army could always “deliver combat at least three times”, as Praissac explained. The ideal marching order for all these contingents, Montecuccoli argued, was one that could file out into ranks in the sequence of its arrival to the battlefield. This meant that cavalry, which typically took up position on the army’s wings, would be placed at the head and rear of a marching column. Artillery would be dispersed at certain intervals among the centre of the marching column, marching side by side with infantry and preceded and followed by cavalry, which would thus form wings for the artillery once it arrived to the battlefield. 

Horn’s violent retreat from Malmö was a relatively rare occurrence in mid-seventeenth-century warfare. Not many major engagements in the Thirty Years War were fought while one side was in the process of marching from one location to another. A necessary precondition for such an operation, Edward Cooke enlightened his readers, was an unobstructed route of retreat. Woods, canyons, and bridges were potentially hazardous choke points that had to be secured lest they blocked the route of retreat. One such choke point would have been the Önsvala Bridge between Malmö and Uppåkra. Wachtmeister’s earlier operation against the Danish cavalry guarding the bridge had therefore secured an open route of retreat for Horn’s army.

Horn’s employment of his rear guard diverged from the established practice, which saw the rear guard engaging the pursuing enemy’s vanguard and then, if possible, breaking contact with the enemy in order to join the rest of the army. Horn’s rear guard synchronized its retreat in a way that would maintain contact with the enemy. Not many seventeenth-century armies would have been capable of such an operation, and an organized and battle-arrayed retreat is no small feat even for modern-day armies. Horn’s retreat from Malmö testifies to the brilliance of Gustaf Adolf, whose military innovations had sought to combine movement with offensive capability and defensive strength.

Wachtmeister’s previous attack at the Önsvala Bridge can be seen similarly as a vanguard opening way for the rest of the army. If Wachtmeister’s operation at Önsvala was indeed directly connected to the retreat from Malmö, which followed several days later, then Horn violated Montecuccoli’s rule about not dispersing the separate corps too far away from one another. Overly venturous corps ran the danger of losing their way and their contact with the rest of the army, Montecuccoli warned his readers. Praissac shared these sentiments and advised the commander to keep his army in one body when marching through enemy land:

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1166 Praissac 1639, 12.
1167 Cooke 1628, 10, 13; Montecuccoli 1756, 85–86.
1168 Cooke 1628, 40–41.
1169 Roberts 1958, 246.
1170 Montecuccoli 1756, 87.
Especially if it be divided by rivers, covered with woods, and mountainous, and if there be in it places of strength, and a mean armie to defend itself; for it always molests you, cuts off the passage of victuall, hindreth you armie in their march, always troubleth them on the Flanks or Reare, waites upon advantages, seeks occasions of surprising, and continually layeth ambushes.\textsuperscript{1171}

No advice could have been more pertinent for armies that were engaged in warfare against irregular opponents. Praissac’s characterization of early modern small war comes close to Clausewitzian concepts of people’s war and friction of war, and the modern proposal of irregular battle-space as an ‘explosive emptiness’.\textsuperscript{1172}

\textbf{4.11 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE}

When the Swedes reached Uppåkra they reverted to positional warfare and took positions behind field works. As Horn had no access to magazines or arsenals, he was concerned about the supply of ammunition and requested further replenishments from the \textit{krigskollegium}.\textsuperscript{1173} Christian IV struck camp at Alrup several miles to the northeast, and the situation between the two field armies once again degenerated into a stalemate. On 14 October Wachtmeister carried out a “sharp execution” against a hybrid group of 300 peasants and 40 dragoons in Hallesta, just outside Lund. The Danes retreated into Hallesta and barricaded themselves inside the houses. Oblivious to any potential collateral damage, Wachtmeister torched the entire village together with its defenders and inhabitants. “Only two old hags and one small child were rescued from the flames”, the \textit{extractskrifvelse} from 22 October reported. The Swedes had counted 150 shots from the enemy; after the fires died down the Swedes recovered from the ashes an equal number of burnt and disfigured muskets. More than half of the peasants, it seemed, were armed with nothing but “spears, pitchforks, and other such instruments.”\textsuperscript{1174} The Danes’ inability to squeeze off in average more than one shot per musket was more likely to have resulted from the Swedish cavalry’s un-pre-cipitated charge rather than any total Danish lack of ammunition.

On 17 October Christian IV broke camp and led his army towards Lund, while attempting to use the Rinnebäck Ravine to hide his advance. Christian IV’s intentions did not go unnoticed by Gustaf Horn, who personally led a detachment of cavalry and several hundred musketeers to the ravine to block Danish passage. Christian IV had already managed to send his vanguard and most of his army over the ravine, when Horn and his troops arrived on the scene. Danish cannons had been positioned on the edge of the ravine so that they could cover the retreat of the remaining troops. Horn charged against the Danish rear guard, which consisted of three squadrons of cavalry, and dispersed most of it. Danish prisoners later informed that in the ensuing chaos 400 Danish soldiers had either been slain or had drowned in the stream at the bottom of the ravine.\textsuperscript{1175} The same quantity of casualties was reported by the \textit{Gazette’s} informant

\textsuperscript{1171} Praissac 1639, 12.
\textsuperscript{1172} Palokangas 2014, 288.
\textsuperscript{1173} KrA 0001/E c/11 (1644), fol. 1507, 9 October 1644, Gustaf Horn to the krigskollegium.
\textsuperscript{1174} RAOSB, ii:8, 318–319, 22 October 1644, exctractskrifvelse.
\textsuperscript{1175} Ibid., 318–319.
in Copenhagen, who also elaborated that many Danes had been taken prisoner.\textsuperscript{1176} Among the rear guard had also been 2,000 German foot soldiers, who managed to save themselves by taking up positions behind earth walls and stone fences, which protected them from the Swedish cavalry. Despite the escape of most of the enemies, the Swedes celebrated Rinnebäck Ravine as a major victory.\textsuperscript{1177} By the time the news reached Hamburg on 16 November, the Danish casualties had been inflated into two thousand dead “and many others taken prisoner.”\textsuperscript{1178}

Apparently no Scanian peasants had joined Christian IV’s army even though it had travelled through friendly terrain in order to get from Alrup to Lund. An obvious explanation lies in the formation and mission of Christian IV’s army itself. The Danish army had been formed into the same kind of battle-arrayed column as Horn’s army during its retreat from Malmö; that is, the marching army was arranged so that it could form itself in battle order without delay. Peasant irregulars would not have had any place in such a formation. “There is nothing more necessary for a soldier than discipline: without it the troops are more pernicious than useful, more formidable to friends than foes”, Montecuccoli wrote.\textsuperscript{1179} Soldiers who were not used to following specific orders and executing necessary evolutions on the battlefield were a potential hazard to the entire army. The seventeenth-century battlefield, particularly a tactically challenging environ such as a ravine, had no room for dilettantes. The Tross too was a liability for a fast-moving contingent. Christian IV had indeed enhanced his operational efficiency by excluding all women and camp-followers from the army.\textsuperscript{1180}

Peasants only appear in the sources after the battle at Rinnebäck. On 18 October Christian IV wrote to Tage Thott from his camp near Lund and instructed him to occupy the Getinge Bridge, which would force the Swedes “to trek out of the Gynge herred.”\textsuperscript{1181} Thott was then to instruct Malte Juel, the acting lensman of Kristianstad, to mobilize the commonalty in the Göinge district and use the levies to deny the enemy any access to cattle and grain and to hinder his operations in all possible ways. On 19 October Christian IV encamped near the Getinge Bridge and ordered Tage Thott to supply his army with all such field kitchens, provisions, and wagons that could be found in Malmö. Christian IV also called for further supplies of gunpowder and match.\textsuperscript{1182} On that same day Christian IV sent similar orders to Juel in Kristianstad, ordering him to send as much food, match, and ammunition and as many men as could be moved from Kristianstad to Getinge “without danger.”\textsuperscript{1183}

Christian IV did not specify, whether the reinforcements should consist of regular troops or levied peasants. Irregular troops would have been more useful for Christian IV’s army as scouts and informants. The narrative in the extractskriftvelse clearly suggests that Christian IV had foreknowledge of Gustaf Horn’s approach, which provided him with sufficient time to arrange his artillery in firing positions along the ravine’s edge.

\textsuperscript{1176} Gazette du 10 Decembre 1644 N. 146, 1001.
\textsuperscript{1177} RAOSB, ii:8, 319, 22 October 1644, extractskriftvelse.
\textsuperscript{1178} Gazette du 3 Decembre 1644 N. 144, 992.
\textsuperscript{1179} Montecuccoli 1756, 43.
\textsuperscript{1180} KCFEB 1641–1644, 511, 10 October 1644.
\textsuperscript{1181} KBB 1644–1645, 137, 18 October 1644.
\textsuperscript{1182} KBB 1644–1645, 137, 19 October 1644.
\textsuperscript{1183} Ibid., 138.
This information may have been provided by local *snapphanar*, but on the other hand any proficient commander was expected to acquire his own military intelligence with or without the help of local inhabitants.

The role and importance of military intelligence and reconnaissance was discussed by many military theorists of the age. According to Montecuccoli, moving armies should constantly reconnoitre their surroundings and avenues of advance in order to understand the lay of the land.\[1184\] Praissac largely echoed Montecuccoli’s instructions, with the inclusion of knowledge regarding the fertility of the country, so that the commander could plan his army’s victualing in advance. Praissac also recommended the use of maps. A commander should possess at least one general map and several particular ones, Praissac wrote, and use them to judge the distances and topography of the battle space.\[1185\]

The military theorists agreed on the necessity of reconnaissance, but did not propose any uniform method for it. Cooke and Montecuccoli seem to have regarded intelligence-gathering synonymous with espionage, which tends to operate at the strategic level. Cooke suggested the employment of travellers, students, merchants, barbers (common physicians), victuallers (military subcontractors), and well-placed enemy subjects as spies in the enemy’s court, in the proximity of his armed forces, or in neutral lands.\[1186\] These requirements would have disqualified peasants as preferred sources of intelligence, as they had little access to sensitive information. Cooke also warned not to trust one’s own spies, “but ever to be jealous of them, and to weigh and conferre their reports with the reports of other espialls, and with likely-hoods, opportunities, and reasons.”\[1187\]

Montecuccoli was more concerned with the maintenance of one’s own secrecy. “Deliberate with many, resolve with few, or even only alone”, Montecuccoli advised in his memoirs. “Hide your designs from the enemy, and if they are discovered, change them”, he continued.\[1188\] Montecuccoli’s advice was heeded by Kalmar’s commandant Johan Fleming, who, in late June 1644, attempted to take the neighbouring Danish salient of Kristianopel by a surprise attack. The plan was exposed, when a local peasant informed the Danes of Fleming’s intentions. Without the element of surprise Fleming did not dare to proceed with his planned attack.\[1189\] Montecuccoli also echoed the later maxims of Clausewitz regarding the importance of hiding military operations. Military endeavours should always appear different from what they actually were; one should appear strong where one was weak and vice versa; and one should feign to attack one place and then carry out the attack somewhere else. Enemy prisoners should be guarded vigilantly in case they were actually spies. Military commanders should not trust enemy deserters or allow vagabonds and strangers to join one’s own army.\[1190\] In some ways Montecuccoli was offering advice to counter the employment of infiltrators suggested by Cooke.

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\[1184\] Montecuccoli 1756, 88.
\[1185\] Praissac 1639, 8.
\[1186\] Cooke 1628, 6–7.
\[1187\] Ibid., 7.
\[1188\] Montecuccoli 1756, 83.
\[1189\] SRA RR, B222, 29 June 1644.
\[1190\] Montecuccoli 1756, 83.
Christian IV’s advance from Alrup towards Lund did not go unnoticed by the Swedes, despite Christian IV’s attempt to hide his designs by marching through the Rinnebäck Ravine. Swedish sources do not suggest that Gustaf Horn employed spies behind Danish lines, even though Christian IV and the rigsråd in Copenhagen were very concerned about Swedish espionage. Instead the extraktskrifvelse recount several instances, where captured Danish soldiers provide their captors with information, some of which was quite detailed. The Scanian peasants, on the other hand, appear tight-lipped in Swedish sources. This did not necessarily have to be the case. Swedish experiences in Prussia and Germany show us that peasants often proved useful as sources of intelligence. During the Prussian War (1626–1629), the Swedish commanders seem to have repeatedly relied on local peasants as sources of intelligence. Hermann Wrangel, for instance, employed peasant spies to keep him informed of the enemy traffic to and from Danzig.\textsuperscript{1191} Friendly peasants could also be used as couriers, which too counted as collaboration and treason. In April 1644 Christian IV ordered the hanging of a Hallander farmhand, who had carried messages between Sweden and Jutland.\textsuperscript{1192}

The Scottish officer Robert Monro, who did not hide his enmity towards “Boores”, recalls having received information from friendly peasants. Monro valued such intelligence, for without it “nothing, or very little can be effectuated in unknowne places.”\textsuperscript{1193} Monro returned to the subject of military intelligence at the very end of his regimental history. Before entering the enemy’s country, the observant commander should have some understanding of the disposition and strength of the enemy’s armies and garrisons, Monro advised his readers. “To have certainty of all this he must have some secret friend with the enemy, for giving him secret intelligence, and that he should not trust too much in one, he must have a substill Boore, now and then frequenting without suspition amongst them, as ordinarily his Majesty of worthy memory had.”\textsuperscript{1194}

Monro’s deliberation is of great interest to our discussion for several reasons. Firstly, Monro shares the view of Cooke and Montecuccoli that military intelligence is first and foremost the realm of spies. Monro’s understanding of reconnaissance is strictly tactical. To Monro reconnaissance meant the scouting of enemy’s positions and strongpoints in preparation for a general assault or the reconnoitring of terrain on the eve of battle. Thus the responsibility for reconnaissance was devolved to tactical leaders, such as sergeants, who would scout the enemy location themselves, accompanied by “another stout fellow” and guided by a local “Boore.” The ideal weapon for tactical reconnoitre missions was the half-pike or partisan.\textsuperscript{1195}

Secondly he regards peasants and other helpful civilians as important assets in intelligence-gathering. Peasants frequented military encampments and without much regard to whether the armies in them were friends or foes. Some peasants visited the camps voluntarily, often selling particular wares or services to soldiers. Others were forced to appear there with contributions or other forms of tribute. No matter what their original motive for visiting the enemy camp was, humble peasants

\textsuperscript{1191} RAOSB, ii:9, 95, 24 April 1627, Hermann Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna.
\textsuperscript{1192} KCFEB 1641–1644, 471, 9 April 1644.
\textsuperscript{1193} Ibid., 201.
\textsuperscript{1194} Ibid., 201.
\textsuperscript{1195} Ibid., 203.
would have been a more obvious choice for informants than the more flamboyant students, merchants, and barbers proposed by Cooke. Monro also recommended the employment of peasants as guides during marches. Peasants had knowledge of the local terrain, particularly of passes and difficult terrain that might hide enemy ambushes or act as safe havens for pursued enemies. The peasants’ intelligence should then be matched with maps in order to produce a comprehensive picture of the combat environment.\textsuperscript{1196}

Still, there would have been limits to the quality of intelligence produced by peasants who were unfamiliar with matters outside their own scope of experience. For instance, it would have been unlikely for a peasant informant to produce the kind of detailed military and technical information that was provided by the captured Danish gefreider Efraim Larsson on the size and composition of the Halmstad garrison as well as the nature and strength of the town’s defensive installations. It would have been very difficult for an ill-informed peasant to place his perceptions in a wider military and political context, which subsequently would have led to inconsistent and even contradictory intelligence. The länsman Brodde Jakobsson, for instance, who paid money to six local informants in Halland and Scania in early 1644, complained to the landshövding Bengt Bagge how difficult it was to extract reliable intelligence from his Danish informants as their diverging reports failed to corrobate one another.\textsuperscript{1197}

Gustaf Horn’s intelligence efforts in Scania were generally successful. In the first week of January 1644, when Horn was still attending the riksråd’s sessions in Stockholm, the riksråd received detailed information from Brodde Jakobsson regarding the levying of Scanian peasants, the construction of field works, and the organization of watches along Scanian roads.\textsuperscript{1198} At the beginning of his invasion Horn was slightly at a loss regarding who exactly was in charge of Danish defences in Scania and Halland. He had apparently detailed information concerning the alleged locations of Christian IV, the Crown Prince Christian, and Helsingborg’s castellan Christoffe Knudsen Ulfeldt, but the real mastermind of Danish defences in Scania, Ebbe Ulfeldt, did not yet appear in Horn’s equations. Horn’s view is understandable, given the previous intelligence from Falkenberg, who suggested that Ulfeldt commanded only a small garrison in Kristianstad. This of course was true in early February, but Horn did not know that the government in Copenhagen had decided to send reinforcements to Ulfeldt and thus strengthen his military position in Scania.

After the capture of Helsingborg, Horn’s overview of the situation in Scania was quite satisfactory. Horn had good understanding of the popular sentiments towards Sweden, Denmark, and the war, and he knew the areas where distraught peasants had taken refuge. What is more important from the perspective of irregular warfare is that Horn and his subordinates were quick to react to irregular threats, often dispersing peasant bands before they had managed to take any action against the Swedes. The Swedish sources rarely tell us how Horn and other Swedish commanders acquired their information. The only sources of intelligence specified by the extractskrifvelse

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1196] Monro 1637, 201. ii.
\item[1197] SRA Strödda handlingar Danska kriget 1643-1645 RA/754/2/M 1291, 2 February 1644, Brodde Jakobsson to Bengt Bagge.
\item[1198] SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Axel Oxenstierna av Södermöre E 574, 6 January 1644, Brodde Jakobsson to Axel Oxenstierna.
\end{footnotes}
are prisoners of war and enemy deserters. As the case of gefreiter Larsson shows, the information provided by captured enemy soldiers could be quite detailed.

While the *extractskrifvelse* never specify Scanian peasants as informants, the correspondence of Prince Christian does. On 21 April, when he was personally present in Malmö, Prince Christian drew up a memo for Tage Thott and all senior officers in Malmö. In his memorandum the Prince acknowledged that “almost all the parties that have been sent out from here have failed to meet the expectations or goals set for them, but were presumably discovered and betrayed by some peasants, so that the enemy has received foreknowledge and information of our plans.” In order to avoid any further security breaches, the Prince issued an order that from thereon no peasants were allowed to move about in Malmö unescorted. In order to help the soldiers control visiting peasants, all the market activities between peasants and town-dwellers were to be concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the town gates, so that the peasants would have no need or cause to wander around inside the city.\(^\text{1199}\)

We can gain further understanding about peasants as sources of information from the larger context of early modern military history. In the light of the Swedish military experiences in Germany, and the advice offered by Praissac and Monro, it seems doubtful that Horn would have excluded peasants as guides and informants. Someone certainly provided Horn with information regarding the mood of the populace and the whereabouts of refugee peasants, and it seems improbable that this information would have originated from prisoners of war or deserters. It seems equally unlikely that there would have been any great shortage of Danish subjects willing to assist the Swedes – particularly if co-operation was made to appear beneficial. Because of the dualistic nature of the Danish executive branch, divided as it was into the two power-centres of the King and the *rigsråd*, every social stratum in the Danish society (with the exception of the fiercely royalist clerical Estate) included those that had become either disaffected with or alienated from one or the other of the two power-centres. The possible disloyalty, or even rebellion, of the Danish populace was a concern that appears in the memoranda of the Danish Chancellery time and again. Why, then, are peasants not identified in the *extractskrifvelse* as sources of intelligence? The answer may lie in the source itself. The *extractskrifvelse* were not confidential reports for the *riksråd*’s eyes only but public manifests that were published in Sweden and abroad. The omission of peasant informants from public documents would therefore protect the identity of the sources. Another possibility is that Gustaf Horn, from whose field chancellery the *extractskrifvelse* originated, did not deign lowly peasant collaborators worthy of mention in his own written presentation of the Scanian campaign.

The Swedes’ ability to identify and locate assembling insurgents may be credited to conventional military reconnaissance carried out by scouts and light troops. The daily routines of scouting, screening, picketing, foraging, and contribution-collection were the preserve of light infantry and light cavalry. What designated such troops as ‘light’ was their armour and weapons. Light troops wore little or no armour. The primary weapon of the light infantry was a musket of some kind, often a caliver (a lighter version of the standard musket) or even a rifled wheel lock musket. The more exotic Imperialist light infantry – Croats, Hajduks, and Poles – would also carry melee weapons such as sabres, axes, long knives, or spears.\(^\text{1200}\) The guard troops (*Leibgarde*)

\(^{1199}\) PCB 1643–1647, 128–129, 21 April 1644.

\(^{1200}\) Brnardic 2009, 35.
of Imperialist commanders often consisted of specialist marksmen called Schützen or Jäger, who were armed with firelocks. These light infantrymen were recruited among experienced marksmen and hunters, and many of them originated from the Alpine regions of Germany. In the latter stage of the Thirty Years War, Duke Maximilian of Bavaria raised three entire regiments of such Jäger.1201

The army of Gustaf Adolf had included a similar contingent of specialist marksmen, Nils Krak's company of sharpshooters. These native Swedes were distinguished by their blue uniforms and smallbore hunting guns known as fågelbössor, firelocks similar in design to the Göingebössor used by the Scanian snapphanar (see chapter 5.1).1203 The Danish Crown Prince Christian too possessed such a bodyguard of livskytter or “lifeguard-shooters.” When the Prince was preparing to leave for Malmö in February 1644, he requested from a certain company commander five of his best shooters to accompany those five livskytter that the Prince already had.1204 Prince Frederick too was protected in the field by a personal “Lieb Compagnie” during his joint military campaign with Anders Bille in early 1645.1205

Light cavalry was typically armed with swords and firearms of some kind, either a harquebus or a pair of pistols. In the Imperial armies the light cavalry consisted typically of Croats, Hungarians, and Poles; in the Swedish armies they were often Finns, who at times carried exotic weaponry such as Polish sabres and war hammers.1206 The Italian military theorist Giorgio Basta had suggested that the Couriers, or light cavalry screening the battaille and acting as its eyes, should consist of mounted harquebusiers.1207 By the mid-seventeenth century mounted harquebusiers had been largely replaced by dragoons, who rode into battle but fought on foot as musketeers. The Danes did not possess any exotic light cavalry; instead they appear to have relied on dragoons and mounted harquebusiers for scouting and skirmishing.

The understanding of how Swedish reconnaissance functioned is patchy at best. The Royalist and Parliamentarian armies in contemporaneous England employed special scoutmasters, whose duty it was to collect and relay military intelligence.1208 According to the English mercenary James Turner, who had fought in Germany under Swedish colours, the profession of a scoutmaster did not exist as such in the other European armies, although he suggested that the Italians and the French employed “Captains of the Spies.”1209 The information acquired by the scoutmaster, however, was “publick” instead of secret and was gathered by military parties rather than spies.1210 The anecdotes in the extractskrifvelse suggest that the main responsibility for monitoring possible musters of insurgents fell on those cavalry formations that

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1201 Brnardic 2009, 35, 46.
1202 Theatri 1647, 750.
1203 Brzezinski and Hook 1993, 38.
1204 PCB 1643–1647, 61, 16 February 1644.
1205 DRA Tyske Kancelli, udenrigske Afdeling/Speciel Del/Tyskland/Bremen Stift/Al. 7. Breve fra ærkebiskop Frederik til Christian IV 1644–1646 (48), 4 January 1645.
1207 Basta 1617, 20.
1209 Turner 1683, 265.
1210 Ibid., 265.
operated outside the main body of Horn’s field army. It was these screening formations and flying columns, usually led by Wachtmeister, Burmeister, and Stenbock, that first identified the irregular threat and first reacted to it. The military intelligence therefore did not circulate through the central command, essentially Horn’s war council, but reached the operational level first, where information was processed and acted upon. By the time news of assembling peasant parties reached Horn, the dispersal and rout of irregular bands was often already a fait accompli.

The subjects of Christian IV were of course more likely to spy on behalf of their sovereign than the enemy. The archive work done by Andreas Karlsson and Anna Karlsson suggests that there existed a constant trickle of military intelligence from peasants and burghers to the Danish military authorities in Halmstad, Varberg, and elsewhere. In the receipts of the Halmstad garrison one can find payments against information delivered. Some of the informants have been named or otherwise identified. Christen “Glass Master” from Halmstad received two thalers for the intelligence he had delivered at the request of the castellan Niels Krabbe. Three Swedish informants, Abraham Povelsson, Hans Halstorp, and Jon Larsson, were paid two thalers and two marks collectively while on their way to Copenhagen via Halmstad. Hans Pedersen, the mayor of Laholm, received one and a half tunnor of rye for information, while his servant was rewarded two thalers for similar service. Karlsson and Karlsson have compiled a list of the other thirteen anonymous informants, who received rewards from the Halmstad treasury between June and November 1644. Some of the informants are only identified as “men” or “women.” Others have been characterized according to their professions, which were either “peasants” or “priests’ servants.” Two informants were identified as having hailed from the Swedish-occupied Laholm, while another three were described as inhabitants of the Knäred district. The account books in the Varberg len reveal that in the winter of 1644–1645 a number of local peasants received ammunition from the garrison so that they might conduct reconnaissance on behalf of the Danish military authorities.

Some of the Danish spies were thought to operate on the Swedish side of the border. Courtbooks in Småland indicate several cases, where local peasants, often those of Danish heritage or others who were employed as workers on the Danish side of the border, were suspected of espionage and treason. Most suspects were acquitted, but at least one of them, a peasant named Björn from the Angelstad district who worked as a farmhand in Halland, was executed by Swedish dragoons on account of the “great threat he posed during time of war.”

4.12 FINAL YEAR OF THE WAR IN SCANIA

After its rough treatment at the Rinnebäck Ravine, the Danish army took up position at the Kävlinge Bridge, thus severing Swedish lines of communication between Lund and Landskrona. Horn sought to circumvent the Danish army and establish a line of

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1211 Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 139–140.
1212 Ibid., 140.
1213 Ibid., 140.
1214 Ibid., 141.
1215 Ibid., 141.
communication with Landskrona by advancing towards another bridge at Getinge.\textsuperscript{1216} Over the course of the next few days the armies conducted a series of manoeuvres and switched places so that Christian IV ended up at Getinge and Horn crossed the river Helgå at Kävlinge.\textsuperscript{1217} Horn was perplexed by Christian IV’s decision to avoid battle, as the Danes would have been in a position to stop the Swedish column and potentially even inflict it a similar chastisement that Christian IV himself had earlier experienced at Rinnebäck. Horn suspected that Christian IV intended to take Ängelholm and thus severe Horn’s lines of communication to Sweden. After leaving reinforcements to Landskrona, Horn rushed north to Ängelholm to prepare the town’s defences against a precipitated Danish attack.\textsuperscript{1218}

On 27 October Christian IV broke camp at Getinge and advanced towards Helsingborg, passing Landskrona along the way. The Swedes estimated his strength to have been 10,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. By now Horn had an explanation for Christian IV’s apparent inactivity: news had reached both Swedes and Danes of the destruction of the Danish fleet at Fehmarn on 13 October.\textsuperscript{1219} On 29 October Christian IV and some of his officers took to a fishing boat at Råå and sailed to Sjælland. The Danish field army then returned to Malmö, leaving behind its wounded and sick in the rural villages outside Helsingborg. The bulk of the Danish army was then transferred from Malmö to Sjælland.\textsuperscript{1220}

This is where the famed extractskrifvelse end. Further research must rely on other sources, which fail to shed quite as much light on the details of irregular warfare. From Boeckler’s Historia we learn that in early November Gustaf Horn departed from Ängelholm and moved into winter quarters at Ystad. By this time preliminary peace negotiations between Sweden and Denmark were already on their way, and Stockholm informed Horn of the progress at the diplomatic front.\textsuperscript{1221} Meanwhile the Swedish border further north had become exposed to attacks by enemy irregulars. In late September Fredrik Stenbock received explicit orders from the riksråd to “maintain the commonalty in discipline and obedience” in and around Laholm.\textsuperscript{1222}

Early October Stenbock requested and received a permission to take leave for a few weeks. During his absence the defence of the Västergötland border near Varberg and Laholm was devolved to Lieutenant Colonel Börje Nilsson and Colonel Johan Wrangel, who between them commanded two companies of cavalry and nine companies of infantry. Soon after Stenbock’s departure a contingent of Varberg peasants, reinforced by their peers from Halmstad and Norway, crossed the border and attacked Västergötland. There they plundered and burned several estates, including Fredrik Stenbock’s own farm at Torpa. The insurgents then slipped back across the border before they could be pursued by Nilsson and Wrangel.\textsuperscript{1223} This was not all. In late October the Swedes uncovered a plot, in which the Hallander peasants employed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1216} RAOSB, ii:8, 319, 22 October 1644, extractskrifvelse.
\item \textsuperscript{1217} Ibid., 320.
\item \textsuperscript{1218} RAOSB, ii:8, 320–321, 4 November 1644, relation uthur Engelholm.
\item \textsuperscript{1219} Ibid., 321.
\item \textsuperscript{1220} Ibid., 321.
\item \textsuperscript{1221} RAOSB, ii:8, 502–503, 6 November 1644, Christina to Gustaf Horn.
\item \textsuperscript{1222} SRA RR, B223, 27 September 1644.
\item \textsuperscript{1223} Boeckler 1679 189; Vessberg 1895, 49.
\end{itemize}
by the Swedes in the construction of field works at Laholm had been instructed by the Danes to take control of the fortification by a surprise attack and then to send for reinforcements from Halmstad. A timely intervention by the watchful garrison saved the Swedes from a potential military disaster.\textsuperscript{1224}

Vessberg desisted from quantifying the damage done by the \textit{snapphanar}, but he nevertheless estimated that their repeated incursions into Västergötland at the end of 1644 inflicted numerous casualties and severe material damage to the Swedes.\textsuperscript{1225} What we do know is that in early 1645 the \textit{riksråd} contemplated the “desolation” of Halland in revenge for the attacks made by Danish \textit{snapphanar} on Swedish soil.\textsuperscript{1226} To what extent these incursions had been organized by the Danish authorities remains unclear. Axel Oxenstierna was convinced that one of Christian IV’s primary aims after his landfall in August had been to incite the Scanian and Hallander peasants against the Swedes.\textsuperscript{1227} There exists one small clue that might suggest Christian IV’s own complicity in the \textit{snapphanar}-campaigns. On 8 October 1644, when Christian IV resided at the Burlöv vicarage near Åkarp, he sent a missive to Tage Thott in Malmö and ordered him to supply one hundred flintlocks with powder and ammunition “for use against the enemies of the realm.”\textsuperscript{1228} Given the fact that regular Danish troops under Christian IV’s command were already armed with muskets, it is very possible that these flintlocks were allocated for levied peasants operating outside the main body of the Danish army.

Gustaf Horn spent the winter months from November 1644 to February 1645 making preparations for a renewed campaign in early 1645. Getting supplies from the Scanian countryside would have been difficult, as Christian IV had ordered Tage Thott to collect as much supplies from the surrounding countryside as possible for the purpose of denying these supplies to the enemy.\textsuperscript{1229} He had sent similar instructions to Christoffer Ulfeld in Kristianstad.\textsuperscript{1230} The Swedish army’s overall state was nevertheless satisfactory: the pestilence that had previously depleted the army’s ranks began to recede, and Horn even allowed many of his officers to take leave of duty and visit their homes in Sweden. The “conservation” and reinforcement of the army was nevertheless necessary from the moral perspective as well, as it would help prevent the outbreak of mutinies.\textsuperscript{1231} For much of 1644, Horn’s field army had been short of artillery, and Horn sought to remedy this shortcoming by writing to the \textit{krigskollegium} and asking them to deliver more “feltartollerie” for his army.\textsuperscript{1232} There were also changes in the army’s command. Lars Kagg, who had been in bad health, returned to Stockholm and

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1224 SRA RR, B224, 9 November 1644.
1225 Vessberg 1895, 50.
1226 SRRP, xi, 7, 13 February 1645.
1227 SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Johan Axelsson Oxenstierna av Södermåre E 979, 9 September 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Oxenstierna.
1228 KBB 1644–1645, 134, 8 October 1644.
1229 KBB 1644–1645, 157, 23 November 1644.
1230 KBB 1644–1645, 156, 19 November 1644.
1232 KrA 0001/E c/11 (1644), fol. 1655, 5 November 1644, Gustaf Horn to the krigskollegium.
\end{flushright}
took up a position in the *riksråd*. So too did Fredrik Stenbock, who was admitted to the *riksråd* in February 1645.\(^{1233}\)

The Queen and the *riksråd* had been preoccupied by the convening of the *riksdag* in October, and the debates concerning the military strategy for 1645 did not really take place until November 1644. Oxenstierna felt that the war against Denmark had turned into a great burden, as it was “pushing so much closer to our skin.” Added to the military concerns on both land and sea was the new diplomatic front that had been opened under French mediation. When Oxenstierna expressed these concerns to his son Johan on 21 November, the Swedish correspondence-lines to Scania had once again been disrupted, and there was no certainty that any letters would actually reach their destination.\(^{1234}\) Gustaf Horn did his best to maintain the lines of communication by arranging nearly daily convoys out of Ystad. Such arrangement, however, tied down several companies of troops and thus represented yet another opportunity cost caused by irregular warfare.\(^{1235}\)

On 12 November the government made a decision to carry out a renewed *utskrivning* at the beginning of 1645. For this purpose the *riksråd* instructed the *krigskollegium* to assign a special commissar to oversee the recruitment and muster of conscripts. Another commissar was to be furnished with money and sent to Prussia and Pomerania, where he would organize the recruitment of mercenaries. Furthermore, the *riksråd* had agreed to reinforce the Bergslagen regiment and the Hofregementet, and to recruit two new regiments in Scotland.\(^{1236}\) These were all long-term plans, but in the meanwhile the *riksråd* had to meet the army’s manpower requirements from already existing sources. Most of the reinforcements, including one *rusttjänst*-company, were drawn from Finland and distributed to the regiments in Scania. From Riga came a whole regiment of Finnish infantry under the command of Colonel Georg Knorring.\(^{1237}\) It took some time for these reinforcements to reach the Scanian theatre of war; Knorring’s regiment did not land at Stockholm until 6 July.\(^{1238}\)

The *riksråd*’s grand strategy in Scania was the conquest of Malmö; all other endeavours were subordinated to it. This was the view presented to Horn in early February.\(^{1239}\) Preparations for the siege had already begun in early January, when Wachtmeister had moved to the vicinity of Malmö with his contingent of cavalry. His mission was to collect as much forage from the surrounding countryside as he could in order to deprive the enemy garrison of any potential supplies.\(^{1240}\) Over the course of January, Wachtmeister sent forage and a number of prisoners to the Swedish headquarters at Ystad.\(^{1241}\) Colonel Harald Stake too operated in Malmö’s proximity. In the first week of January 1645 Stake had encountered in the city’s vicinity

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\(^{1233}\) Vessberg 1895, 50.

\(^{1234}\) SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Johan Axelsson Oxenstierna av Södermörre E 979, 21 November 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Oxenstierna.

\(^{1235}\) KrA 0001/E c/12 (1645), fol. 513, 21 April 1645, Gustaf Horn to the krigskollegium.

\(^{1236}\) SRRP, x, 667, 12 November 1644.

\(^{1237}\) SRA RR, B226, 12 February 1645.

\(^{1238}\) RAOSB, i:16:2, 564, 7 July 1645, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustaf Horn.

\(^{1239}\) Vessberg 1895, 50.

\(^{1240}\) Ordinari Post Tijdender N. 5 Anno 1645, 4.

\(^{1241}\) Ordinari Post Tijdender N. 6 Anno 1645, 1.
a Danish cavalry contingent of 30–40 men, who immediately retreated back to Malmö after making contact with the Swedes. Stake also managed to capture “a couple of the enemy’s musketeers”, who were delivered to Ystad for interrogations.1242 Later Stake and his five companies of cavalry were redeployed to protect the borders of Västergötland.1243

Malmö could not be effectively besieged if it was not simultaneously blockaded from the sea, for which reason any campaign against Malmö would have to wait until the summer, when the seas once again became navigable. By the end of April Horn’s stores were beginning to run out, and he was forced to leave his winter quarters in search of fresh supplies. In May Horn left Ystad, crossed the River Helge, and entered Blekinge. The Swedish incursion into Blekinge reportedly caused many of its inhabitants “to flee to the hills”, meaning the nearly impenetrable wilderness that covered much of the land.1244 Horn’s timing was awkward, as the reinforcements from Finland, Livonia, and Sweden had not yet arrived in Ystad. The riksråd therefore instructed all the landshövdingar along the march-route to assist the columns of reinforcements and facilitate their transit to Horn’s field army in Blekinge. There was still some confusion as late as early June over the redeployment of troops and material from Kalmar to Horn’s army.1245

Soon after crossing the River Helge Horn seized Åhus, where he left General Major Otto von Sperling and his six companies of infantry to keep an eye on Kristianstad. Horn’s field chancellery claimed that the city was blockaded to the extent that “no-one could go in or come out.”1246 In late May the defenders attempted to sally out of Kristianstad but they were repulsed after sustaining an unquantified number of casualties. The snapphanar and peasants too became activated in the surrounding woods and morasses and prepared to proceed against the Swedes blockading Kristianstad. One hundred snapphanar made their way to the Oppmanna parish, where they were met by a contingent of “commandeered” Swedish soldiers who had been sent out for the specific purpose of combatting the insurgents. Most of the insurgents were slain in the ensuing fight.1247

It was around this time that Horn’s army fought another engagement against snapphanar attempting to defend a narrow pass in the Swedish army’s route of advance from Åhus to Sölvesborg. After a brief engagement the snapphanar were dispersed and driven into the thick woods of Blekinge.1248 Horn then captured Sölvesborg and constructed new field works for its defence. On 1 June Horn moved his camp to Fjälkinge, from where he could better blockade Kristianstad. Horn’s army lived off the land, very likely for the purpose of denying supplies to Kristianstad’s defenders and thus making the blockade affect them even harder.1249 Danish envoys and mail,
however, were allowed to reach Kristianstad so that the Danes could not use the disruption of diplomatic correspondence as an excuse to complicate the on-going peace negotiations at Brömsebro.\textsuperscript{1250} In the course of the siege, the Swedes impressed local peasants as labourers. Some of the peasants were employed to construct palisades while others were tasked with clearing the surrounding woods of undergrowth – most likely in order to deprive the remaining snapphanar of terrain cover.\textsuperscript{1251}

In May 1645 the main focus of military events was nevertheless in Västergötland. In mid-May a Danish flotilla of some 25 ships appeared outside Älvsborg, but a storm dispersed the flotilla and sunk some of the ships. A more menacing situation developed further north, where a Danish contingent of six cavalry and three dragoon companies from Halmstad attempted to advance north and join forces with Hannibal Sehested’s Norwegian army in Bohuslän. On 27 May Harald Stake fought a battle against them at Landvetter outside Gothenburg. The Danish contingent was routed but not destroyed. These events caused the riksråd to suspect that the enemy harboured some designs against Gothenburg and Västergötland, and for this reason the government began to re-rout some of the fresh reinforcements to west.\textsuperscript{1252}

The reprioritizing of troop allocations did not please Gustaf Horn, who, on 18 June, complained to the krigskollegium about the change in military priorities. It was crucial that the field army remained strong enough to besiege and take Malmö, Horn explained in his letter. If the Swedes could not become masters of Danish strongholds, foremost over Malmö, they could not keep the commonalty in check and sustain the army from local resources. The best strategy was to remain defensive in Västergötland and along the Norwegian frontier, which would not require the transferral of any great military resources to those locations. The intention of the Danish flotilla and other enemy contingents had been simply to create a diversion and weaken the Swedish army in Scania, Horn rationalized. The Danish force that had clashed with Stake at Landvetter was not strong enough to threaten Gothenburg, which was already full of Swedish troops. There was therefore no need to reinforce Gothenburg; those reinforcements that had been allocated to Gothenburg’s defence should be redirected to Horn in Scania.\textsuperscript{1253}

Most of the reinforcements to Horn marched through Markaryd, because there were “better roads and less hindrances” than in Blekinge.\textsuperscript{1254} Horn was disposed to leave some reinforcements, namely a part of Fabius Berndes’s 200 dragoons, to the Hylte sconce near Markaryd, whence they could escort messengers and relieve from duty those cavalrymen that were situated in and around Markaryd.\textsuperscript{1255} Horn’s line of thought prevailed in the end. The riksråd shared Horn’s concern over the possible weakening of the main army in Scania, and after news of the Danish flotilla’s retreat reached Stockholm, the riksråd once again directed all new recruits to Horn’s Scanian army.\textsuperscript{1256}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1250} AORSH 1644–1648, 67, 23 May 1645; RAOSB, i:16:2, 551–552, 22 May 1645, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustaf Horn.
\item \textsuperscript{1251} Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio 1645, 62.
\item \textsuperscript{1252} Vessberg 1895, 52–53.
\item \textsuperscript{1253} Ibid., 53–54.
\item \textsuperscript{1254} RAOSB, i:16:2, 558, 3 June 1645, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustaf Horn.
\item \textsuperscript{1255} Vessberg 1895, 54.
\item \textsuperscript{1256} Ibid., 54.
\end{itemize}
Horn spent most of the summer planning an attack against Malmö in co-operation with the Swedish and Dutch fleets. On 31 July Horn left the command of Åhus and Sölvesborg to Gustaf Lewenhaupt and proceeded to march west towards Malmö. Luckily for the Danes, the siege of Malmö got off to a late start. The Malmö garrison had lost many soldiers to the pestilence in the winter, and in February and early March 1645 the Danish government had ordered Tage Thott to send over his artillery for the defence of Copenhagen and the armament of the Danish fleet.1257 The government also ordered Thott to send to Copenhagen as many sailors as he could find in Malmö. “The King will procure other soldiers as their replacements”, the government promised Thott.1258

The siege of Malmö had barely gotten underway when news of a cease-fire reached both Horn’s encampment and Malmö. The Swedish besiegers wasted no time in establishing relations with Malmö and requested Thott permission to buy supplies from the city. The Danish government obviously regarded the cessation of arms a fait accompli and gave Thott a permission to sell wares if the Swedes would pay for them. Thott was also authorized to admit Swedish officers in the city as he saw fit. The only caveat was that too many Swedes should not be allowed to enter at the same time.1259

The Peace of Brömsebro was concluded on 13 August 1645. On 19 August Christian IV sent a missive to all the lensmænd, ordering “all subjects, particularly those who in the woods and elsewhere have occupied themselves as snaphaner, freebooters, dragoons, or under other such names, to fight against the Swedes, to desist under the strictest punishment from all hostilities against the Swedes and all further musters in the woods and elsewhere in and around the land as trouble-makers.”1260 The government apparently regarded the lensmænd as its best channel for reaching snapphaner and other irregulars in the woods. During a time of war these armed peasants had constituted a useful military asset, but after the cessation of hostilities they became a liability, perhaps even a threat, and not only to the Swedes but to the Danish authorities themselves as well. Such concern would not have been entirely unjustified. Even as late as 1650, the Swedish governor of Halland Otto Sperling complained to the Gothenburg hovrätt of the persisting snapphanar in the troublesome Hallandsås district that were committing robbery in Halland and Sweden itself. Whether or not these snapphanar had ever been actually employed by the Danish military authorities in the previous war, the Swedish judicial sources do not tell.1261

The Danish Crown began to demobilize its forces after the conclusion of the peace. The conscripts, urban militiamen, and levied peasants returned to their civilian occupations, while the recruited soldiers most likely sought employment elsewhere. Some 1,600 Danes allegedly found new employment in Hessian service by early 1646.1262 The demobilization did not include all troops: Christian IV made sure that senior officers and certain distinguished professional contingents were kept in a state

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1258 KBB 1644–1645, 249, 11 March 1645.
1259 KBB 1644–1645, 404, 14 August 1645.
1260 KBB 1644–1645, 408, 19 August 1645.
1261 Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 244.
1262 Gazette du 10 Mars 1646 N. 24, 160.
of readiness so that they might be “commandeered” to service at a short notice.\textsuperscript{1263} This policy was also being pursued in Holstein, where some of the cavalry were still maintained in service at the end of 1645 while the urban militiamen (serving as infantry) were disbanded altogether.\textsuperscript{1264}

The demobilization of military resources also meant weapons. The list of light armaments sent from Halmstad to Copenhagen reveal the types of small arms and hand weapons employed by the garrison, as well as their quantity and relative proportion in the infantry’s arsenal. The decommissioned firearms consisted of 578 matchlock muskets and 60 firelocks; no pistols were included in the list. The hand weapons included 390 swords, 27 halberds, and 449 morning stars. The large quantity of the last weapons may be explained by the fact that morning stars were manufactured locally at Halmstad.\textsuperscript{1265}

Some localities remained militarized longer than others. The burghers of Kristianopel, for instance, were still billeting a company of soldiers in early 1647.\textsuperscript{1266} The cavalry element in the proposed standing army would be maintained by nobles and Crown peasants alike, but the cavalrymen themselves should not consist of peasants at times of peace, Christian IV insisted.\textsuperscript{1267} In September 1645 he sent commissions to both Jutland and Scania to investigate “place by place” the conditions of the peasantry in areas formerly occupied by the enemy.\textsuperscript{1268} The commissions would have given the peasants a chance to air their concerns as well as to give the Crown the opportunity to estimate what kind of military burdens the peasants would be able to bear in the near future.

\textsuperscript{1263} KCFEB 1645–1648, 56, 13 August 1645.
\textsuperscript{1264} DRA Tyske Cancelli, Slesvig-holsten-lauenburgske Cancelli/A VII/Sager vedr. land- og sjøforsvar/152. Akter vedr. krigen med Sverige 1644–1645, 26 December 1645.
\textsuperscript{1265} Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 276.
\textsuperscript{1266} DRA Danske Kancelli 2. Perioden 1572–1660/181/Afregninger over Borgernes og Bændernes Udgifte til Krigsfolkes Underholdning 1643–1647, 26 January 1647.
\textsuperscript{1267} KCFEB 1645–1648, 230, 28 December 1646.
\textsuperscript{1268} KCFEB 1645–1648, 80, 28 September 1645.
5 TRANSFORMATION OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

5.1 FIRELOCKS TRANSFORM WARFARE

Torstensson’s War indicated a transformation in early modern guerrilla warfare. This transformation grew the scale of guerrilla warfare and increased its overall effect on regular armies. It also elicited from the Swedish army a set of countermeasures, which together constitute something we may by modern standards identify as counterinsurgency warfare. This transformation, however, was limited to the battle space and the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare. The transformation of guerrilla warfare did not constitute a Guerrilla Revolution, as that would have required the kind of institutional, structural, and political changes that define the theory of a Military Revolution as proposed by Michael Roberts.

The catalyst for the transformation was the proliferation of the snaphance musket. According to the nineteenth-century Swedish military historian Fredrik Adolf Spak, the snaphance first appeared in the early or mid-sixteenth century, around the same time as the wheel lock musket. The snaphance originated in Spain, Spak argued, for which reason it was also called the “Spanish lock.”\[1269\] This term, however, does not appear in any of the sources relating to Torstensson’s War. Contemporaries categorized the snaphance among firelock muskets – a generic term for muskets other than matchlocks. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, simple ‘musket’ still meant a matchlock, as related by the Icelandic naval artillerist Jan Olafsson in his colourful memoirs.\[1270\] Other weapons in the category of firelocks were the wheel lock and the flintlock proper. These two muskets did not play any pivotal role in the transformation of guerrilla warfare. The wheel lock was a highly complex and intricate firearm, the purchase of which was beyond the means of most peasants.

Jeremy Black has claimed that the snaphance was an early and more complicated form of flintlock, and was replaced by the latter “from about 1620.”\[1271\] This is not entirely true. The flintlock proper was only developed in France in the 1640s, and its qualities did not diverge dramatically from the earlier snaphance musket. Swedish and Danish sources from Torstensson’s War refer repeatedly to “flintlock guns”, but they do not mean the later flintlock but the earlier snaphance. The confusion arises from the fact that both snaphance and flintlock proper used a piece of flint to ignite the powder in the flash pan, although in snaphances this could be substituted by a sulphuric rock fragment. A probable reference to a flintlock proper comes from 1648 in the inventory of the Nykøbing Castle in Denmark. The inventory differentiates 50 “French flintlocks” from the other 950 “old and new muskets”, which does look like a specific allusion to the flintlocks that had been developed in France only six or five

\[1269\] Spak 1890, 12.
\[1270\] Clausen 1905, 22.
\[1271\] Black 2013, 90.
years earlier. In addition to its firing mechanism, the snaphance was differentiated from the more common matchlock muskets by its smaller size and lighter weight, which was one of the reasons its was favoured by the Dutch mariners as their shipboard firearm.

The snaphance musket had several qualities that made it particularly well-suited for guerrilla warfare, which is typically clandestine, fluid, volatile, and unpredictable. Writing in 1677, Roger Boyle, the Earl of Orrery, listed several reasons why he thought the firelock (by then effectively synonymous with the snaphance) was superior to the matchlock musket. Firstly, the firelock "was exceedingly more ready; For with the Firelock you have only to Cock, and you are prepared to Shoot; but with your Matchlock, you have several motions, the least of which is as long as a performing, as but that one of the other, and oftentimes more hazardous." This reasoning is persuasive, because in irregular warfare, characterized as it is by unpredictability, surprises, and the fog of war, the firearm must be primed and ready for use at all times. Firelock muskets could also be discharged from the knee or from prone positions, which attributes were imperative in ambushes and other guerrilla tactics. However, skilled musketeers could make equally good use of matchlock muskets in difficult terrain. In 1632, Spanish musketeers in the Palatinate prevented the Swedish cavalry from pursuing the retreating Spanish Battaglia by taking up firing positions in the woods. "Every tree, served their muskettiers, both for a Rest, and for a Buckler; every bush was as good as a Turnpike or Galthrop, to keepe off any charge of horses, and to hinder their comming on in order. Among the boughes of the trees, were not the enemies Pikes manageable." Innovative soldiers would not let covered terrain hinder the effectiveness of their matchlock muskets.

Boyle’s second argument was that the match posed a danger to the bandolier, the twenty or so pouches of which were filled with gunpowder. This risk was as present in guerrilla warfare as it was in regular battles. As Charles Harding Firth pointed out in his study of Cromwell’s army, the bandolier was in itself an inconvenience in irregular warfare as it rattled constantly and alarmed the enemy to the musketeer’s presence. The seventeenth-century guerrilla would have had to abandon the bandolier as well if he wanted to maintain concealment during ambushes and other clandestine operations.

Thirdly Boyle argued that the burning match gave away the matchlock shooter’s position, while the firelock did not suffer from the same drawback. This advantage was quite obvious, as a formation of musketeers with alighted muskets made for a luminous spectacle in the dark. Contemporaneous soldiers were well-attuned to spot any potential signs of alighted matches, which at times resulted in excessive apprehensiveness. During General Venables’ expedition to Hispaniola in 1655, the English sentinels often raised false alarms when they mistook Caribbean fireflies for Spanish musketeers. Other false alarms were caused by the land crabs, the sound of whose nocturnal scurrying the English soldiers mistook for the rattle of Spanish

1272 KBB 1648, 29, 17 January 1648.
1273 Das Dritte Buch der Kriegs-Ubung 1675, 4.
1274 Boyle 1677, 30.
1275 Watts 1633, 19.
1276 Firth 1992, 81.
bandoliers.\textsuperscript{1277} During Torstensson’s War, the non-illuminous nature of the firelock musket would have served particularly well the Holsteiner insurgents, who allegedly preferred to operate in the cover of night.\textsuperscript{1278}

Boyle’s fourth argument proposed that the matchlock was more prone to misfires than the firelock. This argument requires further qualification. While it is true that the fire in the match could always go out, particularly in wet and damp conditions, the firing mechanism of the firelock had its own issues with reliability. In snaphance the cock held a piece of flint or “a true Mine-stone” (sulphur rock) in clamps to strike a curved plate of hardened steel called the frizzen.\textsuperscript{1279} The impact of flint and steel would cause a shower of sparks that would ignite the priming powder in the flash pan, whence the flash would travel through the touch hole to cause the main charge of gunpowder to explode. The flintlock proper improved this design by allowing the cock to move from full-cock to half-cock position, in which the flint was in close proximity to the frizzen and could be better adjusted to strike square to and in the center of the steel. This made the flintlock musket more reliable in action. The difficulty of adjusting the flint may have caused professional soldiers to reject some early versions of the snaphance as a service weapon. The French military writer Louis de Gaya, for instance, argued that the firelocks were more prone to misfires than matchlocks “through the defect of the Flints and Springs.”\textsuperscript{1280} In April 1618, when Hermann Wrangel, then the castellan of Kalmar, complained to Axel Oxenstierna that the 500 snaphance muskets that had been recently delivered to Kalmar did not function properly, he appears to have been referring to the weapons’ most obvious shortcoming, the inadjustable and therefore unreliable firing mechanism. “God forbid that any hostilities should break out, as we would fare poorly with such weapons”, Wrangel had lamented to the Chancellor.\textsuperscript{1281} One major defect in the matchlock identified by Boyle was the danger of unintentional discharges. Sometimes during windy conditions sparks would fly from the burning match and ignite the powder in the flash pan before the fusilier intended to fire his weapon.\textsuperscript{1282} This did not happen with the firelock, in which “the motion is so sudden, that what makes the Cock fall on the Hammer, strikes the Fire, and opens the Pan at once.”\textsuperscript{1283}

Boyle’s fifth argument against the matchlock had more to do with logistics than with actual combat. A single matchlock musketeer needed lengths of match, and a troop of musketeers needed copious amounts of match.\textsuperscript{1284} As Boyd observed, match added weight to the army’s baggage and had to be transported in closed wagons lest it grew damp and became consequently less fit for use. If individual soldiers carried their own match they ran the danger of exposing it to the elements. The only way to restore the usefulness of damp match was to dry it in an oven.\textsuperscript{1285} Needless to say,

\textsuperscript{1277} Firth 1992, 82, 84.
\textsuperscript{1278} Gazette du 14 Mai 1644 N. 50, 322–323.
\textsuperscript{1279} Gaya 1678, 22.
\textsuperscript{1280} Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{1281} RAOSB, ii:9, 5, 18 April 1618, Hermann Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna.
\textsuperscript{1282} Firth 1992, 86.
\textsuperscript{1283} Boyle 1677, 31.
\textsuperscript{1284} Firth 1992, 83.
\textsuperscript{1285} Boyle 1677, 31.
early modern guerrillas such as the Scanian *snapphanar* had limited access to ovens and no use for baggage wagons whatsoever. Therefore matchless firelocks saved them both burdens and troubles.

We might add two other arguments to Boyle’s solicitation of the firelock musket, the arguments of increased accuracy and lethality. Admittedly the improvement in accuracy had no direct relation to the musket’s firing mechanism, as increased accuracy only arose from the rifling in the musket’s barrel. Rifling causes the projectile to spin around its axis, which stabilizes the projectile and improves its stability and accuracy. The method of rifling was allegedly invented in Germany in the late fifteenth century.\footnote{Zabecki 2014, 642.} A musket was rifled by forcing a specially-designed tool through the barrel; according to Louis de Gaya, rifled muskets were “wrought and crevassed in the inside from the Muzzel to the Breech, in form of a Screw.” A prerequisite for a rifled firearm was a somewhat thicker barrel than the one found in ordinary muskets.\footnote{Gaya 1678, 22.} Needless to say, the manufacture of rifling was a troublesome process, as seventeenth-century muskets did not have standardized barrels and the tools required for rifling had to be first made by the weapon-smith himself. The time and effort that went into making rifled barrels effectively limited their production to weapons other than matchlock muskets. The instructions issued by Louis XIV to his Guards indeed stipulated that rifled “Carabins” or light muskets were to have either snaphance or wheel locks.\footnote{Ibid., 23.} Rifling also had its drawback. There was a significant delay in jolting the bullets and seal along the rifling into the tight barrel, which made rifled muskets generally unsuitable for conventional battlefields.\footnote{Luh 2000, 155.} This delay, however, would have been less of an inconvenience in guerrilla warfare, whose practitioners typically avoided protracted firefights with their regular and significantly better-armed adversaries.

The increased accuracy of a rifled musket made it more lethal as its bullets were more likely to hit their target than those discharged from an unrifled barrel. Jürgen Luh, who has studied German warfare of the eighteenth century, discovered that the damage inflicted by the rifled muskets of the Hessian *Jäger* Corps was much greater than that caused by soldiers armed with ordinary muskets.\footnote{Ibid., 155.} At the battle of Sangerhausen in 1758, the Hessian *Jägers* and their rifled muskets wreaked so much havoc among their French opponents that the Count of Soubise demanded that Hessian rulers withdraw all the *Jägers* from the Hanoverian-Hessian army.\footnote{Ibid., 155.} On the other hand, the matchlock musket’s powerful load gave it increased range over the lighter firelock. In fact, when Dutch mercenaries under the command of Colonel Mönichofven traversed through Trondheim on their way to Sweden during the Kalmar War in June 1612, the local Norwegian peasants were reluctant to engage them as the Dutch mercenaries’ matchlock muskets outranged their own firelocks – a definite disadvantage in the open mountain terrain.\footnote{Larsen 1889, 238.} (A Scottish contingent of 300 recruited soldiers that followed in Mönichofven’s footsteps was annihilated in...
August, as the Scots allowed themselves to be encircled by the numerically superior peasants. Most of the Scots were slain after being captured.)

In conventional battles, therefore, the users of firelock muskets were placed at a decisive disadvantage against matchlock musketeers, who could open fire at longer range. This fact questions the overly confident claim made by Frank Jacob and Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo that military technology has always evolved through a universal process, in which weapons are consistently designed to be more effective and to engage enemies at longer range, thus minimizing one's own casualties while maximizing those of the enemy. The non-linear emergence and hesitant military adoption of the firelock musket simply does not fit into this neat schematic of evolutionary change in warfare.

Being the standard service weapon of its time, the matchlock musket was used in tactical situations that did not require much accuracy. Regular musketeers discharged their weapons at massed bodies of enemies, and usually over distances of less than 100 meters. The ability to conduct volley fire and countermarches was more important in battle than individual marksmanship. Firelocks, which were used mainly by fowlers, hunters, and specialist military marksmen, benefited more from rifled barrels. It is impossible to ascertain how common rifled muskets were, as seventeenth-century muskets were not always produced readily rifled as modern-day firearms are, but were often rifled later on. With the right tools, almost any existing musket with a sufficiently thick barrel could be rifled – although the process could always go wrong and consequently ruin the barrel beyond repair.

Existing written and material evidence from seventeenth-century Denmark indicates proficiency and even innovation in gunsmithery. Andreas Karlsson and Anna Karlsson have discovered entries in the Halland provincial account books from 1641 and 1644, which reveal that the Danish Crown agreed to pay local gunsmiths to renovate and upgrade muskets for the Halmstad garrison. Some of the work involved muskets barrels, which were to be polished and cleaned. During the war a gunsmith named Niels Lademager replaced matchlock muskets' firing-mechanisms with firelocks – perhaps so that they might be of better use in guerrilla warfare. Even though the account books did not explicitly say so, this renovation would have offered the perfect opportunity to rifle previously plain muskets. The firelock muskets used by the Scanian insurgents were likely of local manufacture as well. The Göinge district in particular was renowned for its metal shops and smitheries, which already in the sixteenth century produced locally-made firearms. These muskets were known as Göingebössor, and they were of distinctive type and form. The Göingebössor had very long barrels and characteristically short stocks, and they were almost invariably equipped with snaphance locks. Another peculiarity in some Göingebössor was the steel cock that could be turned to one side to provide a safety position.

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1293 Michell 1886, 142–143; Larsen 1889, 239–240.
1294 Jacob and Viloni-Alonzo 2017, 12.
1295 Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 14, 190.
1296 Johnsson 1922, 28.
1297 Ibid., 27.
1298 Rangström 1987, 139.
The Göingebòssor were typically smallbore fowling-pieces that had a calibre of 8 to 10 millimetres compared to the roughly 20 millimetres of most military muskets.\textsuperscript{1299} Perhaps the most astonishing specimen of Danish ingenuity in gunsmithing can be discovered at the Tøjhuset Museet. Its collection contains two rifled firelocks from 1645 and 1646 that are equipped with an internal magazine for both ball and powder. A pulling lever (roughly similar to the nineteenth-century Martini-Henry and Winchester rifles) releases powder into the rear portion of the barrel and places the ball there in a manner similar to any modern breech-loader. The earlier musket from 1645, stamped with the words “Das Erste”, is equipped with a snaphance lock; the other, produced in 1646, operates a proper flintlock.\textsuperscript{1300} Knud J. V. Jespersen has quite convincingly described these weapons as an early attempt to produce repeat-fire rifles.\textsuperscript{1301} The two muskets were not, however, made by a Scanian gunsmith. The innovative weapons were the work of Peter Kalthoff, a Holsteiner gunsmith from Flensburg.\textsuperscript{1302} Innovation in Danish gunsmithery, it seems, was not limited to any particular territory or regional group.

How common, then, were firelocks among the snapphanar and other Danish irregulars? The evidence presented in the earlier chapters suggests that the Danish Crown was at pains trying to supply its forces with adequate numbers of firearms. The shortage of muskets did not only affect peasant levies but recently mustered regular troops as well. Firearms were transferred from royal armouries and requisitioned from noble landowners so that they could be delivered to freshly-raised regiments. The areas that were in most acute need of firearms were Jutland and the Danish Islands. Scania and Norway, it seems, received hardly any shipments of firearms whatsoever. On the contrary, on 17 September 1644 the government ordered Tage Thott to supply Captain Mikkel Skov with “300 flint guns and 300 accompanying bandoliers” from the Malmö arsenal.\textsuperscript{1303} Skov needed these weapons for his naval patrol mission in the Kiel Fjord.\textsuperscript{1304} This order suggests that the Malmö garrison was expected to possess a surplus of firelocks. The Crown’s reluctance to distribute firearms to Scanian peasants may have been motivated by reasons other than just mere failure to meet the demands of warfare from the public resources. After the Kalmar War the lensmænd had taken away muskets from the levies because they feared that the peasants would use their firearms to hunt wild game – a privilege that was still restricted to the King and the nobility.\textsuperscript{1305}

At Nørresundby in Jutland the peasants were armed with an array of weapons that also included many firearms. Unlike Peter Englund described in his reimagination of peasant/soldier conflict in Jutland, the battle at Nørresundby appeared in Dyrskojt’s account as a fierce firefight between two heavily armed parties instead of an asymmetrical encounter between iron-clad cavalrmen and sheepish peasants.
armed with mere pitchforks and axes. The anecdote about the thirty mounted peasants with “good long guns” seems to refer to firelocks, which were becoming more common among cavalry in the 1640s. The dragoons of the English New Model Army, for instance, were commonly fitted with snaphance carbines, which enabled the soldiers to use their firearms either on foot or from horseback.

Etymology offers further support for the connection between snaphance muskets and peasant irregulars. Elof Hellquist defined *snapphane* in his etymological Swedish dictionary as a word for an irregular fighter or an outlaw. He also observed the word’s close association with the snaphance musket (in French *chenapan*), and entertained the possibility that *snapphane* would have originally referred to the musket itself. In seventeenth-century France the word *chenapan* was soon given to the outlaws using the weapon. It referred in particular to the insurgent peasants who fought against the French soldiers in the Pyrenees. According to the Brothers Grimm in their eighteenth-century German dictionary, the original German term *Schnapphahn* referred to poultry thieves armed with snaphance muskets. An English-German lexicon from 1796 defines the snaphance musket as “das Feuerrohr mit einem Schnapphahn”, or a musket with a snaphance lock.

O. Källström, who discussed the etymology of *snapphane* in his 1944 essay, dated its German root word *Schnapphahn* to the High Middle Ages, when it was used to denote a robber or a bandit, which usage would obviously predate the snaphance musket. Some sixteenth-century chronicles certainly equated “Schnaphanen” with “robbers” and even “Cossacks.” Källström also found evidence that the word *snapphane* might denote people from certain localities. In his examination of the Swedish Kammarkivet’s fiscal records between 1527 and 1558, Källström identified several references to one Hans Snaphane, an artisan smith (“klensmed”), possibly a weapon smith, who had no apparent association with guerrillas or bandits. Källström inferred from the records that the name Snaphane referred to the smith’s area of origin, which was the Göinge district, an area known for its *snapphanar*-guerrillas and smitheries.

Whichever definition came first, the weapon or the people using it, *snapphanar* predominantly referred to guerrillas, sharpshooters, bandits, and rustlers who made use of the snaphance musket. The *extractskrifvelse* and other Swedish sources constantly refer to *snapphanar* as peasants engaged in shooting activities. When the sources discuss armed peasants under more conventional circumstances, for instance in large formations guarding bridges and fords, they refer to these irregular combatants simply as *bönder* or peasants. To label *snapphanar* simply as a derogatory term is excessive. As we will later see, the Norwegian *statholder* Hannibal Sehested...
used the word to designate certain type of fusiliers under his command, namely ones armed with light carbines and snaphances instead of muskets and harquebuses (see chapter 7.6). It is clear that the word *snaphaner*, as it appears in Sehested’s copybook, does not have a derogatory meaning.\footnote{SNFSH, iii, 72, 31 January 1645.}

Lastly we should remember that arming every individual in the peasant bands with firelocks or other firearms would have been counterproductive. The refinement and proliferation of firelocks did not change the fact that musketeers could not resist any serious cavalry charge on their own.\footnote{Firth 1992, 92–93.} Therefore, when the sources relate that peasant formations encountered by Swedish troops (often cavalry) were armed with spears and pitchforks (essentially improvised pikes) in equal numbers to firearms, we should not automatically assume that this reflected a scarcity of firearms but should instead contemplate the possibility that this division of arms served tactical expediency. Very much like pikes, spears and pitchforks could have provided the musketeers with a degree of protection from the enemy cavalry. It is true that no peasant formation in Scania appears to have succeeded in repulsing a Swedish cavalry attack, but this shortcoming was more likely to reflect lack of drill and experience rather than any critical scarcity of weapons.

### 5.2 BIRTH OF MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE?

Firelocks in the hands of peasants made their biggest impact outside actual battlefields, where they contributed to a change at the tactical level of guerrilla warfare. Historians have tended to label all military actions taken by peasants and irregular combatants as ‘guerrilla warfare’. Technology of the ancient and medieval eras effectively limited these operations to ambushes, foraging, and various hit-and-run tactics, such as the killing of sentinels and stragglers. It is impossible to equate these modest operations with the grandiose aims of modern guerrilla warfare, which boasts of grinding down entire armies and overthrowing established governments. The idea that modern guerrilla warfare traces its origins to the Peloponnesian War or the Teutoburg Forest also contradicts the view of Clausewitz, who believed that “people’s war in civilised Europe is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century.”\footnote{Clausewitz 1997, 308.} Clausewitz understood guerrilla warfare to be dispersed and nebulous. “Its operation, like the process of evaporation in physical nature, is according to the surface. The greater the surface and the greater the contact with the enemy’s army, consequently the more that army spreads itself out, so much greater will be the effects of arming the nation. Like a slow gradual heat, it destroys the foundations of the enemy’s army.”\footnote{Ibid., 309–310.}

The kind of people’s war discussed by Clausewitz required tools and tactics that would succeed in tying down and wearing out hostile armies. The ideal of guerrilla warfare was not a *Vernichtungsschlacht* akin to the Teutoburg Forest or the Beth-horon Pass, two case studies of ancient guerrilla warfare offered by Max Boot in his recent history of guerrilla warfare, but rather the Russians’ attritional...
insurgency campaign against Napoleon Bonaparte in 1812. Clausewitz warned against employing guerrillas against the enemy army’s main body or even against any sizeable detachments. “They must not attempt to crack the nut, they must only gnaw on the surface and the borders”, Clausewitz wrote.

To Clausewitz the ideal guerrilla tactic was to harass the enemy without engaging him in actual battle. The safest method of such harassment would have been sniping, which the British contemporaries of Clausewitz defined as “irregular fire” – a method of fusillade employed with great effect by the Britons’ intransigent Gurkha foes in 1814–1816. After making contact with the enemy, the guerrillas should attempt to disengage, regroup, and attack again at a different location. For instance, a guerrilla band that ambushed the enemy’s vanguard might disengage before the main battle arrived on the scene, fall back, and then renew its attack against the enemy’s rear guard. Certain kind of difficult terrain, such as woods and mountains, would act as force multipliers for the guerrillas, who could use covered and rough terrain to maximize the effect of their ambushes and surprise attacks. These tactics would leave the regular enemy with no other option but to detach patrols and sentinels for the protection of lines of communication and vulnerable choke points such as bridges and mountain passes. At the strategic level, a successful guerrilla campaign would therefore force the enemy to disperse his forces, which Clausewitz regarded highly detrimental for the satisfactory conduct of regular warfare.

Let us consider Clausewitz’s exhortation about ‘arming the nation’. In order to succeed in eroding the foundations of the enemy army, the guerrillas would have to apply constant pressure on the enemy without actually engaging him in pitched battles. As much of Europe was cultivated and settled in the nineteenth century (as it already was two hundred years earlier), its countryside consisting of fields, myriad little roads, isolated farm houses and clustered villages, this would mean attacking the enemy over a distance, with ranged weapons rather than clubs, axes, and pitchforks. In his Bekenntnisschriften from 1812, Clausewitz suggested that all members of the Landsturm (Prussian popular levy) should be armed with muskets; only if one was not available should they carry pikes or scythes. An omnipresent, nebulous guerrilla force that exerts constant military pressure by means of fusillade (and in our own time increasingly with portable rockets, mortars, and remotely operated IEDs) is what constitutes the essence of modern guerrilla warfare. This is what Clausewitz attempted to articulate in his On War and what the modern Finnish guerrilla theorist Veikko Koppinen conceptualized as an “explosive emptiness” – a hostile military environment that presents an existential threat, but which cannot be “fought against, fired at with artillery or automatic weapons or bombed from the air with rockets.”

By its origin, modern guerrilla warfare is not the product of any long-term military evolution but rather the outcome of an abrupt transformation of war. Torstensson’s War in Jutland and Scania was an early example of truly modern guerrilla warfare;

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1319 Boot 2013, 3, 21.
1320 Clausewitz 1997, 311.
1321 Military Sketches of the Goorka War in India 1822, 28.
1322 Clausewitz 1997, 175.
1323 Clausewitz, Daase, and Davis 2015, 196.
1324 Palokangas 2014, 288.
almost everything Clausewitz wrote about people’s war in On War can be applied to it. Evidence for new kind of guerrilla warfare can be best discovered in the Swedish countermeasures against the snapphananr-threat. The most telling evidence of the snapphananarnas’ employment of sniping and opportunity fusillade is the clearing of woods along roads, up to the distance of a musket’s shot. Musket fire from individual snapphananar must have been a serious problem for the Swedes, because otherwise they would not have committed themselves to the laborious task of felling trees along the Scanian highways.

Connected to the road-clearance was the construction of roadside fortifications, the so-called “Russian stockades” that had greatly impressed Jacob De la Gardie during the Russian Time of Troubles. It is difficult to define what exactly these stockades were. Because the sources differentiate these stockades from other fortifications by their Russianness, one might expect the stockades to follow some particular Russian design or feature. There indeed existed two types of distinctly Russian fortification-designs from the Time of Troubles. The first one was the *guliai gorod*, a portable stockade composed of prefabricated panels made of logs and transported on carts or sleds. Some of them may have been only large shields used to protect musketeers. Be that as it may, the panels were thick enough to offer defenders protection from enemy cavalry and musket fire. Another peculiarly Russian fortification was the *primët*, a movable siege tower that was constructed of similar wooden panels as the *guliai gorod*.1325

Neither of these two types of Russian fortication, however, appears to apply to the conditions in Torstensson’s War. The reference to Russian fortifications that were typically made of wood, plus the expediated way in which the stockades were set up to meet an unanticipated Danish threat to Swedish lines of communication, suggest that the “Russian stockades” constructed along Scanian roads were improvised timber fortifications, most likely block houses made of logs. Such block houses would offer no protection against swarming attacks by numerous peasants, who could simply set such constructions on fire, but they would have provided more than sufficient defence against sharpshooters and their small arms fire. In design the constructions may have been similar to those small but compact timber block houses that the Russians built at Sitka and Fort Ross in Alaska in the nineteenth century to offer their soldiers some measure of protection against the Native Americans.1326

Danish peasants supported Clausewitz’s schematic for modern guerrilla warfare by breaking some of the rules for people’s war in On War and subsequently paying the price for it. Clausewitz warned “that armed peasants are not to be driven before us in the same way as a body of soldiers who keep together like a herd of cattle, and usually follow their noses.” Armed peasants, on the contrary, should break contact with the enemy and disperse in all directions instead of committing themselves to combat.1327

The overall effectiveness of guerrilla warfare in Holstein, Bremen, Jutland, Scania, and Halland is best evaluated from the operational and strategic levels.

Estimating the efficiency of guerrilla warfare at the tactical level would require the kind of quantification and qualification of Swedish military losses that is not possible on the basis of existing sources. Contemporaneous sources do sometimes offer estimates of Swedish losses in Torstensson’s War. In May 1644 it was reported from

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1325 Davies 2012, 94–98; Dunning 2001, 166, 293.
1327 Clausewitz 1997, 311.
The Hague that the Swedes had by then lost 4,000 men in Holstein.\textsuperscript{1328} A few months later Giovanni Formarini related to General Ottavio Piccolomini from Vienna that the troops of Prince Frederick had “destroyed” 1,500 Swedes in their operations.\textsuperscript{1329} While the numbers themselves are dubious, based as they are on rumours circulating in distant diplomatic courts, they clearly fail to quantify between those Swedish combat losses that were sustained in actions against regular forces and those casualties that were inflicted by insurgents and irregular militiamen. These same source-critical problems apply to the more northern theatres of war in Scania and Norway, where the Swedish ranks were also being depleted by the persistent epidemics (see chapters 4.8 and 5.3).

At the strategic level the Danes used their \textit{opbud}-levies in Scania and Halland as a vanguard that would slow down and weaken the enemy until the arrival of more regular forces. This strategy was identical to the one employed by the Swedes during the Nordic Seven Years War. Then, as in Torstensson’s War, the military results achieved by forward deployment of armed peasants were modest. The Scanian peasants admittedly attempted to slow down Gustaf Horn’s advance by constructing and manning roadblocks, but as the Swedish sources relate, these were brushed aside by the advancing Swedes. At a more operational level, the Scanian peasants were regularly employed to guard or take possession of key bridges, roads, settlements, and road junctions. This was a fairly traditional use of irregular troops, and one that was suited for forces raised locally and in an expeditious manner. The employment of peasants in static formations also moved irregular warfare closer to a strategy of annihilation that did not work in the favour unprofessional peasant levies. While the documented incidents cannot be extrapolated into any universal rule, the general trend was that armed peasants were at a disadvantage at the operational level, where they would have fought large contingents of regular soldiers.

One operational method, which the Danes never employed, would have been the use of peasant bands as flying columns. This was how the Swedes had used Smålander peasants against Daniel Rantzau’s invading army in the Nordic Seven Years War.\textsuperscript{1330} The concentration of irregulars into flying columns had given Swedish warfare a distinctively attritional outlook, as the flying columns had more freedom to choose between battle and maneuver. The reason why the Danes did not pursue a similar operational method in Torstensson’s War may have had something to do with the terrain. The terrain in Holstein, Bremen, and Scania favoured dispersed guerrilla warfare rather than the concentrated efforts of a flying column. With its scattered pattern of rural settlement, Scania closely resembled certain parts of northern Germany, such as Westphalia, which Clausewitz regarded as being particularly favourable for the conduct of people’s war. Because the German countryside was intersected and covered, Clausewitz argued, the principle of resistance would exist everywhere without being tangible anywhere. The occupying regular army would be forced to disperse its troops over a large area in pursuit of victuals and lodgement, while the irregular enemy could not be cornered and destroyed in single settlements.\textsuperscript{1331} Småland, where the Swedish peasants had operated in a flying column right on Rantzau’s heels, was a

\textsuperscript{1328} DBB 1643–1649, 97, 22 May 1644, N. Burensberg to Matthias Gallas.
\textsuperscript{1329} DBB 1643–1649, 103, 8 June 1644–31 August 1644, Giovanni Formarini to Ottavio Piccolomini.
\textsuperscript{1330} Stille 1918, 93.
\textsuperscript{1331} Clausewitz 1997, 310–311.
scarcely populated frontier zone, essentially a belt of forest separating Denmark from Sweden. There dispersed guerrillas would have struggled to even make contact with an enemy that was traversing through Småland in a single, compact body.

Guerrilla warfare is not limited to military opponents but is regularly employed against civilian populations as well. Irregular warfare between Swedes and Russians in the sixteenth century had typically involved the intentional destruction of settlements and the killing of civilians. The horrors of the Twenty-Five Years War were revisited during the Rupture War of 1656–1658, when both Swedes and Russians laid waste to civilian settlements in order to deprive the opponent of its strategic base areas, from which guerrilla parties and other incursions were launched.1332 Something similar took place during Torstensson War, when Danish irregulars crossed the border and attacked Swedish farms and villages in the Markaryd and Hallaryd districts.1333 These incursions served strategic expediency, as they spread the war to Swedish soil and, to a certain degree, tied up Swedish resources in the protection of the endangered frontier communities. The ability to impose an opportunity cost on the enemy has always been one of the central strategic strengths of guerrilla warfare. The protection of Swedish rural population from Danish guerrilla incursions was the most logical option for the Swedish military authorities to take, but by doing so they forfeited whatever advantages they would have enjoyed by allocating troops and resources for other uses.

Opportunity costs are a two-way street, and the Danes paid their own price for audacious guerrilla expeditions. After the Danish peasants’ attack against Hallaryd, the Swedes mustered a hybrid counterforce that nearly annihilated the Danish irregulars at the River Helge and then proceeded to carry out a punitive expedition against Visseltofta on the Danish side of the border.1334 It can be debated whether the Danish peasant irregulars might have been put to better use in the harassment of Swedish salvaguardia-parties and disruption of lines of communication. Alternative outcomes are of course counterfactual history, but the fact remains that opportunity costs are an inseparable part of all military decision-making. Whether the opportunity cost for deploying Danish irregulars in attacks against civilian targets in Sweden was high or low is something that historians can debate without any definite or conclusive answer.

The snapphanarnas’ greatest tactical advantage, their ability to harass the Swedes by sniping, translated into a strategic strength, when the snapphanar endangered and even disrupted Swedish lines of communication. The disruption of Swedish lines of communication deprived the Swedish government of timely information from Denmark and Germany and thus impeded its military-political decision-making. Any military action that complicates the enemy government’s ability to function at its highest political level must be regarded as a strategic success. The danger to the lines of communication was tangible enough to encourage the Swedes to commit additional troops to guard the cumbersome artillery train that was making its way through the broken and muddy forest roads of Scania.1335 In the age of the Military Revolution, when armies began to increasingly rely on victuals supplied from strategic base areas via lines of communication, the guerrillas’ deployment for severing those lines gave

1332 Gullberg and Huhtamies 2005, 145.
1333 RAOSB, ii:8, 316–317, 25 September 1644, ifrån Markarydh.
1334 Ibid., 316–317.
1335 Vessberg 1895, 20.
guerrilla warfare the kind of strategic dimension it had not enjoyed before. If the emergence of military logistics was in itself a revolutionary development in warfare, so too was the ability to threaten them.

5.3 SWEDISH COUNTERINSURGENCY IN TORSTENSSON’S WAR

Guerrilla warfare can be considered to be successful if it affects the conventional enemy in any way. The spectrum of effects covers various potential outcomes, from annihilation to inconvenience. Few guerrilla campaigns have resulted in the wholesale destruction of enemy armies, even though there were some cases where guerrilla warfare came close to achieving such an outcome. The most obvious example of a militarily decisive guerrilla campaign would be Napoleon’s disastrous retreat from Russia in 1812 – the very event that inspired Clausewitz to formulate his concept of people’s war.1336 Another example would be the Arab Revolt in 1916–1918, when the Arab insurgents effectively paralysed an entire Ottoman Corps by severing Turkish lines of communication, essentially railways, and by blockading Turkish troops in their garrisons.1337 The results of most guerrilla campaigns were more modest. The template for typical use of guerrilla warfare was set down by the Peninsular War (1808–1814), which first introduced the word “guerrilla” to military terminology. The Spanish guerrillas did not destroy Napoleon’s Spanish armies, but rather tied them down and weakened them. The war itself was won by regular Anglo-Portuguese armies through a series of conventional battles and sieges (a dissenting view has been put forward by Michael Glover, who argues that the conventional victories would not have been possible without the attritional effect of the guerrilla war).1338 Most successful guerrilla wars have followed a similar pattern, where guerrilla warfare is supported by, or subordinated to, conventional warfare. By and large, military history supports Mao’s contention that, in order to succeed, guerrilla warfare must be co-ordinated with regular warfare at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.1339

The true essence of guerrilla warfare lies in its modest achievements that do not destroy the enemy but rather tie him down and wear him out. These small-scale actions, the ambushing of patrols, destruction of magazines and bridges, sudden swarming attacks or harassment fire from individual snipers, create together an effect that invokes counter-reactions from the conventional enemy. The set of counter-reactions to the effects created by guerrilla warfare in its turn constitutes an aggregate known as counterinsurgency. If Torstensson’s War was indeed an early manifestation of modern guerrilla warfare, then by that logic we should be able to identify specific Swedish responses and countermeasures to the emerging guerrilla threat. In other words, we should see in Torstensson’s War some Swedish attempts at counterinsurgency.

At the lowest tactical level the transformation of guerrilla war was concretized in the snaphance musket carried by the individual snapphan. The emergence of counterinsurgency warfare does not embody itself in any equally discernible weapon

1337 Murphy 2008.
1339 Mao 1963, 163.
The epoch of the Thirty Years War did not introduce any dramatic changes in the armaments or equipment of ordinary foot soldiers, but there were some modifications in the outlook of cavalrmen that might have made some modest effect in the conduct of small war and irregular operations. These modifications effectively constituted a general trend towards the predominance of light over heavy cavalry. The Swedish army had led the way in this process. Most Swedish cavalry consisted of “land cavalry” that wore little or no armour at all. The reason for this was one of economy: most Swedish cavalrymen were furnished by peasants, who could not afford to provide the cavalrmen with expensive armour. The Swedish cavalry compensated for the reduction in defensive armour by increasing the cavalryman’s offensive strength. Most cavalrmen, whether light or heavy cavalry, had been armed with a sword and a pair of pistols from the early sixteenth century onwards.

The era of the Thirty Years War saw an increase in this arsenal, when armies began to equip their light cavalry with additional firelock muskets. Mounted musketeers were not a new innovation as such troops had already existed in the sixteenth century. Then they were called “harquebusiers” after their preferred weapon, the short-barreled harquebuse, which they fired from horseback. The harquebusiers’ distinguishing feature from the seventeenth-century mounted musketeers had been their armour, which gave them the outlook (and price tag) of heavy cavalry. Harquebusiers had been a common sight in the early stages of the Thirty Years War, particularly in Imperial armies, but they began to gradually disappear in the 1630s, when they were being increasingly replaced by mounted firelock-musketeers and dragoons, who travelled on horseback but fought as infantry. The profusion of light cavalry armed with an assortment of firearms did not revolutionize the conduct of small war, but it nevertheless gave light cavalry more operational options. Any increase in the cavalry’s ability to conduct small war would also translate into an increased ability to combat guerrillas and insurgents.

Cavalry also grew in proportional size in the seventeenth-century armies. This was part of a general shift towards attritional strategy in the latter stage of Thirty Years War, as David Parrott has argued. By the 1640s, the Thirty Years War had reached a stage where existing military-political circumstances favoured a strategy based on territorial control and area denial. Such a strategy could not be effectively pursued by armies that consisted largely of infantry but instead required the formation of cavalry-dominated contingents. The increase in the proportional, and even absolute, size of cavalry greatly facilitated small war against irregular enemies, and in this sense the emergence of cavalry-dominated operational warfare can be seen as a facet of early modern counterinsurgency. Military history shows that mobility is a necessity for successful counterinsurgency warfare, and prior to the development of motorized vehicles the only way to increase the mobility of troops was to place them on horseback. A seventeenth-century cavalryman enjoyed a tactical advantage over guerrillas and armed peasants, who fought predominantly on foot. Cavalry could engage and disengage infantry at will, follow them beyond the range of muskets, cut off their lines of advance or retreat, and generally affect their ability to maneuver.

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1340 Lappalainen 1989, 136; Brzezinski and Hook 1993, 43.
1341 Brzezinski and Hook 1993, 45; Brnardic and Pavlovic 2010, 45.
Early military theorists generally agreed on the central role of cavalry in counterinsurgency warfare. The Marquis of Marcenado had a very low opinion of poorly-led and poorly-equipped peasants, who were incapable of the “evolutions and movements” required in the conduct of an orderly battle.\textsuperscript{1343} In combat insurgent peasants were best defeated by swift and aggressive action; in particular, Marcenado encouraged the use of cold weapons and cavalry, which had the effect of demoralizing peasants, who were unaccustomed to the gruesome practices of war.\textsuperscript{1344} Marcenado’s views were later echoed by Clausewitz, who argued that cavalry was well-suited for dispersing assembled contingents and that its speed increased chaos and terror among the enemies.\textsuperscript{1345}

Torstensson’s War certainly supports the idea of cavalry’s central role in counterinsurgency. When Scanian or Jutlander peasants assembled together in any sizeable formations, the Swedes typically reacted by sending cavalry detachments against them. Hans Wachtmeister in particular seems to have developed exceptional skill in destroying irregular contingents in an expeditious and terminal manner. The extracts from Swedish correspondence tell us little of the way in which the Swedish cavalry achieved its victories over armed peasants at the tactical level, but Peder Dyrskøjt’s relation of the battle at Nørresundby sheds some light on the matter. It seems that at Nørresundby the Swedish cavalry first charged the assembled peasants with cold weapons, thus breaking their ranks and disintegrating their formation. Then the fighting evolved into a running gun fight, in which both sides suffered casualties from fusillade. It is very likely that once the fighting reached Nørresundby, many of the Swedes would have been forced to dismount in order to battle the peasants, who had barricaded themselves inside the houses. Torching the houses, however, would not have required dismounting, as mounted soldiers had better reach to lop torches or incendiary weapons on roofs, the most combustion-prone part of all seventeenth-century cottages.\textsuperscript{1346}

Cavalry’s central role in counterinsurgency warfare can be best discerned at the operational level. There the best unit for conducting counterinsurgency warfare was the armée volante. These were more mobile than other army-sized contingents, as they often consisted largely of cavalry. The origins of the armée volante are somewhat obscure. The French Marshal François de Bassompierre recalled in his memoirs having commanded one in the Long War between Austria and the Ottoman Empire in 1591–1606. The composition of this army had been 3,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry, which indeed set it apart from the more infantry-dominated armies of western Europe.\textsuperscript{1347} The ratio of cavalry to infantry in Helmut Wrangel’s armée volante in Jutland was 4,400 (including dragoons) to 1,200. The predominance of cavalry was less conspicuous in Lars Kagg’s armée volante in Västergötland, which consisted of roughly 1,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry. We may, however, recall that the neighbouring Danish province of Halland enjoyed an abundance of horses, and it is possible that Kagg increased this ratio in favour of cavalry by placing some of his musketeers on horses sequestered from Danish peasants, thus turning some of the infantry into dragoons.

\textsuperscript{1343} Marcenado 1738, 205–206.
\textsuperscript{1344} Ibid., 207–208.
\textsuperscript{1345} Clausewitz, Daase, and Davis 2015, 134.
\textsuperscript{1346} Petresch-Christensen 1911–1914, 56–62.
\textsuperscript{1347} Bassompierre 1692, 108.
This was a common expedient for creating dragoons during the Thirty Years War. The military entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld had done so in the 1620s during his lightning marches through the Palatinate and Alsace.1348 In early 1645 Torstensson placed most of his musketeers on horses prior to his renewed Bohemian campaign that culminated in the military victory at Jankau in February.1349 Hans Königsmarck would do so again in 1648, when he prepared to take Prague by a surprise attack.1350

Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean have suggested that in late summer 1644, in preparation for breaking out of Holstein in order to face the advancing Imperial Army well outside the confines of the Jutland peninsula, Torstensson reconstituted his field army into an armée volante, “with a much greater emphasis on deploying cavalry and dragoons over less mobile infantry.”1351 With this line of thought, however, we run the danger of extrapolating nearly every contemporaneous field army into an armée volante. David Parrott has shown that during the latter half of the Thirty Years War there existed a general trend towards proportionally larger cavalry contingents, which finally came to outnumber the infantry element: the Spanish army that invaded Picardy in 1636 consisted of 13,000 cavalry and 10,000–12,000 infantry; Marshall Turenne’s French army in early 1645 included 9,200 cavalry and only 7,800 infantry. The preponderance of cavalry contingents reflected the shifting operational goals, which aimed at smaller logistical footprints and placed higher premium on foraging and rapid raids into enemy-held territories.1352

Applying the term armée volante to all major field armies (such as Torstensson’s Huvudarmé or main army in 1644) is problematic in the light of contemporaneous sources, which generally describe armées volantes as either reaction/screening forces or ad hoc-formations put together to carry out particular missions. The armées volantes employed or even merely planned by the Swedes during Torstensson’s War all fell within the first category. Helmut Wrangel’s armée volante in Jutland and Holstein and Lars Kagg’s armée volante in Scania were both mobile reaction forces that were largely preoccupied with counterinsurgency duties. The proposed armée volante in Livonia was planned to act as a mobile reaction force to counter any invasion from Poland-Lithuania. This precaution was sensible given the fact that King Vladislav IV had indeed toyed with the idea of assisting Christian IV by invading Swedish-held Livonia. His plans, however, had been frustrated by the Polish parliament or Sejm, which refused to lend any support for such military adventures.1353

At times armées volantes could be formed to carry out specific operations, as the Swiss Protestant Cantons did in 1624, when they assembled an armée volante of 6,000 men to recover the valleys of the Grey Leagues (an Alpine republic) from the Imperial and Spanish forces.1354 The Swiss armée volante, it should be noted, would have consisted almost exclusively of infantry, as cavalry was of little use in the alpine terrain. The Swiss foot soldiers had been at the forefront of the medieval Infantry

1348 Poyntz and Goodrick 1908, 48.
1349 Theatrum 1651, 630.
1350 Generalstaben 1948, 310.
1352 Parrott 2012, 184–186.
1354 Vauciennes 1678, 221–222.
Revolution, in which massed ranks of halberdiers and pikemen had been able to best mounted opponents on fair field in the plains. This emphasis on infantry warfare persisted well into the seventeenth century and the period of the Thirty Years War. According to Edward Cooke (1628), the Swiss still organized their armies into three, two, or at times just a single large battalion without any cavalry elements or reserve units.

As the above Swiss example goes to show, the armées volantes were defined not by their composition but by their purpose and mission. By very definition, their mission would not have been identical to that of the main field armies. Raimondo Montecuccoli defined regular armies in terms of their composition and purpose. An army of 40,000 men would have consisted of 24,000 infantry, 12,000 regular cavalry, 2,000 light cavalry, and 2,000 dragoons. In addition to these troops the army would have contained an artillery train 100 heavy and light field pieces. The cavalry element in the field army, therefore, would have never exceeded fifty percent; dismounted dragoons would have even increased the predominance of infantry over cavalry. Montecuccoli was equally assertive on the role of the regular field army. The army’s purpose was to conduct an opération, which started from secretive preparations and proceeded through marches and encampments to its final objective, a battle against a fortified position or an enemy army. Herein we find the main difference between the field armies and armées volantes: the former were well-suited for siege warfare and pitched battles against massed formations, whereas the latter were not. Conversely a regular field army of tens of thousands of men, lumbering laboriously along roads or through the open country in three separate contingents as the rear-guard (derriere garde), the main force (corps de battaille), and the advance-guard (arrière garde), would have been of little use at the operational level of dispersed and nebulous counterinsurgency warfare.

At the tactical level the question of an ideally-sized counterinsurgency unit becomes more problematic. In March 1637, Cardinal Richelieu informed Louis XIII of various military events that had taken place in and outside France, including the destruction of Bussy de Veire’s cavalry company at the hands of insurgent peasants in Auvergne. This and other French reports have led David Parrott to argue that company-sized units were too small to defend themselves effectively even at the level of localized guerre de partisans. Parrott may be correct in the context of seventeenth-century Auvergne, but in Torstensson’s War company-sized formations were usually quite capable of defending themselves against insurgents. There was one possible exception to this rule. In early 1644, a Swedish foraging expedition escorting several thousand heads of captured cattle from Jutland was allegedly surprised by an unquantified number of peasant insurgents in Holstein. The Swedes barely escaped annihilation, suffering in the process substantial casualties. Christian IV believed that the Swedish leader, Lieutenant Colonel Slebusch, had been taken prisoner, but this news was

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1356 Cooke 1628, 19.
1357 Montecuccoli 1756, 30.
1358 Ibid., 81–101.
1359 Ibid., 5.
1360 Avenel 1858, 760, 10 March 1637, Cardinal Richelieu to Louis XIII.
untrue. Wachtmeister apparently addressed this shortcoming by beefing up the detachments with additional escort troops. An ideal salvaguardia-party would have been of the same size as a platoon, roughly 20–40 mounted soldiers. During their initial invasion of Holstein the Swedes indeed deployed salvaguardia-detachments of 30–40 riders, as was attested by both the Danish legates in Hamburg and Count Penz in Glückstadt. Such small patrols would have been sufficiently strong to deal with individual snipers and other errand snapphanar. The destruction of large peasant parties, which regularly numbered between 300–500 insurgents, would have required two or more companies of cavalry; a standard fana of 250 riders would have combined both tactical and administrative efficiency in the conduct of counterinsurgency warfare.

The size and composition of foraging parties appears to have varied between different European armies and different theatres of war. At the early stage of the Thirty Years War, for instance, the Dutch salvaguardia-detachments in the Electorate of Cologne were not much larger than ten men or so. In his study of the battle between the French and Spanish armies at Tornavento in northern Italy in 1636, Gregory Hanlon has discovered archive references to French foraging parties, which appear to have been composed of infantry alone. The French first sent four or five musketeers to reconnoitre open villages or isolated habitations, while another group of musketeers lay close by in case of resistance. The reason for using infantry as foragers and salvaguardia-parties may have been caused by the fact that the broken terrain of northern Italy (where hedges and vines sectioned the landscape and hindered movement and vision) did not favour the employment of cavalry.

In addition to their increased mobility over regular armies, the Swedish armées volantes enjoyed another advantage at the strategic level: their expertise in contribution-collection, territorial control operations, and scorched earth -tactics. Helmut Wrangel’s armée volante in Jutland combined all these three aspects. Wrangel’s operations

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1362 KCFEB 1641–1644, 449–450, 16 February 1644.
1363 RAOSB, ii: 8, 296, 3 March 1644, extractskrivelse; RAOSB, ii: 8, 297, 14 March 1644, extractskrivelse; RAOSB, ii: 8, 304, 8 to 27 April 1644, kort relation.
1365 Kaiser 2016, 74.
1366 Hanlon 2016, 153.
1367 Ibid., 106.
contained insurgencies and secured material supplies for the Swedish army while depriving them from the Danes. Wrangel never really occupied Jutland and therefore did not set up any military administration there, but his fast-moving operations across the peninsula kept the Danes on their toes and prevented them from re-establishing Danish authority there. Wachtmeister’s cavalry contingent in Scania, even though smaller than an armée volante, was similarly preoccupied with both counterinsurgency and contribution-collection. Contribution-collection and foraging were in many ways ancillary forms of counterinsurgency warfare. Salvaguardia-parties always ran the danger of making contact with insurgents, as many Danish peasants were prone to react violently to the Swedish soldiers’ demands of tribute. All salvaguardia missions could therefore expect troubles from armed peasants, which by default made all such forays exercises in counterinsurgency warfare. Punitive expeditions too were a form of counterinsurgency warfare, but one dealt best in the context of pacification and soldier/peasant relations. Here it suffices to say that the line between ordinary contribution-collection and intentional terrorization of civilian populations was often a muddled one.

Measuring the success of Swedish counterinsurgency warfare in Torstensson’s War is difficult, as counterinsurgency warfare lacks clear metric for success and failure. Most commonly used modern metric has been the casualty rate among insurgents, often known simply as the “body count.” The body count was the quantified metric for American military success in the Vietnam War. It essentially emerged as a confluence of doctrinal deficiencies and technological advances – the latter qualification referring to the new computer-based research methods that were becoming increasingly accepted throughout the American Department of Defense in the late 1950s. There are two major problems with the metric of body counts in the context of early modern counterinsurgency. The first problem is the dubiousness of casualty rates as metric for success in counterinsurgency warfare in general, which has at least as much to do with issues of legitimacy and political stability as it has with combat and the killing of insurgents. The metric of body count, which became associated with its strong proponent, the Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara, ignored these other variables and simply concentrated on quantifying success from the enemy’s attrition rate. The body count, of course, told nothing about the way in which the Communists were growing their own political legitimacy at the expense of the Saigon government, thus creating favourable conditions for a Communist military victory. For this reason the reductionist body count metric has been called the “McNamara Fallacy.” We would face the very same problem of logical fallacy in connection with Torstensson’s War, in which the outcome of the war cannot be associated directly with the rate of attrition among Scanian snapphanan and other irregular troops.

The second problem concerns the availability of primary sources. While the quantification of war deaths among civilians in Scania and Jutland would tell us something about the ferocity of Swedish counterinsurgency warfare and the possible collateral damage caused by it, the existing sources do not permit any rigorous analysis on the demographic effects of counterinsurgency warfare. Even if historians could amass some mortality statistics from parish registers and other sources, these would not allow them to differentiate between various causes of death. The Thirty Years War

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1369 Berni 2016, 183.
shows just how difficult it is to analyse war-time mortality, which was caused not only by violence but also by the accompanying phenomena of disease and famine.  

The qualification of the existing data, such as records of burial at the Halmstad churchyard, suggest that infant and child mortality was high during the war, but this melancholy state of affairs also applied to times of peace in the early modern era.  

Pestilence as a cause of mortality certainly made its appearance during Torstensson’s War, when an unspecified epidemic broke out in Halland, Scania, and Blekinge. The origins of this disease remain unclear; there had, nevertheless, been reports in late 1643 of a “Pest” in Saxony-Anhalt, whence the malady might have spread northwards in the trail of Torstensson’s army.  

Be that as it may, Bodil E. B. Persson, who investigated war-related epidemics in seventeenth-century Scania, concluded that the epidemic of 1644–1645 was most likely not a single disease but a combination of typhus and dysentery.  

The lack of contemporaneous data prevents us from quantifying the overall effects of this epidemic. We do know that it affected Scania as well as the Danish Isles. On 12 September 1644 the government instructed Tage Thott to quarter sick soldiers in Malmö and provide them with necessary care. A month later we learn that there “were a large number of sick soldiers in Malmö.” In January 1645 the Ordinari Post Tijdender made the dubious claim that the pestilence had claimed the lives of every second Danish soldier on the Scanian side of the Sound.  

The pamphlet’s claim that by early 1645 the pestilence had killed 4,000–5,000 people in Malmö was clearly an exaggeration, as that would have meant the demise of every single inhabitant in a city where population never appears to have exceeded 5,000 in the course of the seventeenth century.  

By 27 December 1644 the King had become aware of a “fierce pest in Copenhagen and elsewhere.” Christian IV therefore wrote to a number of doctors in Copenhagen and commissioned them to find out the cause of the sickness and to develop a cure against it. In June 1645 the disease appeared in the fleet that carried Scanian and Sjællander conscripts. The government was forced to disembark the sick soldiers and billet them in Copenhagen. Swedes too suffered from the pestilence. Nils Assersson Mannerskiöld, the commandant of Gothenburg, reported to Lars Kagg on 29 January 1645 that “sickness and mortality is great in and around Gothenburg.” According to the Ordinari Post Tijdender, medical supplies were delivered to Scania from Wismar, but what these supplies were exactly, the pamphlet does not tell us.  

Later in April
Kagg quantified the number of soldiers in Gustaf Horn’s Scanian army incapacitated by sickness. Out of 8,894 soldiers in Horn’s army, 887 or ten percent had fallen ill. Kagg also quantified that the army had lost 928 men through death and disappearance since the end of December 1644. He did not differentiate between mortality and desertion or potential causes of death. Nevertheless, if we extrapolate the sickness rate among Horn’s soldiers to the Scanian population at large, it would be safe to argue that the disease would have inflicted the kind of mortality and dislocation that could not be differentiated from the hardships caused by direct military action.

In 1646, Scania and Blekinge were visited by a Danish commission that gathered information on the material destruction caused by war and the Swedish occupation. The detailed and lengthy report, which Stefan Persson has reproduced in his book Gränsbygd och svenskkrig, would merit its own investigation that ultimately falls beyond the scope of this research. Here it suffices to say that hardly a village in Scania was unaffected by the material devastations of war. In almost every Scanian village at least one farm was either destroyed by war or abandoned by its occupants. The report testifies that the Swedes did not steal only horses, cattle and poultry, but also moveables and non-moveables, such as doors and windowpanes. The report also inventoried valuable trees cut down by the Swedes. At the Emmislöv parish in Göinge the Swedes even removed and melted down the church bell. According to Gregory Hanlon, this kind of destruction and vandalism in itself was not unusual during the Thirty Years War, and did not necessarily entail any special hostility towards civilians. The material destruction was typically motivated by the necessity to recycle metal for horse shoes, muskets’ spare parts, and bullets. Furniture and timber constructions were often chopped up for firewood. Gustaf Horn’s army, however, appears to have gone out of its way to devastate villages and farms that were not in the army’s path of advance or situated in the proximity of the Swedish encampments. The commission’s report seems to suggest that the Swedish occupiers indeed implemented in Scania a systematic and deliberate scorched earth-policy that went beyond the ‘normal’ level of material destruction associated with daily foraging, fire-ransoms, and forced billeting.

Perhaps the strategically most valuable facility destroyed by the Swedes was the gunpowder mill at Lyngsjö outside Kristianstad. It had been established in 1634 for the purpose of providing gunpowder for the Kristianstad garrison. During Torstensson’s War its management had been contracted out to a group of Copenhagen entrepreneurs, who succeeded in making it the second most productive gunpowder mill in Denmark after the Brede works at Sjælland. In 1641–1643, its annual production rate approached 13 tons of gunpowder. There was an attempt to rebuild the Lyngsjö works after the war, but no deliveries were ever recorded after 1645. Its destruction, which quite possibly took place at the very beginning of the war, would have directly contributed to the acute shortage of gunpowder among the Danish defenders of Scania (including the snapphanar).

1382 RAOSB, ii:9, 627, 19 April 1645, Lars Kagg to Axel Oxenstierna.
1384 KBB 1646, 101, 22 April 1646.
1385 Hanlon 2016, 162.
1386 Mårtensson 1997, 4.
The amount of taxes delivered in Halland appears to have fallen by more than thirty percent after the war.\textsuperscript{1387} Most of those farms that remained inhabited were unable to pay part or all of their land-rents (landgilde) and taxes. As a rule, Christian IV was forced to alleviate many taxes and payments, and in some cases even to make compensation for damages caused by the enemy. For instance, when Peder Pedersen, the royal accountant at the Åkær castle in Jutland, was forced to pay contributions to the Swedes from his own resources in order to save the castle and to support the royal peasants, the King deemed it fair to reimburse Pedersen for his losses.\textsuperscript{1388}

The effectiveness of Swedish counterinsurgency in Torstensson’s War is best approached from a qualitative rather than quantitative perspective. The first qualification for successful counterinsurgency warfare was the fact that the Swedish armies never met any military disaster as a result of insurgency. The military danger posed by Danish irregulars should not be underestimated, as insurgent bands could have blocked the Swedish armies’ lines of retreat and thus place them in a situation where they would have been forced to fight regular Danish troops under highly unfavourable circumstances. Such a danger certainly appeared during Horn’s hasty retreat from Malmö, but it was averted by the swift action of the screening Swedish cavalry contingents that dispersed the Scanian irregular bands and kept operational lines and choke points open for the main Swedish army.

Secondly, Swedish troops tended to prevail over the Scanian insurgents at the tactical level. The Swedes allocated fighting against enemy irregulars to cavalry units and dragoons, who could outmaneuver and effectively ‘herd’ the unmounted insurgents into such tactical circumstances that favoured the Swedes. The Danish irregulars’ firelocks did not grant them any tactical advantage over Swedish cavalrymen, as by the 1640s many of them carried snaphance carbines as well. Horses and broadswords, on the other hand, endowed the Swedish troops with the kind of shock effect that the Scanian peasants did not possess.

The third qualification for success was the Swedes’ ability to identify and locate potentially threatening irregular activity. The primary source evidence does not reveal exactly how the Swedish system of reconnaissance and espionage operated in Scania, but its results were indisputable. The Swedes’ high alertness to any danger from potential insurgent bands can be witnessed in their reaction to even non-existing insurgent threats. Even rumours of secret peasant encampments or insurgencies in the making elicited a Swedish military response in the form of a scout party or a flying column.

The success of Swedish counterinsurgency warfare becomes a more controversial issue at the strategic level. It is evident that Swedish counterinsurgency warfare had a direct military impact on the structure and organisation of the snapphanar and other Danish insurgents. As the existing evidence suggests, the organisation of Danish irregulars was hybrid and hierarchical, i.e. that it consisted of a combination of armed peasants and regular soldiers and that it was officered by the latter. The Swedes made some attempts to identify the leaders of the irregular bands, and we also know that at least one alleged leader, Bent Mogensen, was killed in action. His death, or the deaths of other less-known leaders, nevertheless failed to impede Danish insurgency in any discernible way. The local guerrilla leaders did not play such pivotal roles that their

\textsuperscript{1387} Larsson 2004, 18; Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 220.

\textsuperscript{1388} KBB 1646, 111, 25 April 1646.
deaths would have paralyzed the irregular bands or prevented them from continuing their activities. The most likely reason behind this was the swift and uncomplicated replacement of incapacitated or terminated command echelons. Another alternative would have been a cell-like structure among the insurgents, common to modern-day terrorist organisations that do not require monolithic and visible leadership hierarchies to operate but instead rely on decentralized hierarchies.\(^{1389}\) There is no evidence to support a view that the insurgents organized themselves organically and without any recourse to hierarchical leadership. Instead the sources suggest that the irregular warfare of the Danish peasant bands was directed by representatives and associates of the Danish state, be they soldiers, land-owning nobles, royal bailiffs, or even priests. Be that as it may, the insurgency was not some dragon, whose head could be cut off with a single strike.

The strategic priority of Swedish counterinsurgency warfare lied in territorial control and the protection of the lines of communication between Scania and Sweden. The success of Swedish counterinsurgency at this strategic level was mixed. Gustaf Horn and the riksråd were probably right in their view that the control of castles and fortified manors in Scania and Halland would greatly facilitate the Swedes’ ability to control the countryside and nip any potential insurgencies in the bud. Allocating military resources for these ends was perfectly expedient, but a static strategy was never enough to suppress all insurgent activities. Peasant irregulars continued to assemble in territories under Swedish occupation and lines of communication between Scania and Sweden remained imperilled throughout the war. The danger posed to the lines of communication was of such chronic nature that when Horn’s army restored the lines of communication between the different Swedish-held towns in Scania in the summer of 1644, the event was deemed news-worthy enough to be made known to Hugo Grotius in Paris.\(^{1390}\) The construction of stockades and the organization of cavalry patrols to monitor the roads allowed more traffic and mail to get through the Scanian forest roads, but the danger from snapphanar never fully disappeared and still manifested itself at the very end of the war in 1645. If the Swedes had not allocated resources for counterinsurgency warfare, it is very likely that the problem with snapphanar would have been an even greater one. Then as now, counterinsurgency warfare does not offer silver bullets but only partial solutions that work best as an aggregate of various strategies and approaches.

### 5.4 GUERRILLA WARFARE AND THE MILITARY REVOLUTION

The question of resources and counterinsurgency warfare leads to the theory of an early modern Military Revolution. The origins of the Military Revolution theory were in Michael Roberts’s observations regarding the Swedish military state under the reign of Gustaf Adolf. The essence of Roberts’s theory was that tactical and technological changes increased the scale and demands of warfare and thus forced the early modern state to extract and allocate more resources for war. In order to meet these increased demands, the early modern state had to develop and grow


\(^{1390}\) BHG januari–september 1644, 622, 1 August 1644, Harald Andersson Appelboom to Hugo Grotius.
its administration, particularly its fiscal institutions, which led to the emergence of the territorial \textit{Machtstaat}, or more commonly in English terminology, the fiscal-military state. Roberts's argumentation approached the Military Revolution from the perspective of regular warfare, namely mass armies, and paid little or no attention to such issues as fortifications and naval warfare. Later historians, such as Geoffrey Parker and Jan Glete, have done much work to cover these lacunae in Roberts's original theory, but even they have largely overlooked the field of small war, the predominant form of warfare in the age of the Thirty Years War.\footnote{Glete 2000; Parker 1996.} What, then, does guerrilla warfare in Torstensson's War tell us about the Military Revolution?

Torstensson's War signified a transformation towards modern guerrilla warfare that is characterized by swarms of irregular fighters armed with firearms and occupying large segments of the battle space – thus creating an environment of “explosive emptiness” that increases the friction of war for regular armies. The transformation of war was made possible by the firelock musket, which links the transformation to the larger theory of a Military Revolution, but only in a narrow technological sense. Roberts was never interested in the technological aspects of the Military Revolution. To him the nearest thing to a technological shift was the growth of artillery into its own service branch that posed few social barriers to aspiring soldiers and generally modified military thought by harnessing science to war.\footnote{Roberts 1995, 24–25.} Jeremy Black has been more willing to ascribe the Military Revolution to technological changes, particularly to the disappearance of the pike and the arming of all infantrymen with the same weapon, a musket fitted with a bayonet, which development increased both the offensive and defensive capabilities of the infantry. The proliferation of socket bayonets occurred at the very same time when matchlock muskets were being replaced by flintlocks.\footnote{Black 1991, 20–21.} To Black, however, the revolutionary aspect of this development was not the flintlock musket but the bayonet attached to it.

The proliferation of the firelock musket can be seen as a subordinate event within the larger framework of the Military Revolution. Firstly, the firelock musket economized on training (economy in training being one of the hallmarks of the Military Revolution), as it eliminated the burning match, which was an awkward and detrimental feature in irregular warfare. Firelocks in the hands of guerrillas and other irregular combatants eliminated the need for drill, which only served a purpose for battlefield evolutions, not any ‘skulking way of war’ conducted in the woods and hedges. Secondly, the new kind of guerrilla warfare, fought by dispersed swarms of irregulars armed with compact firelocks, required sophisticated tactics, which Roberts identified as one of the characteristics of the Military Revolution. This effectively meant proficiency in disengagement and regrouping for renewed attacks against the enemy army. As Clausewitz pointed out, irregular bands should be ready to operate in larger and more systematic bodies if the enemy’s weaknesses called for a concentration of force.\footnote{Clausewitz 1997, 312.} Changing the pace and focus of guerrilla warfare according to evolving military goals required new levels of tactical skill, foreplanning, and leadership from the guerrillas. The Scanian guerrillas’ ability to disrupt and compromise Swedish lines of communication must be regarded as a succesful example of such tactics. There is
no evidence that the peasants would have been trained in these guerrilla tactics by regular soldiers. Instead it seems that the peasant irregulars figured out their own way of conducting guerrilla warfare with the tools available to them.

Most supporters of Roberts’s theory regard institutional and administrative growth as the most important aspect of the Military Revolution. How does the transformation of guerrilla warfare fit into this institutional dimension of the Military Revolution? Starting with Denmark, the levying, arming, and leading of irregular forces did not necessitate the setting up of any new institutions for the management of irregular warfare. On royal domains in Jutland and Scania the responsibility for levying and arming irregular opbud-levies fell to the local lensmænd. It was even in their responsibility to appoint officers for the leived bands. When very large numbers of peasants were levied, the nobles were enlisted as officers. In Sjælland and Fyn the local nobility controlled all aspects of the opbud. They organized the troops, equipped them, and led them in battle. Because the Danish landowners did not welcome the idea of armed tenants, the demesne peasants’ firearms were stored and maintained by their landlords at times of peace. The Fynian opbud was organized as an actual army, with a general and two lieutenants as its general staff—all of them chosen by the nobility from its own ranks. The local Estates mustered and managed the troops in the manner of a colonel. Leaving the opbud-levies in the hands of the nobility was the only possible choice, as the embryonic central state had no means to muster, manage, or lead all of the levies itself. The nobility’s pivotal role in the management of irregular warfare becomes even more apparent when we recall that the royal lensmænd too were members of the land-owning nobility.

Both Swedish and Danish sources tell us something about the chain of command among the managers of irregular warfare. Gustaf Horn identified local bailiffs and priests as leaders of the Scanian peasant bands. Brode Jakobson’s report from January 1644 identified the local nobles as the ones overseeing the construction of road blocks and organizing peasants into military bands and suggested that the peasant Bent Mogenssen had been commissioned by them to recruit peasants for the purpose of “skelmstycken” or sabotage. Johann Heinrich Boeckler related that the Scanian peasants were led first and foremost by “Landsmannos.” The lensmænd in Scania, Halland, and Blekinge can be identified to have been the following persons in 1643–1645: Gunde Rosenkrans (Frosta), Christoffer Ulfeldt (Helsingborg), Kon Joachim Grabow (Järrestad), Ebbe Ulfeldt and Malte Juel (Kristianstad), Henrik Huitfeld (Landskrona), Tage Thott (Malmö), Niels Krabbe (Halmstad), Kristen Bülow (Laholm), Iver Krabbe (Varberg), Henrik Belov (Kristianopel), and Otte Thott (Sölvesborg). Many of these individuals did indeed exert influence over local military affairs, but more as governors and castellans of key strongholds rather than underground operators in occupied rural districts.

1395 Lind 1994, 34.
1396 Ibid., 34.
1397 RAOSB, ii: 8, 297, 3 March 1644, extractskrifvelse.
1398 SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Axel Oxenstierna av Södermöre E 574, 6 January 1644.
1399 Boeckler 1679, 102.
1400 Erslev 1885, 2–10.
Horn, Boeckler, and Jakobsson were all correct in their own ways. If we approach the question of leadership and organisation within the irregular bands from the top down, using the Danish Chancellery’s copybook, we can see that in Jutland and the Danish Isles the government issued its directives regarding the organization and provisioning of irregular warfare to the lensmænd. In Scania the government acted through Tage Thott and Ebbe Ulfeldt, who commanded the largest garrisons at Malmö and Kristianstad respectively. In Norway military affairs were left to statholder Hannibal Sehested’s discretion.

The land commissars and the war commissars, who supposedly acted as intermediates between the local elites and the centralized fiscal-military state, played fairly prominent roles in the organization and management of irregular warfare in Jutland but not in Scania or Halland. The reason for this singularity may be Jutland’s peculiar social structure. Unlike in the Danish Isles and Scania, where the majority of peasants were either kronbønder or demesne tenants, the Jutland peasants were predominantly freeholders.1401 As such the responsibility for maintaining military readiness fell on the freeholders themselves.

The leadership of the peasant levies remains a muddled issue. One potential group to lead the peasants would have been the war commissars, who operated under the generalkrigskommissariat. The problem with the war commissars was the fact that they followed armies instead of exercising jurisdiction over fixed localities or districts (as the land commissars did). Another hindrance for the war commissars would have been their already numerous and ill-defined duties in the daily management of supply, billeting, and military administration, which would have left them with little time and scarce resources to organize and direct irregular warfare by levied peasants. Finally it seems that the war commissars were poorly qualified to co-ordinate military efforts between armed peasants and the regular army. Robert Monro certainly gave a very damning account of the actions of the Danish war commissars from this perspective. There had occurred a nasty incident between Scottish soldiers and Sjællander peasants in 1628, when the latter had refused to billet foreign mercenaries. A quarrel had soon escalated into a violent conflict, during which the Scottish soldiers had opened fire and killed several peasants. Monro blamed this incident on the incompetence of the Danish war commissars, who had failed to inform the peasants in a timely manner of their responsibility to provide quarters for the Mackeys Regiment. If true, Monro’s account of the incident gives a very poor impression of the war commissars’ ability to organize peasant communities in support of military efforts.1402 In the end, even the most competent war commissars’ duties to collect contributions and billet troops would not have endeared them to the peasant population.

Stefan Persson was willing to attribute a very prominent role for the war commissars in the management of irregular warfare in Scania and Halland.1403 However, it is difficult to see how Persson would have reached such a conclusion on the basis of the Danish Chancellery’s copybook alone. The missives in the copybook are typically directed to the governors Ebbe Ulfeldt and Tage Thott; they do not reveal how they delegated military responsibilities to their own subordinates, the land commissars Gunde

1401 Hybel and Poulsen 2007, 309.
1402 Monro 1637, 61–62. i.
1403 Persson 2007, 294, 296.
Rosencrantz and Gabriel Kruse (and later in 1644 to the additional proviantkommissar Henrik Huitfeldt).\textsuperscript{1404}

The central government did occasionally address the land commissars directly, typically instructing them to make whatever funds they possessed in the landkisten (provincial exchequer) or provisions such as corn available to the regular troops, craftsmen, and other royal servants stationed in Malmö or other garrisons.\textsuperscript{1405} On 8 September 1644 the Chancellery addressed Gunde Rosencrantz and Henrik Huitfeldt in their capacity as proviantkommissær, giving them the authority to collect such contributions “that were deemed necessary for the army’s maintenance.”\textsuperscript{1406} The duties of the two proviantkommissær also covered the procurement of weapons and ammunition, but these supplies were to be acquired for the use of the regular army that was present in Scania in late 1644.\textsuperscript{1407} Gunde Rosencrantz, who also acted as the Scanian landsdommer or land judge, was encumbered by various other duties pertaining to disputed inheritances and outstanding debts.\textsuperscript{1408} The other proviantkommissær Henrik Huitfeldt in his turn doubled as the lensman of Landskrona, for which reason some of the military instructions about troop deployments were issued to him in that capacity.\textsuperscript{1409} None of the three intermediate commissars – Rosencrantz, Kruse, or Huitfeldt – appear to have been instructed by the Danish Chancellery to assume responsibility over the opbud-levies or any other facet of the insurgency.

There are nevertheless some instances where we at least find the Norwegian war commissars exercising direct military command over peasants. On 8 April 1644, when he was directing military operations from aboard his flagship Trefoldighed, Christian IV sent a missive to the war commissars Daniel Bildt and Thomas Dyre, ordering them to keep 300 peasants in readiness for a projected landing on the island of Hisingen north of Gothenburg.\textsuperscript{1410} This, however, may have only reflected the peculiar situation in Norway, where the limited size of the officer corps at times forced the war commissars to assume operational responsibility and command duties.

The Danish Chancellery’s copybook suggests that it was the land commissars who were the most active in the organization and management of irregular warfare in Jutland; Peder Dyrskøjt’s relation, on the other hand, identifies the local nobles as the leaders of peasant insurgency at Norresyndby.\textsuperscript{1411} On the surface these two primary sources seem to contradict one another, but if we look closer we may see that the nobility and the land commissariat were not mutually exclusive sources of leadership. The land commissariat may have been an administrative institution of the fiscal-military state, but it was also one dominated, or indeed fully manned, by the elites – even if these elites were not of wholly local origin until 1645, when the

\textsuperscript{1404} Lind 1994, 333–334.


\textsuperscript{1406} KBB 1644–1645, 115, 8 September 1644.

\textsuperscript{1407} KBB 1644–1645, 138, 22 October 1644.


\textsuperscript{1409} KBB 1644–1645, 43, 8 March 1644.

\textsuperscript{1410} NRR 1641–1648, 317, 8 April 1644; KBB 1644–1645, 50, 13 March 1644.

\textsuperscript{1411} KBB 1646, 165, 19 May 1646; KBB 1644–1645, 247, 9 March 1645; KBB 1644–1645, 120–121, 13 September 1644; KBB 1644–1645, 143–143, 3 November 1644; Petresch-Christensen 1911–1914, 50.
non-aristocratic nobility wrested the control of the land commissariat from the rigsråd-elite.\textsuperscript{1412} The noblemen leading the peasant insurgents at Nørresyndby could have acted as representatives of the land commissariat, in which case even freeholders would have been bound to submit to their authority in military matters. Another, more practical reason for the freeholders to follow local nobles would have been the latter group’s experience in warfare and officering. Most Danish noblemen had served as military officers at some stage of their careers, as the Noble Estate entailed cavalry service – either in person or in the form of cavalrmen recruited and paid by the nobles. At the rigsdag of May 1644 the nobility had even volunteered to “exercere” the peasant levies as part of its rostjeneste-duty.\textsuperscript{1413}

The organization and management of irregular warfare in Scania and Halland appears to have fallen to the responsibility of the land-owning nobles – from Tage Thott and Ebbe Ulfeldt down to the local landlords, who stored the demesne peasants’ muskets in their manors and led their tenants in battle at times of war. In Hannibal Sehested’s case we know that irregular warfare, which in Norway was more hybrid than guerrilla in nature, was managed through a military hierarchy, in which Sehested held the position of a supreme commander. We do not know how Thott and Ulfeldt directed peasant bands and snapphanar from Malmö and Kristianstad because the written evidence does not appear to be there – but direct they most likely did, as the co-ordinated nature of irregular warfare in Scania and Halland suggests. Perhaps in order to understand the structure and function of irregular warfare in Scania we must not look at Thott and Ulfeldt and other lensmænd simply as office-holders but also as members of the Noble Estate. In that case the power network, or military network at times of war, becomes one of informal nature.

The networks among the Danish nobility were at the same time both horizontal and vertical. The former kind of networks operated on the basis of kinship and patronage. Even a superficial look at Tage Thott and Ebbe Ulfeldt reveals their extensive kinship relations among Scanian landowners and local military officials. Tage Thott, as we already saw, was the single largest landowner in Scania. Thott was married and widowed four times. His first wife Hedvig had been the daughter of the statholder Breide Rantzau, and his other three wives were all members of prominent noble families in Scania and Halland. As a landowner Tage Thott controlled the Eriksholm, Bjersjöholm, Skabersjö, Barsebäck, and Ulstrup castles plus several manors; as a lensman he possessed military as well as civilian authority over the Malmøhus len. Thott appeared so confident in his position as a local military-social powerbroker that in 1653 he defied both Hannibal Sehested and Frederick III and allegedly forbade his demesne peasants from taking part in the landmilititsøvelser (regular drills for the levies).\textsuperscript{1414}

Ebbe Ulfeldt too was born in Scania, at the family castle in Råbelöv near Kristianstad. His father Christoffer and his brother Bjørn held military and administrative positions in Scania and Halland during Torstensson’s War. Bjørn Ulfeldt had been the commandant of the Laholm garrison in Halland at the outbreak of the war. After the city had been lost to the Swedes, he commanded a Hallander cavalry company

\textsuperscript{1412} Lockhart 1996, 268.
\textsuperscript{1413} AORSH 1644–1648, 13–15, 23–25 May 1644.
\textsuperscript{1414} DBL, xvii, 347–349.
as a proprietor-captain.\footnote{DBL, xvii, 12–13.} The father, Christoffer Ulfeldt, had initially acted as the governor of Helsingborg and had shared supreme military command in Scania with Tage Thott. After the fall of Helsingborg, Christoffer lost his position of authority and relocated to Kristianstad. When Ebbe Ulfeldt transferred to Ösel, his father took his place as the commandant of Kristianstad. In addition to the family seat at Råbelöv, Christoffer Ulfeldt owned several manors and castles elsewhere in Scania: Ugerup and Hanaskog near Kristianstad, Mölleröd near the Swedish border south of Markaryd, and Vankiva in the Västra Göinge district.\footnote{Ibid., 14.}

A more powerful branch of the Ulfeldt family was built around the rigshofmester Corfitz Ulfeldt and his several brothers and distant cousins to Ebbe and Bjørn Ulfeldt. During Torstensson’s War members of this other branch played prominent roles in military-administrative positions, but mostly in Sjælland and Jutland instead of Scania. We do find Corfitz’s brother Ebbe Jakobsson Ulfeldt as a colonel-proprietor in Malmö, where he commanded a Scanian company that he had raised at his own expense.\footnote{Ibid., 31.}

How did the informal military networks in Kristianstad, Halmstad, and Malmö operate? It is difficult to answer this question due to a lack of existing documents. Either the orders and missives sent by the military governors to irregular bands have not survived or they never existed in the first place. It is indeed very possible that many of the orders sent out from Kristianstad, Halmstad, and Malmö were delivered verbally instead of being written down. The receivers of instructions sent by the military governors would have been officers, bailiffs, clergy, and landowners. The last group would have also included seneschals, who managed manorial estates on behalf of absent landlords, such as Tage Thott and Ebbe Ulfeldt themselves. It would have been quite impossible to operate guerrilla bands by remote control from Kristianstad, Halmstad, or Malmö, for which reason it is very likely that the peasant bands acted with great independence and only followed fairly rough operational guidelines set down by Thott and Ulfeldt. There is little evidence to suggest that the government in Copenhagen ever attempted to micromanage the irregular warfare in Jutland, Scania, or Norway. The King and his rigsråd limited their involvement to general exhortations to oppose the invading enemy at the local level. It is easy to agree with Stefan Persson’s assessment that while the military situation on the Danish islands elicited direct involvement from the Crown, military decision-making in Scania and Halland was delegated to regional authorities, namely the local elites.\footnote{Persson 2007, 294.}

The correlation between insurgent activity and the proximity of Danish strongholds and noble manors is inescapable. By the mid-seventeenth century more than half of all the land in Scania belonged to the nobles, whose Scanian fiefs consisted of 120 estates of varying sizes.\footnote{Åberg 1965, 36–37.} Much of the snappanar-activity indeed occurred along the north-west axis from Kristianstad to Halmstad, the Danish strongholds lorded over by Ebbe Ulfeldt and Tage Thott respectively. The insurgents would have had an easy access to both of these strongholds, as they were merely cordoned off by the Swedes instead of being besieged. The extractskrifvelse relate how the Danish insurgents delivered their prisoners to these places; it is obvious that by visiting the Danish strongholds
the insurgents would have also received new instructions and perhaps stocked up on weapons and supplies. Other areas of conspicuous insurgent activity were located near noble manors and estates. The castles at Torup and Erikholm, the former owned by Joehum Beck and the latter by Tage Thott, were both defended by armed peasants, and the latter was again attacked by peasants after its capture by the Swedes. The fortified manor of Knutstorp too was contested by Scanian insurgents after it had been taken over by a Swedish garrison. The manor had been the birth place of the astronomer Tycho Brahe, and in 1644 it belonged to the powerful rigsråd-aristocrat Jørgen Brahe, who was nicknamed “the little king at Fyn” due to his extensive properties on that island.1420

Ebbe Ulfeldt’s estates near Kristianstad, Markaryd, and Västra Göinge were all hotbeds of insurgent activity. Alf Åberg too identified Göinge as a hotbed of insurgency, but on the grounds of its geography and social structure. Northern Scania was heavily forested, which qualification generally favours guerrilla warfare. Åberg maintained that the peasants in the northern “skogsbygden” or forest districts were traditionally well-prepared for guerrilla warfare and that most of them possessed firearms.1421 Unlike most peasants in Scania, who were predominantly demesne tenants, one fifth of these “forest-peasants” were free skattebönder. This gave them certain independent-mindedness, and they were prone to resist the imposition of contributions and billeting by force.1422 All this may be true, but there is no conclusive evidence to support a view that the forest-peasants organized their insurgency entirely independently of local elites or central authorities during Torstensson’s War. Those localities that they chose to defend in force were not their own remote villages or secretive forest haunts but key road junctions and manorial strongholds.

The network of Scanian nobles was also vertical in the sense of being hierarchical, which likened it to a military chain of command. Like all social strata and political Estates, nobility too was internally stratified. The elites had their own elites. One’s place in the nobility’s internal hierarchy was decided by wealth and proximity to the Court and the rigsråd.1423 Social stratification permeated even military and administrative institutions. Institutional authority still derived more from birth than function, which circumstances could lead to awkward and (in the military) potentially dangerous situations if nobles refused orders from those they deigned as their social inferiors. This all changed in 1671 with the introduction of a table of ranks, which set out a rigid hierarchy of functions and titles that emphasized nature of the service performed instead of social background.1424

In 1643–1645, however, the Danish military was still the bastion of native nobility. The military could easily accommodate the native nobility into its ranks, as the size of the Danish nobility was only 180 or so families and 400–500 adult males.1425 These numbers were obviously not enough to make up the entire officer corps, and new officers were brought in from Holstein and abroad. The recruitment of foreign officers,

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1420 DBL, xvii, 591–593; Weibull 1872, 44.
1421 Åberg 2014, 37.
1422 Ibid., 18–20, 49–50.
1423 Jespersen 1988, 140.
which process was always more modest in Denmark compared to Sweden, did not change the fact that the uppermost positions in the military-administrative hierarchy were reserved for the native aristocracy. Thus we can see that the lensmænd in Scania and Halland during Torstensson’s War – Tage Thott in Malmö, Ebbe Ulfeldt in Kristianstad, Henrik Huitfeld in Landskrona, and Otte Thott in Sölvesborg – were all members of the land-owning elite. Of these four lensmænd, the two supreme commanders Tage Thott and Ebbe Ulfeldt were also members of the Noble Estate’s highest stratum, the true aristocracy. As senior military-administrative commanders and aristocratic magnates Thott and Ulfeldt possessed two chains of command, military and social, to subordinate both military-administrative officials and local landowners and to organize local resistance against the invaders. Soldiers would follow Thott and Ulfeldt as military superiors; local nobles would acknowledge their higher standing in the social hierarchy; demesne peasants would obey them as landlords.

The command structure of the Scanian insurgency corresponds in some ways with that of the entire Danish army, which Gunner Lind has described as being “collective-hierarchical.” The army was hierarchical in the sense that all the officers had designated ranks in the chain of command. It was also collective because of its separate hierarchies between officers and commissars, and because all military administration was being managed collectively at the krigsråd, the nexus from which all separate hierarchies originated.1426

The extractskrifvelse related how Danish priests provided at least some of the leadership for the insurgent peasants, but it is doubtful that they played any major role as operational commanders. To begin with, the anecdote about the fidgety priest leading a peasant band from Kristianstad and fleeing the battlefield at the first sound of gunfire does not paint a complimentary picture of the military capabilities of Danish priests.1427 Neither does the Chancellery copybook’s entry regarding the vicar Nils Riber, who wanted to abandon his congregation in Landskrona and escape to Sjælland.1428 In the Swedish-occupied Helsingborg another timid vicar offered public prayers for both Queen Christina and the invading Swedish army.1429 However, at the opposite end of the clerical spectrum we can find Kjeld Stub, a vicar from Ullensaker near Christiania (Oslo), who held the title of Hannibal Sehested’s kammerraad (Chamberlain) and whom the historian Vilhelm Vessberg characterized as a local “guerrilla leader.”1430 We should, however, keep in mind that, unlike most ordinary parish priests, Stub had already gained military experience in French and Dutch service, and was indeed a highly valued military engineer.1431 It was most likely Stub’s military proficiency rather than his clerical status that qualified him for a military leadership position.

The church does not appear have been very useful as a source of manpower and military leadership, but it may have performed a very concrete function as an organizational basis for mustering irregular levies. The Swedish and Danish sources typically refer to peasant contingents as hailing from some sogne or parish district.

1427 RAOSB, ii: 8, 297–298, 14 March 1644, extractskrifvelse.
1428 KBB 1644–1645, 43, 8 March 1644.
1429 RAOSB ii:8, 293, 19 February 1644, extractskrifvelse.
1430 Vessberg 1900, 9.
1431 DBL, xvii, 523–526.
Less often a reference is made to the herred or judicial districts as origins of peasant bands. Organizing peasant resistance on the basis of parishes was not unusual in early modern Europe. Writing on the early modern French peasantry, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie observed that the Norman Nu-pied -rebels in 1639 possessed a cell-like structure, in which the basic cell was either the parish or the village community. Above the parish, the geographical unit of the insurgency was the pagus, a French peculiarity and an area of bocage or wooded and fenced pasture that consisted of a few dozen parishes.1432

A roughly similar structure seems to have existed in Scania as well. At the heart of every Scanian sogne was the church building, the tallest and most visible construction in early modern Scandinavia. The church did not stand alone, but was always surrounded by a hamlet or a village, often the largest one in the entire sogne. The parish church was obviously the seat of the kirkeherre, the vicar, who acted as the mouthpiece of the King, but it was also the place where the peasants would have associated with one another and even with the local nobles, who attended church services every Sunday just like everyone else. The parish also had its own representative institution, the sognestemme or parish diet, which regulated many aspects of social and economic life in the parish. The parish diet consisted of named peasants, the sognemænd, who assisted the parish priest in his administrative functions and even elected a successor for him in case of death.1433 The church village was the local centre of spiritual, social, and even economic life, which would have made it the perfect muster place for peasant insurgents. Alf Åberg found evidence in contemporaneous Swedish investigation protocols that in 1658 insurgent peasants from the Rödeby parish indeed assembled at the Rödeby church yard.1434 Evidence of similar circumstances in Torstenson’s War is less explicit, but in Halland the Swedes certainly believed that the Hallandsås parish church had admitted a number of insurgents within its walls.1435

Partially overlapping the parish as an administrative unit was the herred, which was essentially a judicial precinct. While the parish diet was the leading municipal organisation, the herredsting, or the meeting of the peasants in the herred, was an expression of self-rule among Scanian peasants – at least among those free peasants who dwelt in the northern forest zone.1436 As a diet the representative peasants or herredsmænd could discuss and decide economic and municipal issues, such as the maintenance of roads and bridges, which topics were not without military implications.1437 The knowledge where to set up a roadblock for best effect, for instance, resided at the herred-level of irregular warfare. The government took interest in the upkeep of local roads and passages, as we can see in September 1645, when the Danish Chancellery sent (via the lensman) orders to the herredsmænd in the Tuse herred in Sjælland to repair the wooden bridge that connected Tuse to the coastal town of Kalungborg.1438

1432 Ladurie 1987, 389.
1434 Åberg 2014, 50.
1435 Ordinari Post Tijdender N. 4 Anno 1645, 2.
1437 Ibid., 29.
1438 KBB 1644–1645, 463, 23 September 1645.
The herredsting was first and foremost a judicial court that was chaired by a herredsfoged or district bailiff and attended by an assembly of stokkemænd or jurors. The former was appointed on behalf of the Crown by the local lensmænd, while the latter were elected by public opinion.\(^{1439}\) Sources do not reveal much about the role played by herredsfoged or herredsting representatives in the organization or conduct of irregular warfare. Judicial or municipal duties hardly qualified anyone for leadership positions in war, but it is not too daring to assume that the early modern peasant society, which was indeed internally stratified, would look up to certain esteemed peers at times of crisis. The herredsfoged, herredsmænd, sognemænd, and village elders would have been in the position to play key roles in the mobilization of local levies and in the encouragement for participation in irregular warfare.

We can deduce something about the powerful role played by the local peasant communities in the conduct of irregular warfare by examining the evidence from the Second Northern War. In 1660, Ebbe Ulfeldt, who had by then changed sides and was serving Charles X of Sweden, drew up a pacification plan, in which the Scanian peasant communities were called on to participate in the effort to combat unruly snapphanar. Ulfeldt proposed to Gustaf Otto Stenbock, the Swedish Governor of Scania, that the Swedes should act through the local herredsting and invite the Scanian peasants (by then legal subjects of the Swedish Crown) to join the Swedish troops in their fight against snapphanar, many of whom had turned to outright brigandage. In the Göinge district, which was one of the areas worst plagued by the outlaw snapphanar, the new Swedish landshövding Carl Gustaf Skytte refined Ulfeldt’s plan to perfection. Skytte billeted Swedish troops in the villages and farmhouses and then asked the local peasants to assist the Swedish counterinsurgency contingents until such time that the district had been freed from snapphanar. The billeting of Swedish soldiers proved to be a powerful incentive for helping the Swedish authorities to fight the snapphanar, as the peasants were quite eager to get rid of their military houseguests. In fact the peasants expressed remarkable initiative in counterinsurgency and volunteered to hunt down the snapphanar on their own.\(^{1440}\)

It is easy to accept Åberg’s assessment that Skytte’s method to separate the snapphanar from the peasant community proved to be psychologically insightful. Both Ulfeldt and Skytte understood that the snapphanar would not be able to act without the support and approval of the local peasant communities. When that support was not forthcoming, the snapphanar became simple outlaws and brigands skulking in the woods, in fear of both Swedish soldiers and local peasants.\(^{1441}\) No similar pacification plan was ever implemented in Scania during Torstensson’s War, which may partly explain the persistence of insurgency up until the official end of the war (and possibly even beyond it). It is evident that parish and herred-districts played a very central role in the organization of guerrilla warfare in Scania and Halland. They were the closest seventeenth-century analogies to Che Guevara’s concept of foco or centers of gravity for guerrilla warfare.

Lastly we should consider the possibility that the insurgencies in Holstein, Bremen, Jutland, and Scania were spontaneous and not planned or co-ordinated by state or local authorities in any way. The idea that peasants waged insurgency on their own

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\(^{1439}\) Jespersen 2000, 119.

\(^{1440}\) Åberg 2014, 52–53.

\(^{1441}\) Ibid., 53.
initiative and for their own purposes raises the problem of peasant communalism. The concept of medieval peasant communalism or Kommunalismus originates from German historiography, namely from Peter Blickle. As Landsrecht or territorial law came to replace manorial justice in the Holy Roman Empire in the late Middle Ages, Blickle argued, responsibility for security was transferred from feudal lords to towns and peasant communities. These communal organisations operated at times of peace with the purpose of defence against external enemies, such as foreign invaders. The organisations also had the potential to act in an offensive capability on their own initiative and discretion. In the military sphere the process of communalism redistributed control and exercise of violence outside the traditional military-feudal establishment.1442

Communalism was not in itself a form of military organisation, but it allowed for the re-employment of collectively-managed tasks in other functions. Lars-Olof Larsson and Kimmo Katajala, for instance, have proposed that the miners' corporative organisation of production in Bergslagen provided them with the means to organize themselves militarily, for instance during the Engelbrekt Rebellion in 1434–1436.1443 Communalism was not Communism; evidence from the Club War and other Finnish peasant rebellions from the early modern era suggest that when peasant communities resorted to dissent, rebellion, or even war, they deferred to the more prosperous members of their social stratum for military and even political leadership. Often these were also individuals who had accumulated some experience in the fields of of trade, litigation, administration, and warfare.1444

Events during Torstensson’s War indicate that there was indeed some correlation between communalism and insurgency. Peter H. Wilson has listed Dithmarschen and Frisia –a wider region west of the Elbe that also included the Bremener marshlands – as primary examples of German communalism in the early modern era.1445 Perhaps not at all incidentally, these two areas were also hotbeds of particularly intensive peasant insurgency in 1643–1645. Dithmarschen had seen the emergence of communal government already in the eleventh century due to the need to construct and maintain dikes and flood defences. Dithmarschen’s communalism had peaked in the late fifteenth century with the consolidation of its own government and its recognized status as a direct Imperial fief. In the course of the sixteenth century, Dithmarschen’s autonomy began to somewhat decline as a result of its political isolation in the shadow of the region’s new overlord, the Duke of Holstein, who was also the monarch of Denmark.1446

Communalism also survived in the Bremener marshlands, although the degree and extent of communalism varied between the constituent regions. Wursten had lost much of its self-rule in the 1525 Treaty of Stade, which had abolished local constitution and subjected Wursten to feudal dues and duties imposed by the Archbishop of Bremen. The peasants of Kehdingen still insisted on the right to participate in the Bremener Landtage as their own Estate, even though they had been formally excluded in the 1590s. Hadeln retained an even more potent form of communalism, as it was

1442 Blickle 1986, 529-556.
1444 Katajala, 2017, 97.
1446 Ibid., 581–582.
still a self-ruling peasant republic with its own laws and a political assembly. As in Dithmarschen, the most pressing task of the peasant communities was the construction and maintenance of dikes and other flood controls. This system of labour would have also served a military function as a foundation for insurgency in the communalist manner proposed above by Lars-Olof Larsson and Kimmo Katajala.

During the Thirty Years War, the peasants of Hadeln had consistently resisted any such military impositions that did not originate from Hadeln’s formal overlords, the dukes of Saxe-Lauenburg. Something of this communalist antipathy towards military intrusions can be deduced from the chronicles of Hadeln in the early years of the Thirty Years War: “On 7 November of this year [1623] there arrived in the Bishopric of Bremen 800 cavalrymen in search of winter quarters. When the people asked them who they were, they answered that they served the Devil, after which the inhabitants rallied themselves and drove out these unwanted guests.”

For the Hadelners, all soldiers were equally bad. When the Bishop of Halle occupied the Bremener lands on the orders of Christian IV in July 1626, the peasants of Hadeln and other marshland areas prepared to resist him by force and even constructed sconces defended by cannons. In August 1626 the bishop received warnings of an approaching army from Hamburg. He then retreated from Hadeln after having deprived the peasants of their muskets. When Danish troops entered Hadeln in search of winter quarters in September 1626, the peasants once again rallied themselves, manning some of the dikes and fortifying them with cannons as a sign of their resolve to defend Hadeln from perceived foreign military intrusions. After 1627, however, Hadeln was forced to endure several full-scale military occupations by Danish, Imperialist, and Swedish armies. There was little that the peasants could do to defend their communalist neutrality against overwhelming military might. The spark of communalist insurgency, it seems, was not rekindled until Königsmarck’s army appeared in the marshlands in 1644.

The inhabitants of Wursten had exhibited similar resentment towards foreign military encroachment during the earlier stages of the Thirty Years War. The peasants of Wursten, however, did not appear to defend their own particularism or neutrality but rather the suzerainty of their official overlord, the Archbishop of Bremen-Verden. This fierce local patriotism was strongly manifested in 1632, when the land of Wursten became a battlefield in the struggle between the then Archbishop John Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, the Swedish army in the Lower Saxon Circle, the Imperialist commander Gottfried von Pappenheim, and the House of Oldenburg. The most notable flashpoint of this power-struggle was the fort of Freiburg on the left bank of the Elbe. In late February 1632 Christian IV had dispatched Colonel Marquard Rantzau with 300 soldiers to take possession of the fort and the surrounding town. Upon learning of the Danish seizure of the fort, Archbishop John Frederick sent his own contingent of dragoons under the command of the French Colonel Daniel du Menys

1448 Chronik des Landes Hadeln 1843, 266.
1449 Ibid., 276.
1450 Ibid., 278.
1451 Ibid., 278.
1452 Theatrum 1646, 617.
to take the fort back. The Danes sallied out of Freiburg and attacked Menys and his dragoons. In the ensuing fight the Bremeners claimed to have killed forty Danes and taken 160 prisoners, but Freiburg nevertheless remained in Danish hands.\footnote{1453}

The Bremeners finally retrieved Freiburg by a different course of action. “However, March the thirteenth [the date according to the Gregorian calendar],” William Watts narrated in his chronicle, “following, and in the night; did 2,000 Bremers people, in white Frocks or shirts, give a Camisado upon the Castle: which they stormed, and killed 300 Danes in it.”\footnote{1454} A very similar version was narrated by the Gazette, which elaborated that of the 330 Danish defenders only seven were left alive: “The rest were massacred and their corpses cast into the River Elbe.”\footnote{1455} The Theatrum Europaeum gave a slightly differing account of the event. In this version the castle was attacked on the night of 4/14 March by “the subjects and inhabitants of the land of Wursten with a number of the Bremeren Archbishop’s soldiers.”\footnote{1456} The version provided by the Theatrum suggests that the recapture of Freiburg did not take place at the initiative of insurgent peasants but was rather directed by the Archbishop’s military servants. The incident had therefore more to do with hybrid warfare than peasant communalism. Later in April 1632 the peasants of Wursten and Alten Land once again rallied to the help of their ruler John Frederick, when they manned sconces outside Hornburg to ward off an attack by Pappenheim’s Imperialists. In this operation too the peasants co-operated with the Archbishop’s troops and their Swedish allies.\footnote{1457}

Discerning linkages between insurgency and peasant communalism becomes more difficult in the context of the war in Jutland and Scania. Kimmo Katajala has argued that the concept of communalism does not sit well with the history of Scandinavia. Communalism in early modern Scandinavia did not rise from the ashes of feudalism but had instead existed since the Middle Ages. The peasantry’s ability to organize armed forces was legitimized by an appeal to these existing communalist traditions.\footnote{1458} From the sixteenth century onwards, peasant communalism eroded in tandem with the growth of state power. The key organisation for armed peasant communalism, the peasant levy (opbud and uppbåd), was effectively taken over by the state and used henceforth to defend the interests of the state rather than communalist peasant autonomy. This process of communalist erosion and state formation culminated in the emergence of standing native armies in the early seventeenth century.

The absence of strong peasant communalism in Scandinavia was best reflected at the command level of insurgency. Guerrilla warfare in Scania appeared to have been co-ordinated and directed to achieve particular strategic goals, such as the severance of Swedish lines of communication or the protection (or reconquest) of specific strongholds (often estates belonging to the noble lensmænd in charge of Scania’s defences). It is difficult to see how that kind of strategic consistency could have been achieved by such guerrillas, who acted at their own volition without the guidance and encouragement of social superiors and government authorities. The intervention from
above by officers, bailiffs, and manorial lords was done through the administrative structures of the peasant communities, which linked the entire society in a hierarchical matrix from the village and parish-level all the way up to the noble-dominated central political organs of the nascent power state.

This hierarchical matrix emanating from an administrative centre to a range of different kinds of irregular warfare leaders is aptly reflected in the results of the archive research carried out by Andreas Karlsson and Anna Karlsson in their local history of seventeenth-century Halland. Karlsson and Karlsson have found documentary evidence of the Danish garrison at Varberg handing out precious ammunition to local peasant bands, some of whom appear to have been organized into actual companies led by noble landowners and prominent peasants. The Danish power state essentially devolved the management and supervision of insurgency to particularist institutions without compromising on the state’s claim to the monopoly of organized violence.

Existing sources suggest that the level of state intervention in the conduct of insurgency was somewhat lesser in Holstein and Bremen. Those armed peasant who made up part of the garrisons at Glückstadt and Krempe were undoubtedly incorporated into the military hierarchy, but there is little evidence to support the notion that this qualification also applied to those insurgents who operated in the countryside and marshlands outside the garrisons. The insurgents preying on travellers and commerce on the outskirts of Hamburg even acted in contrast to the Danish political interests, which did not favour agitating Hamburg at a time of war with Sweden. Preying on traffic in and out of Hamburg may indeed have been an expression of the Bremener marshlanders’ communalism. In the fifteenth century Hamburg had claimed suzerainty over the marshlands and even attempted to extend its colonization as far north as Hadeln. The marshlanders’ resistance against Hamburg’s impositions and encroachments resulted in a short but devastating war in 1455–1456. In the early modern era the marshlanders had clashed with Hamburg time and again. As recently as 1626, the Hamburgers had carried out a large-scale raid into Hadeln, taking with them all the horses and 800 wagonloads of loot.

The legacy of this bitter and protracted conflict may have induced the marshland insurgents to act against Hamburg on their own. Several acts of brigandage and homicide near Hamburg were attributed to these Schnapphanen by contemporaneous sources (see chapters 3.7 and 7.3). On Whitsunday 1645 there was even the suspicious fire in Altona (just outside Hamburg), in which the local Calvinist church was utterly destroyed. The pamphlet Relationis Historicae claimed that the fire was started by gunpowder hidden beneath the church floor. Who had placed the gunpowder there and why, the Relationis could not tell; the wider context of the marshlanders’ private war against Hamburg certainly does not exclude the possibility that the insurgents had something to do with the fire.

Averting such excesses would have required the presence of military leadership among the insurgents, but it seems inconceivable that the embattled garrisons in Glückstadt and Krempe would have possessed any surplus of officers that could have

1459 Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 49.
1460 Chronik des Landes Hadeln 1843, 108.
1461 Ropelius 1832, 143.
1462 Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio 1645, 73.
been distributed to the various guerrilla bands operating in the wide region stretching from the Weser to the Baltic coast. The one exception to this rule would have been the “Holsteiner freien Knechte”, who appear to have been commanded by appointed officers.\textsuperscript{1463} The institutional framework behind the “Holsteiner Knechte”, however, was the Ausschuß-levy and not peasant communalism.

We have also learnt from certain allusions in the bondefred that the Scanian border regions were plagued by irregulars who did not express any clear allegiance to either side but rather operated at their own pleasure as brigands. Brigandage and freebooting committed by snapphanar was a major problem in the Second Northern War, but the phenomenon appears to have existed already during Torstensson War. When researching Danish fortification-construction in Jylland after Torstensson’s War, Christian Klitgaard ran into a document in which an anonymous land commissar discussed the use of prison labour in the construction of field works at Hals, Belsoodde, and Mol. At the time many people had been imprisoned by the Danish authorities on the grounds that they had collaborated with the Swedes and robbed their fellow countrymen.\textsuperscript{1464} Klitgaard went on to examine the extent of such activities in one particular area of Jutland, namely Vendsyssel, and discovered several cases where local peasants had committed robbery and violence as agents of the Swedish military authorities. During the late Kejserkrigen some Jutlanders, then typically women or so-called “Soldaterpige” (“soldiers’ maidens”), had actively assisted the invading Imperialists and advised them on issues of forage and contribution-collection, but according to Klitgaard these were at the time isolated incidents and could not be regarded as a phenomenon in its own right.\textsuperscript{1465}

Kjeld Galster presented a differing view in his own examination of crime during the Kejserkrigen. During the period of Imperialist occupation from 1627 to 1629, the judicial machinery in Jutland ceased to work as tingmøderne or judicial courts were no longer held there.\textsuperscript{1466} This state of lawlessness and general dislocation caused by war led to all sorts of crime, including counterfeiting and banditry. Violent bands of outlaws committed robbery and murder even in Scania and Halland, which provinces, located as they are in modern-day Sweden, had not been directly affected by the Kejserkrigen. Bandits were nevertheless most numerous in Jutland, where they were called Krabber, a word for quarrelsome and truculent people.\textsuperscript{1467}

In Galster’s view these bandits were typically drifters and other marginalized individuals, sometimes even rebellious demesne tenants, but their illegitimate activities nevertheless involved regular peasants, even priests and bailiffs, who bought the loot from the outlaws.\textsuperscript{1468} The Krabber often attacked the occupying Imperialists and robbed merchants’ caravans travelling to Lubeck and Hamburg, which activities induced Galster to liken them to modern-day “saboteurs.”\textsuperscript{1469} The analogy with insurgents should not, however, be taken too far, as the Krabber were often joined by

\textsuperscript{1463} NSM, i, 881, Diarium Tychopolitanum 1643 bis 1645.
\textsuperscript{1464} Klitgaard 1932, 216.
\textsuperscript{1465} Ibid., 217–218.
\textsuperscript{1466} Galster 1947, 116.
\textsuperscript{1467} Ibid., 126.
\textsuperscript{1468} Ibid., 126.
\textsuperscript{1469} Ibid., 127–128.
Imperialist deserters.\textsuperscript{1470} Some of the other miscreants were young boys between the ages of 13 and 16, who banded together in street gangs.\textsuperscript{1471} Most thieves and rustlers were still peasants, who took advantage of the noble landowners’ flight from Jutland and subsequently helped themselves to whatever goods or livestock had been left behind by the absent owners.\textsuperscript{1472}

Kjeld Galster’s study suggests that crime and banditry was rampant in Jutland under the Imperialist occupation in 1627–1629, and therefore it would seem logical to assume that Torstensson’s War would have resulted in a similar upsurge of crime and brigandage. During Torstensson’s War, Klitgaard discovered, collaboration and robbery in enemy service were indeed widespread activities that sometimes involved large groups of men from entire districts. According to contemporaneous eyewitness sources, these “defectors” often terrorized their compatriots and neighbours worse than the Swedish occupiers did.\textsuperscript{1473} The Swedes benefited from this arrangement when they used the defectors as informants, who would help the Swedes to locate sources of supply and weapons caches. The defectors, for their own part, would receive from the Swedes tacit approval for robbery.\textsuperscript{1474}

In Halland too some peasants were suspected of aiding the enemy. These suspicions, which were only rarely proven true, involved assisting the Swedes to cross waterways, revealing hidden caches of supplies to them, serving as guides and guards for the Swedes, and providing them with transportation services. Most of those Hallander peasants who had assisted the enemy, the courts often had to conclude, had not acted at their own volition but under duress and coercion.\textsuperscript{1475} When prominent peasants who had served the Danish Crown as herredsfoged, herredsmænd, or sognemænd were discovered to have had aided the enemy, the courts generally adopted a more dim view of their actions and correspondingly handed out harsher sentences, including capital punishments.\textsuperscript{1476} For instance, Sören Nielsen, a magistrate from the Vallda parish district in northern Halland, was found guilty of collecting contributions on the enemy’s behalf as well as intentionally disobeying orders from his own superiors in Varberg. Nielsen was therefore sentenced to incarceration at Bremerholm, an island prison in Copenhagen, where the convicts had to carry out forced labour.\textsuperscript{1477} Anna Pedersdotter, a woman of no small means as well as local notoriety accumulated through years of acrimonious litigation against her neighbours, had not only collected contributions for the Swedes but had also acted as their spy (reporting directly to Mannerskiöld himself in Gothenburg). For these crimes she was found guilty of treason and sentenced to death in November 1644. Her husband, the cobbler Niels Degen, had already been hanged at Bohus for having served the Swedes as a courier between their armies in Jutland and Scania.\textsuperscript{1478}

\textsuperscript{1470} Galster 1947, 128.
\textsuperscript{1471} Ibid., 121.
\textsuperscript{1472} Ibid., 121–124.
\textsuperscript{1473} Klitgaard 1932, 219.
\textsuperscript{1474} Ibid., 219–225.
\textsuperscript{1475} Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 127–130.
\textsuperscript{1476} Ibid., 131–134.
\textsuperscript{1477} Ibid., 136–139.
\textsuperscript{1478} Ibid., 145–163.
While defection was always an act of treason and lèse-majesté, the threshold for doing so appears to have been lower for mercenaries and recruited auxiliary soldiers, whose loyalty to their employer was purely contractual. Therefore, in March 1645, Axel Oxenstierna recommended to Colonel Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie the services of one “Mårten” Brugman, a German soldier from Lüneburg, who had defected to the Swedish side from the Danish garrison at Kristianstad. Oxenstierna had also been informed of five or six similar turncoats from Kristianstad.\footnote{1479} Prisoners of war too were sometimes pressured to change sides, particularly those that possessed valuable military skills or expertise in technical matters. For instance, Erik Mattesen, a Danish cannon maker who had been captured by the Swedes in Scania, was persuaded to switch sides by Gustaf Horn himself in 1645.\footnote{1480}

When entire communities and regions conspired to switch sides, collusion and collaboration were aggravated into separatism and lèse-majesté. We can find at least one example of such political conspiring between Oldenburg subjects and Sweden. In February 1644 Prince Frederick gave orders to arrest the magistrate (Schulz) Jacob Eissen on the charges of treason. Eissen had allegedly approached Königsmarck with the intention of separating the district of Hadeln from the rest of the Archbishopric and placing it under Swedish suzerainty.\footnote{1481} Prince Frederick’s suspicions may not have been unfounded, as the inhabitants of Hadeln publicly protested the Prince’s designs to billet troops in Hadeln and to mobilize local resources for a war effort against the Swedes.\footnote{1482}

Any Danish guerrilla who committed acts of arson, robbery, and murder on Swedish soil could claim to act in the name of Christian IV, but, just as in the cases of Vendsyssel or the Second Northern War, there were undoubtedly cases where the Scanian snapphanar preyed on their compatriots as well. Some of the snapphanar clearly operated outside the Crown’s control, and these were the ones to whom Christian IV referred in his missive from August 1645 as “freebooters” and “trouble-makers.”\footnote{1483} Those Schnapphanen who preyed on the traffic and commerce on the outskirts of Hamburg were treated as criminals by the Swedes and the Hamburger authorities, even though their violence may also have been an expression of communalist peasant grievance against the city of Hamburg.\footnote{1484} It is difficult to assess the scale of this unsanctioned irregular warfare, but the existing evidence suggests that the phenomenon was more modest during Torstensson’s War than in the Second Northern War a decade later.

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\footnote{1479}{SRA De la Gardieska samlingen/Magnus Gabriel De la Gardies samling E 1518, 13 March 1645, Axel Oxenstierna to Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie.}
\footnote{1481}{Karlsso n and Karlsson 2013, 235.}
\footnote{1482}{Chronik des Landes Hadeln 1843, 306.}
\footnote{1483}{Ibid., 306.}
\footnote{1484}{KBB 1644–1645, 408, 19 August 1645.}
\footnote{1485}{Relationis Historicae Semestralis Continuatio 1645, 58.}
5.5 TRANSFORMATION OF WAR: EVOLUTION, REVOLUTION, OR DEVOLUTION?

According to Michael Roberts, the Military Revolution gave birth to the modern art of war, one personified by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, Alfred von Schlieffen, and, implicitly, by Carl von Clausewitz. In this view, which sees warfare as an aggregation of tactics, strategy, and military technology, the transformation of guerrilla war can be regarded as a component or byproduct of the Military Revolution. In place of an archaic form of guerrilla warfare, characterized by isolated ambushes and hit-and-run attacks, the era of the Military Revolution witnessed the birth of a Clausewitzian ‘people’s war’ fought by dispersed, nebulous, and omnipresent masses of insurgents. These new insurgents were no longer armed with mere farming tools or the occasional harquebuse but instead carried new kinds of projectile weapons, firelock muskets, which were better suited for the conduct of protracted and clandestine small war than any previous ranged weapon. Their tactics too had changed. Whereas traditional form of insurgency in Scandinavia had consisted of roadblocks, ambushes, encirclements, and even pitched battles, in which poorly armed and ill-trained peasants had been invariably worsted by heavy cavalry or professional infantry, the transformation of guerrilla warfare created an ‘explosive emptiness’ that presented an existential threat to the enemy’s lines of operations and greatly increased the friction of war experienced by the enemy army. This was not the result of some steady progress or military evolution but of a change in military technology.

When we look at the institutions and structures of early modern guerrilla warfare, the relevance of the Military Revolution theory diminishes. The true essence of the Military Revolution does not lie in tactical or technological innovations, but in the institutional and structural changes that led to the emergence of the power state. An easy way to visualize the revolutionary nature (or ‘appearance’ in terms of genealogy) of this change is to trace the existing military-administrative institutions back to their first origins. Standing armies, general staffs, navy boards, war offices, and ministries of defence all originated within the wider era of the Military Revolution in 1500–1800 (the timeline proposed by Geoffrey Parker). The continuities from ancient and medieval institutions of warfare were either non-existent or so intermittent that there is little justification for any notion of consistent and holistic military evolution. The tactical and technological innovations greatly increased the scale and demands of warfare, which could no longer be met from private sources alone. The territorial and tax-funded state began to play an increasingly dominant role in warfare, and, at the end of the Military Revolutionary period, finally led to the establishment of a state monopoly of violence.

Stefan Persson, who has approached Torstensson’s War from the perspective of sociology rather than the Military Revolution, has given the monarchy a central role in the organizing and management of peasant resistance. Christian IV was predisposed to defend his autocratic position as the head of a pre-absolutist military system, Persson argued. Persson, who based his analysis of the Danish military system during Torstensson’s War on the Chancellery’s copybook and its royal missives,
identified a new administrative layer of general war commissars, whose intervention in military matters further enhanced royal authority over the conduct of war. The Danish military policy was based on absolutism, “an alliance between the ruler and his subjects that was built on the possibility for the latter to exert influence and to get through their own demands.” By this argument Persson referred to the dualistic principle articulated by Winfried Schulze in his own study of the early modern Ottoman-Austrian military border. The external Turkish threat helped the central state and the previously highly autonomous border societies to find a shared goal in common defence. The local societies had to surrender some of their earlier autonomy, while the central state granted them new privileges in return for localized military efforts. Therefore the dualistic principle essentially meant reciprocity between the central state and the local societies.

Stefan Persson’s argumentation is somewhat problematic in the context of Scania. Firstly, he appears to credit too much importance on the general war commissariat in the conduct of localized guerrilla warfare. The royal missives to the generalkrigskomissærer do not directly associate them with snapphanar or peasant levies; instead the commissars appear in the Danish Chancellery’s copybook paying recruited troops, compensating burghers and peasants for billeting, collecting contributions, organizing accommodation for sick soldiers, supplying garrisons with money and victuals, and being employed in other duties that involved supporting regular troops instead of leading peasant guerrillas.

Secondly, Persson, who writes of Torstensson’s War from the Scanian perspective alone, fails to observe the geographical limits of the general war commissariat. Of the three generalkrigskomissærer identified in the copybook, Cai von Ahlefeldt was posted in Schleswig-Holstein and Henning Valkendorf in Fyn, while the jurisdiction of Knud Ulfeldt covered Sjælland, Lolland, and Fyn. In November 1644 Ulfeldt indeed visited Malmö, but mainly to oversee the transportation of reinforcements from Sjælland. Christian IV also tasked him to subject the nearby districts to heavy contributions “so that nothing should fall to the enemy’s hands”, which duty hardly endeared him to Scanian peasants. In Scania, the duties of the generalkrigskomissærer were effectively carried out by the two governors, Ebbe Ulfeldt in Kristianstad and Tage Thott in Malmö, who as local landlords and powerbrokers shared at least some common ground with the Scanian peasants.

Thirdly, Persson underplays the military role of the local elites and overstates that of the monarch. According to Persson, there was no real sharing of decision-making between the political center and the local-regional military leaders, as the latter did not exert any influence over extraordinary war-taxation. The previous chapter, however, has suggested that the influence of the Scanian elites over insurgency and

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1489 Ibid., 338.
1492 KBB 1644–1645, 156–157, 21 November 1644.
1493 KBB 1644–1645, 157, 23 November 1644.
peasant resistance was informal rather than formally institutionalized. One could obviously question this claim by appealing to the absence of direct documentary evidence of such informal networks of military management. On the other hand, if the Scanian insurgency was being directed personally by Christian IV or by his immediate subordinates, meaning the royal *generalkrigskomissærer*, this could be expected to appear as explicit evidence in Persson’s sources. Yet the one primary source relied upon by Persson, the Danish Chancellery’s copybook, does not suggest any consistent royal management of the Scanian insurgency. Neither, one might add, does the personal correspondence of Christian IV himself. This contrasts with the King’s proactivity in military matters pertaining to the fleet, the Danish home islands and, to some extent at least, the Jutland peninsula and the Holstein duchies. Christian IV took more interest in Scania when he happened to be there himself. For instance, in September 1644, when he was leading his military expedition from Malmö, Christian IV gave detailed orders on the procurement of gunpowder, horses, and money for his field army and the Malmö garrison. The missives dealing with these conventional procurements, however, do not directly link Christian IV with the management and overseeing of peasant insurgency.

The transformation of guerrilla warfare may have grown the scale and military importance of guerrilla warfare, but its demands from the state remained modest. Denmark effectively outsourced all guerrilla warfare and insurgency to structures and institutions outside the fiscal-military state. Much of the responsibility for irregular warfare fell to the peasants themselves, who were often expected to report to duty on their own initiative and to bring their own weapons, preferably firearms. The insurgents would muster according to the existing *herred*- and *sogne*-structures, which would also serve a support function as sources of provisions and replacements. The organizational demands of guerrilla warfare did not necessitate the expansion of duties among the *lensmænd* or other royal administrators, nor did they call for the foundation of new military-administrative institutions.

Only in Jutland did the land commissariat perform any distinctive role in the management of peasant resistance. The state, which did not give the peasants much material help (the notable exception being the few thousands muskets distributed to peasants in Jutland), typically limited its assistance to the provisioning of military leadership. Even there the state could be outperformed by the nobility, who led peasants against the enemy, as happened at Nørresundby in early 1644. The strong noble influence in guerrilla leadership can be identified in operational and strategic goals, which often favoured the interests of the landowning class. To make the boundaries between public and private interests even more indefinite, many of the *lensmænd*, officers, land commissars, and other military authorities were also prominent members of the local elites.

A possible way to link Danish guerrilla warfare to the Military Revolution is provided by David Parrott, who has discussed the limits of early modern states and their claims on the monopoly of violence. Parrott presents a nuanced picture of the early modern state, which was forced to farm out much of its military activities due to its inability to meet the demands of war from its own resources alone. By doing so, Parrott contests the persistent notion that the maintenance of wholly state-recruited

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1495 KCFEB 1641–1644, 495, 8 September 1644; KCFEB 1641–1644, 496–497, 12 September 1644; KCFEB 1641–1644, 497–498, 14 September 1644.
and state-administered military forces was an anomalous development in European history. The focus of Parrott’s investigation is on military entrepreneurs and subcontractors, but his central theme of military devolution can also be applied to other entities and groups outside the state apparatus.

Similar out-sourcing of warfare may perhaps be discerned in Danish guerrilla warfare, in which the nascent power state essentially devolved the responsibility for ‘people’s war’ to peasant communities and land-owning elites. However, this line of thinking requires that we understand peasant communities and elite groups to exist outside the centralized fiscal-military state. The logic of military devolution loses some of its persuasiveness in the case of those Danish peasants, who were tax-paying subjects of the Crown of Denmark. Their eligibility to bear weapons and to serve in the opbud-levies can be therefore understood as a form of taxation, paid in sweat and blood instead of produce and coin. In this sense the English term ‘fiscal-military state’ can appear unhelpful, as it only indicates a state that extracted resources for warfare through financial instruments such as loans and taxes. A better concept for understanding that heavy burden for the conduct of guerrilla warfare, which the Oldenburg state imposed on its peasant subjects, would be the Swedish term militärstat or “military state”, which also encompasses demands for military resources other than money, provisions, and shelter. Military levy, even one limited in duration and distance as opbud was, is nevertheless a strong signifier of the degree of state control over the early modern society. The problem from the perspective of the Military Revolution theory is the fact that the opbud, a medieval institution, predated the military revolutionary period, which according to Roberts began in the mid-sixteenth century.

Parrott’s theory of military devolution becomes much more persuasive when we look at the Danish elites, which evidently exercised much influence over the management and conduct of guerrilla war against the invading Swedes. The comparison between a land-owning noble and a military entrepreneur is not at all far-fetched, as the two were often one and the same person in seventeenth-century Denmark. As proprietor-colonels or other military entrepreneurs, Danish nobles often raised, managed, and lead military units at their own cost and risk. The Crown later compensated them for their efforts in various ways, whether in money, land, or offices (titles, the most sought-after rewards in many European countries, were not granted in Denmark until 1671). Land-owning nobles raised and lead irregular bands in a similar way, either directly themselves or indirectly via intermediates such as seneschals, servants, employees, clients, and associates. Although their motive for doing so would not have been so much personal gain than the necessity to meet social obligations as vassals, patrons, and patriots. As noble status was linked to the rostjeneste-duty and to that duty alone, it would have served the public image of the nobility to associate themselves with any forms of warfare at a time when the nobility’s collective ability to perform effective cavalry-service was being questioned by the state and the two other Estates.

Manorial overlords also had an obligation to protect their tenants from violence, destruction, and even excessive burdens of war, which last commitment some

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1496 Parrott 2012, 2.
1498 Lind 1994, 32.
1499 Munck 1990, 161.
nobles in Fyn took so seriously that they attempted to prevent the billeting of Danish troops on their tenants’ estates. The best way for manorial overlords in Scania and Halland to render any meaningful military service would have been to raise and lead *snapphunar*-bands in guerrilla war against the invading Swedes. The landowners did not simply exploit the peasants as a military resource to protect their own noble seats. By defending the estates of their manorial overlords, the peasants defended their own cottages and homes as well. Joint guerrilla warfare by nobles and peasants against an external enemy exposes a symbiotic side of the tenant-landlord relationship, which view undermines certain enduring notions about the purely exploitative nature of the manorial dominion.

A Military Revolution implies a dramatic reversal of existing conditions in warfare. No such reversal can be discerned in guerrilla warfare, where the regular troops still held the advantage in battle thanks to their better training, discipline, and military skill. The proliferation of firelock muskets did not reverse this situation but rather diminished to a degree the military asymmetry between insurgent peasants and professional soldiers. The firelocks empowered insurgents by matching their firepower with that of regular soldiers and consequently created conditions of war that bore more resemblance to the guerrilla warfare of the modern age than to that of the preceding centuries. For this reason there is some justification to label this departure from previous conditions as a transformation of war, but the degree and pace of that transformation needs to be qualified with some care.

A Guerrilla Revolution it was not. The firelock musket in the hands of insurgent peasants did not turn the tables on regular armies, nor did it cause or even facilitate institutional change in its patron state. Clifford J. Rogers proposed a model of military change called ‘punctuated equilibrium’, which consisted of a series of minor military revolutions. Rogers put forward two such minor revolutions, the Infantry Revolution and the Artillery Revolution, which both occurred during the age of the Hundred Years War in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Even the punctuated equilibrium is an unsatisfactory model for describing the transformation of guerrilla war, as both these two revolutions listed by Rogers implied such institutional, economic, social, and political changes that cannot be ascribed to seventeenth-century guerrilla warfare.

Another discussion is whether technological changes in warfare can bring about any transformation of war, not to mention a military revolution. Arvi Korhonen and Robert I. Frost have both expressed scepticism towards technology as an agent of military transformation. Writing in the 1930s, Arvi Korhonen criticized the “school-masterly view” that the invention of gunpowder would have caused “a revolution in the development of warfare”, as the development of firearms into effective weapons only happened very gradually. The only significant technological innovation in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century warfare, Korhonen argued, was the long pike, which the impoverished and valley-locked Swiss peasants discovered only accidentally and without any knowledge or understanding of ancient Roman warfare. Robert I. Frost has argued that the Military Revolution was not a technological revolution, and that attempts to see several military revolutions round advances in military technology are inherently futile. “No single technological development could in itself transform

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1500 KBB 1644–1645, 254, 19 March 1644.
1502 Korhonen 1939, 31.
warfare, and the question of whether or not particular weapons or fortifications systems were decisive in military terms is largely irrelevant.\textsuperscript{1503}

These are harsh views about the role of technology as an agent of military transformation, and not entirely justified in the light of modern military history. The twentieth century witnessed the appearance of weapons of mass destruction that have overturned the Clausewitzian notion of war as mere continuation of politics. The more recent concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is largely defined by advances in targeting and communications technology that some insist have rendered traditional military methods obsolete.\textsuperscript{1504} The technological innovations of the early modern age were less dramatic, but they too contributed to the colligated concept of a Military Revolution. As Geoffrey Parker has convincingly argued, the appearance of trace italienne-fortifications drove up the sizes of field armies and garrisons and for its part contributed to the institutional and political change that characterized the Military Revolution.

We could also ask, whether there would have been the kind of tactical changes and general professionalization of warfare described by Michael Roberts without the technological element of firearms and pikes. Max Boot has even renamed the early modern Military Revolution as the Gunpowder Revolution, in which the emergence of the modern state was driven by the new firearms technology.\textsuperscript{1505} Korhonen admitted that the appearance of the musket ended a phase of military stagnation, as it allowed the individual infantryman to engage his opponents from distance. The musket consequently prompted soldiers to develop forms of co-operation between musketeers and pikemen and to reconsider the shape, size, and composition of existing tactical units. Korhonen also recognized that the musket had a very visible and immediate effect in the conduct of positional warfare, where combat was no longer synonymous with storming.\textsuperscript{1506} The firelock musket in the hands of insurgent peasants, one could argue, was a technology-driven change that empowered insurgents, increased the scope of guerrilla warfare, and exarcebated its harm against regular armies.

At the other end of the spectrum from the Military Revolution is the evolutionary model of military advance and gradual change offered by John Childs and others. This model too is unsatisfactory, as it assumes either non-change or evolutionary development in guerrilla warfare. The appearance and proliferation of firelock muskets signified a major departure from earlier conduct of guerrilla warfare, where peasants armed predominantly with melee weapons had been forced to engage professional soldiers in close combat. The Dacke Rebellion, the Finnish Club War, and even several incidents during Torstensson’s War itself had shown that under such conditions the peasants were placed in decisive disadvantage due to their poor training, limited fighting skills, and lack of body armour. The technological and tactical gap between Torstensson’s War and the medieval forms of peasant insurgency is too wide to justify notions of stagnation, continuity, or evolutionary development of guerrilla warfare.

The best place to find any military evolution or gradual development would be the firelock musket itself. Like matchlock and wheel lock muskets, the firelock too traced its origins to the sixteenth-century harquebuse. Childs approaches military

\textsuperscript{1503} Frost 2000, 307.
\textsuperscript{1504} Biddle 2002, 104.
\textsuperscript{1505} Boot 2006, 13, 23.
\textsuperscript{1506} Korhonen 1939, 36, 38.
evolution from the perspective of technology, which he sees evolving though a process of trial and error: “By adopting best practice and rejecting less profitable innovations, commanders systematically altered the nature of warfare during the seventeenth century.”

The firelock musket, however, did not become a weapon of guerrilla warfare by systematic design but rather by accident. Its decisive features for irregular warfare, the flintlock firing mechanism and the often rifled barrel, were originally features that were meant to make the weapon more feasible for civilian shooters, who used the firelock musket for fowling and hunting. In the hands of peasants the weapon showed its more sinister side, when, at times of war and conflict, it was discovered to be a useful tool for sniping soldiers instead of pigeons. An early reference to such employment of peasants’ firelocks comes from 1623, when the Protestant military entrepreneur Christian of Brunswick co-operated with Lower Saxon peasants in ambushing a column of Catholic League troops. The peasants first acted as scouts, providing Brunswick with information on the enemy’s movements, and then, after Brunswicks’s troops had attacked and dispersed the enemy column, hunted down those surviving Leaguers who had fled into the local woods. Many soldiers were “snapt up by these Boores,” who were used to “kill Crowes and Vermine upon their owne lands.” An English pamphleteer narrating the event paid particular attention to the peasants’ marksmanship with their fowling pieces, “which are a great deale surer shooters, and fitter for their handling, than the warre-like Musket.” This appears as an indisputable reference to non-military muskets, most likely smallbore or even rifled firelocks.

Similarly in North America the local English militias adopted the firelock in favour of the matchlock musket, as the firelock musket was better suited for the ‘skulking way of war’ practiced in the forested wilderness of the New World. Already in 1609 Samuel Champlain’s French expeditionary force in the first Mohawk War had employed special muskets called harquebuses à rouet, which were shorter and lighter than the normal harquebuses and were operated by wheel locks. These weapons were originally designed for hunting, but they proved useful in combat as the absence of a burning match helped the French to achieve surprise against their Mohawk and Iroquois enemies. The benefits of a matchless musket were not lost on the other European colonists either. In 1629, the English planners of the Massachusetts Bay Colony had suggested to equip a troop of one hundred militiamen with eighty snaphances and only twenty matchlocks. In 1641, the colonial administration in Maryland stipulated that any man who wanted title to land should possess at least “one musket or bastard musket with a snaphance lock.” The bastard musket referred to by the colonial administration was synonymous with a caliver, which generally meant a lighter musket fired without a gunrest.

1507 Childs 2004, 23.
1509 Karcheski 1987, 274.
1511 Lee 2011, 51.
1512 Ibid., 51.
1513 Lepage 2010, 38.
The Native Americans too preferred the snaphance over the matchlock. Remains from Mohawk archaeological sites from the 1620s and the 1630s show a mixture of matchlocks and snaphances, but by the 1640s the majority of excavated musket parts come from snaphances or flintlocks. Wayne E. Lee has argued that the proliferation of flintlock muskets caused a minor Military Revolution among the Native Americans, as the new weapons made positional warfare and open battle much more lethal affairs than before. The increased destructiveness and lethality of firearm-driven warfare resulted in a much more dispersed settlement pattern among the Native Americans, as village-size settlements became targets for musket-equipped raiding parties, while the traditional palisade walls of Native American settlements failed to offer sufficient cover and protection for the defenders.

Over time the firelock musket found its way into the hands of regular soldiers, who adopted it in favour of the less practical matchlock musket. To use the conceptual model of military innovation offered by Boot, the firelock musket was not a ‘disruptive’ innovation that would have unsettled the existing status quo but rather belonged to those ‘sustaining’ innovations, which do not require major organizational or institutional adjustments in order to assimilate. As many other technological innovations of warfare, it too emerged from outside of formal military structures. The establishment of the firelock musket as the predominant military firearm vindicates Jeremy Black’s recent scepticism regarding continuity in technological improvement. The emergence of the firelock musket as a weapon of war was contingent rather than the result of any consistent military development.

The safest way to evaluate guerrilla warfare in Torstensson’s War is to see it as a transformation of war that did not drive the Military Revolution but rather resulted from it. At the heart of the Danish Military Revolution was the failure of the traditional noble rostjeneste to provide sufficient numbers of troops. The only realistic sources of manpower at times of war were hired soldiers or conscripted/levied peasants. The Crown, however, did not have the resources to mobilize and maintain all this manpower at the same time. Therefore the devolutionary model is perhaps the most acceptable one for understanding guerrilla warfare and the Military Revolution, as it implies a situation where the fiscal-military state is able to reward those groups that conduct guerrilla warfare against a foreign enemy from their own resources, by their own methods, and on their own initiative. A technological innovation, the firelock musket, increased the efficiency and impact of this devolved warfare. The central state did not lose its grip over the monopoly of violence by devolving the responsibility for guerrilla warfare to local institutions and elite groups but rather maintained it through them, as these institutions and groups of local government channelled insurgency against an external enemy, thus preventing the erosion of state monopoly of violence and the emergence of non-state challengers to the entrenched state power. The evidence from the Second Northern War, in which a significant minority among the Scanian snapphanar turned to banditry and free-booting, suggests that this devolutionary process was not smooth and without its complications and setbacks.

1514 Silverman 2016, 27.
1515 Lee 2011, 68–69.
1516 Boot 2006, 457, 459.
1517 Black 2013, 53.
5.6 COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE MILITARY REVOLUTION

Danish guerrilla warfare links more strongly with the Military Revolution when we view it from the perspective of the enemy. The new kind of firelock-driven people’s war may have spared its patron state many demands and burdens, but it treated enemy invaders less kindly. The invading army had to allocate material and human resources to combat the effects of guerrilla warfare and to pay the cost of forfeited military opportunities. To use the terminology of Clausewitz, the technological transformation of guerrilla warfare increased the friction of war experienced by the enemy. In order to meet the threat from enemy guerrillas and to minimize the friction of war created by this new kind of guerrilla warfare, the regular armies had to adopt a set of countermeasures and approaches, which together constituted counterinsurgency warfare. This is what the Swedish military was forced to do in Torstensson’s War.

The most imminent threat from Danish snapphanar concerned Swedish lines of communication between the theatre of war and the home country. The Swedes countered this threat in Scania and Halland by building a string of roadside fortifications and by increasing the frequency and strength of military patrols along the roads. The lack of existing sources prevents us from assessing the material and human demands of these two measures with any accuracy, although we may make some rough estimates, starting with the string of “Russian stockades” between Markaryd and Tranarp. We can see from Gerhard Buhrman’s map of Scania from 1684 that the seventeenth-century road followed the same path as the modern-day highways 502, 1840, and 1846.\textsuperscript{1518} This would give the seventeenth-century Markaryd-Tranarp road the distance of some 55 kilometres. If the stockades were indeed constructed at intervals of two Swedish miles or ten kilometres, this would have meant that there existed four, possibly five, such fortifications between Markaryd and Tranarp. It is unlikely that the stockades were substantial in size or powerful in any way, but were instead more or less improvised timber block houses.

The construction materials of these block houses would have consisted of logs, sawn timber, nails, and possible metal reinforcements for doors and shutters. The riksråd would have preferred not to use any amount of money or materials for such constructions unless it felt compelled to do so, but the real burden of these constructions was labour. The entry in the Rikssregistratur from April 1644 reveals that the Swedes employed in this construction work an unquantified number of commandeered peasants, 200 soldiers from Jönköping, and even some rusttjänst-cavalrymen from Fredrik Stenbock’s adelsfana.\textsuperscript{1519} The state paid a twofold price for this construction work: on one hand military troops were diverted from other duties to help build the block houses, thus inflicting an opportunity cost, and on the other peasants were strained with additional labour service, which was effectively a form of taxation (or a contribution in the case of those peasants who might have hailed from Danish Scania) and yet another imposition by the fiscal-military state. After the block houses were finished, the 200 soldiers who had assisted in their construction were assigned to garrison them. The operation of manned block houses would have required further

\textsuperscript{1518} Nilson 2008, 15–19; Snårestad byatalog: http://www.snarestad.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Sk%C3%A5nekarta-1758.jpg.

\textsuperscript{1519} RA RR, B222, 6 April 1644.
outlays on weapons, munitions, and provisions. For their own part these block houses increased the burdens of warfare for the Swedish fiscal-military state.

The Markaryd-Tranarp road was also cleared at those locations, where the woods came too close to the road and offered cover for potential sharpshooters. The decision to clear woods at the width of a musket shot apparently originated at the very highest level of government, even though the order itself was issued by Gustaf Horn. The work itself was performed by Staffan Klingspär’s detachment in March–April 1644. Even today the landscape between Markaryd and Tranarp is heavily forested, which would have meant that Klingspär and his troops faced a gargantuan task in clearing the roadside woods. It is inconceivable that even 800 men could have managed to clear the entire length of the 55 kilometres long road in a mere month’s time, but given the urgency of securing the lines of communication and the direct nature of Horn’s order it is likely that they did clear at least some of the woods. A Danish commission, which visited the area after the war, reported of extensive devastation to the Scanian forests. Even though some of the damage was caused by local peasants who had felled trees on roads to hinder the advance of the Swedish armies, most of the devastation must be attributed to the Swedes and their counterinsurgency efforts. This is suggested by the fact that at places like Varshult the trees had been reportedly felled from both sides of the road at the width of a musket’s shot (“bøsseskud”).

The commission also quantified in its report felled oaks and beeches, which were the most valuable species of tree for any construction project – including those of block houses and stockades. The trees felled in this work could have been used in the construction of the block houses, which would have saved some or all of the block houses’ material costs. The use of troops for labour duty introduced both a resource demand and an opportunity cost. Soldiers assigned to labour service would have required at least the same amount of provisions as combat troops, perhaps even more due to the arduous nature of the work, in addition to which they would have had to be supplied with saws, axes, and other tools. Assigning troops to labour service also represents a very pronounced example of an opportunity cost arising from bypassed military duties.

The deployment of troops to combat insurgency and guerrilla warfare involved both a mobilization of resources and an opportunity cost for forfeited uses of military resources. At the lowest tactical level the insurgent threat forced the Swedes to strengthen their salvaguardia-parties and increase the frequency and size of military patrols along the endangered forest roads. The extractskrifvelse recorded two specific instances, in which Swedish salvaguardia-contingents were attacked and overwhelmed by Scanian insurgents. The first incident occurred in early March 1644, when peasant captured a salvaguardia-party that entered their village. The last recorded incident from April 1644 involved the capture of Hans Wachtmeister’s personal adjutant. After this the extractskrifvelse make no further allusions to salvaguardia-parties

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1520 RA RR, B222, 10 April 1644.
1522 Ibid., 436.
1523 Ibid., 431–515.
1524 RAOSB, ii: 8, 296, 3 March 1644, extractskrifvelse.
1525 RAOSB, ii: 8, 303, 8 to 27 April 1644, kort relation.
coming under threat from insurgents. It is not overly presumptive to conclude that Wachtmeister, to whom the responsibility for contribution-collection in Scania largely fell, reacted to the threat against his salvaguardia-parties by reinforcing them with additional troops.

Parrott’s argument about the company being an insufficiently-sized unit for counterinsurgency warfare does not appear to apply to the situation in Scania and Halland.1526 While large peasant formations could overcome any salvaguardia-parties, the Scanian insurgents managed to muster such formations only on occasion and in certain locations alone. A platoon-sized salvaguardia-detachment should have been able to fight off any opportunistic and improvised attacks by village-level peasant bands and individual snapphanar. The strengthening of salvaguardia-detachments very likely followed the example of couriers and messengers, who were given protection against snapphanar by assigning them military escorts. The stockades along the Markaryd-Tranarp road would have also served as waystations for messengers and as bases of operation for road patrols. The numerical strength of the troops manning the four or five block houses, some 200 men in all, suggests that at least a portion of the troops were assigned to patrol duties outside the block houses at all times.

The war in Holstein presents a somewhat different picture at the tactical level. The Holsteiner insurgents could operate in much larger numbers than their Scanian peers, with some of the contingents fighting alongside regular Danish troops reaching the strength of 2,000 men.1527 The army, which marched out from Glückstadt in June 1644 in its operation against the Swedes in Dithmarschen, contained as many as 3,000 armed peasants.1528 It is unlikely that the insurgents ever fought at the tactical level in such sizeable formations, but they were nevertheless able to ambush and even destroy Swedish contingents that were at least company-sized, if not even bigger. The roads remained constantly imperiled, endangering Swedish lines of communication and supply routes in and out of Holstein.

Fighting the insurgents in the same systematic way as happened in Scania would have required the kind of resources that neither Torstensson nor Helmut Wrangel possessed. The problem of distance in the wide regions stretching from the Wagrien Peninsula to the mouth of the River Weser effectively excluded the possibility of building a string of roadside fortifications to protect the lines of communication akin to the “Russian stockades” employed in Scania (the travelling distance between the tip of Wagrien and Bremen is roughly 260 kilometres). The necessity to fight and maintain operational reserves against various and sizeable regular opponents – Anders Bille’s army in Fyn, the Danish garrisons at Bremen, Glückstadt, and Krempe, and even the Imperialist army that operated in Holstein in the summer of 1644 – ruled out the option of employing strong tactical reactionary forces akin to Wachtmeister’s flying column against the insurgents.

Instead of dispersing their forces to fight the insurgents at the tactical level as Horn did in Scania, Torstensson and Wrangel battled the insurgency in Holstein and Bremen at the operational and strategic levels. While the Swedish counterinsurgency in Scania sought to attack nodes, suppress boundary events, and deny outputs, the counterinsurgency in Holstein and Bremen concentrated on choking off

1526 Parrott 2001, 50.
1528 Gazette du 16 Juillet 1644 N. 83, 556.
inputs, disrupting boundaries, and isolating subsystems. This latter form of counterinsurgency was best expressed in the large-scale devastation of villages and territories suspected of supporting, harbouring, or fomenting insurgency. Such campaigns aimed at ‘draining the swamp’ of insurgency were carried out by Hans Königsmarck in the Bremener marshlands, Helmut Wrangel in Dithmarschen, and Arvid Wittenberg in south-eastern Holstein. The operational counterinsurgency forces, often armées volantes comprising of several regiments, could also attack regular contingents and fortified positions in connection with their scorched earth-campaigns. By employing their limited resources in this manner, the Swedes attempted to alleviate the problem of opportunity costs by serving two military aims with the same force.

The problems of resource extraction and opportunity costs, the central issues behind the Military Revolution and the emergence of the fiscal-military state, became even more apparent at the operational and strategic levels of counterinsurgency warfare. The transportation of the Swedish artillery train along the embattled Markaryd-Tranarp road required the deployment of 1,100 soldiers as an escort detachment under Staffan Klingspår’s command.

Klingspår’s escort detachment is a rare example of mitigated resource demands and opportunity costs. Firstly, the military troops used for this mission were already in existence, either under Klingspår’s direct command or in the garrisons at Kalmar and Gothenburg, for which reason their deployment required no ancillary measures from the fiscal-military state. Secondly, the military opportunity cost was reduced by those 300 troops, who had served as garrison troops in Kalmar and Gothenburg and who could be therefore regarded as reserve troops without any prior military commitment. Thirdly, the deployment of Klingspår’s detachment for escort duties was a pressing military priority that outweighed all other demands. The projected siege of Malmö required that the artillery train from Sweden would arrive in the theatre of war in a timely manner. Attacks by *snapphanar* could have caused further delays, and perhaps even endangered the entire artillery train itself, but this threat was warded off by Klingspår’s detachment, which clashed with the *snapphanar* and eliminated at least some of their leadership (Bent Mogensen). The investment of material, effort, and time in Klingspår’s mission brought back dividends in the form of increased road security and terminated insurgents.

Opportunity costs and prices for resource allocation appear heavier at other instances. Wachtmeister’s detachment was preoccupied with counterinsurgency warfare and the violent pacification of peasant population. The size of Wachtmeister’s cavalry contingent varied from time to time. In mid-March 1644 he commanded a few companies of cavalry; in late April his command had increased to twelve companies of cavalry, which could have meant as many as 1,500 men if all companies were at full strength of 125 men each (which they rarely were). The fluctuation of troop numbers under Wachtmeister’s command, plus the fact that the memorandum from May 1644 listing the disposition of Swedish field units and garrisons in the Danish theatre of war does not assign any specific contingent to Wachtmeister, suggest that Wachtmeister was allocated troops on an ad hoc-basis, most likely for the specific purposes of...
carrying out foraging and/or counterinsurgency missions. While Wachtmeister could perform both these duties with the same cavalry contingent, and thus mitigate the opportunity cost for counterinsurgency warfare, the subordination of twelve cavalry companies under his command in April 1644 seems excessive use of force for foraging purposes alone. The sudden increase in troop numbers under Wachtmeister’s command suggests a response to the irregular threat, which required the reinforcement of salvaguardia-parties. Such reinforcements were obviously reassigned from other, potentially vital duties, and thus they represent an expenditure of military resources and an opportunity cost spent on counterinsurgency warfare.

A similar case may be made concerning the armées volantes that can be best understood as operational formations. Armées volantes were similar to Wachtmeister’s ad hoc -counterinsurgency formations as they too had been originally formed for the purposes of foraging and contribution-collection. The main differences were size and composition. Armées volantes were typically larger than Wachtmeister’s contingents, Helmut Wrangel’s armée volante in Jutland reaching the strength of almost 6,000 men. Unlike Wachtmeister’s counterinsurgency contingent, which consisted exclusively of cavalry, armées volantes were combined arms units with infantry components of varying sizes. The operational size and mixed composition of armées volantes made them concentrated and cohesive contingents compared to Wachtmeister’s counterinsurgency detachment, which often fragmented itself into smaller salvaguardia-parties that were scattered across the Scanian countryside.

The armées volantes, which tended to remain on the move and avoided remaining in one place for any prolonged period, were generally more preoccupied with foraging and intentional scorched earth-tactics than with contribution-collection and pacification. While the destruction of farmhouses and villages could serve the purpose of counterinsurgency warfare and thus eliminate at least some of the opportunity costs involved in fighting the insurgents, the essential logic behind armées volantes was purely military, i.e. the increase of the quantity of one’s own supplies and, conversely, their denial to the enemy. Both Wrangel’s and Kagg’s armées volantes would have been formed regardless of any insurgencies, but in Kagg’s case the irregular threat from Scania did affect the armée volante’s area of deployment and mission parametres. Unlike Wrangel, who was free to roam up and down the Jutland peninsula, the riksråd kept Kagg in a short leash so as to make sure that his armée volante could be used to defend Västergötland and Småland from Danish-Norwegian incursions. This meant that Kagg’s armée volante paid a higher opportunity cost and spent more resources for counterinsurgency warfare than Wrangel did in Jutland. The need to remain available for homeland defence limited the military uses of Kagg’s armée volante, while its deployment on Swedish soil placed extra burdens on the Swedish fiscal-military state. Wrangel could place the burden of war on the shoulders of Danish peasants, while Kagg’s armée volante had to be maintained at least partly from domestic resources.

It is difficult to ascertain exactly how much the counterinsurgency warfare in Scania contributed to the shortfall of military resources. It is certain that the riksråd had initially underestimated the number of troops required for the conquest and subjugation of Scania and Halland. The inability to attain military goals in a timely manner necessitated increased recruitments in Germany and the British Isles as well as

1532 RAOSB, i: 16:2, 476, 18 May 1644, Christina to Horn and Kagg.
1533 Generalstaben 1944, 77.
the transfer of reinforcements from other parts of the Swedish empire. Warfare against *snapphanar* and other insurgents had contributed to this shortfall of troops, when Horn had had to reassign some of his forces to various counterinsurgency duties. Those reinforcements that were assigned to garrisons at Gothenburg and Jönköping would have filled some of the gaps left behind by earlier reassignments of garrison troops to counterinsurgency duties. Christoffer Burmeister’s Finnish cavalry squadron, which arrived in Scania in September 1644, was immediately thrown into action against the insurgents near Helsingborg.\(^\text{1534}\) Fabius Berndes’ 200 dragoons, who arrived at the theatre of war in June 1645, were kept near Markaryd to protect the Tranarp road from the *snapphanar*.\(^\text{1535}\)

Apart from these instances, it is difficult to denote direct correlation between the demands of counterinsurgency warfare and the reinforcements sent to make good the shortfall in troop numbers. This task is further complicated by the fact that some of the reinforcements raised through national *utskrivning* or recruitment abroad never managed to reach the theatre of war before the cessation of hostilities. It can be concluded at a general level that by contributing to the shortfall of troops under Gustaf Horn’s command, the Swedish warfare against Scanian insurgents placed additional demands on the war-making Swedish state.

There was also an opportunity cost to be paid for the reinforcements. While most reinforcements came from peaceful parts of the Swedish empire, such as northern Sweden, Finland, and Livonia, and thus did not have to be detached from any ongoing military operations, their assignment to Scania occurred at the expense of other potential recipients – the nearest and most obvious donor being the Norwegian front, where Henrik Fleming received scarce reinforcements compared to Horn. The *riksråd* was particularly reluctant to weaken any garrisons in Livonia, where they feared Polish intervention. The Swedish military policy in Livonia, as formulated in January 1644, was “to maintain fortifications with strength” and “to have a corpo volante on the field for any events.”\(^\text{1536}\) No transfer of troops could be made from Livonia without endangering this military priority.

The demands of counterinsurgency warfare affected even the highest levels of strategic decision-making and induced the creation of a temporary institution to meet some of these demands, namely the field chancellery of Per Brahe in Västergötland. As an early manifestation of *guerre du cabinet*, the field chancellery was deeply rooted in the concepts of the fiscal-military state and the Military Revolution. According to Michael Roberts, the revolutionary changes in warfare called for new administrative methods and standards, which were at the same time centralized and royal. “Secretaries of state for war are born; war offices proliferate”, Roberts wrote.\(^\text{1537}\) Per Brahe, acting as an extension of the *riksråd* in Jönköping, embodied at the same time both the person of the secretary of state and the institution of the war office. The foremost reason behind Brahe’s meddling in Horn’s military command was the *riksråd’s* concern for the safety of its border provinces, namely Västergötland, Småland, and Kalmar. The main threat against the Swedish frontier regions did not come from the regular Danish forces, which were most of the time concentrated behind the walls of Kristianstad and

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\(^\text{1534}\) RAOSB, ii:8, 318, 24 September 1644, uthur svenske lägret.
\(^\text{1535}\) Vessberg 1895, 54.
\(^\text{1536}\) SRRP, x, 439, 16 January 1644.
\(^\text{1537}\) Roberts 1995, 20.
Malmö, but from the cross-border raids by Scanian *snapphanar* and hybrid contingents of Norwegian soldiers and peasants. Brahe was therefore largely preoccupied with raising forces for local defence and with maintaining orderly relations between Swedish troops and local peasants – a prerequisite for co-ordinated, coherent, and collective countermeasures against any cross-border raiders. By sharing direct military command over the local troops with Lars Kagg, Brahe could also keep an eye on his colleague and make sure that Kagg’s armée volante did not stray too far away from the frontier regions whose defence fell within its duties.

Brahe’s assignment in Västergötland did not last beyond the autumn of 1644. In August we can find him in Gothenburg inspecting the local muster-rolls;1538 two months later he was again acting in his capacity as a senior state councillor in Stockholm and attending a meeting with the representatives of the Noble Estate, who wished to discuss recent taxation with the *riksråd*.1539 Field chancelleries, such as the one presided over by Brahe in Västergötland, are problematic to notions of military evolution or continuity. The preceding Swedish field chancelleries had been primarily just that what their name had implied: portable government chancelleries for Gustaf Adolf during his military campaigns in Poland and Germany. The surviving diary of an unidentified chancellery clerk reveals that in 1630–1632 Gustaf Adolf’s German field chancellery had performed a wide array of different governmental functions, including policy-making and diplomacy.1540 After the King’s death the German field chancellery ceased to exist as an extension of the Swedish government as policies were thereafter being formulated by the Oxenstierna regency in Stockholm.

The field chancellery established by Per Brahe in Västergötland in 1644 was not the same institution that had served Gustaf Adolf in Germany but an ad hoc-governmental tool created for that particular occasion and for those particular circumstances that prevailed near the Scanian front – one of those circumstances being the prevailing threat of Danish irregular excursions into Swedish territory. Brahe’s field chancellery did not in its turn leave behind any administrative descendants or successors. After their work was done, Per Brahe and his secretaries packed their papers and ink vials and returned to Stockholm. The field chancellery as an institution did not represent evolution or continuation – in Foucaultian terms its existence should be contributed to ‘appearance’ rather than ‘descent’. Per Brahe’s field chancellery was ultimately an ad hoc-countermeasure to an endemic and particularist irregular threat. As such it defies the claim by Frank Jacob and Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo that administrative structures “are not established in a short but a long and evolutionary process.”1541

Per Brahe and his field chancellery imposed an outlay and an opportunity cost on the fiscal-military state, even though these costs and expenditures were not of military nature. While Brahe’s two secretaries were salaried professionals, whose services could have been put to good use in Stockholm or anywhere else for that matter, the real expenditure in the field chancellery was Brahe’s valuable time. Brahe was not a secretary of war but the *drots*, the Lord High Steward of Sweden, the chief administrator of the justice system, and the second most influential member in the

1538 RAOSB, ii:3, 527, 9 August 1644, Per Brahe to Axel Oxenstierna.
1539 RAOSB, ii:3, 528, 10 October 1644, Per Brahe to Axel Oxenstierna.
1541 Jacob and Visoni-Alonzo 2017, 9.
riksråd after the Chancellor. As the highest judicial administrator in Sweden, Brahe was expected to supervise the activities of all the hovrätten in Stockholm, Åbo, Jönköping, and Dorpat. He was also expected to attend in person every session of the Svea hovrätt as the acting chief judge.\textsuperscript{1542} This latter responsibility had become increasingly laborious as a result of the Svea hovrätt being inundated with protracted, acrimonious, and complicated law suits between various noble families that argued over finances and issues of inheritance.\textsuperscript{1543}

The assignment to Jönköping was also a distraction from the almost daily work at the riksråd. The drot was no ordinary member of the riksråd but was in fact the Chancellor’s deputy. Whenever Axel Oxenstierna retired to his country estates in Söderåkra, Brahe stepped in as his deputy and carried out whatever tasks the Chancellor required him to, for instance the procurement of provisions from Livonia to Kalmar and other castles “both in the fatherland and in the enemy land [meaning occupied Scania and Halland].”\textsuperscript{1544} The insurgent threat from Scania and Norway, which demanded Brahe’s presence in Västergötland, further complicated the proper and timely function of some of the highest government institutions in Sweden.

Lastly we should remember that the allocation of opportunity costs went both ways and resources for counterinsurgency could be put to other, alternative uses. On 6 April 1644 Fredrik Stenbock had informed the riksråd that several hundred enemies were blocking the road between Markaryd and Fagerhult and thus prevented him from advancing towards southern Halland. He therefore asked the riksråd to send him a few hundred musketeers as reinforcements so that he might proceed towards Halland and subject that land to contributions. The riksråd, however, turned down his request because Gustaf Horn needed the troops in his operation against Landskrona.\textsuperscript{1545} The demands of positional warfare outran those of counterinsurgency. Another military priority that consistently eclipsed counterinsurgency was naval warfare. In May 1644, for instance, Lennart Torstensson did not hesitate to detach 800 musketeers from the garrison at Ribe and attach them to the Dutch auxiliary fleet even though the Swedish position in Jutland was being constantly threatened by regular Danish troops and peasant insurgents.\textsuperscript{1546}

Swedish counterinsurgency warfare against Danish insurgents in Scania and Halland does not undermine the notion of an early modern Military Revolution but to some extent even supports it. While the conduct of counterinsurgency warfare cannot be crystallized into any specific tactical or technological innovations, it nevertheless contributed to the increase in the scale and demands of warfare and expanded Swedish warfare beyond sieges and pitched battles to the ‘explosive emptiness’ of the Scanian countryside in response to the guerrilla threat. Counterinsurgency warfare demanded human and material resources from the power state and imposed opportunity costs on the armed forces. It also induced the central government to engage in limited guerre du cabinet via Per Brahe’s provisional field chancellery in Västergötland. The expansion and growth of warfare, the increase in the number of military impositions

\textsuperscript{1542}Herlitz 1928, 116.
\textsuperscript{1543}Lappalainen 2014, 221.
\textsuperscript{1544}RAOSB, i:16:2, 513, 21 February 1645, Axel Oxenstierna to Per Brahe.
\textsuperscript{1545}RA RR, B222, 12 April 1644.
\textsuperscript{1546}Petersen 1936, 246.
on the society, and the attempt to address unanticipated military challenges at the institutional level are all signifiers and characteristics of the Military Revolution.

Swedish counterinsurgency warfare is also linked to the Military Revolution by the absence of any discernible long-term military evolution or progress. The appearance of firelock-wielding *snapphanar* in the battle space and the sudden danger to the Swedish lines of operation and the home provinces bordering Scania and Halland, an unanticipated threat brought about by the transformation of guerrilla warfare, necessitated new countermeasures from the Swedish military state. The old tactics and tools – sending heavy cavalry to cut pitchfork-wielding and peevish peasants to pieces – no longer sufficed in the new situation. The friction of war, outlays, and opportunity costs imposed by the new kind of guerrilla warfare demanded the kind of wide-ranging, comprehensive, and aggregate responses that only a power state could devise and deliver in the form of determined counterinsurgency warfare. Counterinsurgency therefore only emerged as a corollary of both the transformation of guerrilla war and the Military Revolution.
6 HANNIBAL’S WAR IN THE NORTH

6.1 PREPARATIONS FOR HYBRID WARFARE IN THE NORTH

At the outset of the war, Stockholm had two military goals on the Norwegian frontier: the preservation and protection of Gothenburg and the conquest of two Norwegian provinces, Jämtland and Härjedalen. The preparations for Gothenburg’s defence have already been covered in previous chapters, and here we shall concentrate on the latter goal, the conduct of offensive warfare in Jämtland and Härjedalen. The **riksråd** discussed the prospect of invading Norway on 8 January 1644. In order to get some sense of the potential avenues of advance, the **riksråd** summoned the cartographer and **kriigscollegium** assessor Andreas Bureus, the **justitiepresident** of Gothenburg Peder (Bäfverveldt) Kanutius, the mayor of Brätte Segol Svensson Wallman, Quarter Master General Olof Hansson, and the Västergötland toll inspector Henrik Zinkler to give account of the roads connecting Värmland and Dalarna to Norway.1547 According to these informants, a southern route departed from Brätte towards Uddevalla and the North Sea coast; other routes winded through the forested areas of western Värmland. The Magnora Creek (modern-day Vrangselva), which ran from Magnor to Morast and then emptied itself in Lake Hugn, was the main artery connecting Värmland to Norway.1548

After these interviews the **riksråd** discussed methods of conquering Norway. Axel Oxenstierna predicted that the conquest would be troublesome, for which reason it was preferable to win Norwegians over by good deeds rather than by force. The Norwegians should be shown “all possible humanity”, invited to friendship with letters, and promised security “if they would only remain at peace.”1549 The first military step would be to commission Harald Olofsson to guard the roads to Norway “with some Finns” (meaning Finnish settlers, see chapter 6.5) so that the enemy would not dare to attempt any “attaque” into Sweden. The projected invasion of Jämtland required a specific “dessein” and a capable military leader to execute it. The candidates under consideration were Colonel Johan Oxenstierna, Colonel Hans Strijk, and the **lantmarskalk** Henrik Fleming (the **lantmarskalk** was the ceremonial head of the Noble Estate).1550 After this discussion was finished, the **riksråd** moved on to more practical preparations. Gustaf Horn af Kanckas, the nephew of Field Marshal Gustaf Horn, was commissioned to muster troops in northern Finland, while Jöns Kurck, the President of the Åbo **hovrätt**, would perform similar duty in southern Finland. The **riksråd** also deliberated on the request of Kopparberget’s **landshövding** Johan Berndes to receive 2,000 muskets together with ammunition and match for the “folk that had been assembled there.”1551

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1547 On Zinkler, see Sillén 1865, 209.
1548 SRRP, x, 433, 8 January 1644.
1549 Ibid., 433.
1550 Ibid., 433.
1551 Ibid., 434.
On 9 January the riksråd discussed the need to secure the roads between Jämtland and Norrland. The riksråd decided to rely on uppbåd-levies from Västerbotten for the invasion of Jämtland. Later in the year, when the conquest of Jämtland had been accomplished, the riksråd pondered rather optimistically, the levies could be transferred to Stockholm.1552 By this time it was also agreed that the military command of the invasion force should be delegated to Henrik Fleming and Hans Strijk. Fleming would lead the invasion forces to Jämtland, while Strijk would defend the sconces along the routes of advance.1553 Five days later the riksråd informed Fleming of his new assignment in Jämtland. It was also decided to recruit in Stockholm a number of skilled artilllerymen for Fleming’s army.1554 On 15 January the riksråd decided to send shipments of gunpowder to Örebro, Kopparberget, and Salberget (a silver-mine in modern-day Sala in the Västmanlands län), from where they could be distributed to levies in the surrounding areas.1555

The key persons in the annexation of Jämtland and Härjedalen were the landshövdingar of the neighbouring Swedish provinces – Olof Stake in Värmland, Carl Bonde in the Noraberg’s län, Johan Berndes in Kopparberget’s, Salberg’s, and Näsgård’s län, and Peter Kruse in Säter’s län. On 15 January the riksråd answered to Stake’s request for military supplies for “defensions armatur” and promised him 300 muskets, eight barrels of gunpowder, and six “skeppund” or roughly 1,000 kg of lead.1556 That same day the riksråd wrote to Berndes and instructed him to distribute 400 muskets among the commonalty in the Kopparberget län. These weapons, the riksråd informed, should be available at the “factorien” or weapon smitheries in his län, whence they could be collected and distributed to the levies.1557 These weapons represented only one fifth of those earlier requested by Berndes.

On 16 January the riksråd returned to discuss the need to protect Värmland against any Norwegian incursions from Jämtland. The riksråd resolved that the Norland Regiment should defend Värmland in connection with their projected “impress” upon Jämtland.1558 In addition to the Norrland Regiment, the riksråd also envisioned the formation of a contingent of dragoons, who could keep watch over the Norwegian border and dismount to fight as infantry if threatened by an attack.1559 The subject of the border dragoons was approached with more detail in an undated and unsigned memorandum, which Vilhelm Vessberg recovered from the Oxenstierna samlingen in the late nineteenth century. The unknown correspondent suggested to the riksråd the creation of a dragoon company from “lösdrifvare” or vagrants. The unit would keep watch on the Norwegian border and receive intelligence from their associates in Norway, even from their own children, many of whom resided on the Norwegian side of the border. The command of the border watch could be deferred to the customs officials (uppsyningsmän) at the border. Armed with muskets and led by experienced

1552 SRRP, x, 435, 9 January 1644.
1553 Ibid., 435.
1554 SRRP, x, 438, 14 January 1644.
1555 SRRP, x, 438, 15 January 1644.
1556 SRA RR, B222, 15 January 1644.
1557 Ibid.
1558 SRRP, x, 438, 16 January 1644.
1559 Ibid., 439.
officers, such a company could do better service on the frontier than an entire regiment, the memorandum boasted. The fact that the riksråd discussed the formation of border dragoons on 16 January suggests that the discussion emerged as response to this very memorandum, which in its turn would trace the origins of the document before 16 January 1644.

The plans to defend Sweden’s western borders against Norwegian incursions continued to develop over the course of late January. On 20 January the riksråd ordered Olof Stake to maintain 100 men as a border watch at all times. He should also maintain the commonalty in readiness so that whenever beacons were lit or church bells were being sounded they would assemble together at a designated location and receive orders and instructions from the landshövding. Carl Bonde received orders to make Harald Olofsson the “leader and chief” of all the defences in the Bergslagen mining zone. At the time Olofsson was the bergmästaren or director of mining communities in Nya Kopparberget. As such Olofsson operated directly under the riksråd and independently of the kammarkollegium, under whose jurisdiction mining operations belonged until the end of 1644, when the mining operations were reorganized on collegial basis.

Meanwhile Bonde was to make sure that the existing border watches were being properly rotated. Olofsson in his turn was ordered to maintain and protect the Norwegian border with 200–300 men. Once he had established himself in Bergslagen, he could be supplied with 2,000 “flintguns”, some “six quarters” (roughly one meter) long and with “large barrels.” These instructions seem to recommend the use of military firelocks instead of the lighter smallbore muskets that were commonly used for fowling and hunting. The riksråd delegated the procurement of these 2,000 firelocks to Carl Bonde and Colonel Gustaf Leijonhufvud, who were instructed to order the weapons via “Casten Otter and others”, thus referring to weapons manufactories at Örebro and elsewhere. Other instructions were sent to Peter Kruse and Johan Berndes, who were ordered to delegate “defensionsvercket” to Åke Oxenstierna, a former landshövding of the Viborg and Nyslott län in Finland and a member of the krigsråd in 1638–1640. The riksråd also resolved to dispatch four or six cannons with powder and ammunition to Gävle in Gästrikland, where they could be maintained until the projected “design for Jämtland.”

On 23 January the riksråd sent Harald Olofsson official instructions concerning his military duties. Because Olofsson had good knowledge of the roads and passes between Sweden and Norway, the riksråd elaborated on its earlier decision, he was to go and assist landshövding Carl Bonde in the defence of the Noraberg län. There Olofsson would, with the assistance of Carl Bonde, divide the commonalty, and particularly those Finns that dwelt in the mining areas, into rotes and companies. These levies would then be provided with muskets and ammunition, and at least

1560 Vessberg 1900, 5.
1561 SRRP, x, 440, 20 January 1644.
1562 Odhner 1865, 165–166.
1563 SRRP, x, 441, 20 January 1644.
1564 Ibid., 441.
1566 SRRP, x, 440, 20 January 1644.
one hundred of them should maintain watch over the border at all times. Should the enemy attack across the border, all levies and Finns should be animated; otherwise Olofsson should desist from crossing the border.  

The riksråd’s discussions in January 1644 reveal tentative plans for the pacification of Jämtland. Already on 17 January the riksråd had instructed Olof Stake to desist from crossing the border and had advised him to allow “commercienné” between Värmland and Norway. The riksråd had feared that signs of Swedish aggression might trigger a Norwegian counterattack into Värmland, whose civilian population was unprepared for war. On 20 January the riksråd concluded that the best way to neutralize any threat from Norway was to convince the Norwegians to “give themselves willingly to the devotion of the Swedish Crown.” The riksråd suggested that the commonalty in Värmland should contact their Norwegian peers by letters and convince them that as long as they remained still, they would not be disturbed or harassed by the Swedes in any way. Oxenstierna was skeptical of this plan. Sweden should not fully commit itself to any policy of non-aggression in the north, as the military situation would evolve over time and force Sweden to react to changed circumstances. Oxenstierna was equally unwilling to bring the commonalty in Värmland together to formulate any letters to their Norwegian neighbours; rather the task should be given to a single capable individual, who would speak on behalf of the commonalty and express its “inclinations.”  

The instructions sent to Carl Bonde on 22 January nevertheless remained close to the initial deliberations of the riksråd. Bonde was to send chosen peasants to the other side of the border dressed as Norwegians and entrusted with the mission to convince the Norwegians that they would be better off under Swedish rule. Norwegians would be promised Swedish protection as long as they remained friendly or at least passive in the face of the war between Sweden and Denmark. On 23 January the riksråd instructed Harald Olofsson to contact Jämtlanders himself or via a picked emissary and to remind them that they had always been “free folk” but that lately they had been cast into Danish “thralldom.” The riksråd rather shrewdly referred to the apparent lack of opportunities for Norwegians in Denmark-Norway. Norwegians had trouble making any worthwhile and honourable service for their Fatherland under Danish rule, the riksråd suggested, as the government treated them with disrespect and contempt. Olofsson was to remind the Jämtlanders that they had once lived as Swedish subjects “in good friendship and loyalty.” Now Her Majesty once again invited them to enter Swedish protection, in which they would be restored to their old privileges, freedoms, and laws.

Meanwhile other military preparations were taking place on the Norwegian side of the border. The government in Copenhagen largely limited its role to fiscal matters. The missive from 9 January 1644, which ordered the collection of all dispensable silver
and gold, was also extended to include the King’s Norwegian subjects. So too was the order to double the taxes among trade towns, clergy, and the peasants. There were some qualifications to these decrees. The town of Marstrand in Bohuslän was exempted from the double taxation, as too were the clergy in the arctic Finnmark. The inhabitants of the Nordlandene, or the districts of Salten, Senjen, Andenes, and Tromsø, who were mostly alodial peasants (odesbons), were taxed with a reduced and fixed rate, the so-called halv skat. Other, more military missives, were sent out from Copenhagen on an ad hoc-basis. On 21 December 1643, only a few days after the outbreak of hostilities, the government instructed the war commissar Daniel Knutsson Bildt to muster as many bondesoldater as he could find in Bohus and to maintain them in military preparedness against any Swedish incursion. On that same day Christian IV sent another letter to Hannibal Sehested, investing him with the task of maintaining Norway “in good order” on behalf of the King.

As the Norwegian statholder, Hannibal Sehested (1609–1666) was responsible for raising, organizing, and maintaining military forces in Norway. In his youth Sehested had served the Crown as a diplomat and a courtier. In May 1640 he was admitted into the rigråd, where he served as an expert on foreign policy matters. He was appointed as the Norwegian statholder in April 1642. As a statholder Sehested was the supreme military authority in Norway. It was his duty to raise troops, maintain them for service, and even lead them in battle. Sehested shared military command with none save the King himself, and only on those occasions when the latter visited Norway. Instead of colleagues Sehested had aides. The only purely military aide was General Major Joachim von Bredow, who was commissioned to his post in May 1644. The other military aides were noble commissars, picked mainly from the ranks of the lensmand. Sehested’s first military task was to animate the Norwegian contingent of the armed forces. An ordinance from September 1641 had decreed that the war-time Norwegian army would consist of 512 mounted “archebuserere”, 500 dragoons, and 6,143 infantry. In addition to these forces there already existed 14 kjøbstadkompanier in the towns and roughly 400 other soldiers scattered in various fortifications and castles.

Sehested thus faced a twofold challenge at the outbreak of the hostilities: firstly, he had to make his best to raise forces at the decreed scale, and secondly, to maintain the troop levels. David Parrott has rightly emphasized the latter challenge, which is easily forgotten by such military historians who only observe troop strengths at the moment of initial musters. As soon as an army was put in the field, it began to lose soldiers through death and desertion. Parrott has offered a crude yet elucidative allegory of a bath tub half full of water, intermittently refilled from a tap, but lacking a plug. “The moment the tap is turned off – the moment that additional recruitment

1573 KBB 1644–1645, 6, 9 January 1644.
1574 KBB 1644–1645, 15, 22 January 1644.
1575 Ibid., 16–17.
1576 NRR 1641–1648, 305, 21 December 1643.
1577 Ibid., 305.
1578 DBL, xv, 496–498.
1579 Lind 1994, 335.
1580 Munthe 1901, 7–8.
stops for some reason – the existing water rapidly runs out of the bath." Medieval Denmark had been guaranteed a working tap by the rostjeneste, which required the cavalry service – rendering elites to maintain certain troop levels in return for fiscal, social, and political privileges.

By the 1640s, however, the rostjeneste had become a military anachronism, which fact the ordinance from 1641 seemed to acknowledge. The proposed mobilization plan projected that only 50 cavalrymen could be raised in Norway through rostjeneste alone; another eight soldiers were expected to be funded by the rostjeneste-tax. The 462 remaining mounted harquebusiers were to be provided by the Norwegian nobility, clergy, and allodial peasants collectively. Under the ordinance of 1641, nobles, clergy, and allodial peasants were expected to provide one and a half cavalrymen or mounted harquebusiers per 300 tønder (30,000 kg) of grain. At the outbreak of the war, Sehested came to the realization that this ratio was unrealistic and modified the obligation to produce only one cavalryman/harquebusier per 300 tønder of grain. By late April 1644 Sehested had managed to muster only some 300 cavalrymen through actual rostjeneste and rostjeneste-tax.

The modest returns of rostjeneste left Sehested with only two realistic sources of manpower: recruited soldiers and conscripted/levied peasants. Sehested’s recruitment of professional soldiers remains an under-researched topic. Presently it may suffice to observe that Sehested managed to raise professional contingents with remarkable success. Sehested boosted the strength of his cavalry by recruiting a company of 100 German cavalrymen in May 1644 and two more through Danish war commissars and colonel-proprietors in 1645. All these 290 professional cavalrymen were maintained via the rostjeneste-tax. Between March and July 1644 Sehested also raised four companies (400 men) of hired dragoons. The majority of the hired professionals served in the infantry. A royal missive from 25 April 1644 reveals that by that time the recruited element in the Norwegian infantry consisted of 500 musketeers, 300 pikemen, and 300 “Fyrrør” or harquebusiers. These professionals were soon amalgamated into a single unit, Sehested’s own Livregiment. Sehested reinforced this regiment with further recruitments in 1645, when the regiment reached the strength of 1,515 men. Other professional soldiers were distributed to the native units as officers, of whom there was a pressing shortage in Norway. This shortage was somewhat alleviated by recruitment efforts in Danzig and the Dutch Republic – in June 1644 Jørgen Bielke, son of the Chancellor Jens Bielke, managed to raise 275 officers and NCOs in the latter country, thus competing for Dutch military resources with the entrepreneur Louis De Geer, who was there at the same time raising auxiliary naval forces for Swedish service.

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1581 Parrott 2001, 178.
1582 Munthe 1901, 7.
1583 Ibid., 10.
1584 NRR 1641–1648, 322, 25 April 1644.
1585 Munthe 1901, 11–12.
1586 NRR 1641–1648, 322, 25 April 1644.
1587 Munthe 1901, 13–14.
1588 Ibid., 13.
No amount of modifications in the *rostjeneste* or repeated recruitment efforts abroad could change the fact that the bulk of the Norwegian army would have to be provided by the native peasantry, either through *udskrivning* or *opbud*. The missive from 25 April 1644 projected the number of conscripted peasants to reach 8,000 men, which was a considerably higher number than the one originally decreed in the ordinance of 1641.\(^{1589}\) The conscripts were to be raised through *udskrivning*, where three tax-paying households would provide between them one soldier.\(^{1590}\) Sehested quite rationally foresaw that these conscripts could not be used to maintain all the six native regiments envisioned in the ordinance of 1641 and therefore decreased the number of regiments. The Bergenhus as well as the Stavanger/Agdesiden regiments were dissolved and their manpower was used to reinforce the four other (Trondheim, Tønsberg, Aakerhus, and Bahamas) territorial regiments. During the winter campaign of 1644–1645, Sehested raised another regiment in the Vestlandet districts. This regiment was variably known as the Nordlandske Regiment or the Generalkrigskommissærens Regiment. Conversely, the Tønsberg Regiment was dissolved in the summer of 1644 and its troops were used to reinforce the Bahus Regiment and the new Smålenske Regiment.\(^{1591}\)

The theoretical strength of each regiment was 1,600 men, which would have meant that the Norwegians fielded some 6,400 conscripts at the same time.\(^{1592}\) In reality the number of conscripts in arms at any given time would have been lower than that. The Smålenske Regiment offers an elucidating example of the disparity between the nominal paper strength and the number of troops actually fielded. According to the Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database (SSNE) compiled by Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean, the Smålenske Regiment consisted of 800 infantry, 100 archers, 100 cavalry, and 100 dragoons at the time when Colonel John Taylor assumed its command in August 1644.\(^{1593}\) This meant that the Regiment fell 500 men short of its theoretical strength.

The shortfall in troop numbers could only be made good by a national levy. The missive from 25 April 1644 had recognized the need to “arm the commonalty everywhere.”\(^{1594}\) In 1617, the Crown had similarly identified the necessity to supply the levied peasants with muskets.\(^{1595}\) The government had at that time delivered 5,000 muskets to the Norwegian peasants, first to the allodial “odelsebønder” in Bergen and then to all the lensmænd, who redistributed the weapons to local peasants.”\(^{1596}\) This policy of supplying the peasant levies with weapons from public resources was no longer followed in 1644, in fact quite the opposite. “Every peasant household is responsible for providing one musket for the realm’s defence”, the Crown informed its Norwegian subjects.\(^{1597}\)

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\(^{1589}\) NRR 1641–1648, 322, 25 April 1644.

\(^{1590}\) Munthe 1901, 14.

\(^{1591}\) Ibid., 7, 14.

\(^{1592}\) Ibid., 14–15.

\(^{1593}\) SSNE, Record ID 86. http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne/item.php?id=86&id2=86.

\(^{1594}\) NRR 1641–1648, 323, 25 April 1644.

\(^{1595}\) Ersland and Holm 2000, 191.

\(^{1596}\) NRR 1603–1618, 619, 7 April 1617; NRR 1603–1618, 664–666, 15 September 1617.

\(^{1597}\) NRR 1641–1648, 323, 25 April 1644.
This demand was of course wishful thinking, which reflected more the poor state of armaments among the Norwegian military rather than any inherent bellicosity or martial nature of the Norwegian peasantry. A missive from 6 April 1644 in fact suggests that many Norwegian peasants were incapable of providing their own weapons. Christian IV, who had learned that the Swedes had carelessly left “a great deal of floated timber” on the coast of Hisingen, ordered the war commissar Sigvard Akeleye to distribute 300 muskets to “inland” peasants, who would carry out an amphibious raid to secure the timber.\textsuperscript{1598} Most of the time, however, the Oldenburg state had great difficulty in providing arms for levied peasants.

Even some of the regular contingents such as the Trondheims- and Smålenske Regiments were short of weapons and ammunition at the outbreak of the war.\textsuperscript{1599} The muster roll of the Smålenske Regiment, one of which exists from a partial muster in 1643, reveals that of the 113 conscripts from the Idd and Marker len only 95 appeared in the muster with muskets and 71 with bandoliers.\textsuperscript{1600} The 69 conscripts from Tune, Åbygge, and Veme len possessed between them 45 muskets.\textsuperscript{1601} If we extrapolate these numbers into a wider statistic, we can conclude that one in four conscripts had to go to war without a firearm. Such troops would have to rely on cold weapons, even though the tactical circumstances in the rough northern terrain did not favour the employment of the other main infantry weapon, the pike. Artillery too was in short supply. At the very beginning of the war Christian IV ordered field pieces to be sent over to Sehested so that he could create an effective “diversion” against the Swedes.\textsuperscript{1602} The shortage of ammunition was somewhat alleviated in February 1644 when the King supplied Sehested with powder and ball.\textsuperscript{1603}

The opbud-levies were used primarily for positional watch duties along the border, which would free the conscripted contingents to conduct more mobile warfare.\textsuperscript{1604} One of the levied peasants’ first duties was the construction of barricades to block the mountain passes between Norway and Sweden.\textsuperscript{1605} The number of levied peasants at arms is difficult to quantify as it varied constantly. The musters of levied peasants took place at the local level, and they were not organized into units larger than companies. These levied peasants were not irregular troops in the same sense as Scanian snapphanar but represented a hybrid element in the Norwegian military. While they were not regular soldiers, they were nevertheless expected to serve as such. The same was true of their Swedish peers, who were mobilized in large numbers to serve as substitutes for regular troops. The nature of warfare in the north was therefore hybrid rather than irregular.

\textsuperscript{1598} NRR 1641–1648, 316–317, 6 April 1644.
\textsuperscript{1599} Munthe 1901, 19.
\textsuperscript{1600} NRA Kommanderende general (KG I) med Det norske krigsdirektorium, E/Ea/L0493: Smålenske regiment, 1643–1694, Idd og Marker len.
\textsuperscript{1601} NRA Kommanderende general (KG I) med Det norske krigsdirektorium, E/Ea/L0493: Smålenske regiment, 1643–1694, Tune, Åbygge og Veme len.
\textsuperscript{1602} KCFEB 1641–1644, 430, 5 January 1644.
\textsuperscript{1603} KCFEB 1641–1644, 451, 18 February 1644.
\textsuperscript{1604} Munthe 1901, 16.
\textsuperscript{1605} Vessberg 1900, 8.
6.2 SWEDISH INVASION OF JÄMTLAND

For the first months of 1644, the northern front witnessed something of a phony war between Sweden and Denmark, as the Swedes in particular were eager to maintain some semblance of imperturbation on the Swedish-Norwegian frontier. Hannibal Sehested spent the latter half of January 1644 touring Bohus and Jämtland and inspecting their defences. On 12 January he reached the Midskog church in Jämtland, where he set up a fortified camp for 300 men and appointed Kield Stub as the commander of the local militia. These field works were in due course developed into a formidable set of sconces.\textsuperscript{1606} Sehested also reinforced the garrison and fortifications at Uddevalla.\textsuperscript{1607} By the end of January the Danish military forces in Jämtland comprised of the Trondheim Regiment, which by that time included roughly 900 infantry and 200 dragoons.\textsuperscript{1608} First tentative hostilities may have broken out at the very end of January, when Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Ulfeldt allegedly sent Norwegian raiding parties over the border to Hälsingland, Medelpad, and Ångermanland. As Carl Oscar Munthe pointed out, the evidence for these raids ever taking place is largely anecdotal and derived solely from Niels Slange’s eighteenth-century history of Christian IV’s reign.\textsuperscript{1609}

The actual war in the north began in February 1644 with the Swedish invasion of Jämtland. On 15 February the riksråd drew up an open letter to the commonalty in Jämtland. The public manifest would do four things:

1. It would represent the reasons for war between Denmark and Sweden [from the latter realm’s perspective naturally].
2. It would argue to the Jämtlanders that they were presently subjected to Danish thralldom.
3. It would argue that Jämtland was in fact situated within Swedish borders.
4. It would promise that Her Majesty the Queen was willing to take the Jämtlanders into her protection and extend to them the same rights already possessed by her other subjects; if they would not “sit still”, in other words remain inactive in the face of Swedish invasion, “they would do so at their own risk.”\textsuperscript{1610}

The riksråd had never made quite so bold and far-reaching demands to other Danish subjects in Scania, Halland, or Jutland. There were, however, good historical reasons for the riksråd’s bluster regarding Jämtland. While the Swedish claim for casus belli was as dubious in Jämtland as it was everywhere else, Sweden did nevertheless maintain a legitimate claim for the possession of Jämtland, albeit one based solely on ecclesiastical justifications. As a result of the Christianization of northern Scandinavia in the eleventh century, Jämtland was incorporated into the newly-founded bishopric of Sigtuna, which in its turn was incorporated into the bishopric of Uppsala in the 1130s.\textsuperscript{1611} Around the same time the Jämtlanders began to pay taxes to the Norwegian

\begin{footnotesize}
1606 Vessberg 1900, 8–9.
1607 Boeckler 1679, 110.
1608 Munthe 1901, 19–20.
1609 Ibid., 20.
1610 SRRP, x, 455, 15 February 1644.
\end{footnotesize}
kings, which effectively meant that the Jämtlanders recognized the Norwegian ruler as their sovereign.\footnote{Bull 1927, 32.} Swedish ecclesiastical (if not quite political) authority over Jämtland nevertheless continued until the Peace of Stettin in 1570, when Denmark finally wrested ecclesiastical control of Jämtland from Sweden and incorporated the province into the bishopric of Trondheim.\footnote{Nyberg 2003, 253.} From the Swedish perspective Jämtland’s transferral to Norwegian ecclesiastical jurisdiction was still a recent event, and one which rested on disputable justifications. This Swedish case for ecclesiastical jurisdiction was in its turn translated into a claim for territorial sovereignty over Jämtland and its inhabitants.

Swedish claims for Jämtland rested on shaky ground, but the riksråd nevertheless believed it could sway the Jämtlanders, who were not well-versed in the intricacies of canon law or the complex principles of territorial sovereignty. There was indeed some reason to believe that the Jämtlanders would be favourably disposed towards Swedish rule. When the Swedes had invaded Härjedalen and Jämtland during the previous war in 1611–1613, their inhabitants had offered little resistance. Many of them had paid taxes and contributions to the Swedes voluntarily, and some had even sworn loyalty to Charles IX and his son Gustaf Adolf.\footnote{Harrison and Eriksson 2010, 361.} After the war Christian IV had punished his disloyal subjects in Jämtland by confiscating their tax-land (skattejord) and transferring it to royal possession. The skattejord had not been rented from the Crown or any other landowner, and the peasants had possessed direct ownership over it.\footnote{Gustafsson 2012, 90.} Some peasants managed to buy back the confiscated land from the Crown, which artifice enriched the royal coffers with several thousand thalers.\footnote{Rian 2017, 136.} The confiscation was a very severe penalty and it was not at all unreasonable to assume that the Jämtlanders might still harbour some grievance over their heavy-handed treatment by Christian IV.

The riksråd’s manifest approached hyperbole when it claimed that the Jämtlanders were presently subjected to Danish bondage and that their rights might be better protected under Swedish rule, even though there was some justification for such blustering rhetoric. The most conspicuous difference between the Danish peasants and their Swedish peers was the fact that the latter constituted a political Estate while the former did not. Political representation at the riksdag was indeed a privilege, which the Danish peasants might envy, but there nevertheless existed significant qualifications to the political and social rights enjoyed by the Swedish peasants.

The most obvious qualification was the one, which limited actual political privileges to freeholders (skattebönder) and royal tenants (kronbönder). Only their representatives had the right to vote at the riksdag; demesne peasants (frälsebönder) were voteless, as it was expected that they were represented by their manorial landlords.\footnote{Roberts 1953, 301.} Most Jämtlanders, however, would not have fallen into the latter category even if their skattejord had been confiscated by the Danish Crown. Their skattejord had been taken over by the Danish Crown instead of being transferred to noble landlords, which arrangement effectively transformed former freeholders into royal tenants instead...
of demesne peasants; furthermore the confiscation had no legitimacy in the eyes of the Swedish Crown, which indeed restored the confiscated skattejord to its former owners in 1645.\textsuperscript{1618} The Jämtlanders nevertheless had no way of knowing in early 1644 what would happen in late 1645, and a Swedish takeover always carried with it the danger of large-scale alienations to noble landowners. Such a scenario was not far-fetched, as the Swedish Crown had the notorious habit of granting förvaltningsområde or conquered territories to the expanding elites as rewards for service or collateral for outstanding debts. The förvaltningsområde, such as Kexholm and Ingría in the east, were conversely kept bereft of political privileges. The 1634 Form of Government explicitly excluded conquered territories from the riksdag, which left their inhabitants with little or no political influence.\textsuperscript{1619}

A more serious qualification to the political privileges of the Swedish peasants was the fact that Gustaf Adolf had fallen increasingly into the habit of excluding the Fourth Estate from the riksdag-sessions. Such meetings lacked the full constitutional prestige of the riksdag, for which reason they were called utskottsmöte or committee meetings. Gustaf Adolf had justified these limited meetings on grounds of political expediency. By the late 1620s Sweden stumbled from one urgent situation to another and there was simply no time to summon all the Estates for decision-making. Another contributing factor was the absence of the King himself, who hardly spent any time in Stockholm after 1625, and the series of military campaigns in Poland-Lithuania and Germany, which demanded the King’s presence at the head of the army.\textsuperscript{1620} After the King’s death, Axel Oxenstierna strove to straddle the middle path between the late King’s committee rule and the fully constitutional administration of all the four Estates, and subsequently limited both the number of committee meetings and full-scale riksdagar.\textsuperscript{1621} During the aristocratic regency the political focus undoubtedly shifted away from the riksdag and towards the riksråd, which usurped some of the riksdag’s legislative powers by discussing laws and taxation with the Noble Estate behind the locked doors of the Tre Kronor Castle. The final qualification dealt with the Fourth Estate’s inability to name its speakers or secretaries for the riksdag-sessions. Both were appointed by the King or, in his absence, by the regency.

The Jämtlanders may not have been thoroughly familiar with all these qualifications in the political privileges of the Swedish peasants, but they most certainly knew that if they exchanged Danish rule for Swedish one, they would immediately feel the weight of new taxes. While the tax burden of the Danish peasants was not light, it was less heavy than the one borne by their Swedish peers. Jämtlanders, who regularly traded with their Swedish neighbours in Dalarna and Norrland, were perfectly aware of the particularly onerous indirect taxes, namely the småtullarna or little tolls. The småtullarna were duties imposed on the importation of goods to cities and towns, which made them particularly burdensome to peasants, who sought to sell their produce at town markets. In addition to the småtullarna, the Swedish fiscal-military state also levied various excise duties, licences, and foreign trade tolls.\textsuperscript{1622}

\textsuperscript{1618} Hansen 2006, 246.
\textsuperscript{1619} Katajala 2005, 26.
\textsuperscript{1620} Roberts 1953, 305–306.
\textsuperscript{1621} Steyern 1863, 118–120.
\textsuperscript{1622} Jespersen 2000, 122.
Danish subjects too were burdened with tolls, but these were typically assessed at the local level, which made allowance for leniency, exemptions, and preferential treatment.\textsuperscript{1623} The correspondence of Prince Christian attests to the way in which tolls and levies were regularly flouted if it served the purposes of the high and mighty.\textsuperscript{1624} The Swedish Crown was more inflexible with its taxes. No-one was automatically exempted from the småtullarna, not even the otherwise privileged nobility. The universality of the småtullarna was in fact the only feature that made the tax in the least way acceptable to the native peasantry.\textsuperscript{1625} It was therefore very unlikely that the Swedish Crown would grant the Jämtlanders any exemptions from the småtullarna, as such a policy would create accusations about preferential treatment and would trigger a veritable avalanche of appeals for further exemptions. The postwar arrangements in Swedish-held Jämtland proved that such doubts would have been perfectly justified. These were all the kind of factors the riksråd would have to take into consideration in its attempts to win over the hearts and minds of Jämtlanders.

On 17 February 1644 the riksråd drew up more detailed military instructions for Henrik Fleming, the appointed commander of the Jämtland expedition. In the spirit of the earlier manifest, Fleming was instructed to win the Jämtlanders over by treating them with discretion and respect. He should summon Jämtlander peasants in order to extract an oath of loyalty from them and then send them back to their homes after having disarmed those who carried arms. This treatment would not be extended to the Danish officers, who would be all treated as prisoners of war. After taking possession of the northern parts of Jämtland, Fleming would advance further south and occupy Härjedalen, which would allow him to conjunct and co-operate with the landshövdingar in Dalarna. The riksråd quite rightly identified the Trondheim road as a potential avenue for enemy counterattacks and instructed Fleming to block the road with palisades and some kind of a “place” manned by a company of soldiers.

Lastly the riksråd instructed Fleming to levy every tenth man in Jämtland and use the levied peasants to reinforce the Hälsingland Regiment.\textsuperscript{1626} Fleming’s invasion force consisted of the Hälsingland and Västerbotten infantry regiments, at least two cannons, and an unquantified number of cavalrymen.\textsuperscript{1627} The horses for the latter had been provided by the landshövding Ivar Nilsson, who had been instructed to extract horses as voluntary contributions from priests, tax-inspectors, law speakers, and other local administrators.\textsuperscript{1628} The riders, it seemed, Fleming would have to find himself. At the very end of February, when Fleming crossed the border and invaded Jämtland, his forces amounted to some 2,500 men.\textsuperscript{1629} According to the Gazette, Fleming’s army was also joined by “one thousand of those men who work in the mines.”\textsuperscript{1630} This was

\textsuperscript{1623} Jespersen 2000, 127.  
\textsuperscript{1624} PCB 1643–1647, 22, 22 March 1643; PCB 1643–1647, 98, 18 March 1644; PCB 1643–1647, 418–419, 23 October 1645; PCB 1643–1647, 435, 9 November 1645.  
\textsuperscript{1625} Roberts 1958, 71.  
\textsuperscript{1626} SRA RR, B222, 17 February 1644.  
\textsuperscript{1627} Munthe 1901, 21; Vessberg 1900, 10–11.  
\textsuperscript{1628} SRA RR, B222, 15 February 1644.  
\textsuperscript{1629} Munthe 1901, 22.  
\textsuperscript{1630} Gazette du 28 Mai 1644 N. 57, 369.
a clear allusion to the *bergsknektar* from the Bergslagen mining zone, although their numerical strength appears greatly exaggerated in the French source.

A letter from Axel Oxenstierna to his son from 28 March sheds some light on the course of the invasion. Jacob Ulfeldt, whose force of “Norrbaggar” and conscripted Jämtlanders had been less strong than it had originally appeared, had retreated over the fells with all his soldiers and officers after only one skirmish with the Swedish invaders. The entire province and all of its 40 districts had quickly fallen into Her Majesty’s hands. Most of the Danish bailiffs and priests had followed Ulfeldt with their wives and children; it was rumoured that many of the refugees had frozen to death in the icy fells. Meanwhile the administration of the conquered province had been placed in the hands of Colonel Strijk, who acted as the provisional *landshövding* of Jämtland.¹⁶³¹ The sole skirmish had taken place at Brunflo, where Fleming overcame a sconce defended by some 300 armed Jämtlanders. After driving the Jämtlanders out of their sconce, Fleming continued to pursue them with three infantry companies. In the course of this pursuit the Swedes allegedly torched two villages, Hälle and Gärde, burning alive in the process some sixty enemy combatants.¹⁶³²

Further south the Swedes advanced into Østerdalen in northern Hedmark from Dalarna. On 27 February the *riksråd* had appointed Major Otto Månsson to organize the commonalty of Dalarna into a militia.¹⁶³³ This appointment attests to the chronic shortage of eligible officers in early 1644, as Månsson had committed manslaughter in Germany and had been sentenced to death by the *krigsrätt*.¹⁶³⁴ The *landshövding* Peter Kruse travelled to the northern reaches of Dalarna to persuade the commoners there to form a militia of their own. Kruse succeeded in mobilizing the peasants but was forced to acquiesce to the peasants’ demands and delegate the command of the militia to a local chaplain named Daniel Buscovius. The *riksråd* entrusted Buscovius with the conquest of three parish districts in Østerdalen – Särna, Hedre, and Idre. Buscovius was first to try and win the inhabitants over with good words; if this did not work he was authorized to use fire and sword against recalcitrant parishers.¹⁶³⁵

Buscovius led 200 men against Särna and took the parish by surprise on 22 March. From Särna he extended his control over the neighbouring parishes, whose representatives swore fealty to the Swedish Crown. The Crown rewarded Buscovius for his successful campaign by granting him an annual donation of twelve tunnor of grain and appointing him in 1653 as the vicar of Kumla.¹⁶³⁶ The same day when Särna fell to Buscovius, another Swedish party of 150 skitroopers and 16 horsemen made a foray into Østerdalen but only managed to bring back three prisoners and a pair of oxen.¹⁶³⁷ Looking from Stockholm, the conquest of Jämtland had gone so smoothly that it justified certain degree of self-congratulation. Writing on 15 April, Queen Christina herself boasted to Johan Oxenstierna and Johan Adler Salvius that both Jämtland and

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¹⁶³¹ SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen Johan Axelsson Oxenstierna av Södermöre E 979, 28 March 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Oxenstierna.
¹⁶³³ SRA RR, B222, 27 February 1644.
¹⁶³⁴ Vessberg 1900, 13.
¹⁶³⁵ SRA RR, B222, 14 March 1644.
¹⁶³⁶ Vessberg 1900, 13.
¹⁶³⁷ Ibid., 13.
Härjedalen had been “brought to our and the Crown’s devotion and the enemy’s troops have been driven out of these lands after a few sporadic skirmishes.”

After occupying Jämtland and Härjedalen, the Swedes subjected their inhabitants to a contribution, which amounted to ten thalers in Jämtland and four in Härjedalen, payable in silver or furs. Even this lower rate proved too high for the impoverished Härjedalers, who were granted an extension to their payment. On 15 and 20 March Fleming extracted oaths of fealty from the Jämtlanders. By that time some Jämtlanders had already abandoned their homes and escaped to Norway. Such abandoned estates were punished with a doubled rate of contribution; this contribution of course could only be extracted if the escaped inhabitants chose to return to Jämtland.

While Fleming consolidated Swedish control over Jämtland, the riksråd convened in Stockholm to discuss future operations in the north. After a brief discussion about the possibility of advancing further west and acquiring a possible foothold on the North Sea coast, the riksråd agreed that the securing of Jämtland eliminated any need to expand military operations deeper into Norway. The long-term military goal was to protect the Swedish provinces from Norwegian incursions, and for this purpose the riksråd saw fit to fortify Vänersborg in Västergötland with “a good stockade and a retrenchment.” The riksråd decided to transfer a company of soldiers from Gothenburg to garrison Vänersborg, whence they could “conjugera sigh” with any levied peasants in the Väne district. Jacob De la Gardie suggested that the prevailing wintry conditions would allow them to move a few artillery pieces to Vänersborg. Gabriel Oxenstierna also reminded the riksråd of the existence of a sconce that was situated along the Dalsland road, “where we used to have a toll booth.” Per Brahe saw no viable route for an enemy attack other than Värmland, “and that is a broken land.” The riksskattemästare Gabriel Oxenstierna believed that the most likely corridor for an enemy invasion was the Magnora Creek on the border of Värmland and Hedmark, “where we have a sconce.”

Whether or not Jämtland fell to the enemy, and despite where the Norwegian attack on Swedish soil would materialize, the riksråd agreed on the importance of organizing some kind of popular defence force on the basis of uppbåd-levies. Because the enemy did not yet possess any professional troops in Norway, Brahe pondered, it would suffice to arm the Swedish commonalty with muskets, “which in any event may provide them with good courage if nothing else.” De la Gardie agreed that the enemy would not send any other troops than commonalty, who could be opposed with their Swedish counterparts. The manufacture and distribution of muskets for peasants would have to be organized by two appointed officials, one from the “Krigsrätten” (meaning krigskollegium) and one from the “Cammaren” (exchequer), he continued.

On 29 March 1644 the riksråd issued several instructions to Henrik Fleming, including the suggestion that Fleming should try and lure the runaway peasants...
back to Jämtland in return for their possessions. This pardon was not extended to exiled priests, bailiffs, notaries, or other government employees, whose estates were confiscated by the Swedish Crown. Danes, meaning non-native Norwegians, or those who held any offices in Denmark, were to be evicted from Jämtland. The commonality was to be disarmed and their firearms were to be stored in the newly-created royal manors. Those native “länsmän”, or rather herredsfoged, who swore fealty to the Swedish Crown, were allowed to retain their positions. Former Norwegian taxes and other tithes remained in place under Swedish administration. In terms of local administration, the Jämtlanders would be treated in a similar way “as the commonalty in Hälsingland.” Judicially Jämtlanders would be placed under the jurisdiction of the Västernorrland law-speaker or judge, while Härjedalen was attached to that of Dalarna and Bergslagen. Ecclesiastically Jämtland was to be once again incorporated into the Bishopric of Uppsala; the government requested the archbishop Laurentius Gothus to send new Swedish priests and chaplains to Jämtland.

After occupying Jämtland the Swedes prepared to consolidate their military position there by furnishing magazines for provisions and ammunition and by manning the existing sconces with troops and artillery. The sconces were to be manned by “300 men and two good Captains” from the Västernorrland Regiment plus 100 men from Bergslagen. The sconces had not been finished yet, for which reason Axel Oxenstierna instructed Fleming to construct a “Russian stockade” so that Colonel Strijk could defend himself with the two companies he already had at his disposal. Some of these troops, Oxenstierna suggested, should be converted to dragoons, “so that they might be moved quickly.”

Nine days earlier the riksråd had suggested that Carl Bonde and Johan Berndes could raise “a few hundred men” in Bergslagen for “our inland army.” The riksråd believed it could manipulate the bergsknektar by promising them that they would be allowed to return to their homes as soon as the campaign was over and that they would be henceforth relieved from all military service; on the other hand the riksråd intended to maintain ambiguity over the definition of what constituted a campaign, which studied obfuscation would allow the Crown to retain the bergsknektar in service as long as the war lasted. The issue of levies and conscriptions in Jämtland was a delicate one. By the end of March the Swedes had raised 400 men in Jämtland without any complications. The government wanted to keep things this way and assured the levied Jämtlanders that they would not be sent to Russia, Livonia, or Poland, but would be incorporated in the Hälsingland Regiment. This arrangement was also practical from a purely military perspective, as it addressed the bath tub analogy by releasing new water into the draining pool of the Hälsingland Regiment.

1645 SRA RR, B222, 29 March 1644.
1646 SRA RR, B222, 20 April 1644; RA RR, B222, 20 May 1644.
1647 SRA RR, B222, 29 March 1644.
1648 Ibid.
1649 SRA Henrik Flemings arkiv E3629, fol. 328, 29 March 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to Henrik Fleming.
1650 SRRP, x, 468, 20 March 1644.
1651 SRA RR, B222, 29 March 1644: SRRP, x, 479, 26 March 1644.
6.3 NORWEGIAN RECONQUEST OF JÄMTLAND

While the Swedes were busily reorganizing institutional and civic life in Jämtland, Norwegians were already taking steps to launch a counterattack in Värmland and Jämtland. Jacob Ulfeldt had only left Jämtland with the intention of returning there as soon as possible, and he spent the spring months reinforcing the Trondheim Regiment with fresh troops and better armaments. Meanwhile the early months of 1644 had witnessed a restless phoney war in the frontier between Värmland and Norway. In January and February, several false alarms had been raised on both sides of the border.

A young man named Petrus Magni Gyllenius, who toured Värmland as an itinerant student and kept a diary of his travels, witnessed one such event in the Grums härad on 11 January. “Early in the morning, around eight o’clock, there arrived news that the Danes and the Norwegians had invaded Värmland and that every man should keep himself ready with weapons and to prepare to ward off the enemy, even if one did not know whether the enemy was at hand.” Gyllenius and his companions set out to Warpnäs, “where many peasants had come together after hearing the same news.” Later on that same day (11 January) Gyllenius reached Karlstad, where the local burghers had organized a militia that was busily exercising with its muskets, pikes, and halberds. News of a Norwegian attack had already reached Karlstad on the night between 9 and 10 January and had subsequently created a panic among the town-dwellers, some of whom had even fled the town with their belongings.

On the Norwegian side in Hedemark the fear of a Swedish incursion prompted Colonel Henrik Bielke to organize defensive levies and to construct road barricades that were covered with snow and soaked with water so that they might freeze into solid walls of ice, very much akin to the exotic ice fortifications described by Olaus Magnus in his Historia. In March the Norwegians adopted a more offensive stance and began to make preparations for an operation against Värmland. On 12 March Hannibal Sehested summoned the herredsfoged of Hedemark to Moss, where they were to discuss a possible military expedition with Kjeld Stub. The bailiffs were receptive to Sehested’s plans and returned to their districts to recruit capable peasants and to organize the provisioning of the expeditionary force. The Crown sent supplies of arms and ammunition from Glückstad and the Netherlands, while Sehested himself

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1652 Munthe 1901, 63.
1653 Gyllenius 1882, 85.
1654 Ibid., 85.
1655 Ibid., 85–86.
1656 Ibid., 86.
1657 Vessberg 1900, 15–16; Olaus Magnus 2010, 518.
Sehested’s military preparations raised enough concerns in Stockholm that the riksråd saw fit to expand the mobilization of peasant levies as far east as Södermanland. On 29 March the riksråd instructed the landshövding Hans Rotkirch to “commandeer commonalty” for the defence of the Södermanland län and its manorial estates. In the city of Norrköping in Östergötland the burghers and the labourers at Louis De Geer’s brass factory were all ordered to assume watch duties at the city walls and gates. This order was repealed in July, when the imminent Norwegian threat appeared to have passed.

Sehested assembled at Magnora a mixed force of recruited professionals, conscripts, and levied peasants, altogether some 2,000 men. The Swedes had blocked the road leading to the Morast sconce with barricades, but these were cast aside by Sehested, who reached Morast on 10 April. The Norwegians were allegedly guided by a Swedish soldier, who had defected to Norway from the Hällefors silver-mine and who was later captured by Olof Stake and hanged for his treason. One Norwegian party headed to Skillingsmark, where its members plundered some farmsteads until they either retreated willingly or were driven away by the Swedes. There is some confusion in the sources regarding the nature of the possible Swedish counter-attack at Skillingsmark. The actual event is only recorded by Niels Slange, who was not a contemporaneous eyewitness. The Riksregistratur does, however, contain instructions to Olof Stake from 29 April, when the government responded to Stake’s earlier news from 12 April about the Danish invasion and instructed him to assemble a force of levied peasants and recruited dragoons to repulse the Danish invaders. According to the eighteenth-century chronicler Slange (as quoted by Vessberg), only every twelth Swedish uppbåd-peasant carried a musket; the rest were armed with fowling pieces, axes, and spears. Meanwhile the main force under Sehested’s personal command threatened the Morast sconce, but returned to Norway already on 11 April after Christian IV summoned Sehested to Bohus with all available forces.

Hannibal Sehested’s retreat did not much alleviate Olof Stake’s concern for the security of Skillingsmark and the Morast sconce. Stake had local peasants maintain watch over Morast until mid-July, when they were released home so that they could partake in the hay-making. The Norwegian reconquest of Häradalen raised alarm among the general population in the nearby Swedish province of Hälsingland. In June the commonalty appealed to their landshövding Johan Berndes that he might try and convince the government to relocate the Säter mint-works and its workers to a more secure location at Avesta in Dalarna. On 13 July the riksråd had received a letter from Stake, who had warned the government that the enemy was mustering

1658 Vessberg 1900, 16.
1659 SRA RR, B222, 29 March 1644.
1660 HH, xxix, 490–491, 6 July 1644, the riksråd to the magistrates of Norrköping.
1661 Munthe 1901, 30–31; Vessberg 1900, 16.
1662 Vessberg 1900, 16.
1663 SRA RR, B222, 29 April 1644.
1664 Vessberg 1900, 16.
1665 Munthe 1901, 31.
“2,000 footsoldiers and a few hundred horsemen” near Magnoraby in preparation for an invasion. Stake therefore requested “the good assistance of some folk from Bergslagen” in case the levied peasants guarding the border could not resist the enemy. The government assured Stake that the rumours about two thousand enemy troops were hyperbole and that the existing enemy troops only consisted of peasants and “hastily assembled parties.” Because the Swedish peasants had time and again proved that they were more eager to fight for their country than their Norwegian peers, the government had no doubt that Stake could keep the enemy from crossing the border “so that he will be consumed by hunger in his own land.”

The Norwegian force in fact consisted of the 1,100 strong Akerhus Regiment, which was augmented by 400–500 levied peasants. Lieutenant Colonel Georg Reichwein, the commander of the regiment, was not yet ready to invade Värmland but instead settled to build a new sconce by the Magnora Creek. Reichwein then used this sconce as a base of operations for small raiding parties that achieved little apart from taking a few Swedish prisoners. Stake, however, was concerned over these activities to the extent that in late September he organized a military expedition against the sconce. This expeditionary force, which consisted of two cavalry companies, stormed the sconce on 21 September and either killed, captured, or routed the 70 Norwegians defending it. Around the same time another Swedish cavalry company under Ivar Bagge demolished two Norwegian sconces on the opposite side the border from Skillingsmark. Gyllenius reported that altogether some 150 Norwegians were slain in these actions, which estimate was not based on Gyllenius’s own eyewitness testimony and may have been exaggeration. Gyllenius appears more reliable when he reports that the Swedes captured fourteen Norwegian soldiers, a regimental clerk, a sergeant, a lieutenant, and even a captain. Gyllenius saw these prisoners with his own eyes, as they were first brought to Karlstad, after which they were transported to Stockholm.

On 17 May the provisional landshövding Strijk wrote a letter to the government informing it that a force of 800 Norwegians, including many such soldiers who had fled Jämtland in the winter, had crossed the border along two routes of advance. The enemy was poised to overrun the Swedish garrisons in Jämtland and to continue his advance into Hälsingland. At this point the only regular forces available for Jämtland’s defence were two companies of infantry. The government reacted to the danger by hastily dispatching to Jämtland two thousand troops from Arvid Forbus’s infantry regiment. These troops were to be reinforced by conscripts and levied peasants from Västernorrland. Peter Kruse received orders to raise a few thousand Dalecarlians and to flank the enemy via Härjedalen. Frans Crusebjörn, the landshövding of Västerbotten (and the son of Peter Kruse) was ordered to mobilize

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1667 SRA RR, B223, 16 July 1644.
1668 Munthe 1901, 61.
1669 Ibid., 62.
1670 Gyllenius 1882, 91.
1671 SRA RR, B222, 18 May 1644.
1672 SRA RR, B222, 24 May 1644.
1673 SRA RR, B222, 23 May 1644.
1674 SRA RR, B222, 23 May 1644; SRRP, x, 535, 24 May 1644.
all available soldiers in his province and to march them to Hudiksvall, where they
would receive further orders from Major Lars Persson, the Swedish underkommendant
in Jämtland. Similar instructions were sent to Major Jacob Williamson, who was
ordered to raise 200 fighting men in Medelpad and send them to Jämtland. All the landshövdingar, bailiffs, and lawspeakers in the frontier districts were also
instructed to employ the commonalty in watch duties. Kruse reported to Oxenstierna
in June that the peasants in his district were unwilling to take part in any expedition
into Jämtland or Härjedalen on account of their own impoverished condition and the
“great hunger” that was rumoured to prevail in Härjedalen. Meanwhile Kruse had
some of the more “obstinate and rebellious fellows” put to irons. In the end there
was little need to send Dalecarlian peasants into desolate Härjedalen, as the military
initiative had by June switched to the Norwegians.

The Norwegian invasion was spearheaded by Major Christen Rasmussen and his
company of 359 Jämtlanders, who advanced towards Frösön in order to sever Swedish
lines of communication between Jämtland and Västernorrland. On 31 May this force
took the Mörsil sconce, which had been garrisoned by 100 Swedes. According to local
tradition, it was the local Jämtlander peasants who devised the capture of the scone.
The peasants invited 50 of the Swedes to their village, where they were to be entertained
with food and drink. The invitation was a trap, as Rasmussen’s troops awaited for the
Swedes in the woods surrounding the village. Once the Swedes reached the village,
the peasants signalled Rasmussen to launch his ambush. All the Swedes were killed,
including their commander Captain Olof Svensson. One Swede allegedly attempted
to hide in a chimney, but was discovered and stabbed to death. After this the Danes
stormed the scone and killed most of the remaining Swedes in their beds. According
to an alternative version the Swedes were first captured and only later executed in
Als.

The veracity of these stories cannot be confirmed, but the stories themselves
nevertheless hint of simmering local animosity towards the Swedish occupiers and of
the Jämtlanders’ readiness to co-operate with Norwegian troops.

After the fall of Mörsil, nothing stood between the Norwegians and Frösön, a
fortified island in the Lake Storsjön. The Frösön sconce was furnished with supplies
for at least six months, perhaps even a year. Colonel Strijk, who had in vain called
for relief forces to lift the siege of Frösön, abandoned the Swedish position already in
early August. The final blow to Strijk’s hopes had been the failed relief attempt in late
June by Major Lars Persson and his hastily mustered force of reluctant and desertion-
prone peasants from Västerbotten. Persson’s relief expedition had only made it to the
Gållo Sound, when they were stopped by Norwegian cavalry led by Captain Hans
Mutchas. After making terms with the Norwegians, Strijk and his men left the Frösön
scone and retreated to another scone at Borgsjö.

After his failure to lift the siege of Frösön, Persson received instructions to construct
a new scone at Gimän; if this would prove difficult to do, Persson and his troops

1675 SRA RR, B222, 24 May 1644.
1676 Ibid.
1677 SRRP, x, 536, 24 May 1644.
1678 RAOSB, ii: 11, 219–220, 30 June 1644, Peter Kruse to Axel Oxenstierna.
1679 Bergström 2001, 19–20; Mörsil Hembygdsförening: http://www.hembygd.se/morsil/historia/morsils-
gastabud/.
1680 Bergström 2001, 20–21; Boeckler 1679, 192.
were to retreat to Borgsjö, the defences of which were to be further strengthened by
the construction of “Russian stockades.”

Persson chose the latter course of action
and retreated to Borgsjö, where he was soon joined by Strijk and the remains of the
Frösön garrison. The Västerbotten peasants, whose military performance at Gällö had
been unsatisfactory, were put to better use as a labour force in the improvement of
Borgsjö’s fortifications.

Borgsjö effectively became a forward operations base for Swedish borderguards. There was
good reason for such duty, as already in July the Norwegians had crossed the
border and plundered and burned several farmsteads in the Hafverö härrad.

A similar raid was made in early August against the Liden and Indals districts near
Sundsvall. The enemy incursions encouraged the Swedes to reinforce their border
watches. After the July raid, the Swedes sent sixty musketeers from Borgsjö to guard
the pass leading from Jämtland to the Ljungan valley. In August the government
sent 50 newly-raised cavalrymen to Persson’s assistance in Jämtland, while another
50 were kept in Sweden as a reserve force. The government also advised the frontier
districts to maintain one man from each house in preparedness to meet any serious
enemy incursion over the border. The overall military situation improved at the end
of August, when both the Västerbotten and the Hälsinge regiments, which in the
summer had taken part in the naval expedition to Scania, were recalled and deployed
to guard the northern frontiers.

The plans for a Dalecarlian military expedition into
Härjedalen and Jämtland was abandoned in July. Johan Berndes had suggested quite
rightly in the riksråd’s discussions that the distance between Falun and Jämtland was
too long, and that the Dalecarlians were likely to lose their military cohesion on such
a taxing journey.

By the end of August, the Danish reconquest of Jämtland had become a fait
accompli. The Swedes possessed neither the necessary forces nor the inclination to
undertake yet another expedition into Jämtland, particularly now that the Danes
had reinforced their defences there. Christen Rasmussen was given the command of
the Frösön sconce, which he held with one infantry company and several cannons.
The existing sconce outside Trondheim was strengthened with a new block house,
and the two infantry companies in Trondheim were maintained in constant military
preparedness and furnished with new weapons. The peasants of Bratsberg outside
Trondheim were ordered to maintain watches and to carry out regular exercises on
pain of punishment.

The Norwegians made military preparations even in the arctic
province of Helgeland, where they employed a number of officers to lead and train
the local militiamen.

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1681 SRA RR, B222, 30 June 1644; SRA RR, B223, 11 July 1644; SRRP, x, 565, 12 July 1644.
1683 Munthe 1901, 65.
1684 Ibid., 66–67.
1685 SRRP, x, 567, 13 July 1644.
1686 NRR 1641–1648, 328, 3 June 1644.
1687 Munthe 1901, 67.
6.4 WARFARE ALONG THE GÖTA RIVER

The Norwegian reconquest of Jämtland coincided with Hannibal Sehested’s military expedition into the Älvsborg län. Sehested’s expedition was part of the larger military campaign that had been underway since April, after Christian IV’s naval expedition to the Göta estuary. Christian IV had intended to blockade Gothenburg from the sea, while Sehested was supposed to besiege the city from inland. Sehested’s southern offensive was not therefore subordinated to the reconquest of Jämtland, which on the contrary had been co-ordinated to take place simultaneously with the larger offensive in the south.

Norwegians went into the offensive on 10 April, when a raiding party from Bohus moved up the Göta River and plundered the town of Gamla Lödöse and its surrounding districts on the right bank of the Göta River. The invading Norwegians also distributed yet another troublesome propaganda pamphlet that implored the local commonalty to submit to Danish military authority on the grounds that, by starting the war, the Swedish regency had violated established laws and acted against the interests of the Swedish Estates. Some Västergötlander peasants seem to have been persuaded by this narrative, as Mannersköld later reported that certain peasants had visited Bohus and delivered contributions to the Danish King. It is known from the correspondence of Christian IV that peasants from the Ale härad had paid “Brandskat” to the Danish King in return for royal protection against any military excesses. The riksråd advised Mannersköld that, while such collaborators should be punished in order to make an example of them, no such step should be taken without careful investigation. The peasants’ receptive attitude towards the Danes may have been partly explained by the Swedish military authorities’ unhurried response to enemy incursions. The government indeed regarded the peasants partly responsible for their own woes; the cross-border raids could have been thwarted if the peasants themselves had taken more active role in the defence of their homesteads, the riksråd argued.

Mannersköld did not in early April yet possess the necessary military resources to resist Norwegian incursions into the Göta valley, and even after he received reinforcements from Fredrik Stenbock, these were used to man the fortified positions in and around Gothenburg. In this spirit the Swedes began to strengthen Vänersborg’s defences with palisades and block houses. On 20 April Mannersköld felt strong enough to conduct a raid against Hisingen with 1,200 men, but the attack was repulsed by the Norwegians. Mannersköld’s position became even more precarious five days later, when Sehested’s contingent of some 1,400 men arrived in Hisingen from Magnora.

Christian IV had wished that Hannibal Sehested would go on the offensive as soon as he reached Hisingen, but Sehested declined to commence any major operations until such time that the native regiments under his command had achieved satisfactory unit

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1688 Vessberg 1900, 18.
1689 NRR 1641–1648, 320, 20 April 1644.
1689 SRA RR, B222, 27 April 1644.
1689 SRA RR, B222, 22 April 1644.
1692 Munthe 1901, 49.
1693 Vessberg 1900, 19.
cohesion and the recruited reinforcements, mostly cavalry and dragoons, had arrived on the theatre of war. Therefore Sehested settled to conduct patrols along the Göta River and to maintain border watches for the remainder of May. At the very end of May, Sehested began to send small raiding parties over the border. The parties engaged mostly in the extortion of fire-ransoms, but their presence nevertheless induced Mannerskiöld to enforce the frontier garrisons with regular troops and levied peasants. The riksråd also dispatched the royal underjägmästaren Henrik Persson and his “ryttare” to Vänernsborg’s defence. As has been already shown, Persson’s superior, riksjägmästaren Carl Hård, had been instructed to form a dragoon contingent from gamekeepers, poachers, and other professional sharpshooters. It is likely that Persson, in his capacity as the underjägmästaren, would have commanded these very same troops. If that was indeed the case, then these nearest Swedish equivalents to Scanian snapphanar were not employed in guerrilla or even mobile warfare but as garrison troops in a fortified town. The responsibility for offensive warfare was left to the newly-formed armée volante, which was expected to capture Marstrand and blockade Bohus.

By June the troops under Sehested’s command in Hisingen and Bohus had reached the strength of 1,700 men, 400 of which were cavalry and another 400 dragoons. The remaining infantry contingent consisted largely of conscripted and levied peasants, as the recruited elements were at the time deployed in the Akerhus len. Whether the political pressure from Copenhagen grew too strong or the burden of maintaining military forces on Norwegian soil became too heavy, Sehested adopted a more active stance in mid-June. Norwegian raiding parties began to cross the frontier along the whole length of the Göta River. Sehested’s strategic plan was to link his Norwegian forces with the Danish troops in Halland. For this purpose he sent several parties south in an attempt to cross the Swedish-held territory outside Gothenburg. Some of these Norwegian parties were allegedly 600 men strong, but they were all nevertheless prevented from reaching Halland by Swedish contingents sent out from Gothenburg. Sehested’s forces managed to burn down the town of Gamla Lödöse and to destroy two sconces outside Vännersborg, but otherwise Sehested failed to meet his strategic goal, the conjunction of Norwegians and Danish garrisons in Halland. Mannerskiöld had wanted the Norwegian raids to be avenged (“vindiceras”) by torching the town of Kungsbacka, but the government refused to authorize such an act.

Hannibal Sehested’s operations along the Göta valley created organizational challenges for the Swedes. On 29 June Mannerskiöld had requested reinforcements, particularly cavalry, which might better help him to protect the border against any incursions from Danish-held Varberg. The government had recognized the need for further troops in Västergötland and was already planning to raise the Västergötland

1094 Munthe 1901, 48.
1095 SRA RR, B222, 3 June 1644.
1096 SRA RR, B219, 31 December 1643.
1097 Munthe 1901, 50–51.
1098 Ibid., 51–52.
1099 SRA RR, B222, 29 June 1644.
1700 Ibid.
troop strength to 1,504 cavalry and 2,502 infantry. These planned reinforcements included Wittenberg’s Finnish cavalry companies, which were in fact redirected to Gustaf Horn in Scania as soon as they arrived in Västergötland (even though Horn still waited for them on 18 September). Another sizeable reinforcement was the Upplander cavalry regiment, which Colonel Johan Wrangel was projected to muster at Örebro on 12 July. This cavalry regiment, of which 500 men were destined for Sweden while the remaining 800 riders were kept in Germany, should not be confused with the Uppland land regiment, which was an infantry regiment of some 1,000 men in Sweden and commanded by Gabriel Kyhle.

Raising conscripts and mustering professional troops took time, which the embattled Swedish garrisons in Västergötland did not have in abundance. The quickest way to conjure up reinforcements was to resort to the bergsknektar or the Bergslagen mining zone militia. As we may recall, the riksråd had already decided to raise a regiment of Bergslagen militiamen on 15 June, when it had planned to send half of them to Kalmar and half to Vänersborg. Eleven days later the riksråd decided to deploy the entire regiment of 600 militiamen for Västergötland’s defence. Colonel Wolmar Yxkull and Major Peter Margall were to lead the militiamen to Gothenburg, where they would receive further military training; this arrangement would release trained troops from the Gothenburg garrison to other duties elsewhere in Västergötland.

The mining zone militiamen, however, were not quite as untrained as fresh conscripts or levied peasants. The mining-province of Dalarna had contracted out national conscription in 1621. The Dalecarlians had promised to Gustaf Adolf that they would from thereon maintain a standing force of 1,400 foot in return for exemption from utskrivning. Typically four peasants maintained between them one soldier, who was provided with food, clothing, and an annual salary of fifteen silver coins. In some of the more impoverished districts the responsibility for maintaining a soldier was spread out to six peasants. In return for their upkeep the soldiers would provide labour for the peasants. This system was known as knektehåll or “soldier-maintenance.” In one of its manifestations the mining town of Piteå maintained from 1640 onwards its own force of bergsknektar, who worked in the local silver-mine in return for upkeep by the mining community. In 1649, the practice of knektehåll was adopted in Västerbotten as well.

Because the bergsknektar were not potential conscripts but instead constituted a standing force, they were expected to enter active duty with some existing military skills. The bergsknektar were expected to be drilled regularly by professional soldiers, although the repeated requests for proficient officers to lead, train, and oversee the musters of bergsknektar, such as the one dispatched by Johan Berndes to the
kriegskollegium on 25 June 1644, suggest that their training and supervision was more infrequent and superficial than what the local landshövdingar would have preferred. Sketchy military training was still better than no military training at all, which is why the bergsknektar could be sent to battle in a more precipitated manner than untrained conscripts or levied peasants. The two military emergencies of 1644, the Norwegian reconquest of Jämtland and Hannibal Sehested’s move against Västergötland, both saw the bergsknektar being hurried to the theatre of war in tandem with the active recruited formations. While the bergsknektar could be levied with little delay, their mobilization nevertheless included certain economic factors that could not be overlooked. The riksråd expressed this economic concern very clearly in one of its meetings in early 1645, when it instructed Carl Bonde and Johan Berndes to move companies of bergsknektar to the theatre of war but in such a manner and timetable that the important mining work would not be unnecessarily jeopardized.

Some of the reinforcements sent to Västergötland were incorporated into Lars Kagg’s armée volante that was starting to move from purely defensive duties to more offensive activities, although these were still viewed by the riksråd as operations for “provinciens defension.” On 1 August Kagg finally invaded Hisingen with his armée volante of 2,000 cavalry and foot. The several hundred Norwegians and Danes on Hisingen were routed by Kagg and forced to seek protection behind the walls of Bohus. Sehested’s troops evacuated Hisingen in such a hurry that they left behind pistols, muskets, and cannons. Some hundred Danes were slain in the battle, and a few scores were taken prisoner. Three days later Mannerskiöld crossed the Göta River and took Lärje. The Danes counterattacked with some dragoons, but these were repulsed by the Swedes.

It was around this time that Lars Kagg fell seriously ill and had to relinquish the command of his armée volante, which left a void to be filled in the “Directorium” of “Västergötländs defension.” The Swedish situation in Västergötland and Älvsborg was nevertheless starting to look much better in August 1644. Kagg’s offensive had driven Sehested’s forces out of Hisingen and confined them to Bohus. On 1 August the Dutch auxiliary fleet of eighteen ships arrived in Gothenburg, carrying with it the 700 German recruits that had been taken aboard in Ribe some weeks earlier. Fredrik Stenbock and Per Lillie were, under Per Brahe’s supervision, vested with the responsibility of watching the border of Halland and the frontier between Gothenburg and Vänersborg. For this purpose, the riksråd instructed Lillie to try and recruit locally an additional company of dragoons to augment his contingent of 400 cavalry and foot. Lillie was also instructed to construct additional sconces at Vänersborg, where some of the escaped burghers were now returning to rebuild their damaged houses.

1710 KrA 0001/E c/11 (1644), fol. 1021, 25 June 1644, Johan Berndes to the kriegskollegium.
1711 SRRP, xi, 5, 3 February 1645.
1712 SRA RR, B223, 27 July 1644.
1713 Vessberg 1900, 24.
1714 SRA RR, B223, 14 August 1644.
1715 Vessberg 1900, 24.
1716 SRA RR, B223, 18 September 1644.
1717 SRA RR, B223, 24 August 1644.
6.5 WAR COMES TO SWEDEN

The Swedes spent much of September 1644 consolidating their position along the Göta River and trying to contain the two Danish salients there, the forts of Bohus and Varberg. Mannersköld had been ready to assault the former place, but the government settled in building a sconce at Skårdal in order to simply blockade Bohus. Varberg was to be cordoned off by Lieutenant Colonel Börje Nilsson and his cavalry squadron, which now included a company of newly-raised Västergötlander riders. Mannersköld’s forces included bergsknekter, who were beginning to grow restive this close to the end of the campaign season. Mannersköld had informed the government on 25 September that the bergsknekter were slipping away from their garrisons seven or eight men at a time, and that the remaining militiamen assembled on their own into company-sized groups to demand “demission” from military service, as their respective landshövdingar Carl Bonde and Johan Berndes had allegedly promised to send them home after three months of service. The riksråd was unsympathetic towards Mannersköld, whose request for further instructions it found peculiar and redundant. The riksråd simply reminded Mannersköld of the existence of “krigsartiklarna”, whose regulations all soldiers, including bergsknekter, were expected to follow. That same day, on 2 October, the riksråd also wrote to Wolmar Yxkull and instructed him to keep good order and strict discipline among his bergsknekter. In terms of military discipline, the bergsknekter were evidently likened to regular soldiers.

The timing of these disturbances among the bergsknekter was unfortunate, as Hannibal Sehested once again went into the offensive in October 1644. Over the course of September and October, Sehested assembled near the Värmland border a significant military force that included the statholder’s own Livregiment, the Akerhus Regiment, and the Tønsberg Regiment, all in all some 3,600 foot, 480 cavalry, and 400 recruited dragoons. For once the Swedes had somewhat underestimated the enemy’s strength, as Mannersköld had reported to the riksråd in late October that Sehested had mustered 4,000 troops near the Västergötland border. The commander of Gothenburg naturally feared that the enemy was going to move south against Västergötland instead of advancing east towards Värmland. Fretting over the possibility of yet another invasion, Mannersköld commissioned Börje Nilsson and his cavalry company to organize and lead an uppbåd-levy that might offer resistance to the enemy. He also dispatched Colonel Johan Wrangel with two cavalry companies to keep the Gothenburg-Laholm road open and to act as a reaction force if the enemy should attempt to invade Västergötland. Now that Fredrik Stenbock was in Halland, Mannersköld himself assumed operational command of Västergötland’s defences. Meanwhile the Swedish military presence was becoming something of a burden in certain parts of Värmland. Gyllenius wrote in his diary on 1 October how every rural village in the Köla district was billeted with “ryttere” to the extent that itinerant

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1718 SRA RR, B223, 20 September 1644.
1719 SRA RR, B223, 27 September 1644.
1720 Ibid.
1721 Ibid.
1722 SNFSH, iii, 112, 21 February 1645.
1723 SRA RR, B224, 30 October 1644.
students such as Gyllenius himself “could not find much from the peasants.” These circumstances were unfortunate for itinerant clerical students, who were expected to travel from one parish to another, collecting their upkeep en route from the local peasants as a form of alms.

On 2 October Gyllenius and his companions left Köla for Eda parish, where they hoped to find better upkeep. On their way there the students could hear human voices and the sound of drums in the wilderness. This noise was produced by Norwegian troops who had left their sconces further up the Magnora Creek and who were now on their way to Skillingsmark and the Eda district. Soon after Gyllenius and his companions had passed through the villages of Långeland and Tälle, a Norwegian party attacked the villages and robbed whatever they could find there, “though they [the villagers] had hid most of their belongings in the forest, and there were very few people at home, except for two old housewives.” After looting the villages the Norwegians set them on fire. A few days later Gyllenius stayed at a vicarage outside Köla. Outside the vicarage stood a “strong watch of peasants and old soldiers.”

On the night of 5 October one of the guards accidentally discharged his musket, which caused everyone to grab their weapons and run outside to meet an expected Norwegian attack. The next morning Gyllenius left the vicarage for the Morast sconce, which he reached on 7 October. During another visit a few days earlier Gyllenius had described the sconce as being “well fortified with a block house, walls and round escarpments” and garrisoned by peasants from the Östersyssel tionderäkenskap (tithe district). While Gyllenius was there, the sconce was visited by a Danish herald, who was escorted to the sconce blindfolded so that he could not view the defensive works or estimate the size of the garrison. What the Danish herald and the Swedish commander Per Bondeson discussed, Gyllenius does not tell us. Later that same day Gyllenius and his companions left the sconce and made their way to Karlstad via Dal.

In Dal the Norwegians spread leaflets that promised safety to those peasants who paid brandskatter to the Norwegians. Those who refused were threatened with fire and steel. Olof Stake had intended to visit Dal in order to make sure that the peasants would not be persuaded into paying contributions to the enemy, but the appearing of the rest of the Norwegian army in November induced him to stay put. Sehested went straight for the main Swedish position along the Magnora Creek, the Morast sconce, which he took on 18 November without bloodshed after Bondeson surrendered to the numerically overwhelmingly superior Norwegians. The levied peasants had allegedly all fled at the sight of the enemy force, and the officers were taken prisoner. The following day the Norwegians conducted a raid into the Eda parish district, where they robbed a few cottages and the church itself, carrying its bells into the sconce as booty.

The unexpected size of Sehested’s forces, their precipitous advance, and the sudden defeat of the Morast sconce all shocked the Swedish authorities. Melchior

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1724 Gyllenius 1882, 91–92.
1725 Ibid., 93.
1726 Gyllenius 1882, 93.
1727 Vessberg 1900, 28.
1728 Gyllenius 1882, 94.
1729 SRA Strödda handlingar Danska kriget 1643-1645 RA/754/2/M 1291, anno 1645, kort relation om Morast skantz evröfrande.
von Falkenberg, the former landshövding of Åbo län in Finland, expressed to Lars Kagg his opinion that Per Bondeson should have been able to hold on to the sconce with the military resources at his disposal - he had, after all, received considerable contributions from the local peasants and had promised to use these resources to garrison the sconce with sufficient numbers of levied peasants. This promise, Falkenberg accused, Bondeson had failed to keep. “That is why the sconce was stripped of manpower and consequently surrendered itself to enemy hands.” How exactly the few hundred Swedish defenders could have resisted an enemy force that Falkenberg himself estimated to have reached the strength of 4,000 foot and 900 cavalry, he did not explain to Kagg.1730

The Norwegian invasion generated excited correspondence between Stockholm and the military authorities in the provinces. On 23 November Olof Stake had written to the riksråd and asked for regular troops to reinforce his levied peasants. The riksråd promised to send him one cavalry company; the government also ordered extra supplies of ammunition via the krigskollegium.1731 In early December the Swedes began to muster troops at Örebro, drawing in whatever forces were available in Örebro, Västmanland, Uppsala, and Östergötland.1732 These regular forces did not appear sufficiently strong to oppose the sizeable Norwegian invasion force, for which reason the riksråd wanted to augment them with less regular contingents. One obvious source of reinforcements was the Bergslagen mining zone, where the bergmästare Harald Olofsson was instructed to muster as many bergsknektar as possible for Olof Stake’s aid.1733 All able-bodied men in Värmland were liable for some kind of military service. Even the unbellicose student Petrus Gyllenius found himself standing in watch at Östersyssel in the Eda district.1734

Harald Olofsson, Carl Bonde, and Frans Crusebjörn were also ordered to levy as many Finns as they could find in their respective provinces in Bergslagen and Västerbotten.1735 These instructions meant those “Forest Finns” who had been immigrating to central and northern Sweden since the reigns of Charles IX and Gustaf Adolf. This immigration had continued right up to 1640, and it had brought some 13,000–15,000 Finns to Sweden. The authorities had originally encouraged the immigration, as the Finnish settlers generally cultivated marginal lands in the moraine uplands.1736 The Finnish immigrants had soon made themselves unwelcome and indeed odious thanks to their wasteful form of burn-beat cultivation, excessive hunting, and depletion of woodlands. From 1636 onwards the authorities had taken brusque action against any vagrant Finns, often burning their forest huts in order to compel them to migrate back to Finland. More troublesome Finns were often incarcerated, after which they faced the choice between forced labour in Sweden or deportation to the

1730 SRA Strödda handlingar Danska kriget 1643-1645 RA/754/2/M 1291, 23 January 1645, Melchior von Falkenberg to Lars Kagg.
1731 SRA RR, B224, 3 December 1644.
1732 Vessberg 1900, 29.
1733 SRA RR, B224, 25 December 1644.
1734 Gyllenius 1882, 94.
1735 SRA RR, B224, 14 December 1644; SRA RR, B224, 28 December 1644.
1736 Roberts 1958, 16–17.
Nya Sverige colony in modern-day Delaware. The government missive to Harald Olofsson from January 1644 suggests that the Forest Finns were not the first choice for military manpower. In January the riksråd had instructed Olofsson to levy vagrant Finns in preparation for an all-out enemy invasion and for that purpose only; now that the feared Norwegian invasion had become reality, Stockholm was ready to scrape the bottom of the barrel and send even Finnish vagabonds into the action.

On 19 December, as Gyllenius reported, the Norwegians emerged from the Morast sconce and struck camp at Hammar in the Eda district. Gyllenius claimed that Sehested had under his command 14,000 men, which was gross exaggeration. In reality the Norwegian invasion force in Värmland consisted of 500 cavalry, 736 dragoons, and 2,825 foot. Opposite the Norwegian camp, in a bottleneck-like sound at the southern end of the Lake Bysjön, were the Swedes, who were composed of “peasants and cavalry, as well as a few hundred Finns.” The exact size of the Swedish force is difficult to quantify, but Munthe estimated that they consisted of two or three cavalry companies and two thousand or so bergsknektar, armed peasants, and impressed Finns. The Swedes had cut a chasm in the ice, which prevented the Norwegians from crossing the lake and proceeding further south. Norwegian skirmishers and Swedish cavalry nevertheless ventured on to the frozen lake to exchange fire with each other, “and a few people on both sides were shot.”

Three days later the chasm had once again frozen, which enabled the Norwegians to go into the offensive. Early morning on 22 December, when the Swedes had barely finished their Sunday services, the entire Norwegian army marched on the frozen Lake Bysjön and began to bombard the Swedes with their cannons. The main Swedish battle line on the frozen lake was maintained by levied peasants, who withstood the enemy artillery with remarkable firmness, as both Gyllenius and the archived manuscript Kort Relation testify. The Swedish cavalry and some of the Finns were hidden in the woods on the west bank, behind a large rocky outcrop. The battle between the Norwegian army and the Swedish uppbåd-peasants was essentially a firefight, in which the Swedes finally ran out of ammunition. Gyllenius reported how the militiamen from Karlstad were forced to strip the buttons off their shirts and use them as bullets. When the Norwegians observed that the Swedes were running out of ammunition, they concentrated their attack on the west bank, which they apparently regarded weakly defended. There they ran into the Swedish cavalry and Finns, who resisted the Norwegian attacks well into the evening, when they too began to run out of ammunition. When the Swedish commander on the west bank was severely

1737 Odhner 1865, 200.
1738 SRA RR, B222, 23 January 1644.
1739 Gyllenius 1882, 94.
1740 Munthe 1901, 71–73.
1741 Gyllenius 1882, 94.
1742 Munthe 1901, 74.
1743 Gyllenius 1882, 94–95.
1744 SRA Strödda handlingar Danska kriget 1643-1645 RA/754/2/M 1291, anno 1645, kort relation om Morast skantz evröfrande; Gyllenius 1882, 95.
1745 Gyllenius 1882, 95.
1746 Ibid., 95.
wounded, the Swedish line started to falter and the peasants began to flee from the battle.\textsuperscript{1747} The battle at the Lake Bysjön ended in a Swedish defeat. Gyllenius presented the casualty figures as 300 Norwegian and 30 Swedish dead.\textsuperscript{1748} Munthe thought that of these two figures “the former is probably somewhat too high and the latter surely much too low.”\textsuperscript{1749} Vessberg regarded the battle at Bysjön the “most significant event of the war in these parts.” The defeat certainly created grave concerns on the Swedish side, as it was feared that Sehested might continue his advance further east into the Swedish heartlands.\textsuperscript{1750}

6.6 PROBLEMS WITH PEASANTS

Immediately after the victorious battle Hannibal Sehested resupplied his troops with provisions from the Magnora sconce. In the days that followed, the Norwegians extended their foraging operations to the Köla, Nordmark, and Silbodal districts. There even existed an unsubstantiated Swedish fear that the Norwegians might be only a mile away from Karlstad.\textsuperscript{1751} While the road appeared open to Karlstad and even beyond it, Sehested’s forces remained too small for a full-blown military expedition into the Swedish interior. Therefore he had to concentrate his efforts against Dal, which was now threatened by the Danes from the north, south, and west.

In early January 1645 Sehested reported to Christian IV and Admiral Ove Gedde the disposition of his army in Dal. Lieutenant Colonel Charles van Dick held the Morast sconce with six companies of infantry and a squadron of dragoons. The armoury of the sconce had been reinforced with 600 snaphance muskets.\textsuperscript{1752} From Morast the Norwegians conducted raids into Fryksdalen and sought to cut off any Swedish advance from the north. Lieutenant Colonel Joest Mackenzie guarded the road junction at Köpmannebro with the Aakerhus Regiment, two companies of cavalry, and a squadron of dragoons. Lieutenant Colonel Christian Fuchs was with 400 musketeers at Amål on the shore of the Lake Väner. Colonel Henrik Bielke guarded the Sillerud vicarage with 200 cavalry and four companies of foot, while the main bulk of the army was at Eda, where Sehested had 1,000 cavalry, 400 dragoons, and 1,100 foot.\textsuperscript{1753} The disposition of Sehested’s army specifies that Bielke had under his command two companies of “fyrrører” and two companies of “snaphaner”, while the Eda contingent too included 400 of the former and 300 of the latter. These terms require some further elucidation in the context of Hannibal’s War.

The former term can be traced back to mid-sixteenth century, when it was used to describe a harquebuse.\textsuperscript{1754} A German military lexicon from 1735 still gives the
Feuerrohr the same meaning of a harquebuse, although further specifying it as a “jedes kleines Beschoss,” Eberhard Wassenberg applied the term “Feur-röhren” to unmounted musketeers. In an undated letter, which can with some certainty be dated after 1640, Christian IV gave instructions about the distribution of “fyrrør” among infantry companies. The weapons were to be accompanied by a “Byssemager” whose responsibility it was to maintain them. During marches, “when there was no need to use the firrørøren”, the weapons were to be stored in wagons, apparently in order to protect them from the elements, which might corrode the barrels and firing mechanisms. With these definitions in mind, situated as they are one century before and after Hannibal’s War, it is safe to assume that Sehested used this term to describe foot soldiers armed with light harquebuses instead of heavier muskets.

The latter word, familiar as it already is from Horn’s War, requires more careful qualification in the Norwegian context. In Scania and Halland snapphanar denoted exclusively irregular combatants that waged guerrilla warfare either as individuals or in small bands but not as part of regular formations. Norway differs from this context, as snapphanar do not represent any guerrilla or irregular warfare tradition there. If the snapphanar were included in the troop disposition along with regular contingents such as musketeers and cavalry, they therefore must have operated together with or subordinated to regular troops. It is possible that at least some of the raiding parties sent out from Magnora and the Morast sconce would have consisted of such Norwegian peasant guerrillas, but the existing sources do not reveal this. There is indeed no evidence that the Norwegian peasants would have fought as guerrillas either defensively in Jämtland or offensively in Värmland and Dal. Instead it seems more likely that in the Norwegian context snapphanar indicated weapons rather than tactics, but even this association with any particular type of weapon cannot be taken too far, as we shall shortly see.

Very much like the fyrrører, the snapphanar too appear to have been differentiated by Sehested according to their typical service weapon, most likely the firelock musket. Because neither harquebuses nor firelocks were regular service weapons, it appears logical that their operators were not regular soldiers either. Sehested’s letter from 14 January 1645 indeed reveals that the “500 fresh peasant fellows” who had joined Sehested’s main army at the Feds vicarage, were distinguished from the other troops by the fact that they had been armed with “ny snaphaner.” How exactly the Norwegian snapphanar fought as part of regular formations is difficult to ascertain due to the limitations in the primary sources. Gyllenius’s account of the battle at Lake Bysjön suggests that the combat between Swedes and Norwegians was conducted as firefights, in which the infantry carried no pikes and conducted no drill-like evolutions and manoeuvres. In such scenarios, the fyrrører and snapphanar could have acted as massed bodies of fusiliers akin to the more regular musketeers or, perhaps more likely, as skirmishers in the army’s wings or as kommenderade musketeers between formations and in the ‘forlorn hopes’ ahead of the army. The Norwegian snapphanar could also act as independent contingents. On 31 January Sehested instructed Lieutenant Colonel

1755 Fäsch 1735, 294.
1756 Wassenberg 1645, 568.
1757 KCFEB 1593–1648, efterslæt, 127, 1640–1648.
1758 SNFSH, ii, 565, 14 January 1645.
1759 Roberts 1958, 219–220.
Thomas Gray to take 200 “Snaphaner” to Halden, where they would guard a pass leading to Dal. Strangely enough, Sehested ordered the *snapphanar* to take only their “siidegewehr” with them.1760

Here we must insert some etymological discussion about the two meanings of the German word *Gewehr*. As we may learn from the Grimm dictionary, *Gewehr* in the seventeenth century would designate both a firearm and a sword. *Obergewehr*, or typically the shortened *Gewehr*, would refer to a harquebuse or a musket. *Untergewehr* referred to a cold weapon of some kind, usually a sword.1761 A more established synonym for *Untergewehr* was *Seitengewehr*, in Danish form *sidegewehr*, meaning a sideweapon, or more specifically a sword.1762 This etymological interpretation is supported by the Danish primary sources. In 1612, during the Kalmar War, Christian IV issued instructions for the *landværn*, requiring the levied peasants (one from every fifth household) to appear at musters with a “Sidegewehr” and a “godt Oververge”, which requirements appear in the next sentence as a “Sidegewehr” and a “Langbøsse” (the latter word meaning a musket).1763 The King’s instructions to the town militia of Copenhagen also differentiated between *gevær* and *siitgevær*. Every militiaman was to be equipped with both “offuer- oc vnder-gevehr.”1764 The guard patrols at the bridges should consist of 2–3 musketeers and a corporal carrying a “dragen [drawn] siitgevær.”1765 Furthermore, the Dutch military manual *Kriegs-Ubung* from 1675 explicitly equated the “Seiten gewehr” with a rapier (“Degen”).1766

While the nature of the Norwegians’ “siidegewehr” as swords is thus established, the question why the *snapphanar* were ordered to be armed with swords alone remains an open one. The only conclusion we can derive from Hannibal Sehested’s instructions is that the association between *snapphanar* and firelock muskets was not some universal rule that applied to every possible situation and contingency. Even then it has to be surmised that the *snapphanar* were initially carrying muskets as well; otherwise there would have been no reason to order them to carry swords and swords alone.

The Norwegian occupation of large tracts of Dal forced them to deal with Swedish peasants in the sparsely populated province. Swedish peasant resistance hardly qualified as an insurgency. On 7 January 1645 Sehested dispatched a mixed force of cavalry, dragoons, harquebusiers, and musketeers to clear a roadblock that the Swedish peasants had constructed in the Svanskog parish. After a brief battle the Swedish peasants defending the barricade were dispersed. The destruction of the bridge at Säffle was a more significant hindrance, as it prevented the Norwegians from crossing the Byälven Strait and invading the Värmlandsnäs Peninsula, the largest one in Lake Vänern.1767

1760 SNFSH, iii, 72, 31 January 1645.
1763 Nye Danske Magazin 1806, 172.
1764 KD, v, 265, 18 March 1644.
1765 Ibid., 268.
1766 Das Dritte Buch der Kriegs-Ubung 1675, 4.
1767 Vessberg 1900, 31.
According to an established practice, Sehested subjected the Swedish peasants to contributions, which were levied under the threat of fire and sword. In late January Sehested instructed “any such provosts or priests in Dal, or even bailiffs, scribes, village leaders or anyone else who has authority over the commonalty” to organize the delivery of money contributions and provisions to Halden on the Norwegian side of the border. These acknowledged representatives were themselves to be exempted from contributions. By the end of January Sehested had collected in contributions 15,000 thalers from Värmland and 10,000 thalers from Dal. The delivery date for the first contributions was 8 February; when some of the Dal peasants had failed to submit their dues by that date, Sehested threatened them with “murder and fire” unless the outstanding contributions were delivered to Halden by 20 February. Sehested was quite ready to torch some of the more recalcitrant peasants’ cottages for the sake of setting an example, but any unauthorized robbery by Norwegian soldiers was forbidden under the pain of death. There is no evidence that Norwegians would have actively attempted to disarm the Swedish peasants; instead we have from Sehested somewhat opaque instructions to local officials and priests to make sure that the peasants “laid down their muskets.”

Hannibal Sehested was more troubled by his Norwegian peasants, who had never had much enthusiasm for military service. Their reluctance had already been quite conspicuous during the Nordic Seven Years War in 1563–1570, when the Crown had been forced to employ a combination of stick and carrot in order to induce them to enlist for the purpose of “defending the Fatherland.” During the more recent Kalmar War in 1611–1613, the Norwegian peasants had again been reluctant to participate in a war, which the peasants had considered to be a solely royal venture. Now, in early 1645, the peasants in Smaalene were once again showing signs of war-weariness and malcontent. In his letter to Christen Sehested from 28 January, Hannibal Sehested related how the Smaalene peasants had been unwilling to cross the border on account of their solidarity with their Swedish peers, even though the existing war articles explicitly stipulated that one man from each household was liable to do opbud-service at times of war. Some of the peasants had bluntly refused to serve and had indeed wished ill-fortune on Sehested’s expedition into Sweden.

When some of the more co-operative peasants had attempted to mediate between the mutinous peasants and Crown officers, the former had attacked them, and they were only saved by the intervention of the officers. Consequently Hannibal Sehested instructed Christen Sehested to identify the ringleaders of this mutiny and punish them first. A few days later Hannibal Sehested lamented how “obstinate and mutinous”
peasants had received muskets, gunpowder, and shot from the royal magazines but had then ran away without returning the armaments to the officers.\textsuperscript{1775}

In early February 1645 Sehested had summoned the restless peasants to hear the formulation of war articles and royal missives that decreed that one man from each house was liable for military service as a levied peasant. Any peasant who did not fulfil his duties meticulously would be punished in a manner that would be “remembered.”\textsuperscript{1776} While these peasant tumults in Smaalene indeed appeared serious, they were less pronounced in other parts of Norway. In the end it seems that the Norwegian peasants responded to the Crown’s call in sufficient numbers; on 16 February Sehested himself led an army of 500 musketeers and 1,200 levied peasants across the River Göta to Bohus.\textsuperscript{1777} Around the same time Sehested levied in and around the Aakerhus len another 700 men as boatmen and sailors for the navy.\textsuperscript{1778} The war placed the entire Norwegian society under heavy strain. In 1644 Sehested had introduced an extraordinary tax imposed on every peasant regardless of his form of ownership.\textsuperscript{1779} In addition to this general contribution, Sehested was forced to direct all income from domain rents, tolls, and regali\textsubscript{er} (royal monopolies) for the “Armeens Conservation.”\textsuperscript{1780} With such heavy impositions being placed on the tax-paying peasant class, it is remarkable that peasant disturbances were limited to one open ophbud-mutiny in Smaalene.

Swedish peasants too began to express their dissatisfaction towards the war and its many burdens. Writing from Karlstad, Melchior von Falkenberg had reported to Lars Kagg that “the commonalty in these areas have become quite malcontent” due to the billeting of troops and other impositions. This malcontent was of such severity that no utskrivning could be presently carried out in Dal. Falkenberg, who had been sent to Karlstad to organize conscriptions, appealed to the riksråd and the krigskollegium that if only the peasants would be allowed to remain at peace in their homes for a while, the conscriptions could be carried out in the near future.\textsuperscript{1781} The bad mood of the Dal peasants was not unrelated to the fact that their military and fiscal commitments regarding national defence were lighter than those of Värmlanders.\textsuperscript{1782} Their behaviour was in fact perfectly consistent with the observation made by Kimmo Katajala that those peasants who had most to lose through extraordinary billeting, skjustning, or borgläger were also the ones who fiercest resisted such impositions.\textsuperscript{1783}

Certain groups of peasants were usually exempted from conscription, such as those who dwelled in tax-insolvent (öde) farms.\textsuperscript{1784} Another exempted group were the försvarelseskarlar, who lived within a frihetsmil from a manorial estate and who

\textsuperscript{1775} SNFSH, iii, 70, 30 January 1645; SNFSH, iii, 77, 2 February 1645.
\textsuperscript{1776} SNFSH, iii, 78, 2 February 1645.
\textsuperscript{1777} SNFSH, iii, 95, 16 February 1645.
\textsuperscript{1778} NRR 1641–1648, 339, 16 February 1645.
\textsuperscript{1779} Rian 2000b, 215.
\textsuperscript{1780} NRR 1641–1648, 341, 30 March 1645.
\textsuperscript{1781} SRA Strödda handlingar Danska kriget 1643-1645 RA/754/2/M 1291, 23 January 1645, Melchior von Falkenberg to Lars Kagg.
\textsuperscript{1782} Vessberg 1900, 34.
\textsuperscript{1783} Katajala 2004c, 265–266.
\textsuperscript{1784} Villstrand 2011, 158–159.
usually worked there as farmhands, millers, and such. By early February 1645 even their conscription had become reality. The reason for this was the near-exhaustion of all other sources of manpower. *Utskrifningar* had been carried out in every Swedish province except Dal and Värmland, where they could not be carried out due to enemy occupation.1785 During the winter months the government had granted a pardon to all deserters on the condition that they returned to the army’s ranks. In November 1644 this pardon was extended to May 1645.1786 The largest remaining sources of native conscripts were the *försvarelsekarlar*, and even their numbers seemed low. “Whatever *försvarelsekarlar* can be acquired, only time will tell”, Lars Kagg pondered. “I doubt there will be many that can be accounted for”, he continued.1787 Those *försvarelsekarlar* who were conscripted were all taken into the “Guardie” or the recruited contingents. Kagg had repeatedly complained that this practice weakened the native land regiments, but the *riksråd* had justified its decision on the grounds that otherwise the *försvarelsekarlar*, who did not hail from any fixed rotas, were more likely to desert.1788 There was some truth behind this assertion, as Kagg himself later observed that out of every forty eligible *försvarelsekarlar* only ten would show up in the musters, and the remaining thirty would have to be searched far and wide all the way to the “land’s end.”1789

### 6.7 THE END OF HANNIBAL’S WAR

After the defeat at Lake Bysjön, the Swedes began to send more troops to Dal to stem the Norwegian advance. Gabriel Oxenstierna had reached Finnskogen in northern Värmland by 7 January with 600 Uppland riders, but the government instructed him to maintain his troops in a defensive stance.1790 Harald Olofsson received orders to muster available troops in Finnmarken and Dalarna and to either proceed to Värmland or make a diversionary attack into Norway.1791 The military command over the operations in Värmland and Dal was delegated to Gustaf Stenbock.1792 Meanwhile the main responsibility for slowing down the enemy’s advance fell to Olof Stake, who had mustered *uppbåd*-levies and constructed timber barricades at the forest roads. Stake’s peasant levies, which were dispersed in the woods, were soon reinforced by a company of regular cavalry. These hybrid contingents conducted small-scale operations against the Norwegians with some minor successes, but their military effectiveness was diminished by the peasants’ shortage of firearms.1793 This shortage of firearms was remarkable given the fact that the *riksråd* had already ordered thousands of firelocks for the peasants’ use almost one year earlier. The Dal peasants, however, had never been singled out as recipients of these firearms, and therefore the central

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1785 RAOSB, ii:9, 618, 5 February 1645, Lars Kagg to the riksråd.
1786 SRA RR, B224, 16 November 1644.
1787 RAOSB, ii:9, 620, 1 March 1645, Lars Kagg to the riksråd.
1788 RAOSB, ii:9, 618, 5 February 1645, Lars Kagg to the riksråd.
1789 RAOSB, ii:9, 626, 5 April 1645, Lars Kagg to the riksråd.
1790 SRA RR, B226, 14 January 1645.
1791 SRA RR, B226, 15 January 1645.
1792 SRA RR, B226, 17 January 1645.
1793 Vessberg 1900, 32.
government had made no preparations for their distribution in Dal. The riksråd’s instructions clearly show that the ordered weapons were to be collected at their places of manufacture, which policy effectively excluded all those uppbåd-peasants, whose own home districts had suddenly become war zones.

The Swedish relief force led by Olof Stake and Gabriel Oxenstierna made painstakingly slow progress. The army, consisting mainly of “commonalty”, started out from Karlstad on 4 January; twelve days later the advance party of two companies or 200 men had only managed to reach the Björnö manor four and a half miles away from Karlstad. While the relief army was inching its way through Dal, the vicar of Filipstad redirected Gabriel Oxenstierna’s orders to all the bailiffs in Bergslagen to levy all who could bear arms, and that every man should muster at Filipstad on 10 January with a musket and an axe in their belt. This call to arms was received with some reservation, as no district wanted to show up in force lest their neighbouring district joined them.

Meanwhile Colonel Johan Wrangel led another force towards Dal from the south. Wrangel advanced north from Vänersborg and levied local peasants along the way as instructed by the government. By 16 January Wrangel had reached Köpmannebro, where he clashed with the Norwegians, whose numbers he grossly exaggerated in his letter to Lars Kagg as having been 8,000 men. Wrangel portrayed the battle as a successful rearguard action, where the Swedish “arrièregarde” held off a numerically vastly superior enemy force, losing in the action only one officer and fifty musketeers. Hannibal Sehested offered a very different account of the action in his letter to Ove Gedde. According to Sehested, the Swedish rear guard had been nearly obliterated, and the Norwegians had captured Swedish supplies and cannons. Sehested, who personally led an attack by dragoons and fyrrører, gave special credit for the victory to “our disparaged Norwegian boys.” This solicitation suggests that Sehested himself was sensitive to the largely non-regular nature of his Norwegian forces. Köpmannebro was nevertheless a Norwegian victory, as Sehested managed to prevent any conjunction between Johan Wrangel and the northern expedition led by Johan Oxenstierna and Olof Stake.

While Stake and Oxenstierna were inching their way through Dal, and Wrangel was held up by Sehested in the south, Gustaf Otto Stenbock arrived in Karlstad with the riksråd’s order to reclaim the Morast sconce and to secure the northern provinces, starting with Värmland. If the enemy should retreat through Dal and threaten Västergötland, Stenbock was to pursue him with the bulk of his forces and drive him back to Norway if possible. The forces commanded by Stenbock consisted of at least two fänor of cavalry and infantry transferred from Germany plus 200 infantry from Jönköping. Stenbock advanced towards Morast and the Norwegian frontier unopposed, as those Norwegians who had remained in Värmland chose to retreat south towards Dal. Stenbock’s successful advance induced the riksråd to revise its
orders. In early February Stenbock received new instructions to either capture or blockade Morast and to pursue the retreating Norwegians into Dal. The riksråd was convinced that the Norwegians’ long campaign in wintry conditions had weakened them, in addition to which the riksråd had learnt that sickness had further reduced the enemy’s strength. After securing Dal and Värmland, Stenbock was instructed to set sentinels at passes and to reconstruct the roadblocks demolished by the enemy.1800

In early February the focus of warfare shifted from Värmland and northern Dal to Västergötland and Älvsborg. Sehested crossed the River Göta with a hybrid force of 1,200 peasants, 400 musketeers, 150 fyrrører, and fifteen cavalry in an attempt to storm the Swedish sconces at Holmen. On 15 February Sehested succeeded in storming the Tysslanda sconce after the defensive palisades had been cut down by Norwegian peasants armed with axes. All of the 70 Swedes defending the sconce were put to the sword and their bodies cast into the river.1801 The reason for this, Vessberg surmised, was the Swedish commandant’s attempt to blow up the sconce together with the attacking Norwegians.1802 According to Sehested, the massacred garrison did not include peasants but consisted solely of experienced soldiers.1803 The appearance of Swedish reinforcements under Harald Stake and Gustaf Otto Stenbock prevented Sehested from continuing his advance towards Västergötland and instead forced him to seek safety in Norwegian territory.1804

By early March 1645 the only remaining Norwegian foothold on Swedish soil was the Morast sconce. After a failed attack on 10 March, the Swedes decided to blockade the sconce. In April the Swedes managed to take the nearby Järsōt sconce by storm. Most of the forty Norwegian defenders were put to the sword, after which the Swedes demolished the entire sconce.1805 The massacre of the Norwegian prisoners served no military or political purpose, and it appears to have happened in revenge for the killing of the Swedish soldiers at Tysslanda. The fall of Järsōt effectively sealed the fate of the Morast sconce, which was now tightly sealed from all directions. On 24 May the commander of the Morast sconce, a Scottish officer named Thomas Lion, surrendered Morast to the Swedes. Some weeks after the fall of the Morast sconce Sehested opened an inquiry into Lion’s conduct and why he had surrendered the sconce without first demolishing it “with fire and flame.”1806 Lion was court-martialled and sentenced to death, but was later pardoned by Sehested.1807 After the fall of Morast, Norwegians abandoned their watchposts and sconces along the Magnora Creek. The retreating Norwegians torched the Midskog and Torp sconces. In the latter place this scorched earth policy was executed with such haste that the Norwegians inadvertently burned alive some of their own wounded in the sconce.1808

1800 SRA RR, B226, 8 February 1645.
1801 SNFSH, iii, 98, 14 February 1645; SNFSH, iii, 108, 18 February 1645.
1802 Vessberg 1900, 37.
1803 SNFSH, iii, 95, 16 February 1645.
1804 SNFSH, iii, 101–102, 19 February 1645, memorial.
1805 Vessberg 1900, 38.
1806 SNFSH, iv, 460–461, 10 June 1645; SNFSH, iv, 462, 12 June 1645.
1807 Vessberg 1900, 38.
1808 Ibid., 38.
The Swedes were satisfied with the destruction of the Norwegian sconces along the Magnora Creek and did not pursue the enemy deeper into Norway. Gustaf Otto Stenbock regarded his mission in Värmland completed and requested further instructions from the riksråd in late May, particularly about the future defensive arrangements in Värmland. The riksråd felt the Norwegian threat had by now passed but was willing to send further troops to Värmland and to maintain the Morast sconce with some troops, the exact strength of which was left to Stenbock’s own discretion.1809

By late July the Swedes maintained in Värmland a force of 200 cavalry, 100 dragoons, and 567 foot, who were expected to be soon reinforced with 100 cavalry, 200 dragoons, and 110 foot, thus bringing the total Swedish strength in Värmland to 1,277 men. This troop disposition did not appear to include any levied peasants, as the infantry were specified to belong to the Uppland infantry regiment.1810

One major reason behind the withering of Norwegian military activity was the protracted absence of Hannibal Sehested, who spent much of March and April in Copenhagen giving account of his operations and discussing future military plans with the King and the riksråd. In early March Mannersköld became once again concerned about Norwegian troop movements on the west bank of the Göta River and moved cavalry and dragoons on the east bank to keep an eye on the enemy. He also constructed new sconces at Björketorp and Ry. The regular troops and levied peasants, Mannersköld planned, would constitute an entire corps that could be used to defend the border.1811 The Norwegians did not yet go on the offensive but laid the foundations for a new bridge from Bohus to the south bank of the River Nordre (a tributary of Göta).1812

Hannibal Sehested’s last main attack did not come from Norway but from the North Sea. On 19 May Sehested landed at Varberg with an expeditionary force of six cavalry companies, five dragoons companies, and some 2,000 infantry. Five days later Sehested marched with 2,000 troops from Varberg towards Gothenburg.1813 It is obvious that the 300 muskets, 300 pistols, 1,000 matches, and 10,000 pounds of powder that Christian IV had ordered to be shipped from the Tøjhuset to Varberg on 30 April were meant for Sehested’s use.1814 The planned sea-land operation against Älvsborg and Gothenburg came to naught on 25 May, when Sehested learned of two Danish setbacks: the dispersal of Ove Gedd’s fleet by a North Sea storm and the fall of the Morast scone in the north. What made matters worse was the approach of Swedish reinforcements, which Sehested overestimated to have been 18,000 strong.1815 Instead of attacking Gothenburg Sehested made his way to Kristiania via Bohus, where he left most of his troops.

In Sehested’s absence the Danish troops in Bohus, led by Henrik Bielke and Iver Krabbe, fought a successful engagement against Harald Stake’s troops at Skårdal.

1809 SRA RR, B227, 1 June 1645.
1810 SRA Strödda handlingar Danska kriget 1643-1645 RA/754/2/M 1291, 20 July 1645, Verme Lands defension.
1811 SRA RR, B226, 15 March 1645.
1812 Vessberg 1900, 46.
1813 SNFSH, iv, 159, 21 May 1645.
1815 SNFSH, iv, 159–161, 25 May 1645.
According to Sehested’s report to Christian IV, the Swedish cavalry had fled the battlefield and “left the foot-folk in the lurch.” The infantry had consisted largely of newly-conscripted Swedish Bønderdrenge (farmhands), “who were more likely to fall on their knees and beg for their lives than to fight”, as Sehested contemptuously described them to Christian IV. Only Harald Stake’s own regiment, Sehested continued, had fought well. Many Swedish Under-Officerer had been either killed or captured alongside with several standards. The only Danish setback had concerned the Danish baggage train, which was left unguarded by the Danes and had been consequently pillaged by the Swedish peasants.\textsuperscript{1816} Knowledge of this engagement is one-sided, as the Swedish sources make no direct reference to it. Vessberg nevertheless gave Sehested’s account some credit, as the riksråd soon afterwards instructed Lars Kagg to keep better order among those Swedish troops that had allowed the enemy to make two attacks over the border.\textsuperscript{1817}

Sehested spent much of the summer mustering new forces for a renewed assault against Sweden. In July he recruited 1,200 mercenaries from Germany and the Netherlands, and by the end of that month he and Iver Krabbe possessed between them 5,000 foot, 850 cavalry, and 400 dragoons.\textsuperscript{1818} A Swedish estimate of Sehested’s forces on 1 June had specified that the existing infantry element of 3,238 men had included “footfolk, draguner och snapphanar.”\textsuperscript{1819} It is difficult to interpret, in which context the snapphanar were understood in this report. As we have learned earlier, Danish muster rolls specified snapphanar according to their tactical role as firelock musketeers. On the surface the same logic seems to appear to the Swedish intelligence report from June 1645. Sehested seems to have made attempts to keep conscripts and levied peasants separated from the recruited elements in his army. Sehested took 291 professional soldiers from Lieutenant Colonel van Dyck’s infantry contingent to his own regiment and left the remaining 339 conscripts and peasants in garrison duties in Marstrand and Kvistrumbro.\textsuperscript{1820}

By the end of July the bulk of the new army was concentrated at Bohus, whence Sehested expected to take control of the River Göta. The pontoon bridge across the River Göta was guarded by urban militiamen, who had been ordered to show up for duty with their own “Gevær.”\textsuperscript{1821} Other sections of the commonalty were asked to assist in the defence of the realm not only with their work but with their muskets as well. This appeal was directed at scribes and “Bonde-Lensmænd”, whom Sehested apparently expected to act as the peasants’ military leaders.\textsuperscript{1822} Danish military success would have had a favourable effect in the on-going peace negotiations at Brömsebro, which may have indeed been Sehested’s ultimate strategic goal.\textsuperscript{1823}

In the first days of August the Danes and Swedes fought a series of small battles in the vicinity of the Swedish sconce at Nya Lōdōse. These battles were fought between

\textsuperscript{1816} SNFSH, iv, 493, 6 July 1645.
\textsuperscript{1817} SRA RR, B227, 9 July 1645; Vessberg 1900, 47.
\textsuperscript{1818} SNFSH, v, 210, 29 July 1645.
\textsuperscript{1819} SRA Strödda handlingar Danska kriget 1643-1645 RA/754/2/M 1291, June 1645, Hannibal Lestetts lydellse.
\textsuperscript{1820} SNFSH, v, 210, 29 July 1645.
\textsuperscript{1821} SNFSH, v, 213, 31 July 1645.
\textsuperscript{1822} SNFSH, v, 218, 8 August 1645.
\textsuperscript{1823} Vessberg 1900, 49.
regular infantry, cavalry, and dragoons, and their relevance to the themes of insurgency and hybrid warfare is limited. One event of interest is the Danish Colonel John Taylor’s use of fyrrører as stormtroops in the attempted assault against the Nya Lödöse sconce on 3 August. Musketeers and fyrrører had attempted to scale the walls by first crossing the moat, and had initially taken shelter under the bridge. Their assault came to naught when the Swedish defenders burned the bridge and exposed the fyrrører to musket fire from the sconce.\textsuperscript{1824} The next day a Swedish prisoner informed the Danes that Lars Kagg was approaching the Danes with 9,000 troops.\textsuperscript{1825} While the Swedish reinforcements were not quite so strong, they nevertheless managed to press Sehested westwards and pursue him all the way to Hisingen, thus threatening to cut Danish lines of retreat between Bohus and Marstrand. After two desultory battles in Hisingen Sehested was forced to seek safety behind the walls of Bohus.\textsuperscript{1826}

In his letter to Christian IV, Sehested listed the reasons behind his decision to give up the campaign and return to Bohus. The two main reasons were the appearance of strong Swedish reinforcements and the “unnaturally” adverse weather conditions. A third reason was the “rebelliousness” of the commonalty, who were unwilling to pay contributions or perform watch duties, and who did not hide their enmity towards the war. “Our Lord only knows how perplexed I am by such disloyal people”, Sehested lamented to the King.\textsuperscript{1827} Sehested summed up his analysis at the end of his report. It was no longer possible to stand up against an enemy that could mobilize large quantities of cavalry and levied peasants “who are willing to follow”, while the Norwegian peasants time and again showed themselves unwilling to pay contributions or to perform labour duties or military service. Only strong reinforcements of loyal and professional troops might alleviate this major problem, Sehested felt.\textsuperscript{1828}

By 8 August Hannibal Sehested was effectively blockaded in Bohus. Any attempt to break out from Bohus might lead to the destruction of the army, which in its turn would have catastrophic consequences for Denmark, Sehested ruminated. The regular contingents were not numerous or strong enough to defend Bohus and its surrounding districts from all directions, for which reason Sehested found it necessary to mobilize the local commonalty. On 17 August Sehested issued a public manifest that reminded the commonalty of its obligations and responsibilities to “the Royal Majesty and the Fatherland.” Sehested scolded the peasants for their apparent longing for Swedish rule and reminded them that any peasant who refused to perform watch duties or paid contributions to the enemy would forfeit his rights and be subjected to “robbery and fire” by the Danish military authorities. However, there was no assurance that the Swedes would not respond to the peasants’ misguided manifestations of sympathy with similar means, and the peasants’ best security lied in their proactivity to defend their homes against foreign invaders.\textsuperscript{1829} The effect of such public appeals is difficult to estimate. We know that by 14 August Sehested had already mobilized the commonalty in Hjärtum and Sjöhed, but he nevertheless lacked confidence in their morale to

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{1824} SNFSH, v, 221, 8 August 1645.
\textsuperscript{1825} Ibid., 222.
\textsuperscript{1826} Vessberg 1900, 50–51.
\textsuperscript{1827} SNFSH, v, 223, 8 August 1645.
\textsuperscript{1828} SNFSH, v, 224–225, 8 August 1645.
\textsuperscript{1829} SNFSH, v, 246–247, 17 August 1645.
\end{footnotes}
such extent that he planned alternative retreat routes in case the peasants showed
themselves unwilling to fight.1830

A provisional cease-fire came into effect only four days later; before this the
Danes had to suffer one final ignominy, when retreating Danish soldiers pillaged
the town of Kungälv and inadvertently set it on fire. Sehested was not much moved
by the plight of Kungälv, as its inhabitants had given him scarcely any assistance at
all and had passed on information to Lars Kagg on a daily basis.1831 On 21 August
Sehested began to demobilize his army in an orderly manner. First Sehested wanted a
headcount of all soldiers and an inventory of their weapons and apparel. Then the war
commissars were to inspect the regimental muster rolls and to make an exact count
of both conscripted and recruited soldiers. After that the conscripted peasants could
be sent home. Sehested was greatly concerned over the maintenance of appearances.
Swedish officers, who were coming over to Danish side on a daily basis to oversee
the execution of the peace articles, should not be allowed to discover any “ragged
soldiers”, Sehested instructed his officers.1832 This may have been a reference to levied
peasants, who had not received much care or respect from the Norwegian statholder.
The contempt appears to have been mutual. When Hannibal Sehested left the Bohus
Castle on 13 August he was jeered and insulted by the local people who felt that
the statholder’s belated and failed operation against Gothenburg might expose the
peasants of the Bohus len to Swedish reprisals.1833

1830 SNFSH, v, 226, 14 August 1645.
1831 Ibid., 226.
1832 SNFSH, v, 21 August 1645.
1833 Johnsen 1909, 73.
HYBRID WARFARE IN THE NORTH

7.1 REGULARS OR IRREGULARS?

Torstensson’s War, and in particular its northern manifestation of Hannibal’s War, offers a clear example of early modern hybrid warfare, as both Denmark and Sweden relied heavily on an operational combination of regular troops and levied peasants. At times levied peasants and regular soldiers were separated into their own contingents, at times they were mixed in the same units. The exact ratio of regular versus irregular troops is difficult to gauge for a number of reasons. One difficulty is quantification. The number of levied peasants fluctuated constantly, and any given headcount in the sources is difficult to extrapolate into a sustained argument. Fluctuations in the absolute number of peasants also caused fluctuations in their relative proportion in the military forces. Levied peasants could comprise a minority, half, or majority of the available troops, depending on contingencies and circumstances.

Another major problem in the analysis of hybrid warfare is the distinction between different kinds of combatants – and indeed non-combatants – in early modern Scandinavia. As Gunner Lind has argued, the early modern European society recognized a “hierarchy of arms.” At the top of the hierarchy were the nobles, typically distinguished from the rest of the society by their social obligation to render military service such as the rusttjänst or rostjeneste, and the professional salaried soldiers, i.e. the mercenaries, who fought for money. Below them were all the rest of the able-bodied men, often excluding the clergy on account of their sacred status. This second hierarchical level included in practice all part-time soldiers such as levied peasants and urban militiamen. At the lowest hierarchical level stood the “innocents”, who enjoyed a non-combatant status under nearly all circumstances.¹⁸³⁴ The early modern military thought generally had little problem in identifying these innocents as women and children. In modern terminology these “innocents” would be equated with “civilians.” Their inclusion in the sphere of military activities was a moral rather than a military question. Some Catholic writers also included “harmless” agricultural workers and priests among them as well, “unless the contrary be shown, as when they engage in actual fighting.”¹⁸³⁵

Making a distinction between regular soldiers and irregular combatants was much more difficult even on the most superficial level. Modern soldiers are distinguishable by their uniforms and military insignia. Military uniforms admittedly first appeared in the era of the Thirty Years War, but their use was still intermittent and inconsistent. For much of the Thirty Years War, soldiers would have been distinguished for their scarfs and headgear if anything at all.¹⁸³⁶ German troops, whether Imperialist or Protestant, were responsible for supplying their own clothes; these were usually bought or robbed from the civilians, sometimes even taken from fallen comrades or slain enemies.¹⁸³⁷

¹⁸³⁴ Lind 2014, 50.
¹⁸³⁵ Ibid., 54–55.
¹⁸³⁶ Harrison 2014, 131.
¹⁸³⁷ Arndt 2009, 182.
Gradually regiments and then whole armies began to dress in the same colours, but the initial motive behind this trend was the feasibility of acquiring the same kind of bulk cloth from designated military subcontractors rather than any specific determination to distinguish regular soldiers from civilians or irregular combatants. On the eve of the Swedish invasion of Germany in 1630, most native Swedish troops still wore clothes of coarse woollen material that was the colour of “peasant grey”, as it was called in Sweden.1838

However, there is some evidence that Gustaf Adolf began to attire at least some of his more illustrious regiments (such as the famed Blue and Yellow Regiments) in coloured uniforms after 1630. While many of the uniforms varied from black to red and yellow, the dominant colour appears to have been blue.1839 The incident from April 1644, when the Danish attired some of their Swedish prisoners in new blue clothes, suggests that at least some of the Swedish troops in Torstenson’s War wore uniform apparel.1840 How common such uniforms ultimately were among the Swedes in Torstenson’s War is difficult to positively ascertain from the existing sources. What we do know that in the autumn of 1644 Gustaf Horn complained to the riksråd how it was difficult to tell hostiles from the Swedish soldiers who had garmented themselves in clothes stolen from the Scanian peasants.1841

The Danish troops, who were mostly professional soldiers recruited along an entrepreneurial model, were even less likely to possess standardized uniforms, which indeed made it very difficult for Swedish soldiers to distinguish armed peasants from regular soldiers. The lack of standardization was well reflected in the attires worn by the peasant militiamen in Halland. Some of their companies had received cloth, which subcontracted tailors then made into overcoats. The colours of these coats, however, varied from green to blue and even red.1842 Christian IV had made some attempts to distinguish his recruited troops from the enemy (and possibly the native opbud-levies). In August 1644 he had instructed the rigsmarsk to supply the Scania-bound troops with properly coloured scarfs so that the troops “could be distinguished from the Swedes.”1843 The red and gold scarfs were the colours of the House of Oldenburg, and they were used to designate Danish and Schleswiger troops; red and white scarfs identified the Holsteiner contingent of Christian IV’s army.1844 Whether the scarfs were ever distributed to the King’s troops, remains one unsolved question; whether they actually helped the Swedes to distinguish recruited enemy troops from peasant insurgents is another.

Social background was an equally problematic way of distinguishing between professional soldiers and armed peasants. Danish muster rolls from 1662, which shed light on the background of recruited soldiers in Hendrick Ruse’s infantry regiment of 1,522 men (three recruited cavalry companies of 369 riders in all) plus Eiler Holck’s squadron of dragoons, indicate that the troops recruited from Scania, Blekinge,
and Halland (provinces that were lost to Sweden in 1658) were mostly peasants or farmhands (98 out of 131). By and large, however, the recruited Danes outside Scania were predominantly urban dwellers with artisanal backgrounds, such as cobblers and tailors. There were clearly distinctive regional differences in the soldiers’ social and professional background in 1662, and there is little reason to believe that this structural characteristic would have been any different during Torstensson’s War. Scanian recruits were largely synonymous with peasants, while soldiers from the other side of the Sound typically originated from the cities and trade towns.

When the Swedish sources could not make educated distinctions between regular troops and insurgents, they resorted to assumptions. Hence, any mounted musketeer accompanying armed peasants was categorized by the extractskrifvelse as a “dragoon”, despite the fact that, apart from possible riding boots and swords, unarmoured and helmetless dragoons would have been for all purposes indistinguishable from mounted insurgents. Even the modern-day authors of Europa i brand assumed that the mounted musketeers accompanying the insurgents at Hällestad in October 1644 “were certainly regular Danish soldiers.” These assumptions do not account for the possibility that the alleged dragoons would have been mounted peasants. The distinction between a dragoon and an insurgent could simply be a matter of timing. On 14 April 1644 Prince Christian offered the peasants of Vemmenhögs herred an opportunity to serve as dragoons. Volunteers were only expected to provide their own horses; Prince Christian promised to supply them with muskets and ammunition and to place them under the command of capable officers. At the end of the day, the distinction between a dragoon and an insurgent does not appear to have been a terribly controversial issue for the Swedes. In 1650, the Swedish trial court in Gothenburg described the Hallander brigand Peder Ingvarsen as having been a “Dragon eller Snaphane”, thus essentially using the two terms interchangeably. Muskets might have been the best way to differentiate between regulars and irregulars. Firelocks and smallbore muskets were still distinctively irregular weapons and were more likely to be found in the hands of levied peasants and insurgents than among regular soldiers. The phenomenon of hybrid warfare was embodied in the Norwegian fyrrører and snapphanar, who carried firelocks in Hannibal Sehested’s regular army. Conversely a matchlock would have signified its user as someone unlikely to engage in sharpshooting or guerrilla warfare.

The line between regular and irregular troops was further muddled by conscription. Uppbåd and opbud were universal duties that obliged every able-bodied man in Sweden and Denmark to defend the realm against its enemies. Utskrivning and udskrivning were more evolved forms of this tradition, as they set apart a certain quota of selected men, whose military service was not restricted to any certain duration or location. As selected servicemen, the Danish and Swedish conscripts received at least some kind of basic drill in the use of pikes and muskets. In Denmark much of this training

1841 Ibid., 28.
1842 Ericson Wolke, Larsson, and Villstrand 2006, 296.
1843 PCB 1643–1647, 122–123, 14 April 1644.
1844 Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 240.
took place in the local militias, which were roughly similar to the Trained Bands of the pre-Civil War England. The Swedish conscripts received their basic training in active regiments, where they were mixed with seasoned veterans and recruited soldiers. During Torstensson’s War both Swedes and Norwegians conscripted peasants in an expedited manner, effectively sending them straight into action after the initial musters. In much of the Swedish and Norwegian correspondence from 1644–1645, ‘conscription’ and ‘levying’ become nearly interchangeable terms. The difference between conscripts and levies only began to appear when the traditional limits of uppbåd and opbud were being pushed by the extension of warfare in both time and distance.

The Swedish bergsknektar bore the characteristics of both regular and irregular troops. All bergsknektar had been singled out for military service, which likened them more to conscripts than levied peasants. The bergsknektar received formal and regular training in the military arts, and they were organized militarily into units lead by appointed officers. Even their number was fixed at 1,400, which was effectively the size of a regiment. Yet the bergsknektar did not consider themselves conscripts or recruited soldiers. The inhabitants of Bergslagen maintained their 1,400 bergsknektar in military readiness on the precise condition that by doing so they were all to be exempted from utskrivning. Much like the levied peasants, the bergsknektar were reluctant to serve outside Sweden or for any extended duration, as their mutinous behaviour in 1644 testified. Despite their semi-professional outlook, the bergsknektar maintained much of the mentality of the traditional uppbåd-levies.

The modern age defines regular and irregular combatants largely from the perspective of international war. Both the two Hague Regulations (1889 and 1907) and the Third Geneva Convention (1949) define combatants as “all persons of the armed forces of a party to the conflict.”\textsuperscript{1851} Any combatants who do not fit this admittedly hazy definition can be regarded as unlawful combatants, who do not enjoy the protection granted to non-combatants and prisoners of war. Modern political science understands ‘armed forces’ to be regular and therefore legitimate; ‘irregular combatant’ is consequently treated as a synonym for an ‘unlawful combatant’. The final say on who is an unlawful combatant and how he should be treated is left to the individual nation-states, which have historically had very little toleration for such fighters. The brutal German countermeasures against Franco-Belgian francs-tireurs in 1870 and 1914 are often cited as examples of state armies’ ideological hostility to ‘people’s war’.\textsuperscript{1852}

The aversion of the Wilhelmine officer corps towards irregular combatants can be traced back to the seventeenth century, when the nascent territorial states and their standing armies began to regard organized warfare and ius ad bellum, the right to wage war, as their own monopolies. When, in January 1689, a French brigade under the command of Count Mélach had been fired upon by local “Schnaphanen” on its way from the Neckar Bridge to Handschusheim, the French soldiers retaliated by “summarily cutting down all they met on their way.” After arriving in Handschusheim they set the town on fire. Only the church and hospital were spared by the intercession of a “prominent person.” At Handschusheim the French also murdered several refugees from Heidelberg, including one pregnant woman. The German chronicle describing

\textsuperscript{1851} International Committee of the Red Cross. https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule3.
\textsuperscript{1852} Horne and Kramer 2001.
these events suggested that it was the fusillade from the Palatine irregulars that triggered the French atrocities. The French reaction to the Palatine insurgents in the Nine Years War (1688–1697) did not much differ from the later German responses to francs-tireurs in the Franco-Prussian War and the First World War.

The Swedish responses to irregular warfare and insurgency were not consistent during the Thirty Years War. In Prussia and Germany the Swedish military generally treated insurgent peasants with severity. In the Prussian War (1626–1629) the Swedes had systematically mistreated and even killed all prisoners whether they were regular Polish soldiers or armed peasants. During one of the rare prisoner exchanges in May 1627 the Poles had appealed to Hermann Wrangel that the Swedes should stop abusing and murdering their Polish prisoners as they too were Christians. The wording of the Polish appeal suggests that it concerned only regular soldiers, i.e. such prisoners of war who could be exchanged or ransomed. It seems likely that the Swedes continued their policy of not sparing irregular combatants even after 1627.

During the Thirty Years War the Swedes encountered peasant insurgency in southwestern Germany, where the population was predominantly Catholic and hostile to Protestant invaders. In 1632, insurgent Bavarian peasants shocked the Protestant world by mutilating fifty captured Swedish soldiers. The incident was reported in many contemporaneous sources, including English news pamphlets. According to the Swedish Intelligencer, the Swedes revenged this atrocity by burning “200 of the Boores Dorps and houses.” Robert Monro also related that the Swedes killed all such armed peasants as they happened to meet. The destruction of the peasants’ houses had one counterproductive effect, as the Swedish Intelligencer elaborated. “The Boores having now no houses to goe to (such is the misery of the warres) runne with open mouth and stirre up their Cosins and neighbours of Schwaben and Tirole.”

The Swedish reactions to insurgencies in Swabia and Alsace in 1632–1633 were varied. In 1632, the Swabian landlords incited their peasants to rise against the invading Swedes. The Swedes quickly suppressed the insurrection by attacking the insurgents in force and burning many of their cottages and villages. This time Swedish severity bore fruit, as the homeless and distraught peasants “turned against their owne Masters, that moved them to rise against the Swedes: and cutting off a number of them, they possessed their houses, turning good Swedes againe, being beaten with the rod of Correction in their bodies and meanes.” Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, the Swedish commander in Swabia, did not continue reprisals after the peasants had put down their arms but rather treated them with clemency, which policy elicited many praises from Robert Monro. A prudent commander such as Saxe-Weimar overcame more by wit than “by dint of Armes”, Monro contemplated.

Saxe-Weimar’s subordinate, Rhinegrave Otto Ludwig, was not a proponent of clemency. In late 1632, the Rhinegrave fought a series of battles against the Count of

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1853 Boethius 1690, 435–436.
1854 RAOSB, ii: 9, 100, 18 May 1627, Hermann Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna.
1856 Monro 1637, 122. ii.
1858 Monro 1637, 136. ii.
1859 Ibid., 142.
Salm, who commanded a hybrid army 4,000 peasants and 2,600 soldiers in defence of Alsace and Swabia. After taking the town of Rufach the Rhinegrave spared the soldiers in the garrison but had all the levied peasants put to the sword.\textsuperscript{1860} The Rhinegrave’s policy differed from that of General Patrick Ruthven, who had only recently spared and disarmed those Swabian peasants that he had not killed in battle.\textsuperscript{1861}

When, in the following year, the Alsatian peasants rose against the Swedes in Haguenau and Sundgau and slaughtered the entire Swedish garrison in the latter town, the Rhinegrave suppressed the insurgency with extreme prejudice. The Swedish army, marching from Strasbourg, met some 1,100 insurgents outside Sundgau. The commander of the vanguard, Colonel Harff, was under orders to give no quarter to the insurgents. He killed 1,000 of them but nevertheless took 100 prisoners. The bulk of the insurgents retreated to Blosheim, which the Swedes took by storm. There the Swedes killed 2,000 insurgents and took another 1,000 as prisoners; then they set fire to the town itself.\textsuperscript{1862} When the Rhinegrave encountered some 1,600 insurgents at Dammerkirch, he had them all killed save for one young boy.\textsuperscript{1863} According to the Theatrum Europaeum, this massacre took place after the peasants had already been promised “Accord und Quartier”, and it was motivated by the Rhinegrave’s desire to avenge the previous murders of Swedish soldiers and to set an “Exempel” in order to discourage any would-be insurgents.\textsuperscript{1864}

In Breisgau the Rhinegrave hanged 150 of the peasants, apparently the leaders and prominent insurgents, and had the rest sent to Landseen and Blosheim to construct fortifications as slave labour.\textsuperscript{1865} Later that year Breisgau was recaptured by the Imperialists, but the town was again attacked by the Rhinegrave in 1634, when his troops stormed the Kenzingen Castle and killed every one of its peasant defenders.\textsuperscript{1866} By contemporaneous standards the Rhinegrave seems to have borne some particular grudge against armed peasants. By modern standards it would not be unreasonable to characterize him as a war criminal.

The Swedish treatment of insurgents remained inconsistent throughout the 1640s. The Scottish officer William Forbes recalled how the Swedes killed “great many” of those several thousand Swiss peasants who fought against the Swedes in the Bodensee region in 1645.\textsuperscript{1867} However, when a commandeered contingent of Swedes led by Forbes himself stormed the Castle Heiligenberg, which was defended by “a few hundred peasants”, the overpowered defenders were granted accords “and all of them were taken prisoner.”\textsuperscript{1868} The extension of accords and terms of surrender to peasants does not necessarily support the notion that the levied peasants would have been regarded as legitimate combatants. Sweden and the Empire concluded in the 1640s several so-called ‘cartels’, which specified the amount of ransoms payable

\textsuperscript{1860}The Invasions of Germanie 1638, 92, 110.
\textsuperscript{1861}Ibid., 77.
\textsuperscript{1862}Abelinus 1745, 450.
\textsuperscript{1863}Mercure 1634, 454.
\textsuperscript{1864}Theatrum 1670, 5; Priorato 1648, 152–153.
\textsuperscript{1865}Theatrum 1670, 5.
\textsuperscript{1866}Stadt-Chronik von Freiburg im Breisgau 1838, 75–76.
\textsuperscript{1867}Pleiss 1996, 146.
\textsuperscript{1868}Ibid., 146.
for each category of captured soldiers. For instance, a colonel would be ransomed for 1,000 imperial thalers, while a common musketeer cost only four thalers. Captains cost more than lieutenants, and lieutenants cost more than cornets. These cartels also tell something about the way in which certain types of soldiers were esteemed over others. Turncoats and habitual surrenderers cost half the amount of those “who had had the tenacity to stay in loyal service.” Cavalrymen were prized above infantry, except for Hungarians, Croats, and dragoons, who were ransomed at the same rate as infantry.1869

The higher esteem placed on cavalrymen over infantry was also reflected in the armies’ own wages. A Danish regimental contract from 1644 stipulated that cavalry officers would receive more pay than those commanding infantry. Once again, dragoons were equated with infantry in terms of wages.1870 Levied peasants or militiamen were not included in this regimental wage contract or in any of the further ordinances of payment for the Glückstadt garrison that were issued in 1645.1871 A decade earlier a recruited musketeer in Halland and Scania was paid 75 thalers per annum, while a levied peasant militiaman received only 20 thalers.1872 The cartel between the Swedes and the Imperialists does not set any ransom rates for levied peasants, which may merely reflect the fact that neither side included peasants in their armies in the 1640s.1873 The omission of insurgents and irregular fighters from official cartels may also reflect an existing practice. A German military treatise from 1746 certainly articulated a policy, according to which “Freybeuter, Schnaphanen, Busch-Klepper, Herren-lose Soldaten und See-Räuber” were not deemed worthy of prisoner exchanges or ransoms.1874

In February 1644 Christian IV complained that the captured Swedish soldiers had become a heavy burden to the Crown and demanded that the responsibility for maintaining them should be spread more evenly among the Estates and the rigsråd aristocracy. He also proposed a policy of no quarter that might alleviate the economic burden of maintaining prisoners as well as demoralize some of the Swedish “Bønder Soldater.”1875 Such a policy would have devolved the main responsibility for killing lowly peasant conscripts and uppbild-levies outside the Crown itself, which, according to the War Articles of 1611, was directly responsible for such prisoners alone who belonged to the noble or service elites. The ultimate responsibility for maintaining captured peasants and burghers lay with whoever had captured them, namely the frontline troops and their officers.1876 “Troops would have had no means to guard and feed prisoners, for which reason the suggested royal policy would have forced them to slay their captives. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the King’s cold-hearted proposition was ever pursued with any consistency (or indeed at all),

1869 Sverges traktater 1909, 526, October 1642, cartel between the Swedish and Imperial armies.
1873 Sverges traktater 1909, 526, October 1642, cartel between the Swedish and Imperial armies.
1874 Beus 1746, 217.
1875 KCFEB 1641–1644, 458, 29 February 1644.
1876 Mollerup 1880–1881, 608.
and it was never officially articulated by the Danish Chancellery in its missives. The Danes continued to take Swedish prisoners and exchange them for some of their own captured, as indeed the Crown was obliged to do according to ancient laws.\textsuperscript{1877} In October 1644 Christian IV himself was issuing orders regarding the treatment and guarding of enemy prisoners.\textsuperscript{1878} The King’s harsh suggestion may indeed have been a mere rhetorical device, by which he sought to agitate the aristocracy into contributing more to the upkeep of prisoners.

Even if the Danes did not outright kill surrendered Swedes there nevertheless existed in Sweden a general perception that the Danes treated their prisoners harshly. The pamphlet \textit{Ordinari Post Tijdender} related the story of four Dutch sailors, who had been captured by the Danes but who had managed to escape their captors somewhere near Marstrand. “They had not been able to describe how un-Christianly barbarously the Danes had treated them, not like human beings but like mindless beasts, in the manner of heathens rather than Christian peoples”, the \textit{Ordinari Post Tijdender} reported disapprovingly.\textsuperscript{1879} Whether or not the story was exaggeration or even pure fabrication, it nevertheless reflected the Swedish desire to present the Danes as people who did not respect the established norms of war that were thought to be shared by all Christian nations.

Information on prisoner exchanges during Torstensson’s War is limited, but the existing evidence does not suggest that either side would have included levied peasants or irregular guerrillas in any ransom negotiations or prisoner exchanges. Nils Mannerskiöld, the governor of Gothenburg, received instructions in March 1644 to try and find a way to exchange Danish prisoners of war for those Swedish soldiers who were being held captive at Varberg.\textsuperscript{1880} In his letter to Hans Wachtmeister in April 1644, Prince Christian suggested dispensing with ransoms altogether and instead proposed to simply exchange prisoners at their ‘face value’.\textsuperscript{1881} This arrangement would have excluded any captured peasants, as they did not have any face value in the existing cartels. Later that year in Jutland Carl Gustaf Wrangel refused all exchanges so that he could man his undercomplemented fleet with Danish prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{1882} Exchanges of captured peasants might have been expected to take place in the northern theatre of war, where both opposing armies consisted largely of levied peasants. The surviving sources reveal that both the Swedes and the Norwegians captured enemy peasants, but how they proceeded to treat them is no longer known. There does not appear to be any evidence of either side exchanging or ransoming captured peasants.

If captured peasant irregulars could not be ransomed or exchanged, then what could be done with them? The \textit{extractskrifvelse} and Avery’s pamphlet suggest that the Swedes often released their peasant prisoners after first disarming them. The reason for this policy is laid down in the \textit{extractskrifvelse}, in which Gustaf Horn justifies the practice on the grounds of military expediency: released peasants would return to their homes and continue to pay vital contributions to the Swedish army. This policy

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1877] Mollerup 1880–1881, 607.
\item[1878] KCFEB 1641–1644, 511, 10 October 1644.
\item[1879] Ordinari Post Tijdender N. 4 Anno 1645, 3.
\item[1880] SRA RR, B222, 16 March 1644.
\item[1881] PCB 1643–1647, 133–134, 25 April 1644.
\item[1882] RAOSB, ii: 8, 603, 18 December 1644, Carl Gustaf Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna.
\end{footnotes}
was not leniency but practicality, and the Swedes departed from it when prevailing circumstances called for harsher measures. We know that in March and April 1644 the Swedes briefly stopped taking insurgents as prisoners in order to avenge previous attacks by *snapphanar* and to discourage further guerrilla activities. The *riksråd*’s instructions gave Lennart Torstensson the authority to treat insurgent peasants as unlawful combatants that could be killed with all justification, but Torstensson nevertheless favoured leniency instead of severity in his dealings with the Jutland peasants. During his campaigns in Bohemia and Moravia between 1642 and 1646, Torstensson acquired a reputation as a remorseless chastiser of insurgent peasants, which suggests that his softer approach in Jutland was motivated more by the same practical factors that led Gustaf Horn to spare most of his peasant prisoners. The way in which early modern armies treated insurgent peasants was also connected to the larger themes of peasant/soldier relations, pacification, and the claims of the nascent *Machstaat* for the monopoly of organized violence.

### 7.2 PACIFICATION

The earlier discussion of counterinsurgency warfare in Torstensson’s War excluded one central theme of counterinsurgency: pacification or non-violent ways of suppressing insurgency, which subject is better handled within the context of hybrid warfare. Modern military theory likes to emphasize the ‘softer’ approach in counterinsurgency, often articulated as an aim to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of insurgent populations. A more cynical approach sees pacification as an attempt to rally particularist segments of the society on the side of the centralized state, as the Communist regime attempted to do with tribal power groups during the Soviet Afghan War in 1978–1989. Pacification is an attractive approach in counterinsurgency, as it helps to attain many of the mission goals specified by David Kilcullen. Suppressing boundary events, choking off inputs, or denying outputs would indeed be very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve through violent action alone. As the French military theorist David Galula argued in his study of the Algerian War, the objective in counterinsurgency warfare is the population, which is the “real terrain of the war.” Even the Marquis of Marcenado, the first theorist of counterinsurgency warfare, advocated pacification. Marcenado, who saw insurgencies primarily as crises of government legitimacy rather than purely military events, exhorted military commanders to exercise moderation and leniency towards the insurgent populations. “In fighting rebels one should strive to nip their rebellion in the bud without defeating them to the extent of extermination”, Marcenado instructed his readers. “Even though they [insurgents] are dangerous enemies today, they might be loyal subjects tomorrow”, he continued.

In order to succeed, pacification strategy requires careful foreplanning. The lack of such preparation may have a counterproductive effect on a counterinsurgency campaign, as the Americans discovered in the aftermath of their otherwise successful invasion of Iraq in 2003. Today many political and military commentators agree that

1884 Roy 1990, 408.
1885 Galula 2006, 246.
1886 Marcenado 1738, 200.
the decision to disband the Iraqi army and to ostracize the civil servants of the ousted Ba’athist regime was ill-considered and counterproductive. When influential and militarily capable segments of the Iraqi society had no vested interest in the new government, they found new avenues for action among the insurgents. The reason behind this hasty decision to disband the Iraqi army was the absence of any tangible American plans for postwar pacification, reconstruction, or state-building.1887

This modern-day negligence is even more astounding when we remember that Axel Oxenstierna’s government had indeed made such plans in preparation for the annexation of Jämtland. It is evident that Sweden intended to keep conquered Jämtland (and Härjedalen) and to permanently integrate those territories into Sweden. Therefore we can identify in the riksråd’s instructions and internal discussions two specific objectives for the pacification of Jämtland. Firstly, the riksråd wanted to prevent any pro-Danish uprisings or insurgencies in Jämtland. Secondly, the pacification of Jämtland aimed to replace the previous Danish government structures with Swedish institutions and administrative practices. The disarmament of the Jämtlanders clearly served the first objective. A population that had no access to muskets could not wage guerrilla warfare in any large scale or effective form. The proposed transferral of Jämtlander conscripts into the Swedish army would have served both objectives. On one hand it would have imposed the Swedish system of utskrivning on Jämtlanders and thus tied them more firmly to the Swedish military state, on the other it would have deprived potential insurgencies of able-bodied men and readily-trained cadres. The Swedes were sensitive enough to realize that the overseas deployment of Jämtlander conscripts would not be easily accepted by their new subjects, for which reason they limited the use of Jämtlander troops to Scandinavia and the Baltic parts of the Swedish composite state.1888

While some segments of the Jämtlander society had to be won over to the Swedish side, others needed to be removed. Danish officials, lawyers, and civil servants were obviously no longer welcome in Swedish-occupied Jämtland, although the riksråd was willing to retain such native Jämtlanders who were willing to swear allegiance to the Swedish Crown. This policy also retained all grassroots administration up to the herredsting. As the Second Northern War would show, the continued existence of local grassroots government benefited counterinsurgency warfare, because it left the occupying army with negotiating partners and even potential allies in the war against insurgents. The most suspicious group in Swedish-occupied Jämtland were the Danish clergy. This was not because of any confessional schisms (both Danish and Swedish state churches followed the same orthodox interpretation of Lutheranism) but because of the Danish clergy’s strong commitment to Christian IV. Loyalist priests were potential leaders and organizers of insurgency, and, as long as pulpits remained in their control, dangerous disseminators of pro-Oldenburg propaganda. Ecclesiastical offices were also key instruments in the overseeing and management of conscriptions, for which reason it was imperative that they were manned by such priests whom the Swedish Crown could trust and rely on.

From the Swedish point of view, the banishment of troublesome Danish priests and their replacement with Swedish ones eliminated potential foci of insurgency and generally facilitated the transition from Danish to Swedish rule. The latter view was

1887 Burke 2011, 112–113.
1888 SRA RR, B222, 29 March 1644: SRRP, x, 479, 26 March 1644.
more preeminent in those territories, which Sweden intended to integrate permanently into its own realm. In his examination of the Kexholm län and its integration into Sweden over the course of the seventeenth century, Kimmo Katajala has ranked the ecclesiastical institutions above the fiscal-military apparatus as vehicles for integration and pacification. The assimilation of the conquered peoples into loyal Swedish subjects would happen best through the church organization that disseminated royal rules and regulations from the pulpit. The extension of fiscal-military institutions into the conquered territory did not in itself increase the legitimacy of the Swedish rule among the native population, Katajala argues.1889

The success of Swedish attempts at pacification in Torstensson’s War can only be evaluated from the longer historical perspective. The implementation of different pacification measures had barely begun when Jämtland was reclaimed by the Norwegians. When Jämtland and Härjedalen were incorporated into Sweden, it happened through a negotiated peace instead of violent conquest. Therefore the process through which Sweden asserted its control over these provinces no longer really qualifies as pacification but rather falls within those political methods that Sweden employed in the construction of its composite or “conglomerate” state. The conglomerate state has been defined by Harald Gustafsson as a state consisting of several territories that all have their own relations to the ruler, their own privileges, and possibly their own representative institutions. Conversely we might think that the sovereign rules different parts of the conglomerate state in different capacities.1890

The key concept after Brömsebro was transition rather than pacification. After the conclusion of the peace the Danish authorities in Jämtland summoned the clergy and senior representatives of the peasantry to a meeting at Frösön (there were no burgheers or nobles in Jämtland). There Christian IV’s personal envoy officially released the Jämtlanders from their former fealty to the Danish Crown and exhorted them to show obedience to the new Swedish authorities. Danish civil servants were relieved of their positions and replaced with Swedish ones. Those priests who had assumed active military roles were also banished from Jämtland, but the majority of the priests were allowed to retain their positions; they were, however, expected to learn Swedish and to send their children to Swedish schools. This was a clear concession from the Swedes, who had earlier wanted to rid Jämtland of all Danish priests. Administratively both Härjedalen and Jämtland were incorporated into the Härnösands län, and judicially they were subjected to the Västernorrland lagsaga. From 1647 onwards the clergy and peasants were granted the right to send their representatives to the riksdag.1891 At grass-roots level the Jämtlanders remained in close contact with the Norwegians. The market fair at Levanger in Trøndelag, for instance, continued to be regularly attended by Jämtlanders but not by those from Sweden proper.1892

The Swedes did not automatically assume that the transition would go smoothly, and the Swedish garrison at Frösön sconce was instructed to assist the new landshövding by military means if the Jämtlanders did not show sufficient obedience. The Swedish commendant Mathias Franck harboured some reservations about the Jämtlanders. In 1646 he wrote that the Jämtlanders were loyal “but that their hearts feel otherwise

1889 Katajala 2005, 46.
1890 Gustafsson 1998, 194.
1891 Villstrand 2011, 295
1892 Johnsen 1967, 127
than their mouths speak.”\textsuperscript{1893} These reservations were partially vindicated during the Second Northern War and Scanian War, when Jämtlanders colluded with the invading Danes and even waged war against the Swedes. The absence of any uprisings or armed rebellions against Swedish rule during times of peace might nevertheless be considered as a qualified success of earlier pacification in Torstenson’s War, if only for the fact that the Swedish policies did not drive the Jämtlanders into open rebellion.

Pacification was less discernible in Jutland, Scania, and Halland. The release of captured peasant irregulars certainly qualified as pacification, as the Swedish military authorities only released them on the condition that the peasants would desist from further acts of resistance. This was not a consistent policy but was in fact punctuated by violent reprisals for real or alleged insurgent activities. The \textit{riksråd} had never thoroughly discussed the pacification of these southern regions, as it did not originally expect to retain them after the war. In the Peace of Brömsebro Denmark nevertheless pledged Halland to Sweden for the duration of thirty years.

On 7 September 1645 Gustaf Horn and Lars Kagg received instructions, which illustrate the way in which Sweden sought to pacify Halland and make the political transition as smooth as possible. Firstly Horn was instructed to inspect all the landbooks and charters that were available at Halmstad and to learn everything he could about the local privileges and rights as well as about the Danish Crown’s regalia in Halland. After this he was to summon together all the Estates in Halmstad and Laholm in order to notify them of the details of the peace. The Estates were to be “exempted and absolved” of all previous “obligations” to the Danish Crown. Any willing Hallanders were invited to swear fealty to the Swedish Crown and become Swedish subjects with all the entailed rights and privileges. All other inhabitants, whether they were nobles, burghers, priests, or peasants, were allowed to retain their estates, possessions, and privileges if they formally acknowledged the new Swedish authority.

Those nobles, who resided in Danish territory but owned estates in Halland, were still guaranteed their former possessions with the one caveat that their demesne tenants and dayworkers were obliged to obey the new Swedish rulers. Recalcitrant nobles, burghers, priests, and peasants were allowed “one year and a day” to sell their estates before leaving Halland. Bailiffs and other officials were allowed to leave in peace; those of them who declared loyalty to the Swedish Crown were allowed to remain in Halland but were relieved of their offices. Lars Kagg received identical instructions pertaining to the Swedish occupation of Varberg in northern Halland.\textsuperscript{1894}

The success of the Swedish pacification policy in Halland remains a nuanced topic. There were no uprisings against the Swedish rule in Halland during the next decade or so of peace, but at the outbreak of the Second Northern War some Hallanders did join the Scanian \textit{snapphanar} in their guerrilla warfare against the Swedish army.\textsuperscript{1895} Knud Fabricius had mixed feelings about the condition of Halland in 1645–1657. Fabricius identified great dissatisfaction with the Swedish rule in Halland during the next decade or so of peace, but at the outbreak of the Second Northern War some Hallanders did join the Scanian \textit{snapphanar} in their guerrilla warfare against the Swedish army.\textsuperscript{1895} Knud Fabricius had mixed feelings about the condition of Halland in 1645–1657. Fabricius identified great dissatisfaction with the Swedish rule, particularly among the peasants, whose relations with the Swedish bailiffs and soldiers were strained. The peasants’ bitterness was exacerbated by the poor economic conditions of postwar Halland and the unalleviated \textit{hoveri} or labour duty that made Swedish impositions

\textsuperscript{1893} Villstrand 2011, 295.

\textsuperscript{1894} HSH, xii, 112–116, 7 September 1645, Christina to Lars Kagg; RAOSB, i: 16: 2, 575–577, 7 September 1645, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustaf Horn.

\textsuperscript{1895} Englund 2000, 509.
and demands hit the peasants harder than before. As Arne Remgård later pointed out, the Hallander peasants had seen their goods being sequestrated by both Danish and Swedish soldiers during Torstensson’s War. Otto Stenbock, the first Swedish governor of Halland, warned the kammarkollegium and Axel Oxenstierna in late 1645 that the continued foraging and extraction of contributions ran the danger of driving the peasants to such destitution that they could no longer be able to till their fields. In the years that followed the Swedish administration in Halland was indeed forced to loan out fodder to the peasants from the Swedish military magazines. This gesture should not be seen as selfless philanthropy, as the dearth of corn and scarcity of farm animals in Halland had been largely caused by the Swedish army itself.

Instead of rebelling against the Swedish rulers, many Hallander peasants voted with their feet and simply emigrated to Scania, Sjælland, or Norway in search of better economic opportunities. This migration can be seen as a valve that ridded Swedish-controlled Halland of potential troublemakers, insurrectionaries, and Danish fifth-columnists, and therefore directly contributed to the calmness there. On the other hand, the Swedish military presence in Halland was too imposing and the Swedes’ hold of the administrative institutions too strong that the Hallanders would have seriously contemplated any open insurrection against their new overlords before the outbreak of the next war in 1657. Magnus Durell, the Swedish judge of the Hallander land court in 1653–1657, crystallized the Swedish pacification policy in his favourite slogan “the powerful evoke respect.” Fabricius seems to have been right not to overemphasize any one reason behind the submission of Swedish-occupied Halland. As with other forms of counterinsurgency warfare, pacification strategy too seems to have succeeded best as a colligation of different effects and policies, some of them intentional, others accidental.

The Swedes adopted in Torstensson’s War a ‘soft’ approach to pacification by offering the conquered Danes and Norwegians incentives in return for their obedience. Such a soft approach to pacification, however, has never been self-evident in the history of counterinsurgency warfare. An alternative to soft pacification would have been a coercive approach, which has historically meant forced resettlements and various ways of social engineering that fall short of outright genocide (the latter being something that can no longer be understood as pacification). Forced populations transfers constitute a pacification method that is often associated with modern counterinsurgencies, embodied infamously in such ill-fated projects as the Strategic Hamlet Program pursued by the Saigon regime and their American allies during the Vietnam War.

Ambitious resettlement projects harnessed to the service of counterinsurgency are not a purely modern phenomenon as they already occurred in the early modern age. King Philip III of Spain resorted to such methods repeatedly during his reign in 1598–1621. In 1602 Philip III congratulated the authorities of the city of Quito in

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1896 Fabricius 1906, 30.
1897 Remgård 2000, 21.
1898 Ibid., 21–22.
1899 Fabricius 1906, 30.
1900 Ibid., 30, 32.
Ecuador for the “good effects that have resulted from the pacification and resettlement of the mulattos and warlike Indians of the Province of Esmeraldas.”

Seven years later Philip III sanctioned the expulsion of the Spanish *moriscos*, descendants of the Muslim Moors whom the increasingly intolerant Catholic government regarded as Spain’s national enemies. By 1614, the government had expelled some 275,000 of the original 300,000 *moriscos* living in Spain. The heavy-handed expulsions were later condemned by Cardinal Richelieu as unjust and counterproductive, as they only drove the once-Christianized *moriscos* back to the arms of Islam. Richelieu’s justified criticism did not even go far enough. The expulsions were not counterproductive on religious grounds alone but on purely military terms as well. Instead of suppressing an insurrection the expulsions ignited one. When news of the expulsions reached Valencia in October 1609, over 20,000 *moriscos* rose up in rebellion there. The Viceroy of Valencia was forced to deploy two infantry regiments, several cavalry companies, and an unquantified number of militiamen (“Land-Volck”) in order to defeat this quite actual insurgency created by the ham-fisted expulsions themselves.

Oliver Cromwell, the leader of Parliamentarian England, was another prolific social engineer and reorganizer of tumultuous subject-peoples. After having conquered Ireland by a protracted and messy military campaign that involved the notorious massacres in Drogheda and Wexford, Cromwell sought to prevent any future insurgencies by resettling the more troublesome elements of the Irish population. The Cromwellian pacification of Ireland after 1651 consisted of the encouragement of Irish military emigration to the Continent (where many Irish sell-swords found employment in Spanish and French armies), the shipping of men, women, and children to the West Indian colonies as indentured servants, and the transplantation of large segments of the Catholic population to the western parts of Ireland, where they were thought to represent a lesser threat to the political, military, and economic interests of the English Parliamentarians. In the end, isolating the Catholic labour force to remote parts of Ireland turned out to be an economic and social impossibility to the Parliamentarian conquerors. Michéal Ó Siochrú has instead credited more significance to the redistributive aspects of the Cromwellian Act of Settlement, which essentially destroyed the Catholic land-owning elites as economic, political, social, and even military leaders among the native population. Whatever success the Act of Settlement enjoyed as a policy of pacification resulted from the transfer of landed property, not that of people.

Would similar forced resettlements and expulsions of conquered peoples been an impossibility in northern Europe thanks to the Scandinavian mores and traditions? The answer to that question would have to be no. As we have already seen, during the Nordic Seven Years War in 1563–1570, Erik XIV had toyed with the idea of expelling

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1902 Lane 2002, 22.
1903 Lynch 1969, 42–43.
1904 Ibid., 48.
1905 Michaud and Poujoulat 1853, 34.
1906 Lynch 1969, 47.
1907 Khevenhüller 1722, 261.
the Danish inhabitants of Scania and Blekinge and replacing them with Swedes. Meanwhile the Danish Admiral Herluf Trolle had proposed to one of King Frederick II’s advisors the colonization of conquered parts of Sweden with peasants from Jutland. In Trolle’s opinion Jutland possessed a surplus of peasants who could be armed and deployed in Sweden. “Any land they conquered, they could retain; it would be a veritable army of Huns. If the enterprise was successful, as much good would be had of a Jutland peasant in Sweden as of a Swedish peasant”, Trolle elaborated in his letter. Had this plan ever been put into action, it would have amounted to an ethnic cleansing, as Jeppe Netterstrøm has quite rightly pointed out.

During Torstensson’s War, the Swedes did not have any great inclination for large-scale expulsions or ethnic cleansings. The reasons behind this disinclination were practical rather than ethical: seventeenth century Sweden was simply too starved of population to afford to lose any segments of its demography. Such few mass emigrations that did occur in the seventeenth century were not directly machinated by the central government, which was generally averse to any migrations within or beyond its borders. Charles IX had, exceptionally enough, encouraged Finnish migration to the highlands of Södermanland, Dalarna, and Värmland, but his son Gustaf Adolf was concerned about the excessive drain of Finnish population that the continued migration might entail. In 1620, Gustaf Adolf proscribed all native emigration beyond the Swedish dominion.

Another wave of emigration occurred in the aftermath of the Peace of Stolbova in 1617, when many Orthodox Karelians, previously subjects of the Muscovite tsars, suddenly found themselves living in Lutheran Sweden. The native Orthodox population of the recently-conquered Karelia and Kexholm län proved to be a source of potential insurgency, as many Orthodox Karelians sided with the invading Russians during the Rupture War in 1656–1658. In the aftermath of the war some 25,000 Karelians fled to Russia in fear of Swedish reprisals, with some Karelian districts being left entirely deserted. This mass exodus was still more voluntary than forced. The Rupture War in northern Karelia was more about the control of population than about the control of territory; labour force was scarce on both sides of the border, which made peasants effectively contested commodities – even to the extent that the Russian captured Lutheran peasants and brought them back to Russia as slaves. After the war the Swedish government resettled the easternmost borderlands with Lutheran peasants from Finland. The resettlement of Karelia and Kexholm with more compliant and loyal subjects effectively removed the danger of future Orthodox insurgencies in the eastern förvaltningsområde, but the pacification came with its own opportunity cost, as the new settlers represented a population loss to their previous home provinces.

1910 Larsson 2005, 94.
1911 Netterstrøm 2014, 125.
1912 Ibid., 125.
1913 Roberts 1958, 16.
1914 Ibid., 16.
1917 Gullberg and Huhtamies 2005, 158.
The same demographic logic of protecting scarce human resources appears to have prevented the Swedes from considering the expulsion of all natives from the newly-conquered provinces of Jämtland and Härjedalen. The inhabitants of these two provinces represented a valuable resource, as the northern reaches of the Swedish realm remained sparsely populated despite the general trend of population growth: more than half of the population lived south of the River Dalälven. The Swedes already had some difficulties in finding sufficient numbers of workers for their own mines and forges in Bergslagen and the northern provinces. The Piteå silvermines in Lappmark were operated by 40 soldiers in 1643. After the end of Torstensson’s War, Hans Lybecker demanded the soldiers’ quick return to Piteå as no work could be done in their absence. In September 1645 Carl Bonde appealed to Axel Oxenstierna that he might facilitate the demobilization of conscripted and levied soldiers from Bergslagen as their labour was sorely needed home in agriculture and canal-construction. Every able-bodied man was expected to carry his weight in the mountains and the mining districts. When Christer Bonde became aware of certain jobless drifters in Bergslagen in 1647, he wrote to Axel Oxenstierna and suggested that all idle men in Bergslagen would be apprehended and either conscripted into the army or pressed into labour service.

In Halland any large-scale expulsions or resettlements would have flown against the principles of the Brömsebro Peace, which stipulated that the Swedish dominion over Halland was merely provisional. Even if there had appeared some military necessity for them, population transfers in Halland could have been interpreted as a direct violation of the 1645 peace terms and might have amounted to a Danish casus belli. There was ultimately no reason to ever consider population transfers, resettlements, or any other form of ‘hard’ pacification in either Halland or Jämtland, as the local insurgencies ended with the formal conclusion of peace and the transferral of suzerainty from Denmark to Sweden.

A somewhat similar approach prevailed in the Archbishopric of Bremen-Verden, which was formally annexed by Sweden in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The marshlanders of western Bremen had carried on insurgency to the very end of war in 1645, and when the diehards in Bremervörde resumed hostilities against the Swedes in early 1646, they were joined by many local peasants. Königsmarck did not resettle the troublesome marshlanders but instead punished them with heavy contributions and billeting of Swedish troops. Population transfers and forced resettlements could have had very dire ecological consequences for sparsely populated wetlands such as the Bremener marshlands. These marginal areas, which were subjected to repeated floods and inundations, required permanent settlers who would operate

1918 Villstrand 2011, 373.
1920 RAOSB, ii: 11, 333, 6 January 1643, Hans Filip Lybecker to Axel Oxenstierna.
1921 RAOSB, ii: 11, 334–335, 24 October 1645, Hans Filip Lybecker to Axel Oxenstierna.
1922 RAOSB, ii: 11, 121–122, 12 September 1645, Carl Bonde to Axel Oxenstierna.
1923 RAOSB, ii: 11, 170, 172, 15 and 31 June 1647, Christer Bonde to Axel Oxenstierna.
1924 Theatri 1647, 1099.
1925 Zetterqvist 1891, 58.
the dikes and other flood controls that mitigated the impact of possible deluges on communities further upriver.

Political realities too favoured restraint in Bremen-Verden. While the Danish defeat in Torstensson’s War transferred the suzerainty of Bremen-Verden to Sweden, the Archbishopric still remained part of the Holy Roman Empire and therefore retained all those constitutional traditions and “German Liberties”, which that position entailed. Therefore the best way to impose Swedish dominion over the Archbishopric, as Axel Oxenstierna educated Hans Königsmarck, was to prioritize the security and interests of “Her Royal Majesty’s Estates in Germany”, to which category the Bremeners too were now included.1926 The Swedish pacification in Bremen appears to have succeeded without further coercion beyond contributions and billeting. In 1654, when Sweden sought to revive the ancient rights of the Archbishop over the city of Bremen by force of arms, Königsmarck succeeded in raising 6,000 Bremener “Land-Volck” as militiamen and labourers. He also mustered 1,600 men in the western marshlands as militiamen and feudal cavalry (Roβdienst).1927 After 1645, the ‘people’s war’ in Bremen-Verden was harnessed to Swedish service.

7.3 PEASANTS AND SOLDIERS

Modern historiography of the Thirty Years War has become increasingly interested in the relations between soldiers and peasants. Herbert Langer, an East German historian who investigated the Thirty Years War from a cultural and Marxist viewpoint, characterized the soldiers and peasants as mortal enemies, locked in an existential war inside the wider political conflict.1928 Another Marxist, the Soviet historian Boris Porshnev, argued that the Landgraviate of Hesse-Cassel in particular was the principal arena of a German peasant movement and “the war between the peasants and the soldiers.”1929 Less pronouncedly Marxist historians too have embraced these notions of existential warfare. Most recently Dick Harrison has argued that the entire Thirty Years War was first and foremost a war between soldiers and peasants: “The frontline fluctuated constantly and paid no regard to religious beliefs or overall real-political scenarios. For the peasants every soldier was an enemy. For the soldiers every peasant was a potential object of plunder and every peasant wife a possible target of rape.”1930

The idea of the peasant/soldier warfare as an existential conflict is rooted in the Marxist concepts of materialist dialectics and class struggle. The German peasants did not have political privileges or representation in the Reichstag, but they nevertheless constituted a social stratum. Soldiers too formed their own social group or corporation, if not quite a genuine social Estate. In the sixteenth century the German Landsknechte had gone to great extremes in their dressing in order to differentiate themselves from peasants and burghers and to strengthen their own group cohesion.1931

1926 RAOSB, i: 16, 595, 7 March 1646, Axel Oxenstierna to Hans Königsmarck.
1927 Irenico-Polemographia 1658, 623.
1929 Porshnev and Dukes, 2012, 188.
1930 Harrison 2014, 149.
The outrageous appearance of the mercenary soldier may have mellowed by the early seventeenth century, but the internal cohesion of the military profession still survived in full vigour. Soldiering was still a profession and a life-time occupation, even though often a short one.

Soldiers did not constitute their own Estate, as the wider social stratification was reflected in the military hierarchy itself: the military leaders were predominantly members of the nobility, while the men under their command hailed from the lower orders. Brage Bei der Wieden has indeed called the early seventeenth-century German mercenary army as a *Nebengesellschaft* or a “side-society.” During time of war this side-society would come into conflict over material resources with the wider society, or at least with its largest and most vulnerable component, the peasantry. In vulgarly Marxist terms, a parasitic and non-producing class, the soldiers, exploited a toiling and productive peasant class.

There indeed exists some evidence that, in the turmoil of the Thirty Years War, the peasants did not necessarily differentiate between soldiers of varying political or confessional allegiances. When the Rhinegrave Otto Ludwig defeated a Spanish cavalry contingent in the Archbishopric of Mainz in early 1632, many of the surviving Spaniards were later hunted down and killed by the local peasants, who would have been Catholics. An English pamphlet from 1634 related how Catholic Bavarian peasants killed two hundred Imperialists – whether they did this on purpose or by accident, the anonymous author could not tell. The former cause seems more likely, as already in early 1633 at least 2,000 Bavarian peasants had banded together in northern Bavaria, ready to kill any soldiers that attempted to seek winter quarters under the peasants’ roofs. By the end of 1633 this existential conflict between Catholic peasants and Imperialist soldiers had escalated into a full-blown war, as Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar reported to Axel Oxenstierna in January 1634. One prominent theatre of existential peasant/soldier conflict was Lorraine, which the historian Hervé Drévillon described as being a “veritable province martyre.” This Imperial Duchy, which was situated awkwardly within both Habsburg and Bourbon spheres of influence, was invaded and occupied by all the major combatants of the Thirty Years War, as well as by the lesser mercenary armies mustered by private military entrepreneurs such as Ernst von Mansfeld, Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, and even the Duchy’s own ruler, Duke Charles IV of Lorraine. The cycle of peasant/soldier violence, the vengeance of the peasants and the punitive expeditions of the pillaging soldiers, was immortalized in visual art by Jean Callot, who based his series of etchings titled *Les misères et malheurs de la guerre* on his own experiences in war-torn Lorraine.

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1932 Bei der Wieden 1996, 97–98.
1933 Mercure 1633, 99.
1934 N. C. 1634, 2.
1935 Würdinger, and Heilmann 1868, 432.
1936 RAOSB, ii: 7, 141, 12 January 1634, Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar to Axel Oxenstierna.
1937 Drévillon 2014, 50.
1939 Drévillon 2014, 49.
The existential and social-material interpretations of peasant/soldier conflict may well apply to the situation in Lorraine and Germany, but their appeal diminishes in the context of Torstensson’s War. As the presented evidence suggests, Danish and Swedish peasants did not take up arms solely in defence of their own immediate interests, but as subjects of the respective Crowns and for the sake of common defence and even patriotic duty; terms such “Fadernesland” and “Landets defension” make repeated appearances in the existing primary sources, both Swedish and Danish. Furthermore, the hybrid nature of warfare in Scandinavia diminished that boundary between peasants and soldiers, which was more definitive in continental Europe. This does not mean that friction between peasants and ‘friendly’ soldiers did not exist. Andreas Karlsson and Anna Karlsson, who have investigated the receipts of the Hallander tax-districts, have discovered several cases, in which the Danish soldiers requisitioned corn, cattle, draft animals, and even clothes from the peasants. The compensation for these requisitioned goods was typically modest or even non-existent. At some instances these requisitions were accompanied by violence against recalcitrant peasants. While the peasants themselves did not forcibly resist these requisitions, they nevertheless protested them to the local lensmænd. On the Swedish side, there existed similar peasant disgruntlement towards billeting, contributions, military service, and other burdens of war imposed by the military state.

One indicator of a more restrained and less existential conflict between peasants and soldiers was the relative shortage of the kind of atrocities and destabilization-tactics that characterized irregular warfare elsewhere in Europe. Peasant brutality against captured soldiers or civilians in the Tross is a repetitive theme in the Thirty Years War that was recorded in several contemporaneous chronicles as well as in the fictional novel Simplicius Simplicissimus by Hans Jacob Grimmelshausen. The insurgents’ victims were typically stragglers and other soldiers, who had the misfortune of encountering hostile peasants in unfavourable terms. The torture and mutilation of captured soldiers was not rare. Many contemporaneous sources related the incident, where Bavarian peasants mutilated and blinded their Swedish prisoners in 1632. In 1641, an English news pamphlet related how Tremliner peasants, who had attacked Swedish troops under the command of Königsmarck, mutilated a captured drummer, cutting off his ears, nose, and fingers, “and bid him to return again to the army.” The peasants had a good reason to attempt and deter the rapacious Swedish soldiers, as they were hiding in the woods with their wives and children.

Such incidents were not restricted to Germany alone. In 1633, Gualdo Priorato wrote in his chronicle, the peasants in the Duchy of Milan had nailed Imperialist soldiers to trees “by reason of out-rages committed by the Dutch [German soldiers].” The German

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1940 AORSH 1644–1648, 6, 1 March 1644; KBB 1644–1645, 4, 5 January 1644; KBB 1644–1645, 5, 7 January 1644; KBB 1644–1645, 102–103, 23 August 1644; RAOSB, ii: 8, 305, 8 to 27 April 1644, kort relation; RAOSB, i:162, 513, 21 February 1645, Axel Oxenstierna to Per Brahe; SRA RR, B222, 23 January 1644; SNFSPH, v, 246–247, 17 August 1645.
1942 SRA Strödda handlingar Danska kriget 1643-1645 RA/754/2/M 1291, 23 January 1645, Melchior von Falkenberg to Lars Kagg.
1943 Grimmelshausen 1874, 36–39.
1944 Monro 1637, 122. ii; Spanheim 1645, 290; Theatrum 1646, 646, Watts 1632, 157.
1945 Newes from foraigne parts for the last two weeks past 1641, 9.
soldiers naturally avenged such atrocities on local peasants, thus further accelerating the cycle of violence.\textsuperscript{1946} Peasant atrocities against soldiers were not unheard-of in the Oldenburg realm either. During the Kejserkrigen in 1628, the peasants of Fehmarn had allegedly grown so incensed with the marauding enemy soldiers that they murdered all those Imperialist prisoners of war that had been left on the island by the Danish naval forces.\textsuperscript{1947} In the previous year the peasants of Fehmarn had attacked and even killed some of Christian IV’s Scottish soldiers because they mistook the Scots for Imperialists.\textsuperscript{1948} Similar ghastly anecdotes, however, cannot be found from primary sources pertaining to Torstensson’s War, even though the Swedish historian Anders Fryxell claimed that the Holsteiner Schnaphahnen were in the habit of mutilating their Swedish victims.\textsuperscript{1949}

Sometimes the insurgents targeted the civilians in the Tross. This phenomenon is best encapsulated in the relation, which the Catholic League General Johann Tilly sent to the Duke of Brunswick in 1625. Tilly lamented to the Duke, how the insurgent Harzian peasants “burn and skin the wives and children of the soldiers, cruelly mutilate with axes ears, noses and feet, yes, even the heads and necks of soldiers and distinguished officers, skinning them alive, slivering off their skin, and leave them lying half-dead on the roadside.”\textsuperscript{1950} Tilly in his turn responded to the peasants’ atrocities in kind. In his public letter to the mayor of Einbeck, the Count of Solms described the horrendous reprisals carried out by the Leaguers and the Imperialists, in which innocent men, women, and children were killed, women and young girls raped, houses plundered, and the land devastated “in a manner that had not been experienced since the Tatars and Turks.”\textsuperscript{1951}

Atrocities by insurgent peasants against Swedish soldiers, civilians, and camp followers are a definite possibility during Torstensson War, but one that cannot be definitely ascertained from the existing sources. During the Nordic Seven Years War, the Danish Tross of Daniel Rantzau was constantly imperilled by the Smålander peasants. In November 1567 Smålander peasants inflicted great damage to Rantzau’s baggage train.\textsuperscript{1952} The following January a hybrid force of Smålander peasants and Swedish soldiers commanded by Henrik von Minden again managed to attack the baggage, where they killed at least 50 women and children.\textsuperscript{1953} Similar incidents have not been recorded from Torstensson’s War, perhaps for the obvious reason that Gustaf Horn’s baggage train in Scania was limited in its size and therefore did not expose any substantial numbers of camp followers to the dangers of irregular warfare – Gustaf Horn’s own daughter Agneta of course being one notable exception to this rule.

The only direct reference to a Swedish Tross in Holstein comes from the summer of 1644, when Torstensson’s field army was preparing to evacuate its position in the north and to move south-east towards Saxony and Bohemia. In early August 1644,
the Danish pamphlet *Relation fra Fyn Lybeck* tells us, the combined headcount in the Swedish, Imperial, and Danish armies in Holstein was 120,000 people, including the civilians in the “troβen.”1954 The *Relation* then went on to elaborate how the retreating Swedish “arsonists” (*Mordbrenderer*) burned part of their own baggage in the road between Neumünster and Rendsburg in one gigantic pyre that illuminated the night-sky as seen from the latter town.1955

Most of the time, however, the Swedish supply trains in Holstein and Jutland appear to have travelled as dispersed convoys between the Swedish-held towns and cities. This certainly would have exposed them to the predations of insurgents and militiamen, who indeed ambushed and intercepted several Swedish travellers and supply wagons during the war.1956 The worst single atrocity appears to have been the alleged murder of a Swedish major, his wife, and their children in the vicinity of Hamburg in April 1644. The major and his family were not apparently killed outright but only after they had been first held as hostages by “Schnapphanen” who had planned on ransoming their prisoners. This incident, which was reported by the pamphlet *Relationis Historicae* in 1644, suggests that the line between insurgency and outright banditry was a blurred one.1957

The *Tross* was hardly more typical for the Danish armies. While the army led by Anders Bille from Jutland to Holstein in February 1645 was trailed by a sizeable baggage train, Christian IV specifically proscribed the inclusion of women, children, and civilian camp followers to the army that operated in Scania in the autumn of 1644.1958 The Danes, notably enough, did not face insurgent threats in these areas of operation. Therefore it was more likely the necessity to gain operational speed and flexibility that ultimately favoured the discarding of cumbersome baggage trains by both the Swedes and the Danes rather than any existential danger posed to the *Tross* by insurgents and partisans.

There does exist one recorded incident of a Swedish female camp follower being captured by Scanian insurgents and subsequently killed by her captors. The peculiarity of this incident nevertheless makes it an unsuitable case study for the purpose of generalization. The source behind the incident is an interrogation report of a captured Swedish woman. The unnamed woman was evidently a member of the Swedish baggage train. She had been captured as a result of a battle at Gudmundtorp near the Lake Ringsjön, which was situated deep in Danish Scania, and she reported to her captors that her husband and two sons all served as cavalrymen in Gustaf Horn’s army. After being interrogated at the Bosjön cloister she was taken to a nearby forest and killed with an axe.

The reason for her violent death was explained by Christoffer Ulfeldt in his letter to the Danish Chancellery in 1646. During her interrogation at Bosjön the woman had

1954 *Relation fra Fyn Lybeck* 1644, 3.
1955 Ibid., 3.
admitted to being a witch. She had given herself over to the Devil three years earlier, and she had no intention to denounce Satan and accept Jesus Christ as her Lord, the attached report in Ulfeldt’s letter related. More astonishingly, the woman informed her captors that the Swedish field army included an entire contingent of 305 “witch-women” commanded by a Witch-Colonel, “who was bearded like a man.” The witches would infiltrate the Danish ranks by first entering their camps in women’s clothes, but after the Danes would break camp and move the witches would disguise themselves as men and ride with the cavalrymen. Their goal was to bewitch the Danes so that they would be incapable of inflicting any harm to the Swedes. The woman admitted that her own mission was to find out if there were any Danish *snapphästar* in and around Ringsjön and whether any Swedish peasant irregulars had made it that far to the south in their own cross-border forays. As to her own sorcerous powers, she stated that if the Danish peasants at Gudmunthorp had not reached the sanctuary of a nearby church ground, “none of them would have made it out alive.”

Christoffer Ulfeldt’s letter makes it clear that the Scanian insurgents did not kill the captured Swedish woman out of spite but because they genuinely believed that she was a witch. The killing of suspected witches in seventeenth-century Europe is a phenomenon attested by numerous primary sources as well as being a well-established field of scholarly investigation in secondary literature. The fact that the Scanian peasants would suspect a strange woman of being a witch was not therefore extraordinary; neither was the much more fantastic belief that the Swedes employed witches for military purposes. This was a fairly common belief during the epoch of the Thirty Years War, and one recorded by Friedrich Spanheim in his chronicle *Le soldat suédois* (first published in 1633). In 1631, Spanheim related, the Imperialists had spread rumours that Gustaf Adolf employed Lapplander sorcerers, whose charms empowered the Swedes so that they could not be resisted, and who controlled the weather with their ability to call forth strong winds and violent storms. The originator of this myth appears to have been Olaus Magnus and his *Historia*, which related how Finnish wizards sold favourable winds to seafarers. Finnish and Lapplander seers could also divulge mystical information about the condition and whereabouts of one’s friends and enemies.

The Scanian peasants could hardly be blamed for believing in the existence of a Swedish witch-battalion, a well-established myth by then, and the killing of the suspected witch was from their perspective a sensible safety precaution, not a spiteful act of violence against a Swedish civilian who just happened to cross the Scanians’ path. The incidence nevertheless made Christoffer Ulfeldt uncertain whether the bizarre incident should be kept secret or not. At the end of his letter he addressed the secretaries of the Chancellery: “I do not know if it seems appropriate to you to let the Chancellor [Christen Thomesen Sehested] to see this. In some other country it would have been printed.” Gösta Johannesson, who discovered the letter in 1965, was certain that the story was never printed, but whether Sehested was made aware of it, he could not tell.

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1959 Johannesson 1965, 36.
1960 Ibid., 37.
1961 Spanheim 1645, 86.
Popular imagination in both Denmark and Sweden associates *snapphanar*-activity with brutal repressions by the Swedish military authorities. The strength of this popular belief has not diminished but rather increased over time. The Scanian local historian Per Olov Ganrot described Horn’s War as “blatant and meaningless Swedish devastation of the Scanian communities.”1964 Another example of this view is the Swedish TV-series *Snapphanar* (2006), in which the Scanian guerrillas are cast as heroes and the Swedish military authorities are represented as repressive and brutal villains. Even Dick Harrison has approached the *snapphanar* in his popular magazine article from the perspective of their “brutal fate.” We learn from Harrison that captured *snapphanar* were burned with hot irons, broken on the wheel, or hanged and quartered, and that these punishments were meted out by court martials instead of civilian judges.1965

Once again, these popular beliefs may apply to the later Second Northern War and the Scanian War, but the existing evidence from Torstensson’s War does not indicate that the soldiers tortured captured insurgents or executed them in any consistent or intentionally brutal fashion. Several Swedish atrocities against Danish and Holsteiner peasants were nevertheless recorded. These excesses and atrocities included the mass-suffocation of captured Jutlander peasants at Aalborg, the destruction of Hallesta at the hands of Hans Wachtmeister and his flying cavalry column, the much more extensive and systematic burning of villages in Holstein carried out by General Major Wittenberg in April-May 1644, those unqualified and unquantified civilian deaths in March-April 1644 that resulted from Gustaf Horn’s orders to give no quarter to peasant insurgents, and the despoliation of Dithmarschen and the Bremener marshlands by the armies of Hans Königsmarck and Helmut Wrangel in 1645. The devastation of Dithmarschen, it should be noted, could have been at least partly justified in terms of strategic necessity, as the Danes had set up magazines there for their own military purposes.1966

These melancholic events cannot be written off as isolated incidents, but they still reflect more the nature of all early modern warfare rather than any consistent Swedish policy of intimidation, terrorization, and mass murder. The Swedish soldiers did not differ much from any other soldiers in their heavy-handed treatment of the civilian population nor did they single out the Danish peasants as their specific victims. In December 1644 the inhabitants of Altmark in western Brandenburg protested the “unheard-of and barbaric” behaviour of the Swedish troops that had been billeted in their towns and villages. The Swedes had allegedly tormented nobles, burghers, and peasants alike with “robbery/pillage/rape/fire and sword/wanton destruction.”1967 The Lutheran subjects of the Elector of Brandenburg, it should be noted, were not even at war with Sweden at the time. This was simply the way soldiers treated such civilians that were not explicitly protected from requisitioning and forced billeting by salvaguardias or powerful missives. Sometimes soldiers also torched villages for purely tactical reasons. For instance, at the battle of Allerheim on 3 August 1645

1965 Harrison 2015, 79.
1966 DRA Krigsrådet i Glückstadt/Regeringskancelliet i Glückstadt/XV/Militaria/No 23. Besværinger over Skatter m. v. fra Befolkningen i Ditmarsken og Kremp og Wilster Marsk m.m. samt Frederik (III)’s Ordner desang, 1644–1646, fol. 4, undated.
the attacking French musketeers set fire to the village itself in order to flush out the defending Imperialists and Bavarians from their positions inside the houses.\textsuperscript{1968} In June 1619, on the other hand, Ernst von Mansfeld torched the village of Sablat to cover his own retreat from the field of battle.\textsuperscript{1969} “That like doe you, that the rest of your Army may passe with safetie”, Edward Cooke later commented on Mansfeld’s stratagem.\textsuperscript{1970}

The \textit{riksråd} in Stockholm did not feel one way or another about the treatment of peasant insurgents. In Jämtland and Härjedalen, the two provinces that Sweden planned to keep in perpetuity, the government gave detailed instructions that aimed at pacifying the local population. In Holstein, Jutland, and Scania, where the \textit{riksråd} had no long-term interests, the two supreme commanders, Torstensson and Horn, were given unrestricted liberty to treat the enemy civilians as they saw fit. Torstensson and Horn, it would seem, saw fit to follow the general principles laid down in the famed Swedish War Articles. The Articles prohibited unlicensed plunder and wanton acts of violence against civilians and decreed a death sentence on many infractions against this principle. In this sense the Swedish War Articles were not a novelty.\textsuperscript{1971}

The Imperial \textit{Reichs-Policey-Ordnung} of 1538 had already designated priests, sole supporters of peasant families, housewives, maidens, children, and the old and feeble as non-combatants, who would be protected from all robbery and violence by soldiers.\textsuperscript{1972} The Danish War Articles of 1644 proscribed in a similar way all acts of violence against women, children, priests, and the elderly.\textsuperscript{1973}

The Swedish War Articles differed from the \textit{Reichs-Policey-Ordnung} in the sense that they were not terms of contract between mercenaries and their employers but orders to conscripted native troops, subjects of the Swedish Crown.\textsuperscript{1974} As the majority of the Swedish forces in Torstensson’s War consisted of native troops, the Articles were followed at least marginally better among the armies in Scania and Jutland than in Germany, where most troops were still German recruits and had to be treated as employees rather than subjects. Military justice was administered on the spot, as was illustrated by an incident that took place in Gustaf Horn’s field army in March 1644. Per Stall, a captain in either Gustaf or Erik Stenbock’s regiment, had ordered the profoss to place a female servant in fetters. Stall had then taken the fettered maid to his own quarters where he had raped her. This crime, which was explicitly and vociferously proscribed by the Swedish War Articles, resulted in court-martial and Stall’s execution by firing squad.\textsuperscript{1975} The incident suggests that military discipline and Articles of War were enforced with some rigour. The Swedish military no longer tolerated from its officers the kind of monstrous behaviour that had still been exhibited during the Nordic Seven Years War when Colonel Claudius Collart (aka Gallus) had kidnapped a Norwegian housewife and forced her to become his personal camp prostitute.\textsuperscript{1976}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1968] Begründete Summarische Relation 1645, 1.
\item[1969] Appollogie of Mansfield 1622, 11–12.
\item[1970] Cooke 1628, 43–44.
\item[1971] Roberts 1958, 240.
\item[1973] Dänisches Kriegs-Recht und Articuls-Brief 1644, 14.
\item[1974] Bäckström 2013, 422.
\item[1975] RAOSB, ii: 8, 300, 26 March 1644, extractskrifvelse.
\item[1976] HSH, xxi, 17, 1564, Konung Erik XIV:s Krönika.
\end{footnotes}
The economic historian Erik Arup thought otherwise. Torstensson’s “landsknægte” had spent so many years on the field, Arup argued, that their “military discipline was not as good as it had been in Wallenstein’s army.” This is a bizarre statement, as Wallenstein’s Imperial Army had never been known for its exemplary discipline. Wallenstein admittedly maintained better order among his troops than his colleague Johann Tilly, the commander of the Catholic League army, whose unpaid troops regularly resorted to unauthorized contribution-collection and naked brigandage. By 1630, however, the excesses of the Imperial Army itself had reached such levels that they elicited strong protests from the Electoral Collage and finally resulted in the dismissal of Wallenstein from his post as the Imperial Generalissimo. While the analogy of Wallenstein is not helpful, Arup was right to identify problems of discipline in Torstensson’s army prior to the invasion of Holstein and Jutland. Many Swedish cavalrymen had made themselves absent in Moravia in 1642, typically to carry out foraging missions for their own purposes. This phenomenon, however, reflected the peculiar military situation in Moravia rather than war-weariness or some characteristic undiscipline among Torstensson’s soldiers. The Swedish army was widely dispersed in Moravia, and the army command was not able to maintain constant control over the cavalry contingents that roamed across the wide and broken countryside in their restless search for victuals and loot. Similar conditions did not exist in Scandinavia during Torstensson’s War, with the possible exception of Jutland after the responsibility for military operations there had been delegated to Helmut Wrangel and his armée volante.

Another explanation behind the relatively restrained treatment of enemy peasants may have been the hybrid nature of Scandinavian warfare. Insurgents and armed peasants in both Denmark and Sweden were subjects of their respective Crowns and carried out warfare because they were legally obliged to do so. The systems of opbud and uppbåd were in this sense identical, and both the Swedish and Danish military authorities knew this. As the insurgents in Germany acted at their own volition and outside the framework of any corresponding military organization, their insurgencies carried with them the stigma of political transgression and violation of the established social order, even though some of the insurgents in Bavaria and Alsace were admittedly stirred up by the local elites. The snapphanar in Scania and the levied peasants in Jämtland straddled an awkward territory between regular soldiers and illegal combatants. As mere representatives of their social Estate they had no right to wage war; as duty-bound subjects of their Crown and Fatherland they did. The brutal treatment of Scanian insurgents in the later wars lends support to this explanation. The peasants in Halland and Jämtland had become de facto subjects of the Swedish Crown in 1645; the peasants in Scania, Blekinge, and Bohuslän were transferred under Swedish sovereignty in the Peace of Roskilde in 1658. Their insurgencies and cooperation with the Danish Crown were thereafter acts of rebellion and lèse-majesté and had to be punished accordingly.

1977 Arup 1955, 159.
Lastly we should evaluate the effectiveness of peasant levies and hybrid warfare in general. At the beginning of Torstensson’s War both sides had a very high opinion of their own peasant levies and a very low opinion of the enemy peasants. Towards the end of the war these views had somewhat changed. Writing to Ferdinand III in March 1645, the Imperial envoy Georg Plettenberg observed that the Norwegian peasant levies were too ill-equipped and insufficiently provisioned to maintain those modest military successes that Hannibal Sehested had won in early 1645. Only major Imperial military successes against Torstensson’s army in Germany, Plettenberg felt, were sufficient enough to strengthen the Danish negotiation position at Brömsebro.\footnote{Vessberg 1900, 39.}

Sehested himself apportioned much of the blame for his military failures to the Norwegian peasant levies. To begin with, the Norwegian army had been too “puny” to accomplish a general offensive or even a lesser diversionary operation against the Swedes. The levied troops had soon tired after marching hither and thither “in the frost and cold while suffering from hunger and other calamities.”\footnote{AORSH 1644–1648, 97, 25 April 1645.} The small size and weak military strength of the Norwegian army was further abated by the quality of the troops, the levied peasants, who could do little except plunder and arson enemy provinces.\footnote{SNFSH, iii, 169, 173, 24 April 1645.} After the war Sehested saw the future of Norway’s defence in recruited troops and a strong navy.\footnote{Bøggild-Andersen 1946, 48.} Hannibal Sehested’s nineteenth-century biographer (and distant relative) Thyra Sehested agreed with her protagonist’s assessment that the peasantry’s wartime unreliability made the creation of “an orderly army” more necessary.\footnote{Sehested 1886, 77. i.} The Norwegian peasants had admittedly been reluctant to cross the border and meet the enemy in battle, but, as Thyra Sehested herself put it, “the Swedish peasant would not have been any better either.”\footnote{Ibid., 75.}

Vilhelm Vessberg allocated some of the blame on Hannibal Sehested himself, who had overestimated his initial military gains and failed to take advantage of opportunities to prevent the fatal conjunction of Swedish armies in Dal. Vessberg nevertheless joined Sehested in his assessment of Norwegian peasant-soldiers, who were generally unwilling to serve in a military capacity.\footnote{Vessberg 1900, 39.} Carl Munthe was careful in his evaluations. He saw no reason to criticize Sehested, who did the best he could under the prevailing circumstances. Munthe also evaluated the success of Sehested’s campaign on quantified rather than qualified terms. Norway was simply too poor in material and human resources to sustain the kind of protracted campaign that would have been necessary to force Sweden on peace terms favourable to Denmark, Munthe pondered.\footnote{Munthe 1901, 210, 229.}

The tactical performance of the levied peasants is difficult to evaluate, as the peasant levies in the northern theatre of war were mostly pitched against one another.
At Lake Bysjön the Swedish levies withstood Norwegian fusillade resolutely and only broke formation when their commanding officers were killed or wounded. Tactically the battle at Lake Bysjön was unsophisticated. There were no pikemen, elaborate battlefield evolutions, and little in the way of actual cavalry. The Norwegians had light artillery but the Swedes did not. The battle was conducted as a firefight, to which the Norwegians could bring superior troop numbers and more firepower. The Swedish sources suggest that the mobilized uppbåd-levies were to be armed with firelock muskets. These weapons would have been ideal for sporadic fusillade between thin or even open formations, which was the basic tactical disposition at Lake Bysjön. Despite its tactical insophistication, the battle at Lake Bysjön was clearly a heated conflict that was fought with great determination by both sides and which resulted in several hundred casualties. The northern theatre of war did not see much in the way of guerrilla warfare despite the fact that the broken and covered terrain in Jämtland and Dal would have favoured it. Both the Norwegians and Swedish peasant levies constructed and manned roadblocks, yet they never managed to hinder the enemy’s advance. The Forest Finns in Bergslagen were apparently expected to operate on skis, as Carl Bonde lamented in February 1645 that the lack of snow prevented the use of Finns as ski troops.

The sources reveal more about the morale and discipline among the peasant levies. There was clearly much unwillingness among both Norwegian and Swedish peasants to take up arms or to fight their social peers on the other side of the border. Much of the reluctance can be explained by the structural problems surrounding opbud and uppbåd. Peasant levies were limited in their duration and territorial extent. Peasants did not necessarily feel any obligation to serve longer than a year. During the Nordic Seven Years War, many Swedish peasant-soldiers had requested Erik XIV the permission to return to their homes after one year of military service; what was perceived as excessively prolonged military service caused many native levies to mutiny in Russia in 1613.\footnote{RAOSB, ii: 11, 120, 10 February 1645, Carl Bonde to Axel Oxenstierna.} The bergsknektar, who did not subsist from agricultural work but instead worked in the mining industry, were equally restive if their military service became protracted. The use of levied peasants to conduct military expeditions into enemy territory was also testing the limits of the established tradition, in which levies were to be raised for the purpose of national defence only.

Another structural problem was caused by all the other heavy burdens imposed on the peasantry during wartime: contributions, taxes, billeting, and labour duties. The collective burden of taxes, impositions, and duties on both Danish and Swedish peasants was so heavy that it was not unreasonable if they showed only little enthusiasm for military service. It should be noted, however, that the Swedish peasants did not flat out refuse to partake in military expeditions, as they had still done in the previous wars. During the Nordic Seven Years War (1563–1570), the Dalecarlians had objected to levies on the grounds that “it was better to die at home of old age than to die outside another man’s door of hunger and destitution.”\footnote{Nilsson 1990, 228–229.} Some decades later, during the Kalmar War (1611–1613), a large group of Dalecarlian peasants had assembled at Dala and drawn up a written statement, in which they refused to invade Jämtland

\footnote{Hallenberg and Holm 2017, 86.}
and instead expressed their intention to stay home and defend only their own land.\textsuperscript{1991} What prevented expressions of public dissent, however, may have been military conjecture rather than unqualified obedience. The Norwegian counterattack in late May 1644 eliminated the necessity to send Dalecarlian peasant levies into Jämtland and Härjedalen, and the true depth of the Dalecarlians’ apparent unwillingness to fight the war on foreign soil was never fully fathomed.\textsuperscript{1992}

A third structural problem in the way of effective peasant levies was the traditional interconnectedness and on-going interaction between Swedish and Danish peasants. Trade between Swedish and Danish peasants was the norm, and in Småland it was indeed a crucial part of the local economy. Cross-border marriages and other social relations were also common.\textsuperscript{1993} Göran Rystad has argued that the Scanian and Smälander peasants were not separated by language, religion, or culture.\textsuperscript{1994} Artur Strid conversely concluded that the good relations between the two communities resulted from similarities in language, lifestyle, and mentality.\textsuperscript{1995} During the time of the Kalmar Union, the economic and social interests of the Smälander and Scanian peasant communities had begun to diverge, and after the disintegration of the Union they were not willing to lose the peace and security of former times. In the fifteenth century, therefore, the peasants began to implement the bondefred, or “peasants’ peace.” It meant a local truce concluded by frontier peasants at their own initiative and at their own terms, for the purpose of mutual protection and safety. Such local truces were concluded in every border war from the Engelbrekt Rebellion onwards.\textsuperscript{1996} The last bondefred was concluded in 1676, and its form and content did not differ from the earlier ones.\textsuperscript{1997}

During Torstensson’s War, at least one bondefred was concluded between the Danish peasants in Halland and their Swedish peers in the Kronoberg län in March 1644. Peasants were also known to negotiate with enemy authorities, which technically qualified as lèse-majesté. Andreas Karlsson and Anna Karlsson have even found evidence in the Hallander courtbooks of Swedish peasants attending Danish ting-sessions as witnesses and plaintiffs during the war.\textsuperscript{1998} At one instance a Swedish peasant sent an appeal to the very highest authority in Denmark. In February 1644 a peasant in Värmland had attempted to persuade the commonalty to send a letter to Christian IV in order to negotiate alleviated terms for a Danish-imposed “brandskatt.” Axel Oxenstierna ordered Olof Stake to send the accused peasant to Stockholm for further investigation and a “resolution.”\textsuperscript{1999} This order shows that the riksråd took the problem of bondefred and unauthorized grassroots negotiations seriously, and followed the principles of good government by investigating the matter itself. That had not been the case in the Nordic Seven Years War, where such transgressions had

\textsuperscript{1991} RAOSB, ii: 11, 4–5, 16 June 1611, Carl Bonde to Axel Oxenstierna.

\textsuperscript{1992} RAOSB, ii: 11, 219–220, 30 June 1644, Peter Kruse to Axel Oxenstierna.

\textsuperscript{1993} Lerbom 2013, 183.

\textsuperscript{1994} Rystad 1965, 33.


\textsuperscript{1996} Rystad 1965, 31–42.


\textsuperscript{1998} Karlsson and Karlsson 2013, 120.

\textsuperscript{1999} SRA RR, B222, 6 March 1644.
been left to the military authorities. In 1564, the Swedish provost Per Gadde was known to have hanged in one day 78 Smålander peasants who had been suspected of merely visiting the enemy camp and paying contributions to the Danes.\textsuperscript{2000}

The notion of an early modern Military Revolution expects to see increased scale and demands of warfare as well as the emergence of new fiscal-military institutions. With these qualifications in mind, the phenomenon of hybrid warfare in Torstensson’s War seems to lend modest support to the Military Revolution theory. The mere existence of peasant levies does not yet vindicate notions about the expansion of warfare and the encroachment of state power on the larger society, as the origins of uppbåd and opbud predated the start of the Military Revolution in the mid-sixteenth century. The picture becomes more nuanced when we look at peasant levies in the context of hybrid warfare, where they were either used to bolster existing regular formations or to stand in as substitutes for them. Torstensson’s War was fought on a large scale by Scandinavian standards, and the use of hybrid formations to meet the shortfalls in manpower can indeed be seen to support the notion of a dramatic increase in the scale and demands of warfare.

However, if we look at peasant levies from the perspectives of their duration and terms of service, we began to move away from the Military Revolution theory. One of the central tenets of the Military Revolution is that armies remained in service beyond the traditional campaign seasons, thus becoming permanent and standing military forces. This was not the case with peasant levies, which remained limited in the duration and reach of their service. These limits and terms of service among peasant levies were the central deficiencies, which conscription had sought to remedy. Another major deficiency was the lack of discipline among peasant levies, which problem manifested itself time and again during Torstensson’s War. Efficient monopoly of violence could only be claimed by a state that controlled and regulated the activities of its soldiers through institutionalized military discipline. This condition was not fully met in the peasant levies. Despite these shortcomings both the Nordic realms were forced to rely on levied peasants as part of their military manpower. The levying of peasants even after the introduction of conscription in both Sweden and Denmark testifies to the respective power states’ inability to meet the demands of warfare and to live up to the historiographical standards of the Military Revolution.

The Military Revolution theory also expects to see institutional and administrative growth. Once again we are left in a grey area, as hybrid warfare in Torstensson’s War did not necessitate any founding of new bureaucracies or fiscal-military institutions. Instead both the Danes and Swedes devolved the organizing and management of hybrid warfare to existing institutions, often local military governors. The reason for this is that, unlike in insurgency, hybrid warfare required an element of regular troops, who were typically present in strong garrisons and fortifications. The centers of hybrid warfare in Bremen, Holstein, and Scania were therefore military strongholds such as the town of Bremen itself, Glückstadt, Krempe, Kristianstad, Malmö, and Halmstad. Hybrid warfare was conducted from these strongholds as series of military operations, joined in by regular troops (often cavalry and dragoons) and led by professional officers. The ultimate military leadership in hybrid warfare was often personified by local governors such as Count Penz, Prince Frederick, Ebbe Ulfeldt, and Tage Thott. In

\textsuperscript{2000} Vaupell 1891, 145.
Jutland the occasional hybrid operations were directed from the neighbouring island of Fyn, often by the rigsmarsk Anders Bille himself.

In Norway, the central institution in the enablement and management of hybrid warfare was the statholder Hannibal Sehested. There were only few intermediates between Sehested and the levied peasants. Sehested issued direct orders to choice officers and key administrators, and even consulted the assembled peasants at herredsfoged in person. Sehested also showed great personal initiative in his efforts to muster, equip, and direct the Norwegian troops. He implemented a special tax to cover the officers’ wages and cancelled the war commissars’ commissions from 1640 and instead used their projected funding for the war effort at hand. Sehested acquired supplies and weapons, hired troops, and carried out fortification-work from his own resources, thus effectively muddling the distinction between public finances and those of his own. When his personal resources no longer sufficed, Sehested loaned money from the Marselis banking family. After the war Christian IV compensated Sehested for at least part of his personal outlays.

The need for money also forced Sehested to consider the conversion of the peasants’ opbud-duties into monetary contributions. This measure, however, was not practical given the already heavy fiscal burden imposed on the Norwegian peasants. Instead Sehested implemented a general contribution that covered all the social strata, and which remained in force throughout the war and even beyond it. These various measures nevertheless proved insufficient to properly equip and provision the Norwegian peasant levies, which suffered from chronic shortages of ammunition, weapons, and even boots and clothes for the duration of the entire war.

The key institution in the Swedish management of hybrid warfare was the landshövding or the provincial governor. It was the landshövdingar who mustered, equipped, supplied, and at times even led the uppbådd-levies. This central role of the landshövdingar in hybrid warfare somewhat undermines that institutional expediency and logic on which the historiographical concept of the power state is constructed, because military duties, theoretically at least, did not fall within the responsibilities of the landshövdingar. The administrative logic behind the establishment of landshövdingar had been the separation between civilian and military spheres of authority. At the beginning of Gustaf Adolf’s reign in 1611, the local administration in Sweden was still lorded over by ståthållare or stewards, who possessed direct military authority over the troops at their disposal. While the government instructions from 1635 essentially established the landshövdingar as civilian governors, they still left them with many duties pertinent to warfare. The landshövdingar were expected to be present at all musters and conscriptions, to maintain fortifications within their precincts, to organize billeting and troop transports, and to keep an eye on levied peasants and troops in transit lest they disturb the peace. They also supervised royal armouries,

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2002 Ibid., 195–196.
2003 Bøggild-Andersen 1946, 46.
2004 Sehested 1886, 41–43, 8 May 1646, proclamation by Christian IV. ii.
2006 Ibid., 197.
saltpetre works, and musters of rustjäanst-cavalry, which last duty greatly irritated the self-conscious nobility.\footnote{Odhner 1865, 180.} They did not, however, possess the mandate to lead troops in combat to or assume any operational authority.

Torstensson’s War shows the landshövdingar exceeding these mandates time and again, if not at their own volition but because the riksråd instructed them to do so. The existing military institutions, namely the land regiments, were designed to deal with regular troops, not hybrid armies that consisted largely of levied peasants. Added to this institutional limitation was the veritable dearth of proficient officers in the Swedish homeland, which forced the riksråd to fill the ranks with whatever human resources were available in the frontier provinces – landshövdingar, bailiffs, and even customs officials.

Hybrid warfare seems to have failed most noticeably at the logistical level, as both Denmark and Sweden had great troubles in arming and supplying their hybrid formations. The Danish and Norwegian peasants were expected to provide their own weapons and gear, which effectively meant that the opbud-levies were chronically short of almost everything from muskets to shoes. Because there did not exist any fiscal-military institutions to support the peasant levies, the only external help for them could come from the royal family and the Norwegian stattholder Hannibal Sehested, who used their personal resources to alleviate some of the worst deficiencies. The acute shortage of firearms was recognized by the Danish Crown after the war, and over the course of the next few years the government in Copenhagen made several reforms that aimed at increasing the supply of muskets. In May 1646 the Crown decreed that all subcontracting of firearms production should be made on a contractually reliable basis, in other words, that the individual subcontractors would be guaranteed cash payment or at least an official receipt against the delivery of muskets.\footnote{KBB 1646, 200, 31 May 1646.} This official commitment to manage the reimbursement of delivered muskets encouraged domestic firearms production, and in the years that followed we can see the appearance of new firearms factories in Denmark. One such new factory was the Brobyværk in Fyn, which was owned by the rigsmarsk Anders Bille himself.\footnote{Arup 1955, 175.} The rigsmarsk had justified the establishment of such a factory by the poor quality and inconsistent standard of imported weapons, which had generally been old, worn down, and only superficially refurbished. The business of importing weapons had also demanded both effort and cost, which could now be reduced when weapons were manufactured domestically.\footnote{Blom 1877, 91–92.}

Unlike Denmark, Sweden did possess one fiscal-military institution of potential use for supporting hybrid warfare, namely the krigskollegium. Swedish peasants were not expected to appear at uppbåd-musters with their own weapons; instead the Crown took upon itself to supply the levies with the required numbers of firearms. The riksråd directed the krigskollegium, its subordinate body, to place an order for the required weapons at one of the arms factories in Närke, Hälsingland, or elsewhere, the management of which was subcontracted to the financier and industrialist Louis De Geer. According to Sören Klingnéus, the various gun-foundries produced annually some 16,000 muskets throughout the era of the Thirty Years War.\footnote{Klingnéus 1997, 61.} That
annual production rate was twice the size of the existing stock in the Copenhagen Tøjhuset in 1646. The Swedish production capacity included firelocks as well; in 1637 *the krigskollegium* ordered 5,000 “flintbarrels” from the Arboga factory.2013 There was nothing exceptional in the mass production of snaphance muskets, as such weapons had been issued in bulk to the Swedish troops already in the 1620s.2014 Thus, theoretically at least, the Crown would have been able to arm the *uppbåd*-levies with sufficient numbers of firearms through military-industrial subcontracting.

The sources nevertheless reveal that these weapons did not reach all of the levied peasants, many of whom still resorted to spears, axes, and other traditional weapons of insurgency. The problem rested with distribution rather than production. While the *krigskollegium* could place orders at arms factories and oversee the implementation of contracts with military industrialists, it did not possess any grass-roots infrastructure that could have organized the orderly and timely distribution of weapons to the *uppbåd*-levies. The only reliable way for the levied peasants to gain access to these weapons would have been to collect them in person from the arms factories themselves, but this was not always a realistic option under the chaotic and rapidly shifting circumstances that characterized much of the hybrid warfare along the Swedish-Norwegian frontier.

From the material perspective the conduct of hybrid warfare in Torstensson’s War was indeed an example of the failure of the early modern states to meet every demand of warfare, and in this sense Torstensson’s War does not seem to lend much support for the Military Revolution theory. There is, however, one institution that redeems some of the claims for a Military Revolution, namely that of *knektehåll*. The system of *knektehåll* had enabled Sweden to maintain a permanent militia of *bergsknektar*, who were better trained than the common peasants and who could be mobilized faster than the *uppbåd*-levies.

The roots of *knektehåll* went back to the 1540s, when Gustaf Vasa had first mustered a native volunteer army. This was also the time when Sweden had first begun to implement the notorious *borgläger* system, in which officers and soldiers were allocated upkeep, services, and revenue from peasant households.2015 The *borgläger* was a combination of tribute and billeting. The peasants were expected to accommodate soldiers during off-campaign months. They also had to pay to the soldiers a contribution in money and kind, according to their own means and the demands of the military. Heikki Ylikangas has convincingly argued that the *borgläger* constituted a wage paid to the soldiers by the civilian population.2016 In the absence of any orderly fiscal-military administration, the *borgläger* was collected directly by the soldiers themselves. Today, Kimmo Katajala concludes, most historians agree that the *borgläger* was the central cause behind the Finnish Club War in 1596. Much of the current debate revolves around the question whether it was the actual fiscal onus represented by the *borgläger* or the way in which it was collected that ignited the peasant rebellion.2017 Both causes likely motivated the rebellion, as it is obvious to modern historians that the soldiers collected taxes in larger quantities than they had

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2013 SRRP, vii, 4, 19 January 1637.
been authorized to and that the manner in which the borgläger was imposed did not respect established legal norms or social privileges.\textsuperscript{2018}

The reorganization of the Swedish army in the early 1600s essentially killed off the borgläger and replaced it with more orderly collection of military resources. One such system of collection was the knektaheäll, which continued the practice of supporting soldiers via natural economy. The bergsknektar proved to be a key military resource during those successive wars that were fought along the Swedish-Norwegian frontier in 1643–1679, which in its turn enhanced the appeal of knektaheäll as a system for maintaining permanent military forces. The knektaheäll compared favourably to förlänning, which was a fiscal system and burdened with the structural problems of the noble-dominated Estate-society. The main problem was that the continued alienation of royal fiefs to the nobility had decreased the revenue-basis of förlänning, as manorial estates were exempted from taxation and could not be used to finance officers and soldiers. The introduction of absolutist rule in 1680 and the subsequent reduktion or resumption of alienated estates enabled the Crown to rethink the maintenance of the native army. Förlänning and rusttjänst gave way to indelningsverk, which was essentially an agreement that all state expenditure should be covered by designated sources of revenue. In the military sphere indelningsverk operated as an allotment system akin to knektaheäll. Farms were paired into rotes that would support at least one infantryman. Cavalrymen were supported by volunteer farms called rusthållar, which provided a cavalryman in exchange for fiscal privileges. All soldiers were assigned to provincial regiments, whose maintenance and annual musters were the responsibility of the respective landshövdingar. The commanding officers usually lived near their soldiers in the same parish districts.\textsuperscript{2019}

Alf Åberg identified military evolution in the indelningsverk, but in his mind this evolution reflected back to the utskrivning of infantry in the 1630s. Gustaf Adolf had envisioned a system where the peasants in each file would separate a small allotment of land to support the conscript and his family. According to Åberg, the “later indelningsverk” of Charles XI was built upon this precedent.\textsuperscript{2020} The main problem with Åberg’s line of thought is the fact that the earlier indelningsverk of Gustaf Adolf never really got off the ground, as Åberg himself admitted. The peasants were, from the start, reluctant to diminish the size of their farms by separating any allotments from them. Furthermore, as more and more farms passed into noble control as donations, fewer farms could be included in the rotas.\textsuperscript{2021} Unlike the knektaheäll, which continued to maintain and supply troops from one decade to another, the earlier indelningsverk had become essentially extinct by the time of Torstensson’s War.

The later indelningsverk created a standing army that was maintained through the naturahushållning or natural economy, where resources were allocated directly instead of being circulated through the centralized institutions of the fiscal-military state. The indelningsverk allowed Charles XI to maintain a permanent army of 25,000 foot and 11,000 cavalry, who could be further augmented by some 10,000 professional soldiers that Sweden might recruit from northern Germany. At the outbreak of the Great Northern War in 1700, Charles XII was able to mobilize 76,000 men at short notice to

\textsuperscript{2018} Lappalainen 2009, 90–92.
\textsuperscript{2019} Villstrand 2011, 192–194, 196.
\textsuperscript{2020} Åberg 1973, 266–268.
\textsuperscript{2021} Ibid., 266.
meet several threats from no less than three directions (Denmark, Saxony-Poland, and Russia). Nils Erik Villstrand seems justified in his view that the *indelningsverk* was the best possible military system for Sweden, which relied on natural economy and did not possess many resources.\(^\text{2022}\)

The *indelningsverk* further militarized the Swedish society and set a military-organizational example that was later admired and even emulated by the likes of Frederick the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte. In this sense it can be argued that the earlier system of *knektehåll*, which essentially served the purposes of hybrid warfare, contributed to the Military Revolution by providing foundations for the Carolean military state, the recognized end result of Michael Roberts’s original theory. On the other hand the *knektehåll* is also a rare example of institutional delineation in early modern warfare. The *knektehåll* had borrowed the principle of maintaining military forces *in natura* from the earlier practice of *borgläger*, adjusted the principle to the needs of hybrid warfare, and then passed on its tradition to the later *indelningsverk*, in which the evolved practice of *knektehåll* was applied to the entire Carolean army. The organizational principle of hybrid warfare in Torstenson’s War was therefore not a catalyst behind any revolutionary transformation of war but rather a key link in an evolutionary chain of changes by successive stages. This institutional evolution, however, was ultimately necessary adaptation to the sizeable growth in the scale and demands of warfare, a transformation of war in its own kind and one conceptually best explained by the theory of a Military Revolution.

\(^\text{2022}\) Villstrand 2011, 197–198.
8 CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of irregular warfare in Torstensson’s War generally lends support to the theory of an early modern Military Revolution. This, however, is a blanket statement that requires careful qualification before we can do any justice to the complex and nuanced nature of early modern irregular warfare. It is indeed these nuances and qualifications that are more interesting than any sweeping argument for or against the Military Revolution, as they breathe life into what otherwise would be a declamatory academic theory. By looking at Torstensson’s War as a case study of early modern irregular warfare this book has identified some of the transformations of war attached to the Military Revolution theory and probed some of the limits and qualifications of that military change.

Transformation in Torstensson’s War is best discernible in guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. The appearance and proliferation of a technological innovation, the firelock musket, transformed the tactical and operational aspects of guerrilla warfare, namely by empowering the combatants and turning insurgency into the nebulous and omnipresent “people’s war” first articulated by Clausewitz. This transformation of guerrilla warfare occurred when regular armies were becoming increasingly reliant on lines of communication – either in the logistical sense as lines of supply or as interior lines that provided operational flexibility for armies fighting attritional warfare. The guerrillas’ ability to threaten these lines greatly increased the ‘friction of war’ experienced by regular armies. Jan Glete questioned Michael Roberts’s original thesis about war forcing state expansion by suggesting that warfare itself did not necessarily drive military-administrative growth but that war opened up opportunities that the early modern state sought to proactively embrace. Glete’s view was later reaffirmed by Alan James, who applauded Glete’s recognition of “socially and culturally defined motives for going to war in the first place.”

While Glete’s qualification to the Military Revolution theory is undoubtedly applicable in some historical instances, it appears susceptible in the context of counterinsurgency and Torstensson’s War. Counterinsurgency offered no opportunities for institutional growth and administrative expansion that the Swedish power state would have rushed to exploit; rather it represented unwanted and extraordinary demands that the Swedish power state had to address with whatever means it happened to have at its disposal. The original theory by Michael Roberts about war as the driving force behind state reaction to the demands of war is thus vindicated in the context of Torstensson’s War.

The Swedish power state responded to the guerrilla threat by a set of countermeasures that further increased the scale and demands of warfare. Some of these demands were met by direct allocation of human and material resources. Others represented an opportunity cost, in which the Swedish power state forfeited alternative actions and investments in its pursuit of counterinsurgency warfare against Danish insurgents. Knud J. V. Jespersen appears to have been right to argue that while the Scanian and Holsteiner guerrilla operations themselves did not directly affect the course of the war, they nevertheless tied down Swedish troops that could have been used elsewhere for

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2024 James 2006, 35.
other missions. In this sense guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency in Torstensson’s War supported the notion of a Military Revolution that forced the early modern state to allocate more resources and effort to meet the demands of warfare. Claiming, however, that the Danish and Holsteiner insurgencies “brought the Swedish lightning war to a standstill” borders on hyperbole. The Swedes reached their initial strategic goals in Denmark and Norway in a swift manner, largely unhindered by the peasant insurgents and their hasty attempts to block Swedish advance routes by roadblocks and rearguard action. The insurgency only started to seriously impact the Swedish war effort after the initial ‘lightning’ stage of the war was over.

The concept of a Military Revolution also implies increased military efficiency and professionalism. Here the existing evidence lends only marginal support for the Military Revolution. Danish guerrilla warfare managed to endanger Swedish lines of communication and to force the enemy to react by allocating troops and resources to counterinsurgency duties, but otherwise the Danish guerrillas made little impact in the overall conduct or outcome of the war. The traditional view of Torstensson’s War, which sees the war being decided by naval action and positional warfare, remains unperturbed by the mixed record of irregular warfare on the land. Danish insurgents did not effectively hinder or even discernibly slow down the Swedish advance into Jutland or Scania. When the insurgents stood their ground and faced Swedish troops in battle, they stood good chance of being defeated. As Gert Jeppson has concluded, a battle between regular and well-trained Swedish soldiers, many of them with previous experience from the continental war, and loosely organized bands of Scanian farmhands led by a few local leaders could not have been any more unequal. Conversely Swedish counterinsurgency warfare in Scania must be regarded as a qualified success. Sentries and stockades along the key routes diminished to a degree the irregular threat against lines of communication, and operations by flying columns and armées volantes prevented insurgents from severing lines of retreat at the face of Danish counter-offensive in 1644. Some of this success may be credited to Swedish intelligence efforts, which appear to have elicited key information from captured enemies and local informants, namely Danish peasants.

The record for success in hybrid warfare must be attributed to the Danes and Norwegians, even though they lost the war. The inescapable fact is that much of the hybrid warfare in Hannibal’s War was conducted on Swedish soil, which flies against the notion among early modern combatants that wars should always be fought outside one’s own borders. The strategy of Swedish hybrid warfare was predominantly static, and aimed at defending domestic frontier provinces and maintaining Swedish foothold in Jämtland and Härjedalen. The Norwegians, who used their hybrid contingents of regular soldiers and irregular peasants to conduct cross-border raids, maintained the initiative and often forced the Swedes to follow a belated strategy of reaction. The Norwegian hybrid contingents also included a strong element of regular forces, which were able to defeat the largely irregular Swedish formations in open battle. In Holstein the Danes managed to wage small war of notable intensity by employing both regular troops and irregular militiamen/insurgents. While the Danes did not manage to expel the Swedes from Holstein or Bremen, they nevertheless succeeded in maintaining their strategic strongholds in Krempe, Glückstadt, and the city of Bremen itself.

2026 Jeppson 2007a, 3.
While we can discern in Torstensson’s War evident transformation of war, the overall picture of irregular warfare in Torstensson’s War is not one of unqualified revolutionary change. Some essential nuances are introduced by continuity and evolution. While the firelock musket was an agent of military transformation, it nevertheless represented technological evolution from earlier harquebuses and matchlock muskets, even though from a purely military perspective its evolution into the preferred weapon of insurgents was accidental, as the firelock was originally intended for fowling and hunting and not for warfare. We can also find military evolution in hybrid warfare, where the Swedish allotment system of knektehåll later evolved into the indelningsverk, which was the organizational basis of the Carolean military state. Peasant levies in Denmark and Sweden, on the other hand, represented uninterrupted continuity from the medieval times. Peasant levies should have been anachronisms in the age of national conscription and subcontracted professional armies, but necessity forced the two overstretched fiscal-military states to employ them as strategic reserves or even as the first lines of defence in exposed frontier regions. The peasant levies proved to be one of the most enduring military institutions in Scandinavia: Finnish uppbåd-levies were called into action as late as 1809, when they were employed to wage widespread yet desultory guerrilla warfare against the invading Russians.

The key qualification to irregular warfare in Torstensson’s War and the Military Revolution is one of devolution. As David Parrott has convincingly argued, early modern states resorted to military devolution and outsourcing whenever they appeared incapable of meeting the demands of warfare from their own resources alone. The existing evidence suggests that the Danish insurgency was devolved largely to particularist institutions and networks outside the administration of the centralized power state. Much of the insurgency was organized and managed by village-level grassroots administration, parishes, and land-owning elites. Some of the insurgency appears to have been spontaneous, and may have indeed been simply brigandage unconnected to the effort of resisting foreign invasion. At some instances insurgency was managed by professional soldiers and royal bailiffs, who indeed represented centralized state power. Prince Christian intervened in some matters pertaining to insurgency during his brief visits to Malmö, but he hardly assumed any formal command over irregular warfare. In Holstein, the focal points of insurgency appeared to have been the Danish garrisons at Glückstadt and Krempe, which supported, incited, and in some cases even directly managed the insurgency in the nearby territories. Similar role but in more modest scale was played by the episcopal strongholds in Bremen-Verden, which managed to mobilize at least some of the marshland peasants in the Archbishopric’s defence. Swedish counterinsurgency, on the other hand, was almost fully in the hands of the state and its direct servants. At the start of the war, the riksråd articulated some general policies regarding the treatment of possible insurgents and left the actual execution of these policies to the field marshals Lennart Torstensson and Gustaf Horn. During the war the riksråd formulated precise countermeasures to fight the Scanian snapphanar and passed on its decisions to local military commanders as instructions and orders. The riksråd even indulged in guerre du cabinet when it sent one of its key members,

the *drots* Per Brahe, to operate a field chancellery that would co-ordinate efforts between the political centre and the army in Scania. In Hannibal’s War, the *riksråd* was forced to devolve military authority over hybrid warfare to local *landshövdingar*, who, theoretically at least, were not empowered to assume personal command role over military forces. In the absence of any effective military institutions to assume responsibility over peasant levies and hybrid warfare, the *riksråd* had to make do with whatever institutions were available, even if those institutions were of non-military nature. The same was not true in Norway, where all war efforts were supervised and co-ordinated by a single institution, the *statholder* Hannibal Sehested. However, as Sehested was forced to assume much personal responsibility over the recruitment and provisioning of troops, whether regular or irregular, his stadholdership also contained a strong element of military devolution to subordinates, namely commissars and military officers.

Finally Torstensson’s War testifies of the extensive scale of irregular and hybrid warfare and the generally high occurrence of combat. The actual number of combat casualties is difficult to quantify, but the narrative sources suggest that the losses on both sides were tangible enough to necessitate repeated demands for reinforcements. For the Scanian *snapphanar* in particular, a violent death in combat was not at all an unlikely fate. There were also several individual actions, such as Järpsäter, Tysslanda, and Norresundby, where the casualty rate on one side may have approached one hundred percent. These observations question the claim made by some military historians that the period of the Thirty Years War saw little actual fighting between opposing armies. For Hans Delbrück, who published his authoritative history of warfare soon after the First World War, battles had to be “decisive” before they had any military significance. In Delbrück’s view the first decisive battle of the Thirty Years War was the White Mountain in 1620, and the first decisive battle fought by Gustaf Adolf was Breitenfeld in 1631, even though the Swedish armies had engaged Imperial forces in Pomerania, Mecklenburg, and Brandenburg on a daily basis since their landing in Germany in July 1630. 2029

Perhaps as a result of this deep-seated notion of rarity of combat in the Thirty Years War, the ‘new military historians’ have focused on armies as social organizations and have shifted military history from the traditional drum-and-trumpet narratives to the *Kulturgeschichte* of everyday life. 2030 “Through the practice of social history, the relations between war and society have come to the foreground, a perspective which is now generally the rule rather than the exception”, as Maria Sjöberg has summarized this prevailing trend in military history. 2031 The focus on the “social and civil spheres in the military” nevertheless runs the risk of ignoring the fundamental nature of early modern armies as fighting formations that sought battle and were frequently engaged in combat. The social-civic sphere of military life was very limited in Torstensson’s War. Gustaf Horn’s army in Scania operated with a small baggage train and instead relied on logistical lines and magazines for its supply. The Swedish armies in Holstein and Jutland tended to operate a system of convoys between occupied strongholds. The logic of hybrid warfare in the north excluded civilian followers altogether, as the levied peasants sought to put as much distance between the theatre of war and their

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2030 Kroener 2013, 95–97.
2031 Sjöberg 2014, 147.
own homes as possible. For the insurgent peasants in Jutland and Scania, the sphere of domestic life and the theatre of war were the one and the same thing.

This study has extended the dimension of the Military Revolution theory to include the previously overlooked forms of irregular and counterinsurgency warfare. The book has also introduced new content to the Military Revolution theory, mainly the empowerment of peasant insurgents through the proliferation of new firearms technology, as well as the emergence of distinctive counterinsurgency measures to combat the increasingly troublesome insurgents. The necessity to combat insurgents demanded from the Swedes additional military resources and stipulated the employment of specific methods and tactics, which all contributed to the increased professionalization of the officer corps and the emergence of the modern military art – all distinctive features of the Military Revolution, as presented by Michael Roberts. The Danes, for their part, found it expedient to bolster up the insurgency by reinforcing the insurgents with regular troops, thus steering insurgency in the direction of hybrid warfare. The propensity to transform guerrilla warfare into a conventional war remains one of the central tenets of modern theory of guerrilla warfare as well.

The expansion of the content-analytical model of the Military Revolution has been done in the context of Torstensson’s War in 1643–1645. We can identify a transformation of war underway in Torstensson’s War, even though the war itself was not the cause of that transformation. This transformation of war was not revolutionary in its pace or effect, and it can be understood to have driven the Military Revolution only partially. Some of that transformation indeed resulted from the Military Revolution rather than propelled it. The notions of transformation and change must also be qualified with elements of continuity, evolution, and devolution, which were all present to some degree in irregular warfare during Torstensson’s War. Yet none of these nuances and qualifications really undermines the theory of an early modern Military Revolution in the sense it was originally presented by Michael Roberts. According to Roberts, the period 1560–1660 represented a drastic departure from earlier forms of warfare and redefined the relations between state, society, and the military. Roberts argued that this period resulted in the kind of modern warfare recognizable to our own age, one of territorial states, standing armies, and the modern art of war as embodied by the Moltkes, Schlieffen, and Clausewitz. We can already recognize in irregular warfare during Torstensson’s War some of the end-results of the Military Revolution, namely the emergence of Clausewitzian ‘people’s war’ and systematic counterinsurgency in the modern sense of the word. The transformation of war was admittedly qualified by continuity, evolution, and devolution, which some historians regard as evidence questioning the tenability of the Military Revolution theory. Irregular warfare in Torstensson’s War shows that these qualifications did not diminish the outcome of the Military Revolution but rather contributed to it. The Military Revolution theory does not need to be understood as a singularly revolutionary transformation. Instead it can be seen as a colligation of various qualifications that all contributed to the emergence of modern warfare.
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