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dc.contributor.authorBatrancea, Larissa
dc.contributor.authorNichita, Anca
dc.contributor.authorOlsen, Jerome
dc.contributor.authorKogler, Christoph
dc.contributor.authorKirchler, Erich
dc.contributor.authorHoelzl, Erik
dc.contributor.authorWeiss, Avi
dc.contributor.authorTorgler, Benno
dc.contributor.authorFooken, Jonas
dc.contributor.authorFuller, Joanne Schaffner, Markus
dc.contributor.authorBanuri, Sheheryar
dc.contributor.authorHassanein, Medhat
dc.contributor.authorAlarcón- García, Gloria
dc.contributor.authorAldemir, Ceyhan
dc.contributor.authorApostol, Oana
dc.contributor.authorBank Weinberg, Diana
dc.contributor.authorBatrancea, Ioan
dc.contributor.authorBelianin, Alexis
dc.contributor.authorde Jesús Bello Gómez, Felipe et al (Incl. Niskanen, Mervi)
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-24T07:20:02Z
dc.date.available2019-09-24T07:20:02Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.urihttps://erepo.uef.fi/handle/123456789/7769
dc.description.abstractThe slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.
dc.language.isoenglanti
dc.publisherElsevier BV
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJournal of economic psychology
dc.relation.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.102191
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjecttrust
dc.subjectpower
dc.subjectslippery slope framework
dc.subjecttax compliance
dc.subjecttax evasion
dc.titleTrust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations
dc.description.versionfinal draft
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Business, activities
uef.solecris.id65146136en
dc.type.publicationTieteelliset aikakauslehtiartikkelit
dc.rights.accessrights© Elsevier B.V
dc.relation.doi10.1016/j.joep.2019.102191
dc.description.reviewstatuspeerReviewed
dc.publisher.countryAlankomaat
dc.relation.articlenumber102191
dc.relation.issn0167-4870
dc.relation.volume74
dc.rights.accesslevelopenAccess
dc.type.okmA1
uef.solecris.openaccessEi


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